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The Folewer to the Donet

EARLY ENGLISH TEXT SOCIETY

Original Series, No. 164

1924 (for 1923).

PRICE 30s.

of þe oþe þingis and þis ſaid ſar-
kyng of multitudine in þum ſiþ 18^e
þis ſaid departing of dyuerſite
fro oþe þingis : is in eþi creatur
his comenſe or his vyrtie as oon
ſimil doctour holdiþ. And þus
ſone y ſoule of þeſe .iiij. natural
or byndeli condicions or diſpoſi-
cions comon to alle creatures. þt
is to ſcie. treuy. goodnes & vyrtie
In au of maner y ſchal trete of
þeſe .iiij. þat is to ſcie of natural
treuy. of natural goodnes. and
of natural comenſe in þe boók
of ſentence. If eny man kan ſcie
oþ wiſe and bettir of þe þan y
ſcie here and þan y ſchal ſcie þe
in latin. y vouchſe ſaþ þat þe
ſo ſcie and teche. for y ſchal be
zedi of þum þe bettir wey to lere
ne. And 3nt eſtþdon forto ſette
nizer togridere at oonye what
is nolt bifore in þis þſent chap
þnapali entendiþ þorum lengir
declaration. y ſcie þus. moral
goodnes of a dede is not ellis
þan þe haþing togridere of alle
þe accordaunce whiche ouȝte be
bi doom of reſon biþir y de-
de. þe obiect of þe dede. eþi re-
quyrd arbiſtraice of þe dede.
þe choiſe of þe wil to þe doom
of reſon ſo þat if eny of þeſe ac-
cordaunce be away. þe dede is
not morali good but oft is ſeen
þat þe is ſþi morali yuel. and
ſo aȝenward morali þueſteſſe
of a dede is not ellis þan þe
ſaþ in þe dede of eny oon ac-
cordaunce whiche is requyrd

to be had into moral goodnes
of þe dede. or if in þe dede
eny contrari diſcordaunce be had
aȝenſ ſum accordaunce requyrd
to be had into making of mo-
ral goodneſſe. || Her eendy þe
firſt part of þis preſent boók
clepid þe ſoleiſer to þe donet.
And nolt nert ſoleiſyþ þe ſe-
cond part. || firſt chap.

¶ I dur not wiſtondig
þt 3our doctrine of þe
donet i aſſiguyng
iiij. tablis of god

dis laue. and in aſſiguyng .xxij.
pointis to make þe .iiij. tablis
is ful twelve preceiſe and pro-
ſtable. 3nt for as myȝt as me
ſeien þat a tre wel wagged 18^e
puffis of wyndis ſchal take
þerþi þe ſiſſer ſtandig. þer
fore þat þe ſaue doctrine caſſe
þe faſtir 3oot and þe ſiſſer ſon-
dement. y ſchal wagge it 18^e
puffis of a fewe argumentis
in þis preſent. 11^e part of þis
boók of whiche argumentis
þis ſchal be þe firſt. In þe .iiij.
chap bifore of þe .1^e part of þe
donet 3e haue writte .iiij. tablis
to be alle þe tablis of goddis
moral laue aȝenſ þis 3out
þrittyng y may argue þus
3i how good ſþile 3e written
iiij. tablis of goddis laue.
bi ſo good ſþile 3e ouȝte writte
v tablis of goddis laue. for
whi 3e written .iiij. tablis of
goddis laue to be of dedis whi-
che þen vertues for þem ſiþ

The Golewer to the Donet

BY

REGINALD PECOCK, D.D.

BISHOP OF ST. ASAPH AND CHICHESTER

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM BRIT. MUS. ROY. MS. 17 D. ix

WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON PECOCK'S LANGUAGE AND STYLE

BY


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TO
R. W. CHAMBERS
AND TO THE MEMORY OF
W. P. KER

‘pese distinccions, o my sone, take þou to þee, and make þe myri
with hem, and þanke god for þyn so liȝt and esi comyng into hem
and into þe leernyng of knowyngal vertues and of moral vertues
in her ground and fundament, such as is here bifore in þis book so
soon and so redili *and* promptli ȝouun to þee. And marke wel
heraftir how fer þou myȝtist haue radde and in how many ȝeeris,
eer þow schuldist haue founde document forto lede þee cleerli and
feelyngli and comprehensiveli into hem; and take þou witnes of
many oolde laborers in filosofie *and* dyuynyte, whiche neuer ȝit
bifore þis writyng so cleerli and feelyngli *and* comprehensiveli
wanne into hem.’ (*Folewer*, p. 176).

PREFACE

THE *Folewer to the Donet* is a storehouse in the 'comoun peplis langage' of many of the favourite scholastic ideas of mediaeval Europe. Considering the difficulty and magnitude of the topics with which it deals, it is 'schort and compendiose,' and will be found intelligible even by those who have no previous knowledge of philosophy or of the theories and phraseology of the schools. There is little original in the matter, but the daring to express it in English, and the wish that the *Folewer* and other similar books should 'be govun or lende abroad amonge lay personys' mark Pecock as an adventurer. As such he deserves more appreciation and closer study than he has yet received.

To edit the text as carefully as possible, and to summarize the text in a form suitable for rapid reading by the general student, has been my main concern. But it is hoped that the Glossary and the section on Pecock's Language will complement Schmidt's *Studies*, and the section on Pecock's Style lead to more sympathetic appreciation of Pecock's literary value.

I am much indebted to Babington's Introduction to the *Represser* in my summary account of Pecock's biography, and to Schmidt's *Studies in the Language of Pecock* and Baldwin's *Inflections and Syntax of Malory's Morte d'Arthur* in my section on Pecock's Language. Schmidt has dealt fully with the syntax of the verb, and has a useful account of Pecock's phonology. I have therefore devoted my attention to the accidence and the development of the language since Chaucer's time.

I thank the Reader and the Staff of the Oxford University

Press for their help and consideration in the production of the book; the authorities of the British Museum for permission to publish the *Folewer*; Miss May T. Jeffrey-Smith for copying part of the manuscript; Professor R. Priebisch for hints on mediaeval punctuation; Professor H. C. Wyld and Mr. J. H. G. Grattan for helpful suggestions with regard to the Language section; Miss J. Flemming for comments on Pecock's biography and opinions; and Professor R. W. Chambers for reading the proof-sheets and for the benefit of his criticism and advice. I also warmly thank Miss G. Chambers for help of other sort than can be acknowledged in foot-note or any critical apparatus.

Professor W. P. Ker had passed from us before he had read any part of the *Folewer*, but he was interested in the progress of this sequel to the *Donet*, particularly in the debt (direct or indirect) of Pecock to Aristotle. It is feared that this edition of the *Folewer* may be inferior to that of the *Donet* in that any errors and misapprehensions of my own introduction have not come up to the doom of his wide and careful scholarship.

I join his name and that of Professor R. W. Chambers, dedicating this book as an affectionate tribute to those distinguished scholars whom I am privileged to call my friends and teachers.

E. V. H.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

November, 1923.

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ABBREVIATIONS

THE following books are specially important, and are referred to in an abbreviated form :

Book of Faith = Reginald Pecock's *Book of Faith*. . . Edited . . . with an introductory essay . . . by J. L. Morison. Glasgow. 1909.

All references to the *Book of Faith* are to this edition.

Donet = The *Donet* by Reginald Pecock . . . edited . . . and collated with the *Poore Mennis Myrrour* . . . by E. V. Hitchcock. E. E. T. S. O. S. 156. 1921.

All references to the *Donet* are to this edition.

P. M. M. = *Poore Mennis Myrrour*, British Museum, MS. Addl. 37788.

Collated with the *Donet* by E. V. Hitchcock. See *Donet*.

Rep. = The *Repressor* of over much blaming of the Clergy by R. Pecock. . . . Edited by C. Babington. 2 vols. 1860. *Rolls Series*.

All references to the *Repressor* are to this edition.

Gairdner's monograph on the *Reule* = The *Reule* of Crysten Religioun by Reginald Pecock. . . . The original manuscript (written in 1443) now for the first time described by James Gairdner. London. 1911.

Schmidt's *Studies* = Frederik Schmidt's *Studies* in the language of Pecock. Upsala, 1900.

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I.

A. Roy. MS. 17 D. ix described.

OF the *Folewer to the Donet*—as of Pecoock's five other extant Roy. MS. 17 D. ix. the only copy of the *Folewer* known to exist. works¹—only one copy is known to exist, that now preserved in the British Museum as Roy. MS. 17 D. ix.

In the British Museum *Catalogue of the Royal and King's Manuscripts*, Vol. II, p. 252, Roy. MS. 17 D. ix is thus described :

'Vellum; ff. 105. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ in. $\times$ 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ in. Circ. 1450–1460. Gatherings of 8 leaves, with catchwords. Double columns. Sec.² fol. [commences] 'vertues ben'. Among the scribbling on fol. 102^b occur the names John Wilson, Johannes Earton, clericus, and Johannes Karton, clericus. Belonged to John Theyer (monogram with no. 6 on f. 2²). Theyer sale-cat.³ no. 85; C. M. A.⁴ 6627.'

The vellum on which the *Folewer* is written is excellently preserved, but the first few folios show some worm-holes and discolouration at the foot, this deterioration gradually becoming less noticeable as the work proceeds. The vellum is now of the same colour on both sides, and little difference of polish is discernible. On fol. 42^b (modern foliation) at the foot of the right-hand column, there is a small hole older than the text between *reproof* and *be*. The text runs on accurately. This is the only hole I have noticed within the text columns of the MS. Material.

The vellum of the fly leaves from the 14th-century work on scholastic theology (see below) is much yellower, thinner, and more crumpled.

At the beginning of the volume are two paper leaves, and at the end two more, probably contemporary with the binding, for

¹ The *Represser*, *Book of Feith*, *Reule of Cristen Religioun*, *Donet*, and *Poore Mennis Myrrour*.

² According to the modern foliation: see below, p. xii.

³ Now Brit. Mus. Roy. MS. App. 70.

⁴ i. e. Bernard's *Cat. MSS. Angliæ*.

the binding fly-leaves at the beginning and end are backed with the same paper. The wire lines are an inch apart, and there are no water-marks. The paper is in good condition.

Gatherings.

The 'ff. 105' noted in the Museum *Catalogue* entry¹ may be more specifically described as i + 102 (last 3 blank) + ii. For only 99 folios are devoted to the text of the *Folewer*. Folios i, 104 (mutilated) and 105 are separate leaves, all three being from 'a 14th-century MS. of some work of scholastic theology'.¹

The remaining 102 leaves are arranged in twelve gatherings of eight leaves and a thirteenth gathering of six leaves, with catchwords,² but no signatures. The text ends eight lines from the top, first column, of the verso of the third leaf of the final gathering, marked fol. 100, but really fol. 99.³ The remaining three leaves of the gathering are ruled up for text, but are now occupied with various sketches and scribbings⁴ in hands of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, the most interesting of which is the note on fol. 103^b.⁵

Foliation.

The MS. is doubly foliated in arabic. The modern pencil foliation starts with the vellum fly-leaf from the fourteenth-century MS. of some work on scholastic theology—actually separate,⁶ so that the text according to this foliation begins on fol. 2^a. The older, and probably contemporary, foliation, in fading ink, generally to be made out nearer than the modern to the top right-hand corner, starts correctly with the first leaf of the text as fol. 1. But fol. 62 of the older foliation has been missed in the counting, so that from fol. 63 onwards the two foliations corre-

¹ See Brit. Mus. *Cat. of the Roy. and King's MSS.*, Vol. II, p. 252.

² There is a slight discrepancy in the spelling of the catchword on fol. 96b—*totil i his*—and the spelling of the first words of the text of 97a—*totil in hise*.

³ See below, Foliation.

⁴ These scribbings are thus summarized in the Brit. Mus. *Cat. of the Roy. and King's MSS.* Vol. II, p. 252:—

⁵ On ff. 3b, 4, 58 [ff. 2, 3, 57, of the old foliation], 101–103b are mis-

cellaneous scribbings, 15th–17th cent., including (16th cent.) the first three lines (f. 101) of Ovid's *Tristia*, forms of petition, 'A medicen to kyll fiche', and 'Medycens for to distroy the canker', one ascribed to Rudolphus Grinfeldus (ff. 58 [f. 57, old foliation], 102b). On f. 103b is the note 'tendebatur in isto libro per dominum Thomam Sauage episcopum Londoniensem (1496–1501) vt videatur an sit heresis suspectus'.

⁶ See preceding note.

⁶ See above, Gatherings.

spond, both ending with fol. 100, which is strictly fol. 99 of the actual text.

Note. In this edition the modern foliation has been followed, in order to bring the references into line with those in other works on Pecock. It must be remembered that this foliation throws out the proper foliation for the catchwords, which should be looked for therefore on fols. 9^b, 17^b, 25^b, &c.

The pages are ruled in ink, the horizontal lines being $\frac{1}{8}$ of an Ruling. inch apart. Only the top and bottom horizontal lines are ruled right across the page; the others extend irregularly a little beyond the four vertical lines which bound the two columns of text laterally, and which extend to the edges of the leaf. There are forty lines of text in a column, and the columns measure $8\frac{1}{8}$ inches by $2\frac{3}{8}$ inches.

Two horizontals roughly bound a line of writing, the letters lying in the space between, the tall strokes touching the upper line, and the tail strokes the lower, though *y* and *z* generally extend below, as occasionally do the tail strokes of other letters.

The handwriting is the formal book-hand of the middle of the fifteenth century, rather larger and heavier than that of the *Donet*, strong and regular, yet pliant. Babington believed it to be the same hand as that of Pecock's *Book of Feith*, Trinity MS. B. 14. 45, and Henry Wharton believed the handwriting of this MS. of the *Book of Feith* to be Pecock's own.¹ One cannot speak with any certainty as to the scribe of the *Folewer*, but it seems to me very unlikely that it is Pecock himself. The MS. is obviously written out fair—very fair, for there is only one slight addition in the same hand (fol. 76^b) and few corrections—and a busy bishop would hardly do so mechanical a task himself.

The handwriting is the same throughout.

There are some marginal notes by later hands, quite trivial, and passed over in this edition. Sometimes a hand or device points attention to passages of the text, as on fols. 79^a, 86^b, 87^a.

The punctuation marks used are the point (.), colon with intermediate sloping dash (⋈), the upright dash (|), this dash following a point (.|), an upright double dash (||), occasionally an upright treble dash (|||), and the question mark (⁂).

These stops do not seem to have been applied in a mechanical

¹ See Babington's *Introd. to Rep.* p. lxxviii.

manner, and the punctuation cannot be conveniently summarized, as careful consideration must be given in each case to all the factors involved. If the punctuation seems erratic, it must be remembered that fifteenth-century conceptions of sentence structure were different from ours. Sometimes it may be hazarded that the points merely indicate breath-pauses; there are even points in what we should consider the middle of a breath-group.

The following remarks hold good in a general way, but there are frequent exceptions to the usages indicated:

- (1) The point, followed by a capital letter, has the value of the modern full stop. Cf. Col. 1, l. 6.¹
- (2) The point, not followed by a capital letter, divides off phrases, clauses, and syntactical groups generally, and has usually the value of the modern comma. Cf. Col. 1, l. 30; Col. 2, l. 15; Col. 1, l. 19.
- (3) The ÷ sign is used as is the point under (2). Cf. Col. 1 l. 34; Col. 2, ll. 18, 21, 24.
- (4) The upright dash, or point followed by the dash, may be equivalent to the modern full stop, as in Col. 1, ll. 15, 21; Col. 2, l. 8; or have only the weight of the modern semi-colon, as in Col. 1, l. 33, Col. 2, l. 2.
- (5) The upright double dash marks a new paragraph or division, as in Col. 2, ll. 10, 28.
- (6) The upright treble dash marks an important division, as the end of Part I, Col. 2, l. 6.²

Ink, rubrication, &c.

The ink of the text is generally a good black, but here and there shows signs of fading, and is either considerably lighter or much faded on certain folios in succession, e. g. fols. 30^a, 30^b, and 31^a.

The chapters are numbered in red in the same characters as the text, and probably by the same scribe. Latin texts are underlined in red. On fol. 80^b the statement as to the ending of Part I and the beginning of Part II is written in red. The Part and Chapter appear in black as a running headline in the same characters as the text, and again probably by the same scribe—the Part being given on the verso and the Chapter on the recto.

¹ See Frontispiece, facsimile of fol. of the *Folewer*, see Introd. Section II, 80^b, for the references here cited. Method of Transcription.

² On the punctuation of this edition

The MS. has not been through the illuminator's hands. As in the *Donet*, a space is left at the beginning of chapters for an illuminated initial capital, the corresponding 'director' being inserted in the blank space as a guide.

The MS. formerly belonged to John Theyer,¹ of Cooper's Hill, Brockworth, Gloucestershire, who lived from 1597-1673. At his death, his grandson Charles inherited his library, and sold it to Robert Scott, the bookseller, from whom Charles II purchased it (seemingly in, or shortly after 1678) for the Royal Collection, with which in due course it passed into the custody of the British Museum. Two valuations, one of Robert Scott and the other by the King's appraisers, accompany the list of Theyer's books known as the *Theyer Sale Catalogue* (now Brit. Mus. Roy. MS. App. 70). By the former the *Folewer* (No. 85) is appraised at £2; by the latter (following the usual policy of the King's valuers!) at £1.

The earlier history of this MS. of the *Folewer*, before it passed into the hands of John Theyer, is not known. The only hint I can find is the note on fol. 103^b: 'tendebatur in isto libro per dominum Thomam Sauage² episcopum Londoniensem (1496-1501) vt videatur an sit heresis suspectus'. Who had dared to save it from the general bonfire?

The title³ is given in the opening sentence, fol. 2^a—'þe folewer to þe donet'. The *Theyer Sale Catalogue* curiously misspells this as 'ye flower to the Deuote'. A similar mistake occurs in the list of Theyer's books in MS. Harley 695, fol. 316^b, No. 257: 'The Follower of the Devout'. In Bernard's *Cat. MSS. Angliæ*, p. 202, No. 6627, the same mistake is copied. 'Devout' was corrected to 'Donet' by Waterland and Lewis, who seem, however, not to have seen the book.⁴

¹ See above, p. xi, *Museum Catalogue* entry, and *Intro. to the Catalogue*, Vol. I, p. xxvi. For account of John Theyer, see also *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*

² See *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* for information concerning Thomas Savage.

³ It may be the *Folewer* that is referred to in the *Poore Mennis Myrrour*, fols. 14b, 20a, and 35b, as 'þe iij^e parti of þe donet'. But

a similar reference in the *P.M.M.*, fol. 62b, is unsatisfactory, the advantages of tribulation not being treated in the *Folewer*, but in the *Donet*, p. 100. Babington remarks that when the *Folewer* is referred to in the *Represser*, the title is always written on erasures. (See Babington's *Intro. to Rep.* p. lxix.)

⁴ See Babington's *Intro. to Rep.* p. lxviii.

A note¹ by a sixteenth-century hand at the top of fol. 2^a attributes the work to Pecoock, who refers to it many times in his other books.

Binding. The binding is the usual binding of the Royal MSS.—second half of the eighteenth century—leather, with gold line as border, and on the back the crown, laurel, and circular device. 'M. B.' (Museum Britannicum) is stamped in gold on the cover. The leather of the back and the lettering thereon are much worn.

The *Folewer* has never before been printed or, so far as is known, completely transcribed.²

B. Date of the '*Folewer*'.

Date of the *Folewer*, c. 1453-4. The *Folewer* cannot be later than 1456, the date of the *Book of Feith*.³ For in the *Folewer* Pecoock refers to the *Book of Feith* as unpublished: 'Holde þei her pacieence vnto tyme þei heere of þe book of feip'.⁴ This does not necessarily mean, of course, that at the time of writing the *Folewer* none of the *Book of Feith* had been written, since Pecoock was in the habit of working at several books at the same time.⁵ But it proves that the *Folewer* was intended to be, and probably was, 'published' first.

Again the *Folewer* cannot be earlier than 1453-4, for at the time of its writing it is 'into þis present day bi more þan vi ȝeer passid aftir þe bigynnyng of þe strijf'⁶ arising from Pecoock's famous sermon at Paul's Cross, 1447. It is impossible to date the work with absolute certainty, but 1453-4 seems very probable.

SECTION II.

Method of Transcription.

My aim has been to represent the manuscript as faithfully as possible, emending only in the very few cases of obvious carelessness.

¹ Reginaldus Peacock, Episcopus Cicestrensis clarus Anno domini 1450. Educatus oxon[ie] in Collegio orialensi.

² Frederik Schmidt, author of *Studies in the Language of Pecoock*, Upsala, 1900, notes that he has transcribed 20 folios.

³ See Morison's edition of the *Book of Feith*, Introd. pp. 10-12, and Babington's Introd. to *Rep.* pp. xxxii-iii, foot-note.

⁴ p. 70, ll. 16-17.

⁵ See Introd. to *Donet*, p. xvi.

⁶ *Folewer*, p. 108, ll. 22-3.

ness or error. Such emendations are given in the text within square brackets, and the manuscript reading in the foot-notes.

Spaces are sometimes left in the manuscript for omitted references. If possible, these have been supplied, and inserted in the text within square brackets.

Where the scribe uses confusing conjunction or disjunction, and I have modernized, departures from the manuscript are pointed out in the foot-notes.

The exact writing of *ff*, *u* for *v*, *v* for *u*, *3* and *g* has been preserved, and the old symbol *þ* retained. The scribe does not employ the thorn as an initial capital.

Extensions are indicated by italics. In the case of the contractions for *-er* and *-ir* the same sign is employed, and it is difficult to know how to extend rightly. Taking the work as a whole, *-ir* is generally used when such words as *ferþir*, *raþir*, *wheþir* are written in full. Hence for the sake of consistency, and because the *i* spelling is so prominent a feature of Pecock's terminations, I use the *-ir* extension, except in the case of a few words such as *maner*, *ouer*, *vertu*, which are always spelt with *-er* when written in full.

A flourish at the end of a word is extended as *e*; e.g. 'doctoure', 9/15.

The question as to the use of hyphens is a difficult one to the editor of a Middle-English text. In the manuscript of the *Folewer* hyphens are never used by the scribe within the line; at the end of a line, when the word is broken, an oblique double dash is employed in the MS.: e.g. *leerzne*. In this edition hyphens are used only when a word is broken at the end of the printed line, and in the case of the *y*-prefix (OE. *ge-*), which is generally written disjunctively by the scribe; e.g. MS. *y nou3* (OE. *genoh*) is transcribed *y-nou3*.

Proper names and the titles of books are rarely written in the manuscript with initial capitals. Though annoying to the modern eye, the erratic majuscules and minuscules have been preserved in this edition. I have put titles of books within inverted commas.

The punctuation is mainly my own, that of the manuscript so differing from modern usage¹ that it is confusing to a reader closely engaged with the subject-matter. As the long, involved,

¹ See Introd. Section I, A. Punctuation.

repetitive sentences and subtleties of expression render the work difficult to follow, I have attempted to make it clearer by punctuating somewhat more heavily than is usual at the present day. Even after full stops capital letters are employed in this edition only where used in the manuscript.

When citing from editions of Pecock's other works, the punctuation and orthography of the editors have been preserved.

SECTION III.

Biography of Pecock.

IN this Introduction it is not intended to deal at length with the biography of Pecock, nor does this section advance anything new in matter. All that is given here is such a biographical notice as will serve for handy reference. For more exhaustive treatment of Pecock's life, work, and opinions, the reader is referred to the following works, especially to Babington's Introduction to his edition of the *Repressor*, to which I am greatly indebted:

- (1) *A treatise proving Scripture to be the rule of faith, writ by R. Peacock about the year 1458 [sic], with a preface by Henry Wharton. 1688.* [This book contains extracts from Pt. I of the *Book of Feith*, and the whole of Pt. II, and the Preface is an interesting sample of earlier criticism and appreciation of Pecock.]
- (2) *The life of the learned and right reverend Reynold Pecock . . . being a sequel of the Life of Dr. John Wiclif, in order to an introduction to the History of the English Reformation . . . by John Lewis: London, 1744. New edition, Oxford University Press, 1820.*
- (3) *The Introduction to C. Babington's edition of Pecock's Repressor of over much blaming of the clergy. 2 vols., 1860. Rolls Series.* [In the foot-notes to the Introduction are useful bibliographical references to the older authorities for Pecock's life and opinions.]
- (4) *The biographical notice in the Dictionary of National Biography, and the works mentioned in the bibliography appended thereto.*

- (5) Miss A. D. Greenwood's essay in the *Cambridge History of English Literature*, vol. ii, pp. 286-96.
- (6) The introductory essay to Morison's edition of Pecock's *Book of Faith*. Glasgow, 1909.
- (7) E. M. Blackie's article in the *English Historical Review*, July, 1911.

Note. Miss Jessie Flemming's Arnold Prize Essay for 1922, *Reginald Pecock: his place in the history of English thought*, has not yet been published. By kind permission of the author, I have incorporated in this Biography several of her suggestions.

Reginald (or Reynold) Pecock was born at the end of the fourteenth century, about 1395-6. The exact date is unknown, but he was probably little over twenty when elected to his fellowship at Oriel in 1417. He is supposed to have been a Welshman, and to have passed his childhood in Wales, but the place of his birth and the nature of his early training are not recorded.

In 1421 he took orders, and some time subsequently obtained the degrees of Master of Arts and Bachelor of Divinity. His learning and scholastic ingenuity procured for him the patronage of that encourager of talent, Humphrey Plantagenet, Duke of Gloucester, then Protector of England during the minority of Henry VI. It was through Duke Humphrey, no doubt, that Pecock was early summoned to court. In 1431, again probably through the influence of the Duke, he became Master of Whittington College, London,¹ and from thence onward figured prominently in Church and State, one of the brilliant group of courtly divines so much envied and criticized at the time.

During his stay in London Pecock gave up a great deal of time to writing, both in Latin and English. Of the works still extant which date from this period, the *Reule of Cristen Religioun*,²

¹ Founded by the famous Mayor of that name for the maintenance of five secular priests, whose appointment was to depend upon their intellectual abilities.

longing to Mr. Pierpont Morgan's Library, New York. It deals with the 'Seven Matters' of Christian religion, for list of which see *Donet*, p. 27, and *Folewer*, Notes to 2/20.

² Now extant in one MS. only, be-

his 'first book', was on hand in 1443, the *Donet*¹ and an extract from Pt. I of the *Donet*, called *The Poore Mennis Myrrour*,² somewhere between 1443 and 1449. It is impossible to date Pecock's works exactly. His habit of making cross-references from one to another³ shows that he had several on hand at the same time.

In 1444 Humphrey of Gloucester secured for Pecock the bishopric of St. Asaph in Flintshire, and in the same year he was given the degree of Doctor of Divinity.⁴ Pecock's duties as bishop were evidently not so strenuous as to prevent his writing and studying and preaching.⁵ He preached a great deal himself, though he afterwards defended bishops who sought to be excused from that duty. What Pecock scorned was ignorant exposition of Holy Scripture, not the learned sermon.

This question of preaching was the main text of Pecock's famous sermon at Paul's Cross in 1447.⁶ He attempted to prove that bishops could not be censured for not preaching, as their time was taken up by the supervision of their dioceses and of the lower clergy; or censured for not residing in their dioceses, as they had difficult and responsible offices to perform in London as advisers in Church and Parliament and Court. Papal provisions and first-fruits were also defended. This sermon marks the beginning of Pecock's downfall, though for some years fortune still apparently favoured him. It increased the indignation of the populace and the more puritan party at the Court and Universities against the selfish life of the bishops, and harmed the bishops and the higher

¹ Extant in one MS. only, MS. Bodl. 916. Edited by me for the E. E. T. S., 1921; O. S. 156. Pt. I is a 'schort compendiose report' and complement of the *Reule of Cristen Religioun*. Pt. II is directed against Pecock's detractors.

² Extant in one MS. only, Brit. Mus. Addl. 37788. Collated in footnotes to my edition of the *Donet*.

³ See Editor's Preface to *Donet*, pp. xvi-xvii.

⁴ See Babington's Intro. to the *Repressor*, p. xiii: 'He was at the same time admitted to the degree of

doctor of divinity (possibly by royal mandate) without keeping any exercise or act.

⁵ Unfortunately the Episcopal Registers of both St. Asaph and Chichester have been lost for the years during which Pecock occupied these sees.

⁶ The seven conclusions of this sermon are referred to in the *Folwer*, p. 108. Pecock's account and vindication of them is printed at the end of Vol. II of Babington's edition of the *Repressor: Abbreviatio Reginaldi Pecok*.

clergy by directing still greater attention upon themselves and prevalent Church abuses. The bishops were naturally inclined to favour Pecock's conclusions,¹ though many saw he had acted unwisely; but as time went on he alienated them also, perhaps by spreading in English among the laity his criticisms of the authority of the Fathers and the doctors and various Church beliefs and practices. But most of his views were by no means unique or unorthodox, and political differences may have been the real reason for antagonism.

In the year of this famous sermon, 1447, Duke Humphrey had met his death, and the Duke of Suffolk (to whom the death of Gloucester was widely attributed) had become chief minister. By some means or other, Pecock, a favourite of Gloucester's, gained Suffolk's favour also, and through his influence was made Bishop of Chichester in 1450. Suffolk was impeached and assassinated in the same year, and the enemies of Pecock merely bided their time. His later works abound in references to the activity of his foes. He was well aware that everything he wrote would be received with hostile criticism, and, beginning to be anxious about the consequences of his daring, wished to reconcile himself with the all-powerful hierarchy. But logic and rationalism proved useless against the passions, and Pecock was pre-doomed to failure.

By 1449 Pecock was at work on the *Represser*,² though the book was apparently not published till some six years later.³ It is directed against the teaching of the 'Bible men' or Lollards,⁴ who were still sufficiently disturbing the peace of the orthodox party. Pecock attempts to justify existing church practices which the Lollards had decried, particularly the use of images, the going on pilgrimages, the possession of estates by the clergy, the government of the Church by the Pope, archbishops, and bishops, the lawfulness of papal and episcopal statutes, and the institution of the various religious orders.⁵ This book is Pecock's greatest

¹ See above, p. xx, foot-note 6.

² Edited from the MS. in the Cambridge University Library, the only MS. extant, by C. Babington for the *Rolls Series*. 2 vols. 1860.

³ See Lewis's *Life*, p. 62, and Babington's *Introd.* to the *Repressor*, p. xxii.

⁴ For the general history of the

Lollard movement, see Gairdner's *Lollardy and the Reformation in England*, 1908.

⁵ John Bury's *Gladius Salomonis*, written at the Archbishop's request after Pecock had been accused of heresy, is a clever answer to Pecock's conclusions in the *Repressor*. Excerpts

work. It is invaluable as a clear, if somewhat bigoted, refutation of the views of the Lollards and their supporters, and gives the reader a good idea of the discontent in Church and State at the time. As Babington well says: 'Fulness of language, pliancy of expression, argumentative sagacity, extensive learning, and critical skill distinguish almost every chapter.'¹

At the same time as the *Represser*, Pecock had on hand the *Folewer to the Donet*, part of which deals with the intellectual virtues as the *Donet* deals with the moral. This was 'published' (in the mediaeval sense) about 1454.²

It was probably the 'publication' of the *Book of Feith*³ (c. 1456) with its daring statements in English on the relation of the Scriptures and Faith and Reason,⁴ and its denial of the necessity of belief in the descent of Christ into Hell,⁵ that let loose the long pent-up fury of the people, universities, and clergy upon Pecock. The Court and people had long eyed him with suspicion as a favourite of the hated Suffolk. With Henry VI he was unpopular, on account of his open criticism of England's part in the war with France. He had no apparent following in Church or State, though there must have been scholars who admired his learning, and clergy who acknowledged the truth of his theological views, as is proved long after his death by the continuance of his doctrines, 'the pestiferous virus that circulated in many human breasts'.⁶

On October 22nd, 1457, at a stormy Council meeting at Westminster, at which the King was present and appealed to, Pecock's expulsion was demanded. He was accused of heresy and sedition,

from Bury's work are given at the end of Vol. II of Babington's edition of the *Represser*.

¹ Introduction to edition of *Rep.* p. xxix.

² Extant in one MS. only, Brit. Mus. Royal MS. 17 D. ix. See *Introd.* to *Folewer*, Section I, A. and B.

³ Extant in one MS. only, now in Trinity College Library, Cambridge (B. 14. 45). Edited by J. L. Morison. Glasgow, 1909.

⁴ Cf. *Donet*, pp. xxi-ii. The views themselves were common enough at

the time. It was the cold, reasoned statement of them in the 'comoun peplis langage' that so stirred the indignation of Pecock's peers.

⁵ It is noteworthy that this article is left out in the Creed given in the *Donet*, pp. 87-8. The missing chapters of the extant MS. of the *Book of Feith* probably included the Creed.

⁶ See letter of Edward IV to Pope Sixtus IV, given in the *Calendar of State Papers*, Venice, I, No. 451; February 24, 1475. Quoted in *Introd.* to edition of the *Donet*, p. xxv.

and commanded by Archbishop Bouchier to appear for trial on November 11th, bringing copies of his books for examination. Pecock's spirit was not yet broken. He professed himself willing to be judged by works composed within the last three years; for those before that date he would not answer, since some had been intended only for private circulation.¹ He made a dignified demand to be judged only by his peers in learning—a plea which did not add to his popularity with the doctors and divines, and one which was overruled by Bouchier.

Pecock employed the short respite granted him in carefully revising his later works. The Cambridge MS. of the *Represser*, the only one now extant, was used at the trial, and contains numerous erasures and alterations in Pecock's own hand.² Of the nine books he finally presented for examination we can be positive only of two, the *Represser* and the *Book of Feith*; but the importance of the *Folewer* and its late date (c. 1454) makes it practically certain that it was among the number. The *Reule of Cristen Religioun* and the *Donet* would have been ruled out by Pecock on account of their early issue.

The events which followed were tragic. The doctors condemned Pecock's books as heretical, and Bouchier offered him the choice of recantation or the stake. Worn out with many years of intense study and controversy, surrounded on every side by enemies, Pecock quailed at this terrible alternative: on the one hand martyrdom, with defiance of the judgement of the doctors, and the defence of those views he had so earnestly expounded; on the other, a few years of disgrace and scorn, and the failure of a life-time's noble effort. The choice was far from simple. There was the life to come to consider. If Pecock's opponents were right, he was differing from the authority of the Church, and so was condemned to eternal damnation, however much a martyr for his belief. He seems to have been utterly confounded, to have

¹ This objection of Pecock to be judged by his earlier works must not be taken to mean that he considered them of little importance. His constant references to them in his most mature books prove that his work must be taken as a whole and con-

sidered as a whole. But at the time of his trial he was naturally anxious to be called to account for as little as possible.

² See Babington's *Introd.* pp. xxxix and lxii-iii.

honestly thought himself in the wrong, and therefore to have chosen recantation:

‘I am in a strait betwixt two, and hesitate in despair as to what I shall choose. If I defend my opinions and position, I must be burned to death; if I do not, I shall be a byeword and a reproach. Yet it is better to incur the taunts of the people than to forsake the law of faith, and to depart after death into hell-fire and the place of torment. I choose, therefore, to make an abjuration, and intend for the future so to live that no suspicion shall arise against me all the days of my life.’¹

On November 21st, at Lambeth, he retracted various conclusions, and on December 4th he made a public confession of heresy before twenty thousand people at Paul’s Cross,² himself handing to the executioner for burning fourteen of the volumes he had compiled with such learning and pains.

The clergy lost no time in publishing Pecock’s recantation. Oxford renounced her brilliant scholar, and burnt at Carfax all the copies of his works procurable. Pecock was deprived of his bishopric and confined in the abbey of Thorney in Cambridgeshire, with ‘no books to look on, but only a portuous (breviary), a mass-book, a psalter, a legend, and a bible; nothing to write with; no stuff to write upon.’³ Here he died, probably about 1460.

SECTION IV.

Pecock’s Language.

Pecock’s dialect South-East Midland, or London Literary Standard with a somewhat larger admixture than commonly employed of Southern and Western peculiarities.

THE value of an investigation of Pecock’s language lies in little things. We are apt to read his prose too easily and casually. It is already so close to the standard, so unprovincial, so modern, that unless we have studied in some detail the earlier and later stages of the English language, little of note strikes the ear and eye.

It is just this standard, modern character in work of the middle of the fifteenth century that makes Pecock’s language important. His prose is almost free from dialectal features. Though he is often said to write the so-called ‘Oxford dialect’, which is best

¹ See Babington’s *Introd. to Rep.* p. xlvii.

² For full account, see Babington’s

Introd. to Rep. pp. xlvii-l.

³ See Babington’s *Introd. to Rep.* p. lvii.

described as South-West Midland¹, careful study has revealed few peculiarities that really mark his language off from the South-East Midland and literary 'London type', by Pecock's time the 'received Standard'.²

The most striking feature of Pecock's inflections, as of Wiclif's (who is also supposed to use the 'Oxford type'), is the very large proportion in suffixes of the *i* spelling (as against *e*): *-is*, *-ip*, *-id*, *-ir*, &c.³ Skeat 'hazarded the guess'⁴ that this extensive use of the *i* spelling in terminations was characteristic of the 'Oxford dialect', and Schmidt, who has worked out a comparison of the language of the *Represser* and the *Folewer* and the Wycliffite Bible on the one hand, and that of certain of the London charters and Chaucer's works on the other⁵, came to the conclusion that Skeat's 'guess' was supported by other evidence. But this writing of *i* is no test of dialect, for as a variant of the *e* spelling it is widespread at this date,⁶ though intentionally avoided under certain conditions.⁷ The *i* in *-is*, *-ist*, *-ip*, *-id*, shows that the modern pronunciation, as in *houses*, [*iz*], was already general; *-ir* was probably [*ər*], but this is not certain.⁸

In fifteenth-century texts certainly written in the Oxford area, it is the *u* spelling, not the *i* (*y*), which is so striking in the orthography of unaccented syllables. The *Epistolae Academicæ Oxon.*⁹ and the Registers of *Godstow* (1450)⁹ and *Oseney* (1460)¹⁰ afford plentiful examples—*lettur*, *utturly*, *protectur*, *profute*, *fforthurmore*, *togedur*, *almus*, *ordur*, &c. In Pecock this *u* spelling

¹ Cf. Wyld's *History of Modern Colloquial English*, p. 28.

⁶ Cf. Wyld's *History of Modern Colloquial English*, pp. 261 ff.

² In this section I use the terminology of Wyld in his *History of Modern Colloquial English*—'regional dialect', 'received standard', &c. See Wyld's introductory chapter for explanations.

⁷ If the stem ends in the stroke letters *i*, *u*, *m*, *n*, the *-e*-spelling (sometimes *-y*-) is usual in Pecock: e.g. *receyqued*, *comeþ*. If the stem ends in any other consonant, the *-i*-spelling is preferred, e.g. *couplid*, *clepid*. But there are frequent exceptions, e.g., *perceyquid* (*Donet*, 11/27). For fuller information, see *Introd. to Donet*, pp. xxiii–iv, and Schmidt's *Studies*, pp. 34–6.

³ e.g. *gendris*, *helpip*, *helpid*, *bettir*. On this question of spelling unstressed syllables, see Wyld's *History of Modern Colloquial English*, Chap. VII.

⁴ In his article, *On the dialect of Wicliffe's Bible*, in the *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1896.

⁸ See below, p. xxvii, foot-note 1.

⁹ Ed. A. Clark, E. E. T. S., 1905.

¹⁰ Ed. A. Clark, E. E. T. S., 1907.

is rarely found except in the strong past participle, where *-un* is sometimes used alongside *-e*, *-en*.¹

As regards that common test of dialect—not, of course, a very sure one as between East and West—the 3rd pers. plural of the Personal Pronoun, it should be noted that Pecock shows no trace of the *þ*-forms², *þer*, *þem*, in the genitive and accusative-dative, using only *her*, *hem*. By this time the *þ*-forms for the oblique cases were making their way in the London dialect, though the *h*-forms were still quite common. The earlier London charters as compared with the later are very instructive in this respect. The nominative in Pecock, as in the London dialect and elsewhere at this date, is *þei*.

It should be noted also in connexion with this question of the 'Oxford Dialect' that Pecock normally levels out strong preterites on the so-called 'Northern Preterite' system, common in early Northern texts and later in East Midland and Literary Standard, by which the distinction between pret. sing. and pret. pl. is lost, the pret. pl. being assimilated to the pret. sing., as in modern *sang*, *drank*, &c.³ Pecock has very few 'Western Preterites', thus named because so often found in the South, South-West, and South-West Midlands, where the vowel of the past participle is assumed by the preterite.

Examples are:—

<i>chese</i>	<i>chose</i>	<i>chosen</i>	<i>chosen</i>
<i>fynde</i>	<i>founde</i>	<i>founde(n)</i>	<i>foundun, founde</i>

But the usual forms for the sing. of *chese* are: *chaas*, *chase*, *chas*.

¹ See below, p. xxxiii.

² The only *þ*-form I have noted is *a them* in a passage quoted by Gairdner from the *Reule*: 'that eche of *them* myzte helpe the other', Monograph on the *Reule*, p. 20. As the only extant copy of the *Reule* is in America, I have no opportunity of checking this form, but suspect it to be merely an error in transcription.

³ The standard language had travelled far in this respect since Chaucer's day. Contrast the pret. forms of Chaucer and Pecock*given in the Tables below, pp. xxxiii-xlv; e.g. Chaucer's (*a*)*bood*, (*a*)*biden*,

(*a*)*roos*, (*a*)*risen*, *wroot*, *writen*, as against Pecock's *abode*, *aboden*, *roos*, *roosen*, *wroot* (or *wrote*), *wroten*; Chaucer's plurals *dronken*, *wonnen*, alongside Pecock's *dranken*, *wannen* (but note Pecock's *sungen*). The pret. plur. forms of Classes IV and V in Pecock, *bären*, *spāken*, *bāden*, &c., are due to levelling with a new pret. sing. type, *bāre*, *spāke*, *bāde*, &c. See Wyld's *Hist. of Mod. Colloq. Engl.* p. 343. Such new plurals are already making their appearance in Chaucer, but the corresponding singulars have apparently short vowels.

And for the preterite of *fynde* he has also the 'Northern Preterite' type :

fonde, foonde

fonden

Pecock's verbal forms are normally East Midland. There are some Southernisms and South-Westernisms: an occasional possible pres. indic. pl. in *-eþ*, e.g. *serueþ*, Donet, 23/31¹; an occasional form with *gg*, the Southern development of OE. *cg*, as *ligge*, Donet, 161/26, alongside the Midland development of the analogical form with single *g*, *seie*, *bie*, &c.; the occasional *i-*, *y-* prefix (OE. *ge-*) of the past participle, e.g. *y-callid*; the forms *sille*, *silf*, *zitt*, *zilde*; *sprad*, *rad*, *drad* (p. ps.) alongside the non-Southern *sprede*, *red*, *dred*; ² a rare *u* for OE. *y*³, e.g. *buried*, *moche*

¹ 'sipeþ þe same kindes or gendris of meenal vertues of þe first dede, soort, or parcel, or table, *serueþ* into vertues of þe iij^e and of þe iij^e seid soortis and parcellis or tablis'. But the verb here is possibly sing. by attraction to the intervening singular nouns, and in any case occasional *-eþ* forms are found in texts of admittedly London and Literary Standard origin throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and even later. Cf. Wyld's *History of Modern Colloquial English*, p. 339: 'This form is one of the Southern characteristics of the original London dialect which were gradually ousted by E. Midland encroachments, but it lingered long in the conservative usage of the upper classes of society'. Pres. indic. pls. in *-eþ* are much commoner in the *Epistolae Academicæ Oxon.* of the fifteenth century, Pt. I, 1421-57, Pt. II, 1457-1509, edited by H. Anstey, 1898, *Oxford Hist. Society*, Vols. xxxv, xxxvi. Cf. No. 182, 'your humble bedemen þ^t hertly prayth'; No. 142, 'we conceyvyth'; No. 209, 'to you . . . that causeth, supporteth, and furthereth', &c. It is noteworthy, however, how frequent also in the *Epistolae* are pres. indic.

pls. without ending—we *pray*, we *recommend*, we *gret*, &c.

² Cf. Wyld's *History of Modern Colloquial English*, p. 54.

³ In Mid. Eng. *ū* for OE. *ȳ* (the mutation of *ū*) is typical of the South, South-West, and the Central and West Midlands; *ē* for this OE. *ȳ*, which is already found in the OE. period in Kent, is not confined in Mid. Eng. to this county, but spreads to Sussex, Essex, part of Suffolk and presumably to Surrey, Middlesex, and parts of Cambridgeshire; *e* is also found alongside *i* and *u* in the London area, so that Pecock's sporadic *e* forms (e.g. *kessiden*, *besines*) are not of much weight. The unrounded *i* (*y*) is the normal development in the North (including Yorkshire) and the East Midlands (Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Huntingdon, and part of Suffolk), but is also found in Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, and Devon. By the fourteenth century *i* forms predominate in the London dialect. See Wyld's *Short History of English*, § 158; and Miss Serjeantson's *Dialect Distribution of certain Phonological Features in Middle English*, § 118, in *English Studies*, IV, p. 226.

(*o* written for *u*), *lust*, but the normal Northern and East-Midland unrounded *i* (*y*) forms are far more frequent, the *i* sometimes occurring in Pecock even where we have *u* spellings in present 'received Standard', e.g. *biried*, *bisines*, *risch* (= 'rush')¹. Southern forms are frequently found in the 'London dialect' and in Chaucer; in fact it is these occasional Southern features which distinguish the London language from pure East Midland, the other differences being almost negligible. The 'Oxford type' has far more distinct South-West Midland characteristics, such as:—

- (1) frequent *-us*, *-ud*, *-un*, *-ur*, &c., in unstressed syllables, e.g. *almus*, *writun*, *wrecchud*, *vndur*.
- (2) *ũ*, *ũ* (*ui*), for OE. *ȳ*, *ȳ*, e.g. *furst*, *fuire*.
- (3) rounding of *a* to *o* before *n*, e.g. *mon*, *con*.²
- (4) frequent pres. indic. pls. in *-eth*.

We may say that the typical S. W. Midland features hardly occur in Pecock's language, but there are few S. E. Midland and London characteristics which Pecock does not exhibit.

No doubt Pecock was influenced by his residence at the University of Oxford; but the influence would surely have been in the direction of standardizing his language. He would have surrendered there his more striking native Western provincialisms. For the language of many Oxford scholars of his day must have approximated very closely to the standard type, and accepted little of the purely regional Oxfordshire dialect around. At the period when Pecock's great works were written, he was passing most of his time in London, a dignitary of the Church and connected with the Court, and by this date the Church officials and the Court were talking, or at any rate writing, 'Standard English', though, of course, personal peculiarities of dialect would crop up occasionally. It is not surprising, therefore, that Pecock's language is so closely related to the standard type of his day. As for his Southernisms, we must remember how forms from other dialects linger on in the

¹ The pronunciation in Modern Standard English of *buried* (S. E. *e* type), *business* (E. Midl. *i* type), and *rush* (= [ʁ], normal development of S. W. *ũ* type), provides interesting examples of the inconsistency of our modern spelling, and of the preserva-

tion in standard English of the three typical developments of OE. *y*.

² Note that Pecock, though using the *a* in such words as *man*, *can*, writes *o* before *-nd*, e.g. *lond*, *vndirstonde*. But this is not limited to South-West Midland. Cf. Chaucer.

purest Standard English well into the sixteenth century and later, in some cases even down to our own age. Very probably the Literary Standard of Pecock's time was more Southern than is commonly believed. Caxton complained later that 'the langage now vsid varyeth ferre from that which was vsed and spoken when I was borne', and it is quite possible that there is some reference here to the shift in proportions, the London type (by then the 'received Literary Standard') having by Caxton's time become gradually more East-Midland and less Southern.

It seems to me that the regional influence in Pecock is too slight to prevent his being included among the writers of Standard Literary English. If one must define his language more exactly, it is best to class it as South-East Midland, or London Literary Standard with a somewhat larger admixture than commonly employed of Southern and Western peculiarities.

THE NOUN

The great inflectional changes were over by the time Pecock began to write. Inflections had been levelled, declensions, conjugations, and genders simplified. As far as the nouns were concerned, there were hardly more so-called 'exceptions' than to-day¹: the rest were declined after one fashion—the fashion of the OE. strong masculine of the ordinary *fisc* type. And of this type only three forms were recognized: the nominative singular, which did duty for all the singular except the genitive; the genitive singular in *-is*, *-ys*, *-es*², occasionally *-s*³; the plural (all cases) in *-is*, *-ys*, *-es*.

THE VERB

The verb⁴ is more complicated. The general scheme of inflections is given below, *-i-*, *-e-*, or *-y-* being used according to orthographical environment.⁵ As far as the inflections are concerned,

¹ Mutated plurals, *foot*, *feet*, &c.; *-n* or weak plurals, *shoo*, *shoon*, &c.; unchanged plurals of the old strong neuter type, *deer*, *deer*, &c.

² In the extant manuscripts of Pecock's works, stems ending in the stroke letters *i*, *u*, *m*, *n*, generally take *-e-* or *-y-* in the inflections; other stems usually take *i*. Exceptions to

this rule are rarer in the *Folewer* than in the *Donet*.

³ Cf. e.g. 'þe book of *resons doom*'; *Fol.* 10/8.

⁴ For the section on the verb, I am specially indebted to Schmidt's *Studies in the Language of Pecock*, Upsala, 1900.

⁵ See above, foot-note 2.

the most important thing to note is that the 2nd pers. sing. of the preterite of strong verbs takes regularly the *-est* (*-ist*, *-yst*) ending of the weak conjugation,¹ and that the vowel of this strong 2nd sing. pret. indic. is regularly that of the 1st and 3rd persons singular.

INFLECTIONS OF THE VERB.

PRESENT INDICATIVE.

Strong and Weak.

Sing. 1.	-e, —
„ 2.	-est, -ist, -yst
„ 3.	-ep, -ip, -yp, -p (occasionally, the preceding vowel being syncopated)
Pl. 1, 2, 3.	-en (usually); -e; -un (rare; cf. <i>takun</i> , <i>Folewer</i> , 200/11.)

PRETERITE INDICATIVE.

	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weak</i>
Sing. 1.	-, e ²	-id(e), -ed(e), -d(e), -t(e) ³
„ 2.	-est, -ist, -yst	-idist, -edist, -dest, -test
„ 3.	-, e ²	-id(e), -ed(e), -d(e), -t(e) ³
Pl. 1, 2, 3.	-en, -e	-ide(n), ede(n), -de(n), -te(n)

PRESENT SUBJUNCTIVE.

Strong and Weak.

Sing. 1, 2, 3.	-e, - ⁴
Pl. 1, 2, 3.	-e, -en, - ⁵

¹ For example, in the *Donet*: *barest*, 210/37; *tokist*, 167/13; *bigannyet*, 209/33. These weak *-est* forms have not begun to affect the strong 2nd sg. preterites in Chaucer, e.g. *bigonne*, not *bigonnest*. The vowel in Chaucer is usually that of the plural, e.g. *sonȝe*, *founde*, *bigonne*, but sometimes, as in *thou drank*, it is assimilated to that of 1 and 3 sing.

² The addition of *-e* in the 1 and 3 sg. strong pret. seems governed by orthographical rules—a double root-vowel without final *-e* being equal to a single root-vowel with final *-e*: e.g. *wroot*, *wrote*; *saat*, *sate*. Cf. Schmidt's *Studies*, § 56.

³ The endings of 1 and 3 sg. pret. ind. and subj. of weak verbs vary according to class. Those which drop the medial *-i-* or *-e-* usually retain the final *-e*; e.g. *sente*, *Donet*, 162/22. Those which retain the medial vowel usually drop final *-e*; e.g. *clepid*, *Donet*, 26/32. But there are frequent exceptions. Cf. Schmidt's *Studies*, § 56, and below, pp. xlv-vi.

⁴ Apocope is seen, for example, in *fast* (1 sg.) *Donet*, 184/33; *reck* (2 sg.) *Donet*, 205/28; *send* (3 sg.) *Donet*, 5/11.

⁵ *-e* is the commonest ending but *-en* is often found, e.g. *diffoulen*, *Donet*, 160/6. Apocope is seen, for

PRETERITE SUBJUNCTIVE

	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weak</i>
Sing. 1.	-e, -	-id(e), -ed(e), -d(e), -t(e) ²
„ 2.	-est, -ist, -yst ¹	-idist, -edist, -dest, -test ¹
„ 3.	-e, -	-id(e), -ed(e), -d(e), -t(e) ²
Pl. 1, 2, 3.	-en, -e	-ide(n), -ede(n), -de(n), -te(n)

IMPERATIVE

Strong and Weak

Sing. and Pl. -e, with occasional apocope

INFINITIVE

-e³, with occasional apocope

PRES. PART.

-ing, -yng

PAST PART.⁴

<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weak</i>
-en, -e (with apocope of -n), -un	-id, -ed, -d(e), -t(e) ⁵ .
-n (with syncopation of preceding vowel)	
-ne ⁵ (with syncopation of preceding vowel, and addition of final -e)	

STRONG VERBS.

By Pecock's time the four grade type of the old strong verb has practically disappeared, the distinction between preterite singular and plural having been lost. The preterite plurals generally assume

example, in *knowlech* (3 plur.) *Donet*, 103/1.

¹ The second sing. pret. subj. ends like the second sing. pret. indic. in -est, -ist, -yst, e.g. *koupist*, *Fowler*, 146/8; *tokist*, *Fowler*, 153/23. It may be noted that in Chaucer and Malory the strong verbs still retain the old -e form. The 2 sing. pret. subj. of weak verbs was sooner assimilated to the indicative, and there are already examples even in late Old English. Cf. Sievers' *AgS. Gram.*, § 365, Note 3.

² See foot-note 3, p. xxx.

³ Occasionally an -i infinitive is found, e.g. *brepī*, *Donet*, 201/28.

⁴ The prefix *i-*, *y-* (OE. *ge-*) is occasionally found. Participles adopted from the Latin appear sometimes in shortened Latinised guise, sometimes with the English weak ending, -ed, -id. Cf. *circumstancionat*, *circumstanciatid*, *circumstancionatid*, *circumstauncid*.

⁵ It is probable that the addition of final -e in such past participles as *borne*, *lefte*, is merely 'a sort of ornamental ending which was not sounded'. Cf. Schmidt's *Studies*, § 57.

their modern forms, being assimilated to the preterite singular,¹ except in Classes III and IV, where the plural vowel may be kept.² Class III indeed shows some hesitation as to whether to adopt throughout the preterite the singular or plural vowel. Hence the double forms:

<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
<i>fonde, foonde</i>	<i>fonden</i>
<i>founde</i>	<i>founden</i>

In Class II *chese* exhibits a variety of preterite forms. The sing. *chose* is due to the influence of the preterite plural and past participle, the preterite plural *chosen* having already adopted the vowel of the past participle. The explanation of the sing. *chase*, *chaas*, and *chas*, apparently with both long and short vowel, is probably that the *a* is due to analogy with preterites of the *bear* class—*bare*, &c. Caxton has also the form *chase*.³

One cannot always say with certainty what are the exact quantities of Pecock's vowels. The scribes write, for instance, *wijsdom* and *wisdom*, *bihetyng* and *biheeting*, *demeþ* and *deemeþ*. But their spelling is probably a great help and seems generally consistent. Apparently they double a vowel or add a final *-e* to show length: *roos*, *rose*; *wroot*, *wrote*. After a short vowel the consonant is sometimes doubled, and an inorganic *e* added: *biganne*, *wanne*, &c. When the word is left with the simple vowel alone, neither doubled nor followed by an inorganic *-e*, there is some doubt as to the quantity, but probably it is meant to be read short: *zäf*, *späk*, alongside *zäue*, *späke*. Similar spellings and apparently similar license of length are to be found in Malory.⁴ It should be noted that while Chaucer's vowels in these words are short, Modern English pronounces them long, so that probably we have in Pecock an indication of contemporary uncertainty of pronunciation, the older and younger forms existing side by side. With these double forms may be compared Chaucer's vowels in Class IV, *bär* (also *beer*), *bräk*, *cäm* (also *coom*), *stäl*, which by Pecock's time are all usually long—*bare*, *brake*, *came* (also *cam*), *stale*. Compare the long forms of Modern English.

¹ e.g. *abode*, *aboden*; *roos*, *roosen*; *wrote*, *wroten*; [*drank*], *dranken*; [*wann*], *wannen*, &c.

² eg. *sungen*, *founden*, *beere*.

³ See Wyld's *History of Modern*

Colloquial English, p. 346.

⁴ Cf. Baldwin's *Inflections and Syntax of Malory's 'Morte d'Arthur'*, § 158.

The past participles of strong verbs have a variety of endings. Cf. *zeun, zeuen, zeue, zoun, zouen, zoue*. The retention of the *y*-prefix, is exceedingly rare in Pecock as compared with Chaucer.

By this date the *-n* is frequently dropped in Midland as well as in Southern and Kentish, and Pecock seems to employ or drop the *-n* so entirely at will that no evidence can be drawn from the past participle as to dialect.

In the following Tables the classification adopted is that of Sievers's *Angelsächsische Grammatik* (Cook's translation, *Grammar of Old English*, pp. 254-359). The Chaucerian forms parallel to Pecock's are given where possible. These are quoted as in ten Brink's *Chaucer's Sprache und Verskunst*, revised Kluge, (M. Bentinck Smith's translation) but with many additions from the text as published by Skeat.

Conjectural infinitives are put within square brackets, the weak forms developed by a strong verb in round brackets. Chaucer's forms are given in italics. Length is not marked in the verbs.

For the rarer forms in the *Donet* and *Folewer* I have aimed at giving every reference in my Glossaries to these editions; for the common forms one reference only has been thought sufficient, both in the Glossaries and in the following Tables. In the Tables references from the *Represser* are taken from Schmidt's *Studies in the Language of Pecock*, pp. 22-42, and from Babington's Glossary to his edition of the *Represser*.

¶ The following abbreviations are used :

OE.	=	Old English
C	=	Chaucer
P	=	Pecock
BF	=	<i>Book of Feith</i>
D	=	<i>Donet</i>
F	=	<i>Folewer to the Donet</i>
PMM	=	<i>Poore Mennis Myrrour</i>
R	=	<i>Represser</i>

CLASS I.

OE.	<i>ī</i>	<i>ā</i>	<i>ī</i>	<i>ī</i>
C	<i>ī</i> (<i>ȝ</i>)	<i>ē</i> (<i>eo</i>)	<i>i</i>	<i>i</i>
P	<i>ī</i> (<i>ȝ</i>)	<i>ō</i> (<i>oo</i>)	<i>ō</i> (<i>oo</i>)	<i>i</i> (<i>y</i>)
		c		

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Pl.	Past Part.
C	(a)byde	(a)bqqd	(a)biden	(a)biden
P	abide, D 13/35 abyde, D 9/8	abode, D 153/ 11	aboden, F 29/ 10 abode, R 19	abide, R 387 abiden, F 87/22
C	(a)ryse	(a)rqqq	(a)risen	(a)risen
P	(a)rise, D 30/ 11; D 6/23	(a)rose, D 34/ 23; D 103/ 33 roos, D 88/6 aroose, PMM, fol. 12 ^b	roosen, R 497	rise, BF 158 risen, BF 158
	byde. <i>See</i> (a)byde.			
C	bte	bqqt		biten
P	bite, F 201/4			
C	dryve	drqqf, drof		driven, drive
P	dryue, D 20/33 drive, BF 125	droue, F 142/ 7; 212/21		dryue, D 5/6 dryuen, F 50/19 drive, BF 129
C	ryde	rqqd	riden	riden
P	ride, R 303	rode, R 374		
	ryse. <i>See</i> (a)ryse.			
C	shyne	shqqn (shynede)		(shined)
P	schyne, F 33/20			
C	slyde			
P	slide, F 164/22			sliden, F 16/28
C	smyte	smqqt		smiten
P	smyte, R 488			smyten, F 68/6 smyte, F 225/10
C	wryte	wrqqt	writen	writen, write
P	write, D 3/25	wrote, R 55 wroot, D 5/8 wroote, D 6/18	wroten, R 61	writen, D 4/12 write, D 7/17 writun, D 3/22 wrytun, R 423

CLASS II.

Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
OE. ēo, ū	ēa	u	o
C ē (ee), ū (ou)	ē	ū	ō
P ē (ee), ou (ow)			ō, u ¹
C (for) <i>beede</i>	(for) <i>bad</i>	<i>bede</i>	(for) <i>bode(n)</i>
P forbede, D 137/ 17	forbade, D 179/ 22		forboden, D 137/ 15 forbodun, R 457 forbode, D 136/24 (forbodid, D 135/ 17)
C <i>bowe</i>	(bowed)		
P bowe, F 76/38	(bowid, F 178/ 26)		
C <i>cheese</i>	<i>chees</i>	<i>chōsen</i>	<i>chōsen</i>
P chese, D 27/4	chose, R 185 chas, R 349 chaas, R 349 chase, R 349	chosen, R 448 chese, D 132/15	chosen, D 173/5 chose, R 112 chosun, D 41/13
C <i>yeete</i>			
P [3e(e)te]			3ut, R 163, 164 y-3utte, R 138 3otten, D 125/17 (3ottid, D 124/29)
C <i>loute</i>	(louted)		
P loute, D 119/21			
C <i>scheete</i>			<i>shoten</i>
P scheete (1sg. (schotte, BF 265) pr. subj.) F 126/2			

CLASS III.

1. Stem ending in nasal + consonant.

OE. i	q (a)	u	u
C i, ī (ȳ)	2, ȳ, a	u (o), ū (ou)	u(o), ū (ou)
P ī (ȳ)	o, ō(oo) a	o, a; u(o), ou	u(o), ou

¹ The only preterites of Cl. II which I have found in Pecock are *forbade* (which, as already in Chaucer, has been contaminated by pret. *bade* from *bidde*, Cl. V), *schotte*, and the preterites of *chese*. The singulars *chase*,

chaas, *chas* are of doubtful origin; the sing. *chose* and plural *chosen* have the vowel of the past participle; and the plural *chese* has the vowel of a normal pret. singular *chese*.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing. ¹	Pret. Plur. ¹	Past Part.
C	(bi)ginne	(bi)gan 2 sg. bigonne, bigan ²	(bi)gonne(n)	(bi)gonne(n)
P	bigynne, D 96/ 18	biganne, R 540 bigunne, BF 194 2 sg. bigannyst, D 209/33		bigunne, D 84/6
C	bynde, binde	bōnd	bounden	bounde(n), bonde
P	binde, R 317 bynde, F 142/39	bonde, R 317		bounden, D 61/ 26 bounde, D 16/23 bound, D 16/29 bonde, R 297
C	drinke	drank	dronke(n)	dronke(n)
P	drinke, R 527 drynke, F 87/ 15		dranken, R 319	drunke, R 122 drunken, D 35/ 23 (drunkid, F 156/ 10, used as adj.)
C	fynde	fōnd 2 sg. founde	founden, fonde	founden
P	fynde, D 7/27	founde, D 7/13 foonde, F 67/ 1 (twice) fonde, R 365	founden, D 141/7 founde, R 504 fonden, R 242	founden, D 12/ 15 founde, D 4/14 foundun, R 192
C	grynde	grōnd		grounden
P	grynde, F 170/ 10			
C	renne	ran	ronnen	ronne(n)
P	renne, D 1/5			runne, D 7/1
C	shrinke	shrank		
P	schrinke, R 347	schränke, R 347		
C	singe	sōng	songen	songe(n)
P	singe, R 120		sungen, R 205	sungun, R 199

¹ See above, p. xxxii, on the confusion in the preterite forms of Class III in Pecoek.

² Contrast Pecoek's form.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
C	<i>winne</i>	<i>wan</i>	<i>wonnen</i>	<i>wonne(n)</i>
P	<i>wynne</i> , D 28/2		<i>wanne</i> , F 176/ 15	<i>wonne</i> , D 5/21 <i>wunne</i> , R 409

2. Stem ending in l + consonant.

	OE. e (eo)	ea	u	o
C	<i>e, ē (ee)</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>o</i>	<i>o</i>
P	<i>e, i</i>		<i>o</i>	<i>o</i>
C	<i>helpe</i>	<i>halp, heelp</i>	<i>holpen</i>	<i>holpen</i>
P	<i>helpe</i> D 11/33	<i>(helpid, R 337)</i>		<i>holpun</i> , R 382 <i>holpen</i> , BF 157 <i>holpe</i> , R 284
C	<i>yeelde</i>	<i>yald</i>		<i>yolden</i>
P	<i>ȝilde</i> , ¹ BF 136 <i>ȝolde</i> , ¹ D 41/6 <i>ȝulde</i> , ¹ PMM, fol. 15 ^b			<i>ȝulde</i> , ¹ D 41/11 <i>ȝuld</i> , ¹ PMM, fol. 15 ^b

3. Stem ending in r or h + consonant.

	OE. eo	ea	u	o
C	<i>e, i</i> ²	<i>a</i>	<i>ʊ</i>	<i>ʊ</i>
P	<i>e, i</i> ²		<i>ʊ</i>	<i>ʊ</i>
C	<i>fighte</i> ²	<i>faught</i>	<i>foughten</i>	<i>foughten</i>
P	<i>fiȝte</i> , ² F 134/28			<i>fouȝt</i> , R 514
C	<i>kerre</i>	<i>karf</i>	<i>korven</i>	<i>korve(n)</i>
P	[<i>kerue</i>]			<i>coruun</i> , R 163 <i>coruen</i> , R 213
C	<i>worthe</i>			
P	[<i>worthe</i>]			<i>worthe</i> , 'only R 516' ³

¹ Infs., *ȝilde*, *ȝulde*, perhaps Southern (eastern and western area respectively); *ȝolde*, *o* for *u* (cf. *moche*). Past part., *ȝuld(e)* for *ȝēld(e)*, possibly showing the change of [ō] to [ū] or [ū] (cf. *doun*, *sunner*, *sunnest*); if indeed the form is not due to levelling

(cf. *hulpe* for *holpe*; see N.E.D.).

² The *i* in the Mid. Eng. inf. *fighte*, *fiȝte* (OE. *feohtan*) is parallel to OE. *i* from *eo* (*e*) before *ht* + *e* or *ht* final: cf. OE. regular *cniht* (Pal. Mut.) *cneohtas*, and levelling *cnihtas*.

³ Schmidt.

CLASS IV.

Stem ending in single liquid or nasal.

Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
OE. e, i	æ, a or o, ō	ǣ, ǫ	o, u
C ē	a, ō (oo)	ē, ē, ō	ȝ, u (o)
P ē(ee), i(y)	ǣ	ā, ee	ō
C bere	bar, ber, beēr 2sg. bere, bare	beeren, beren, baren	bȝren, bȝrn, bȝre, bȝrne
P bere, D 56/17	bare, F 106/ 16	baren, R 530 beere, F 104/ 38	born, D 31/8 bore, R 205 boren, D 127/15 borne, R 205
C forbere. As for bere.	2sg. barest, D 210/37		
P forbere D 30/ 24 forbeere, PMM, fol. 11 ^b			forborn, D 48/5 forborne, R 555 forbore, R 228
	bicome. See after come.		
C breke	brak		bȝke(n)
P breke, D 39/1	brake, R 147, 254		broke, D 88/16 brokun, F 106/ 18
C come	cam, coom	camen, coomen	come(n)
P come, D 30/19	came, D 162/ 13	camen, F 30/1 came, D 2/2	(ouer)come, F 159/8 comen, F 79/28
C bicome. As for come.			
P bicome	bicame, R 359 bicam, D 87/29		bicome, D 102/ 14
	forbere. See after bere. [nyme]. See vndirnyme.		
C shere			shȝren, shȝrn
P [schere]			schorne, R 532
C speke ¹	spak	speken, spaken	spȝke(n)
P speke, ¹ D 6/12	spake, D 25/ 30 spak, R 23, 202	spaken, R 246 spake, F 60/39	spokun, D 4/12 spoken, D 128/ 11 spoke, D 45/37 stȝle
C stele	stal		
P stele, D 177/29	stale, R 135		

¹ Originally belonging to Cl. V; passed over by Chaucer's time into Cl. IV.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
C	<i>tere</i>	(<i>to</i>) <i>tar</i>		(<i>to</i>) <i>tqren</i> , (<i>to</i>) <i>tqre</i> <i>tqrn</i>
P	<i>tere</i> , F 170/10			toren, F 170/11
C		(<i>vnder</i>) <i>nam</i> , (<i>vnder</i>) <i>noom</i>		<i>nome(n)</i>
P	<i>vndir-</i> <i>nyme</i> , R 2			<i>vndirnome</i> , R 2

NOTE.

C	<i>were</i> ¹	<i>wered</i>	<i>weren</i>	
P	<i>were</i> , D 152/36	<i>werid</i> , R 532	<i>weriden</i> , R 124	<i>worn</i> , R 543 <i>worne</i> , R 347

CLASS V.

Stem ending in single consonant other than liquid or nasal.²

	OE. e(ie), i	æ, æ ³ (ea)	ǣ(ēa)	e(ie)
C	<i>ē, i</i>	<i>a, e, ē, ē</i>	<i>ĕ, ē</i>	<i>ē, i</i>
P	<i>ē, i</i>	<i>ǣ, ē (ee)</i>	<i>ā, ē</i>	<i>ē, ō</i> ⁴
C	<i>bidde</i>	<i>bad</i>	<i>bede(n)</i>	<i>bede(n)</i> , <i>bidde</i>
P	<i>bidde</i> , D 53/8	<i>bade</i> , D 121/21 <i>bede</i> , F 167/14	<i>baden</i> , R 446	<i>beden</i> , D 148/34 <i>bede</i> , D 148/19 <i>bedun</i> , R 111
C	<i>ete</i>	<i>eet, eēt</i>	<i>eete(n)</i> , <i>ete(n)</i>	<i>eten</i>
P	<i>ete</i> , D 117/4	<i>ete</i> , D 117/6 <i>eete</i> , D 117/14	<i>eten</i> , R 342	<i>eten</i> , D 35/23 <i>ete</i> , R 526 <i>eete</i> , F 87/24

forȝete.⁵ See after *gete*.

C	<i>gete</i>	<i>gat</i>	<i>gete(n)</i>
P	<i>gete</i> , ⁵ D 42/24 <i>geete</i> , D 201/35	<i>gate</i> , R 226	<i>gete</i> , D 45/12 <i>geten</i> , D 48/8 <i>getun</i> , D 49/12 <i>y-gete</i> , D 87/7 <i>goten</i> , ⁴ F 44/32

¹ Originally weak, but exhibiting in Chaucer strong pret. plural, and in Pecock strong p. p.

² For *Speke*, see under Class IV.

³ Verbs with stem in *-et-* have often a long vowel in the pret. sg. in OE.

Cf. *ǣt*, *frǣt*, *mǣt*.

⁴ By analogy with Cl. IV, e.g. *ȝounn*, *wounn*, *goten*.

⁵ It is interesting to note that by this time the simple verb is *gete*, as against the compound *forȝete*.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
C	<i>forȳete</i>	<i>forȳat, forȳat</i> 2 sg. <i>forȳete</i>		<i>forȳeten, forȳete(n)</i>
P	<i>forȳete</i> , ¹ D 145/ 3 ²	2 sg. pret. subj. <i>forȳatist</i> , BF 287		<i>forȳete</i> , D 142/ 14 <i>forȳeten</i> , D 145/ 36
	<i>forȳeue. See after ȳeue.</i>			
C	<i>ȳeve,</i> <i>ȳive</i>	<i>yaf</i> 2sg. <i>yave</i>	<i>yave(n)</i>	<i>ȳeven, ȳiven</i>
P	<i>ȳeue</i> , D 2/8 <i>ȳiue</i> , 'only R 168' ²	<i>ȳaf</i> , D 135/22 <i>ȳaue</i> , D 120/17 <i>ȳafe</i> , F 69/17	<i>ȳaue</i> , D 214/21 <i>ȳauen</i> , R 281 <i>ȳauun</i> , R 459	<i>ȳouun</i> , ³ D 19/27 <i>ȳouen</i> , ³ D 41/11 <i>ȳoue</i> , ³ R 74 <i>ȳeuen</i> , R 64 <i>ȳeun</i> , R 98 <i>ȳeue</i> , R 98
C	<i>forȳeve,</i> <i>forȳive</i>	<i>forȳaf, forȳaf</i>	<i>forȳeve</i>	<i>forȳeve(n),</i> <i>forȳive</i>
P	<i>forȳeue</i> , D 194/ 5			<i>forȳouun</i> , ³ D 193/ 13 <i>forȳeuen</i> , F 226/ 11
C	<i>lye</i>	<i>lay</i>	<i>leyen, laye(n)</i>	<i>leyen</i>
P	<i>ligge</i> , D 161/26	<i>lay</i> , D 34/22 <i>laie</i> , D 88/4 <i>laye</i> , PMM, fol. 12 ^b		
C	<i>see</i>	<i>saugh, seiȳ,</i> <i>saygh, sy, say,</i> <i>sey, seiȳ</i> 2 sg. <i>sawe, saye</i>	<i>saugh, sawe,</i> <i>seye(n), sye(n)</i>	<i>seye(n)</i>
P	<i>se</i> , D 14/ 13	<i>siȳe</i> , D 9/29 <i>sie</i> , R 186 <i>sawe</i> , D 25/18 <i>sauȳe</i> , R 305	<i>siȳen</i> , F 71/2 <i>sien</i> , R 187 <i>sawen</i> , D 25/20	<i>seen</i> , D 20/15
C	<i>sitte</i>	<i>sat, seet, seet</i>	<i>seeten, sete(n)</i>	<i>seten</i>
P	<i>sitte</i> , R 123	<i>sate</i> , R 300 <i>saat</i> , R 196		
C	<i>were</i>	<i>waf</i>		<i>wȳven</i> ³
P	<i>wewe</i> , R 139			<i>wouun</i> , ³ D 11/23

¹ See note 5, p. xxxix.² Schmidt; Babington notes that it occurs 'very rarely'.³ See note 4, p. xxxix.

CLASS VI.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
OE. a	(ea, e, ȝ)	ō	ō	a (æ, ea, ȝ)
C	a, ā, ȝ, ȝ, ȝ	ō	ō	a, ā, ȝ, ȝ
P	ā, e, ē (ee), o	ō (oo)	ō (oo)	ā, ō, ē
C	bake			bake, baken
P	bake, R 118			bake, R 67
	bitake. See after take.			
C	drawe	drow, drough, drogh, drew 2 sg. drowe	drowe	drawe(n)
P	drawe, D 58/7	drowe, R 194		drawe, D 141/1 drawen, D 111/18 drawun, R 163
C	fare	(ferde)	(ferde(n))	fare(n)
P	fare, D 90/3			
C	forsake	forsook	forsooken	forsaken
P	forsake, D 4/3	forsoke, R 315		forsakun, F 65/38 forsake, R 547 forsaken, F 44/31 grave(n) grauen, D 119/19 (graued, R 169)
C	grave			
P	[grauē]			
C	laughe	lough	lowen, loughen (laughede)	laughen
P	lauze, R 156 lawze, R 156 lauzwe, R 120	(lauzed, R 120)		(lauzed, BF 111)
C	shape	shoop	shoopen	shape(n)
P	schape, D 202/25	schope, BF 255 (schapide, BF 264)		schapen, F 12/27 schapun, R 221 (schapid, F 52/33)

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
C	<i>slee</i>	<i>slough, slow</i> 2 sg. <i>slowe</i>		<i>slave(n), slayn,</i> <i>sleyn</i>
P	<i>slee, D</i> 134/4 <i>sle, F</i> 19 /21; 131/31	<i>slowe, BF</i> 265		<i>slein, R</i> 246 <i>slayn, R</i> 157; <i>F</i> 19/26 <i>slain, R</i> 56 <i>sleyn, F</i> 137/30
C	<i>stōnde</i>	<i>stood</i>	<i>stoode(n)</i>	<i>stōnden</i>
P	<i>stonde,</i> D 7/23 <i>stond, PMM,</i> fol. 60 ^a	<i>stood, R</i> 11 <i>stode, R</i> 11	<i>stoden, R</i> 286	<i>stonde, F</i> 224/38
C	<i>under- stōnde</i>	<i>understode</i>		<i>understōnde</i>
P	<i>vndir- stonde</i> D 17/ 29	<i>vndirstode, D</i> 26/11	<i>vndirstoden, F</i> 60/37; 148/ 30	<i>vndirstonden, D</i> 124/8 <i>vndirstonde, D</i> 1/15
C	<i>swere</i>	<i>swoor</i>	<i>swooren</i>	<i>swore(n), sworn</i>
P	<i>swere,</i> D 126/ 31			<i>sworn, D</i> 189/ 14 <i>sworn, F</i> 137/13 <i>swore, BF</i> 252 <i>sworne, BF</i> 294 <i>sworen, R</i> 516
C	<i>take</i>	<i>took</i> 2 sg. <i>toke</i>	<i>tooke(n)</i>	<i>taken</i>
	<i>take, D</i> 1/11	<i>toke, F</i> 106/27 <i>took, D</i> 104/10 <i>tooke, F</i> 24/ 10; 36/34 2 sg. <i>tokist,</i> D 167/13	<i>token, R</i> 35 <i>tooken, R</i> 173 <i>toke, R</i> 30	<i>takun, D</i> 23/18 <i>taken, D</i> 145/19 <i>take, D</i> 17/18 <i>y-takun, D</i> 167/ 22 <i>tak, R</i> 57 <i>bitakun, F</i> 3/6
	<i>bitake,</i> D 160/ 28	<i>bitoke, F</i> 3/3 <i>bitook, BF</i> 264	<i>bitoken, D</i> 158 /36	
	<i>vndirstonde. See after stonde.</i>			
C	<i>wake</i>	<i>wook</i>		<i>waken (waked)</i>
P	[<i>wake</i>]	<i>woke, R</i> 224		
C	<i>waxe,</i> <i>wexe</i>	<i>wex,¹ wex,¹</i> <i>wax²</i>	<i>wexen</i>	<i>waxen, woxen</i>
P	<i>wexe, R</i> 342	<i>wexe,¹ R</i> 342 (<i>wexid, R</i> 334) <i>waxe,² F</i> 113/ 30	(<i>waxiden, R</i> 243) (<i>wexiden, BF</i> 221)	

¹ Analogy with reduplicating verbs.² Analogy with Classes III, IV, V.

REDUPLICATING VERBS

Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
OE. <i>ǣ</i> (ǣ), <i>ō</i> , <i>ēa</i> , <i>æ</i> , <i>ē</i>	<i>ǣ</i> , <i>ēo</i>	<i>ǣ</i> , <i>ēo</i>	As first grade
C <i>a</i> , <i>ǣ</i> , <i>ō</i> , <i>ē</i> , <i>ē</i> (<i>ee</i>)	<i>ǣ</i> (<i>ee</i>), <i>i</i> (rare)	<i>ǣ</i> (<i>ee</i>), <i>i</i> (rare)	As first grade
P <i>a</i> , <i>ō</i> , <i>ē</i>	<i>ǣ</i> , <i>i</i> (rare)	<i>ǣ</i> , <i>i</i> (rare)	<i>a</i> , <i>ō</i> , <i>ē</i>
C <i>bete</i>	<i>beet</i> , <i>bet</i>	<i>bette</i> (<i>n</i>)	<i>bete</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>bete</i> , F 125/30			<i>beten</i> , F 36 33 <i>beete</i> , F 37/6 <i>bete</i> , F 37/3
<i>bifalle</i> . See after <i>falle</i> .			
C <i>bihȝte</i> , <i>bihete</i>	<i>-heȝt</i> , <i>heet</i> , (<i>-highte</i> , <i>hight</i>)	<i>bihighte</i> (<i>n</i>)	<i>-hȝten</i> , (<i>-hight</i>) ¹
P [<i>bihete</i>]	(<i>bihȝte</i> , R 404)		(<i>bihȝt</i> , ¹ R 404)
C <i>blowe</i>	<i>blew</i>		<i>blowe</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>blowe</i> , D 6/30	<i>blewe</i> , F 20/5		<i>blowen</i> , D 164/ 30
C <i>falle</i>	<i>fel</i> , <i>fil</i>	<i>fellen</i> , <i>fille</i> (<i>n</i>)	<i>falle</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>falle</i> , D 40/1	<i>fil</i> , F 142/6 <i>fel</i> , BF 264 <i>fil</i> , R 286 <i>fel</i> , F 71/25	<i>fillen</i> , BF 119	<i>falle</i> , D 89/7 <i>fallen</i> , D 54/20
C <i>bifalle</i>	<i>bifel</i> , <i>bifil</i> , <i>befil</i>		<i>bifalle</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>bifalle</i> , D 56/18	<i>bifille</i> , R 447 <i>bifelle</i> , BF 265		
C <i>growe</i>	<i>grew</i> , (<i>growed</i>)		<i>growe</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>growe</i> , D 77/21	<i>grewe</i> , R 347		<i>growen</i> , F 13/ 23
C <i>holde</i>	<i>heeld</i> , <i>held</i>	<i>helde</i>	<i>holde</i> (<i>n</i>)
P <i>holde</i> , D 3/21	<i>helde</i> , F 113/ 28	<i>helden</i> , F 111/ 10	<i>holden</i> , D 48/29 <i>hold</i> , R 144
<i>hoolde</i> , D 132/4	<i>hilde</i> , BF 258	<i>heelden</i> F 111/ 16	<i>holde</i> , D 83/23
C <i>honge</i> , <i>hange</i>	<i>heeng</i>	<i>henge</i>	(<i>hanged</i>)
P <i>hange</i> , R 197	<i>henge</i> , R 199, 261		(<i>hangid</i> , R 221)
<i>hang</i> , D 143/14	<i>heng</i> , R 139		

¹ The parts of this verb, and still more of the simple verb *hote*, are much confused by Chaucer's time; Pecock's *bihȝte*, though developed

from OE. *heht*, *-hēt*, seems to be regarded as a weak preterite, and the p. p. *bihȝt* is formed on the weak model.

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
C	<i>knowe</i>	<i>knew</i> 2 sg. <i>knewe</i>	<i>knewe</i>	<i>knowe(n)</i>
P	<i>knowe</i> , D 4/18	<i>knewe</i> , D 174/ 27	<i>knewe</i> , F 40/5 <i>knewen</i> , BF 257	<i>knownen</i> , D 28/8 <i>knowun</i> , D 1/6 <i>knowe</i> , D 25/23 <i>known</i> , D 71/23
C	<i>lete, leete</i>	<i>leet, let</i>	<i>lete</i>	<i>lete(n), laten</i>
P	<i>lete</i> , D 114/1	<i>lete</i> , R 355		<i>lete</i> , R 158 (<i>lette</i> , D 161/30)
C	<i>sowe</i>			<i>sowe(n)</i>
P	[<i>sowe</i>]		<i>sewen</i> , R 319	
C	<i>þrowe</i>	<i>þrew</i>	<i>þrewe</i>	<i>þrowe(n)</i>
P	<i>þrowe</i> (1st. sg. pr. subj.) F 126/2	<i>þrewe</i> , R 260		<i>þrouȝe</i> , D 88/17 <i>þrowen</i> , D 167/ 15 <i>þrowe</i> , D 147/13 <i>þrowun</i> , R 86

VERBS STRONG IN OE. AND WEAK IN PECOCK.

A. *Verbs weak in Peacock and already exhibiting weak forms in Chaucer.*

	Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past Part.
	<i>Creepe</i> , R 207		<i>crepiden</i> , R 269	
	<i>Drede</i> , D 200/22			<i>drad</i> , R 249, F 149/31 <i>dradde</i> , D 161/18 <i>dred</i> , F 43/33
	<i>Fle</i> , D 12/19		<i>fledde</i> , R 318	<i>fled</i> , R 515
	<i>Lauȝe</i> , R 156	<i>lauȝed</i> , R 120		<i>lauȝed</i> , BF 111
	<i>lawȝe</i> , R 156			
	<i>lauȝwe</i> , R 120			
	<i>Lie</i> , <i>Lye</i> (to tell lies), F 62/20; F 69/3	<i>liede</i> , F 68/37 <i>lyed</i> , F 62/13	<i>lieden</i> , BF 221	
	<i>Re(e)de</i> ¹ D 82/29			<i>rad</i> , D 7/25, F 177/2 <i>red</i> , D 1/14 <i>radde</i> , F 27/14, 176/10 <i>redde</i> , D 157/18

¹ Frequently weak in W. Saxon. Cf. Sievers' *Ags. Gram.*, § 395, Note 3.

B. Verbs strong in Chaucer, but exhibiting weak forms in Pecock.

Inf.	Pret. Sing.	Pret. Plur.	Past. Part.
[Graue]			graued, R 144
Helpe, D 11/33	helpid, R 337		
Lete, D 114/1			lette, D 161/30
Le(e)se, D 37/12			lost, D 161/31
Sti(3)e, D 86/10	stized, D 5/10		loste, D 89/4
Waische, R 124	stied, D 88/9		
Wexe, R 342	waischid, R 468		
	wexid, R 342	wexiden, BF 221	
		waxiden, R 243	
Schape, D 202/25	schapide, BF 264		schapið, F 52/33

WEAK VERBS.

The weak verbs in Pecock may be roughly divided into two classes, as against the Old English three—the Old English Second Class, from the Germanic *-ōja-* verbs, being merged into the First.

The two classes of weak verbs in Pecock are distinguished by their preterite endings, the First Class having *-ed(e)*, *-id(e)*, the Second Class *-d(e)* or *-t(e)*.¹

The FIRST CLASS includes:—

- The OE. First or *-jo-* (*-ja-*) Class verbs, with original short stems; in Pecock often even those with stems ending in *-d* or *-t*:—e.g. *werid*²; *settide*.³ Also some with original long stems:—e.g. *kisside*, *wenede*.
- The OE. Second or *-ōja-* Class verbs, by levelling of OE. *-ode* to *-ed(e)*; *-id(e)*:—e.g. *loued*; *trowide*.
- Most verbs of foreign origin:—e.g. *conteyned*; *grauntid*.

The SECOND CLASS includes:—

- Most OE. First or *-jo-* (*-ja-*) Class verbs, with original long stems:—e.g. *herde*; *ledde*; *kepte*.
- The so-called 'Irregular Verbs' of the OE. First Class, namely

¹ The Second Class have *-d(e)* or *-t(e)* according as to whether their stems end in voiced or voiceless consonant. Cf., however, *sende*, *sente*; *leue*, *lefte*.

² Note that this verb has already in Chaucer strong pret. plur. *weren*. Pecock has strong past part. *worn(e)*.

³ Contrast OE. and Chaucerian *sette*.

those which have i-umlaut in the present, but which as early as Germanic or W. Germanic times joined the preterite and past participle inflections directly to the stem, without an intermediate vowel:—e. g. *bouzte*, *brouzte*, *tauzte*.

- (c) Two verbs of the OE. Third, or *-ē-* (*-ǣ-*) Class: *hadde*, *seide*.¹
 (d) The verb *made*, which originally belonged to the OE. Class II or *-ōja-* class, but which later lost intervocalic *k* and the linking vowel:—*maad*, *made* < *mākede* (OE. *macode*).
 (e) The verbs *drede*, *rede*, *leese*, originally strong, which have gone over by Pecock's time entirely to the weak conjugation.² I have not noted preterites of these, but compare the past participles, *drad(de)*, *dred*; *red*, *rad*, *redde*, *radde*; *lost(e)*.

The verbs of Class I usually have past participles in *-ed*, *-id*. Cf. *lyued*, *loued*, *trowid*. The verbs of Class II have *-d(e)* or *-t(e)* without connecting vowel. Cf. *herd*; *tauzt*; *bouzt*; *maad*; *lost*. Verbs with stems ending in *-d* or *-t* have often apparently no ending, owing to syncopation and assimilation, e. g. *set*; *drad*; *red*.

PRETERITE-PRESENT VERBS.

The forms of the Preterite-present verbs in Pecock show little change since the time of Chaucer. The tendency to discard the distinctive forms of the plural present, which has begun in Chaucer and gone so far in Malory, has not in Pecock gained much ground. Pecock still has *kunne(n)*, *kun*, *moewe(n)*, *mow*, *schule(n)*, as compared with Chaucer's *conne(n)* (occasionally *can*), *moewe(n)*, *mow* (occasionally *may*), *shullen*, *shul*, *shuln*, (occasionally *shal*), and Malory's normal *can*, *may(e)*, *shal*, *shall(e)*.

Pecock, however, like Malory, has plural *dare* as against Chaucer's *dor* (occasionally *dar*).

The following forms of the Preterite-present verbs occur in the *Donet*, *Poore Mennis Myrrour*, *Folewer*, *Represser*, and *Book of Feith*:—

CAN.

Infín. *kunne*

Past Part. *kunnen*

Pres. Part. *kunnyng*

Weak: *kunnyd*, *koude*, *kunned.*

¹ OE. *hyogan* did not survive. *Lyue* (OE. *libban*) went over to the First Class, with pret. *lyued(e)*.

² *rēdan* is commonly weak in W. Saxon.

Pres. Ind.

- Sing. 1 & 3. can, canne, kanne
 2. cannest, canst
 Pl. kunnen, kunne, kun

Pres. Subj.

- Sing. & Pl. kunne

Pret. Ind.

- Sing. 1. coupe, koupe
 2. coupist, koupist
 3. coupe, koupe, cowde (D 5/27)
 Pl. couthen, couthe, kouthen, koupe

Pret. Subj.

- Sing. & Pl. 1 & 3. koupe
 Sing. 2. koupist

DARE.

Pres. Ind. and Subj.

- Sing. 1 & 3. dare, dar
 Pl. dare¹

Pret. Ind. and Subj.

- Sing. & Pl. durste, durst²

MOWE, MAY.

Infin. mowe, may (F 138/36, 139/14) *Pres. Part.* mowing

Pres. Ind.

- Sing. 1. mai, may
 2. maist, maiste
 3. mai, may, maie, maye
 Pl. mowen, mowe, mow, moun (R 273)

Pres. Subj.

- Sing. & Pl. 1 & 3. may, mowe
 Sing. 2. mowe

Pret. Ind. & Subj.

- Sing. 1 & 3. myzte, myzt
 2. myztist
 Pl. myzt(en), mizten

MUST.

Pres. and Pret. Ind. and Subj.

- Sing. must, muste³
 Pl. musten, muste

¹ See above, p. xlvii.

² Also used as a present.

³ I have found no example in Pecock of the old present *mote*, *moot*.

OWE.

Infin. owe

Pres. Ind.

Sing. 1. owe¹

3. owip

Pl. owen

Pres. Subj.

Sing. & Pl. owe

Pret. Ind. & Subj.

Sing. 1. ouzte¹

2. ouztist

3. ouzte, owzt, ouzt

Pl. ouzten, ouzte, ouztiden

SCHAL.

Pres. Ind.

Sing. 1 & 3. schal

2. schalt, schalte (F 198/32)

Pl. schulen, schul(e), schullen

Pres. Subj.

Sing. schule

Pl. schulen

Pret. Ind. & Subj.

Sing. 1. schulde, schuld, schude

2. schuldist

3. schulde, schulde, schude

Pl. schulden, schuld(e)

WITE.

Infin. wite

Pres. Part. witing, wityng

Past Part. wiste, wist

Pres. Ind.

Sing. 1. woot, wote

2. wost

3. wote

Pl. witen

¹ owe, owip, owen, the descendants of the OE. (cf. Chaucerian) present sing. and pl. occur several times, not with the old meaning, 'to possess', but

with the sense of moral obligation :— e.g. owip, D 14/31, &c.; owen, D. 21/25, &c. But ouzte, &c., with present sense, is commoner.

Pres. Subj.

Sing. & Pl. wite

Pret. Ind.

Sing. wiste, wist
Pl. wisten

Imperative

Sing. & Pl. wite

ANOMALOUS VERBS.

Note. As far as the forms are found, the only important variation from Chaucer is the absence of an *arn*, *are* form for the pres. indic. pl. of the verb *be*.

BE.

Infin. be, bi *Pres. Part.* beyng, being
Past Part. be, ben (rare, but cf. F 36/33; and R p. 335, first hand, corrected by second hand to *be*), bi.

Pres. Ind.

Sing. 1. am
2. art
3. is
Pl. ben, be

Pres. Subj.

Sing. be, bi (F 218/25)
Pl. ben, be, bi

Pret. Ind.

Sing. 1. was
2. were
3. was
Pl. weren, were

Pret. Subj.

Sing. were
Pl. weren, were

Imperative

Sing. & Pl. be

DO.

Infin. do *Pres. Part.* doing, doying
Past Part. doon, doun, don, do, y-doon

*Introduction.**Pres. Ind.*

Sing. 1.	do
	2. doost, doist
	3. doop, doip, dop
Pl.	doon

Pres. Subj.

Sing.	do, doo (F 115/36)
Pl.	doon, do

Pret. Ind. and Subj.

Sing 1 & 3.	dide, did
	2. didist
Pl.	diden

Imperative.

Sing. & Pl.	do
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GO.

<i>Infin.</i>	go	<i>Pres. Part.</i>	goyng, going
<i>Past Part.</i>	goon, go (D 7/5)		

Pres. Ind.

Sing. 1.	go
	2. goost
	3. goop, goip
Pl.	goon, goen, go

Pres. Subj.

Sing.	go
Pl.	go, goon

Pret. Ind. and Subj.

Sing. 1 & 3.	wente
	Pl. wenten

Imperative.

Sing. & Pl.	go
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WOLE, WILLE.

<i>Infin.</i>	wole, wille	<i>Pres. Part.</i>	willyng
<i>Past Part.</i>	willid ¹		

¹ *Wille*=OE. *willian*, a regular weak verb, is used alongside *Wole*, *Wille*=OE. *willan*, in the same sense of willing, e. g. *willip*, *Folewer*, 146/33; *willid*, *Folewer*, 116/30.

As forms in *will-* are also derived from OE. *willan*, it is not easy to separate the *will-* forms of the two verbs, except in the case of *willip*, *willid*.

Pres. Ind.

Sing.	1.	wole, wil
	2.	wolt, wolte
	3.	wole, willip ¹
Pl.		wolen, wollen, willen

Pres. Subj.

Sing.	wole, wille
Pl.	wole, wille(n)

Pret. Ind. and Subj.

Sing.	1.	wolde, wold
	2.	woldist
	3.	wolde
Pl.		wolden

The negative forms, *nyle*, *nylle*, *nil*, &c., are very common.

THE ADJECTIVE.

Whereas in Chaucer the distinct form in *-e* for the plural adjective and weak adjective is normally preserved, in Pecock the adjective often loses all trace of inflection. The plural *-e* has sometimes disappeared, and the weak ending *-e* is not regularly kept. Participles used as adjectives are usually uninflected².

Compare the erratic inflection or want of inflection in the following adjectives :—

þe seid long book, D 2/13, *þilk seid Cristen multitude*, R 318 ;
but *þe seide Cristen multitude*, R 318 ;

þe first chapitre, D 8/16 ; but *þe rehercid firste premysse*, R 332 ;
þe hool substaunce, D 2/27, *þe hool ful kunnyng*, D 3/8 ; but *al þe hoole Bible*, R 62 ;³

þe hiȝ wiȝsdom of god, F 60/32-3 ; but *þe hiȝe riȝt wey*, F 11/28 ;
þis present dialog, D 3/11 ;

þese seid chapitris, D 2/22 ; *þe vij seid maters* D 2/29 ; but *alle myne opire synguler opynyons*, F 36/28 ;

greet bisinessis, F 104/29 ; *ouer hasty and vndiscreet awaiters and bachiters*, D 4/8 ; but *ȝonge scolers*, F 13/34 ;

¹ See note on previous page. *spokun* seiȝers and affermers, F

² Cf. in contrarie maner *disposid* 60/33-4.
reders or heerers, D 5/13 ; þe now ³ *hoole* in a later hand. See Babington's Glossary.

in my englisch bokis and in my latyn bokis, D 5/18; but *my writingis, englishe and latyn*, D 4/19.

Pronominal adjectives are usually inflected for the plural: *alle suche pingis*, D 6/8; *opire maters and treubis*, F 11/16; *pilke moral vertuose werkis*, F 1/12; *myne opire synguler opynyons*, F 36/28; but *myn hondis*, F 132/38.

In comparisons *-er (-ir)* and *-est (-ist)* are used, and are uninflected. The comparison with *more* and *most* is very rarely employed;¹ *mo(o)re* and *mo(o)st* are still usually independent adjectives or adverbs, the comparative and superlative of *mych (moche)*. Cf. D 36/23, 145/32; 118/4, 19/24. But note *moost cleer*, D 19/24.

Relics of the old mutated comparatives and superlatives are seen in *strenger*, D 107/9, *lengir*, D 54/36, *eldir*, R 210, *eeldist* R 406, *strengist*, F 10/29, &c.

THE ADVERB.

Pecock's adverbs differ little from those of Modern English.

Adverbs originally formed from adjectives by the addition of *-e*, or adverbs identical in form with adjectives themselves ending in *-e*, assume *-li* forms in Pecock. Cf. OE. *sōþe*, Pecock *sotheli*;² OE. *clāne*, Pecock *clenli*. Adverbs formed from adjectives and participles by the addition of *-ly*, *-li*³ had become especially and increasingly common, so much so that *-li*, *-ly* in Pecock is the regular adverbial ending—*accordauntly*, *accordingli*, *answeringli*, *attendauntly*, *auctoritatively*, *avidiosely*, *avisidli*, *avisingli*, *rudely*, &c. The *-ly* ending is also used to form adverbs from nouns—*manly* = 'as a man', *beestly* = 'as a beast', *eendli* = 'finally, ultimately'.⁴

The *-is* adverbial ending from the genitive *-es* is seen in *bisidis*,

¹ But note that a sort of double comparative is found, 'apparently for emphasis', e.g. 'for *more pleyner understanding*', *Rep.* 344. See Babington's Glossary.

² *Sōþlice* is however used alongside *sōþe* in OE.

³ The fuller form *-like* is also found, e.g. *eerliche*, D 207/5.

⁴ e.g. 'So ofte and þanne he lyueþ *beestly* and not *manly*, neipir as it is according a man to lyue', *Donet*, p. 13, ll. 20–21; 'it is forto kepe and folewe þe doom of resoun in taking and bering and continuyng excellent labouris . . . fynali or *eendli*', *Donet*, p. 57, ll. 18–21.

ellis, nedis,¹ whilis. Traces of other forms are also found—e. g. in *-ing* or *-ling*, *heedling*, D 213/26; in *-en*, *seelden*, D 192/28.

Except in the case of those adverbs which have a special comparative and superlative form, the comparative and superlative of the adverb may be formed in two ways. Sometimes the comparative and superlative of the adjective is used without any change, e. g. *bat he schal þe broder and þe wijder se*, D 135/6–7, *esier*, R 268. But usually the *-er* and *-est* (*-ir*, *-ist*) are added to the positive adverb, e. g. *feruentlier*, D 32/2, *spedelier*, D 39/8, *sweetlier*, D 6/29, *esilier*, F 101/37, *euenlier*, R 496. *More* and *most* are not normally used in comparison.

THE PRONOUN.

PERSONAL PRONOUN.

The forms of the personal pronoun differ in no respect (except the merely orthographic) from Chaucer's normal usage:—

1st pers.

Sing. Nom.	I, y	Pl. Nom.	we
Acc.	me	Acc.	us
Gen.	min, myn, mi, my	Gen.	our, oure; ouris ²
Dat.	me	Dat.	us

2nd pers.

Sing. Nom.	þou	Pl. Nom.	ȝe
Acc.	þee, þe	Acc.	ȝou, ȝow
Gen.	þin, þyn, þy, þi	Gen.	ȝowre, ȝoure; ȝouris ²
Dat.	þee, þe	Dat.	ȝou, ȝow

3rd pers.

	<i>Masc.</i>	<i>Fem.</i>	<i>Neut.</i>
Sing. Nom.	he ³	sche ³	it
Acc.	him	hir, her	it
Gen.	his	hir, her, here (F 65/22)	his
Dat.	him	hir, her	it
Pl. Nom.	þei, þey		
Acc.	hem		
Gen.	her, here (F 30/25); heris ²		
Dat.	hem		

¹ The double form *nedisli* is also used.

² Non-attributive. See Glossary.

³ *He*, *sche* sometimes still refer to things. Cf. F 132/18, 155/19, &c.

DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS (and DEMONSTRATIVE ADJECTIVES).

Sing.	1. þis, þys	Pl.	þes(e), þis
	2. þat		þo(o)
	3. þilk		þilke

These retain only a singular and plural form, alike for all genders. *þe* is definite article for all genders and cases, and both numbers.

REFLEXIVE PRONOUN.

The reflexive pronoun with *silf* is partly modernized. *Silf* is regarded sometimes as an adjective (uninflected)—*it silf*, *him silf*, *her (hir) silf*, *we silf*, *vs silf*, *you silf*, *hem silf*; sometimes as a noun or pronoun—*my silf*, *þy silf*. Forms corresponding to ‘ourselves’, ‘yourselves’, are not found.

INTERROGATIVE PRONOUNS.

The interrogative *who*, with its neuter *what*, is declined as in Modern English. *Which(e)* usually has final *-e* in the plural.

RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

The forms are those usual at the period, but the commonest relative pronoun is not *that*,¹ but *which(e)*, used as ordinarily for persons as well as things, *who* having its general sense of ‘whoever’: cf. *opire trouþis whiche ben conteyned*, D 3/2; *azens hem whiche wolen inþugne*, D 3/5; *peple which came to him*, F 106/32–3; *euen as who is wonyð to . . . he schal*, F 15/10–13. When *whos(e)* and *whom(euer)* seem to refer to inanimate objects, personification of their antecedents is to be assumed: cf. *with helpyng and þe wirchyng of spiritis*,² of whom *y schal speke aftir*, F 39/29; *he of hem*³ *whos wirchyng*, F 31/16. *What* is used relatively: cf. *y seie and write al what y haue, or schal seie or write*, D 6/16.

PREPOSITIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS.

For the most noteworthy uses and meanings of the various prepositions and conjunctions, see Glossary.

¹ For *þat* as relative pronoun, cf. e.g. *Donet*, 119/16, ‘I am þe lorde þi god *þat* ledde þee,’ and *Folewer*, 9/39, ‘þe largist booke of autorite *þat* euer god made.’

² *Spiritis* are explained (l. 32) as *þynne bodies* conveying sight impressions to Common Wit and Imagination.

³ i.e. the inward bodily Wits.

SECTION V.

Pecock's Style and Vocabulary.

Pecock has been well called 'the greatest prosaist of his time',¹ yet his importance in the history of English prose style has been generally neglected, or at any rate under-estimated. He is indeed 'a solitary and unappreciated phenomenon'.² Lewis and Babington have minutely examined his life and his claim to a prominent place in history and theology; Morison and Miss Flemming have described his contribution to fifteenth-century English thought; Blackie has examined some of his doctrines.³ But, except for brief notices in books of selections and text books of literature,⁴ and for Schmidt's dissertation,⁵ which deals mainly with the syntax of the verb, little has been said on Pecock's language and style.

Under-estimation of Pecock seems strange. At any period he would have been a noteworthy figure in prose. In the middle of the fifteenth century, at the end of the Middle Ages, at the critical period of transition between Middle and Modern English, at the time when Latin as the universal tongue for serious scholars was beginning to give way to the native languages, he is of the utmost importance. His daring to discuss the great scholastic theories of the Middle Ages, the favourite learned religious and philosophical topics and controversies, in a vernacular⁶ unused to the subtle arguments and fine distinctions of the schoolmen, is alone enough

¹ Kellners's *Introd. to the E. E. T.* S. edition of Caxton's *Blanchardyn and Eglantine*, p. cxi.

² *Camb. Hist. of Eng. Lit.*, Vol. II, p. 286.

³ For the works of these writers see above, *Introd.* pp. xviii-xix.

⁴ See particularly Craik's *English Prose Selections*, Vol. I, where Churton Collins, in dealing with Capgrave, pays tribute to Pecock's greatness, p. 90; and where Craik comments on the logical element in Pecock's style, p. 52. Also Saintsbury's *Short Hist. of Eng. Lit.*, pp. 205-8,

which aptly summarizes the essentials; *Cambridge Hist. of Eng. Lit.*, Vol. II; and G. P. Krapp's *Rise of English Literary Prose*, pp. 64-75.

⁵ Schmidt (Fredrik): *Studies in the language of Pecock*. Inaugural dissertation. Upsala, 1900.

⁶ This was one of the charges later brought against him, for it was deemed heretical to argue about religion at all, especially in the 'comoun peplis langage'. And it must be noted that for the laity to possess such English books was regarded as a heresy.

to warrant the printing of his books and a close examination of his style and vocabulary. And even if his opinions are accounted of little worth to-day, if his matter is dismissed as unoriginal, boring, and tiresome, all must admit the importance of his earnest laborious effort to make religious and philosophical knowledge easy and rational for an ignorant but awakening laity in a tongue all could understand.

The literary power of the 15th century is with the prose of Pecock, Fortescue, and Malory.

In English literature the power of the fourteenth century is with Chaucer and other poets, the power of the fifteenth century is with the prose of Pecock, Fortescue, and Malory.

It is convenient here to note some dates. Pecock's whole literary life falls in the middle of the fifteenth century—between 1443, the date of the *Reule of Cristen Religioun*, his first book, and 1457, the date of his trial, after which pen and paper were denied him.¹ Of Pecock's six extant books, the *Reule of Cristen Religioun* was on hand in 1443; the *Donet* and *Poore Mennis Myrroure* between 1443 and 1449; the *Represser* from 1449, for some six years onwards; the *Folewer* was 'published' (in the mediaeval sense) in 1453-4; the *Book of Feith* in 1456.

Comparison of Pecock's prose with that of his predecessors—Chaucer, 'Mandeville', Trevisa, Hampole, and Wiclif.

When Pecock's first works were circulating, Wiclif had been dead sixty years, and Chaucer over forty. What had Wiclif, Chaucer, and Pecock's immediate predecessors done for English prose?

Chaucer cannot be called a great original prose writer; in the fourteenth century vernacular prose was in too humble a position to occupy Chaucer's real attention and creative gifts. The Preface to the *Treatise on the Astrolabe* is well known and loved, but there is nothing else for which one really cares at all. 'Mandeville's' *Travels*,² delightful as they are in matter and often in melody, are immature in the art of complex sentence structure. They are built for the most part in the simple, colloquial fairy-tale manner, with the usual plentiful supply of *and* and *but*. Trevisa is a

¹ See the primate's instructions to the Abbot of Thorney in Cambridgeshire, where Pecock was confined after his trial until his death, the date of which is not recorded:—

That he have no books to look on, but only a portuous (breviary), a mass book, a psalter, a legend, and

a bible. That he have nothing to write with; no stuff to write upon.' Quoted by Babington, *Introd. to Rep.*, p. lvii.

² The Cotton MS. (Titus c. xvi) is generally supposed to be about 1410-20.

conscientious translator, but no originator in style. As to the prose work of Richard Rolle of Hampole, that belongs to the history of impassioned poetic prose, and cannot be justly compared with Pecock's prose of reason. Hampole was a mystic, professedly opposed to laboured work on religious and philosophical topics; he goes little beyond the sermon, homily, and meditation.

With Wiclif the case is very different and demands fuller treatment. Pecock was admittedly a student of Wiclif's works, and diametrically opposed as are the doctrines of the two writers, there is something in the way of style that Pecock may have learned from his predecessor. The likenesses, however, are not sufficiently striking to involve necessary imitation on Pecock's side.

Both Wiclif and Pecock deliberately chose the vernacular for those works they intended for the people; but Wiclif's prose is far more the vernacular of everyday life, for it must be remembered that his English works are addressed more exclusively than Pecock's to the less educated, and that Wiclif used Latin for his more ambitious treatises. Whereas Wiclif steadily avoids discussing mere subtleties of logic and uncertainties of conception and rendering, Pecock rejoices in them, and never misses a chance of developing side-issues. From this difference in the attitude of mind springs the chief difference in style. Wiclif's sentences are generally much shorter and simpler; Pecock's, owing to their multiplication of detail, are long and heavy, but they are in reality clear and correct in syntax and style. Pecock has more range and luxuriance of expression than Wiclif, more intensity of argument and correspondingly greater variety of pitch. In Pecock subordinate clauses are more skilfully employed, and there is more careful selection of connecting words.

Both writers use the 'plain style', with little attempt at rhetoric. Pecock is the more scholarly, the more alive to niceties of vocabulary and expression. Wiclif is far less inclined to accumulate synonyms and to balance pairs or triplets or even strings of words. Both seem practically without humour: they take themselves and their work very seriously: their aim is to instruct, not to delight.

One cannot claim for Pecock a higher place than Wiclif in the history of English prose style; Wiclif's position has long been well established. But one must allow Pecock to be a pioneer of English literary prose, a forerunner of a long line of writers on

highly technical subjects who have written with more grace, no doubt, but with no greater scholarship.

Comparison of the prose of Pecock with that of his contemporary, Capgrave.

The inferiority to Pecock of his exact contemporary, Capgrave, (1393-1464) is thus summed up by Churton Collins:—

‘Capgrave stands midway between two important eras in the development of English prose composition—between the era initiated by John de Trevisa, the pseudo-Mandeville¹, Chaucer, and Wycliffe, which may be said to have culminated in the chief work of Reginald Pecock, and the era initiated by his immediate successors, Sir Thomas Malory, whose *Morte d'Arthur* was completed in 1473,² and Sir John Fortescue, whose *Governance of England* was written about 1476. But in point of style Capgrave is as inferior to his predecessors as he is to his successors. Incomparably inferior in point of vigour, grace, rhythm, and copiousness and choice of words to the composition of the chief contemporaries of Chaucer, *his style as compared with that of Pecock seems almost a relapse into barbarism*. Without vigour or colour, without grace or ornament, his style is singularly jejune and feeble. Here and there, indeed, a neatly turned sentence and a rhythmic paragraph indicate that the example of his more accomplished predecessors had not been without effect. Considering how much our language had been enriched by Chaucer and Lydgate in verse, and by Pecock and others in prose, it is surprising that Capgrave's vocabulary should be so limited; and limited it is in a remarkable degree.’³

This judgement of Capgrave seems a little unkind, in that while it most justly calls attention to Capgrave's defects, it neglects to recognize his merits, except for that one grudging admission as to an occasional neatly-turned sentence or rhythmic paragraph. Most readers know Capgrave only through his *Chronicle*, and here, it must be admitted, the entries are exceedingly bald and colourless. But the Dedication of that *Chronicle* to Edward IV does not begin, or end, with the extract from it in Craik's *Prose Selections*, and it is not all occupied, like that selection, with tiresome rhapsodisings on the number Six. There is little to quarrel with in the earlier portion of the Dedication. The constructions and rhythms of the following sentences, for example, are not unlike those of Pecock, and would, it seems to me, have justified quotation in the *Selections*:—

‘Also if ȝe merveile that in thoo ȝeres fro Adam to the Flood of Noe sumtyme renne a hundred ȝere, or more, where the

¹ See above, p. lvi, foot-note 2.

² See below, p. lix, foot-note 5.

³ Craik's *English Prose Selections*, Vol. I, p. 90.

noumbir stant bare, and no writing therein, this schal be myn excuse; for soth, I coude non fynde, not withstand that I soute with grete diligens. If othir studious men that have more red than I, or can fynde that I fond not, or have elde bokes which make more expression of thoo stories that fel fro the creacion of Adam onto the general Flod than I have, the velim lith bare, save the noumbir, redy to receyve that thei wille set in.'¹

Saintsbury in his *Short History of English Literature*,² while agreeing with Churton Collins on the inferiority of Capgrave's style to that of Pecock, recognizes the real merit and real limitation of Capgrave's style—that it is 'suited fairly for plain business-like narration, *but hardly for anything else*'. This suitability to easy narrative is what strikes one in reading things of Capgrave's other than the *Chronicle*—the *Life of Augustine*,³ for example, which the E. E. T. S. editor, Mr. J. J. Munro, believes more original than translated.⁴ The style there so suits the subject that one reads easily on, and it is not till the critic begins to weigh its merits that it is discovered to be really rather feeble stuff. It soon becomes obvious that there is no need to labour the point of Capgrave's inferiority to Pecock.

It must be remembered that by 1457, when Pecock's literary labours were arrested, the work of Fortescue, Caxton, Malory, and Fabyan was still to do; Fisher, Berners, and More were not yet born. Even if we grant the superiority of Wiclif in the fourteenth century, can we find in the first seventy years⁵ of the fifteenth century any one to seriously compete with Pecock?

Of course, it is no good pretending that through Pecock come the glories of our prose. No one would recommend him as a model of style, and it is rash to be even enthusiastic over his merits. But that does not prevent a reasonable admiration of those merits, and no writer is better worth studying historically. Men were soon aware of the pitfalls into which he had fallen, and saw how

¹ *The Chronicle of England*, by John Capgrave, edited by F. C. Hingeston; *Rolls Series*, 1858; p. 2.

² p. 208.

³ Edited by J. J. Munro for the E. E. T. S., O. S., No. 140. 1910.

⁴ See pp. vii-viii of Mr. Munro's edition.

⁵ Fortescue's *Governance of Eng-*

land was written after 1471; Caxton's translation of *Le Recueil des Histoires de Troy* was finished in 1471; Malory completed the *Morte d'Arthur* between 1469 and 1470, but it was not printed by Caxton till 1485; Fabyan's *Concordance of Histories* was finished in 1509.

much more direct and economical his prose should have been, how much it lacked in cadence and melody. But pioneer work is almost necessarily wasteful, and the solid virtues of Pecock's prose were as useful in the making of English prose style as the melodies of Malory.

The difficulties experienced by Chaucer, Caxton, and Pecock in fixing a literary standard language.

Pecock, like Chaucer before him, and Caxton after, was faced with the problem of a 'word-board' that readers from all the shires of England might understand. He felt the difficulties of rapidly changing sounds and divergences of dialect:—

'Langagis, whos reulis ben not writen, as ben Englisch, Freensch, and manye othere, ben chaungid withynne 3eeris and cuntrees, that oon man of the oon cuntre, and of the oon tyme, my3te not, or schulde not kunne undirstonde a man of the othere kuntre, and of the othere tyme; and al for this, that the seid langagis ben not stabili and foundamenti writen.'¹

He laments the limitations and uncertainties of the English language, but is not deterred thereby. It is the *thing* that signifies, not the *name*:

'Y can not bettir counseil . . . for pees and accorde þan forto remembre it what oon writip in sentence þus: 'Whilis men accorden in þe þing and in þe treupe in it silf, stryue þei not aboute wordis and namyng of þe same þing'; Nameliche herfore for þat alle wordis mowe signifie as men at her owne lust wole haue hem to signifie, and specialy in nede, whanne þere is not so greet plente of names but þat þer is lack of propre names to summe propre þingis.'²

This is the keynote of Pecock's attitude towards the English he wrote. It was the message that principally mattered; the language was of importance only in so far as it could best and most clearly express his thoughts to ignorant men.

Pecock's forging of a philosophic vocabulary.

One must remember that he had no literary form ready to hand for his subtleties and philosophisings. He had not even a ready-made vocabulary. Three ways were open to him. He could anglicize foreign words, e.g. *assumpt*, *defensory*, *discherid*, *excusatorye*, *esplayng*, *inpressli*; translate Latin words by their nearest English equivalents, e.g. *appetitis* or *lustys*, *accidentis* or *fallyngis*; or give to existing English words new and extended meanings, e.g. *ouerer* (= 'superior'), *ouerte* (= 'superiority'),

¹ *Book of Faith*, p. 251.

² *Donet*, p. 44.

rennyngli (= *cursim*, 'rapidly'), *fer fet* (= 'far-fetched', 'extravagant'). He tried all three ways, with results often unfortunate, but always deserving of sympathy and respect.¹

Hallam has represented the language of Pecock as 'more obsolete than that of Lydgate or any of his contemporaries'.² This is too sweeping. Pecock uses many old-fashioned words for which we have later substituted foreign equivalents—such as *folewer* for *sequel*, *outdrauht* for *extract*. Sometimes he favours, or even invents, such cumbersome Teutonic formations as 'vn-to-be-pouzt-vpon',³ many of which are now regarded as utter strangers by the ordinary layman for whom Pecock wrote, while their 'fair Frenshe' and stately Latin brethren slip naturally into the speech of the most unlettered. But it is highly probable that, at that time, these clumsy Teutonisms were far better understood by the ignorant laity than their more polished French and Latin substitutes. And Pecock freely uses well-known foreign words. He is neither startlingly conservative to the old Teutonic element, nor startlingly liberal in the adoption of foreign forms. It is a mistake to represent Pecock's works as a mere treasure-trove for the Teutonic philologist and dictionary-maker. They are more. Pecock is no purist. It is a well known fact that during the fourteenth century, particularly the latter half, the number of French words introduced into English literature was great, and by Pecock's time the composite nature of the language was fixed. Pecock incorporates a very large French and Latin element, accepting without question all those borrowings which had safely established themselves. Nevertheless, where he has no way of rendering a Latin learned term or technical phrase or abstract noun, he turns

Hallam's
view of
Pecock's
language as
'obsolete.'

¹ A little time spent with the *N. E. D.* reveals how much Pecock did in the way of enriching and extending his vocabulary. Many 'first examples' are quoted from the *Represser*, and the *Donet* and *Folewer* can furnish more. The following are a few words not noted, or not noted in the same sense, in the *N. E. D.*, or of which the *N. E. D.* editors were able to cite only much later instances: *anagogie*, *accordingnes*, *avidiosely*, *charitative*, *corrupcioun*, *currauntli*,

declaratorye, *disworschiping*, *explaying*, *general* (sb. = 'genus'), *insensible*, *noysum*, *passionable*, *pretence* (adj.), *remembre* (sb.), *recording* (adj.), *recrete* (trans.). For references see Glossary to *Donet*.

² *Lit. of Europe*, Vol. I, p. 317, foot-note m. Sixth edition, London, 1860.

³ Ben Jonson saw the force of such *un-* compounds: cf. *un-in-one-breath-utterable*; *Every Man in his Humour*, I, v, 113.

to the native vocabulary, and forges, for the sake of clearness and simplicity, those curious Peacockisms that make his pages look archaic and unintelligible to-day. It is in these strange forgeries¹ that the chief difference between his vocabulary and that of Chaucer consists, though Chaucer also has his peculiar poetic words that never really took hold of the English language outside the tradition of more or less artificial poetry.

Peacock's
tautology.

What really makes Peacock's style appear old-fashioned, obsolete, awkward, in the eyes of the reader of to-day, is his tautology, not his actual language. But in this repetitive style he was of his time, not behind it. And his repetitions are not due to carelessness or confusion of thought, as they so often are in much higher rated prose. They are a conscious element of Peacock's style, and have their uses, if they have their defects.

Coupling of
foreign and
English
synonyms.

Frequently Peacock couples an English word with a Latin or French. Sometimes, like the translators of the Bible, he does this where doubt might arise as to his meaning, explaining a difficult foreign term by a long roundabout 'simpler' phrase, and then purely for the sake of being understood by a wider class of readers, some of whom, ignorant of Latin and knowing 'na more Frensché pran, can hir lift beele'/? would find the foreign words difficult. Compare, for example, *forth-forgo and comprehend* or *to send or gader in scouring* (*Poet.* 11: 12); *mercantils or fallings* (*Poet.* 12: 8); *most according or most comprehensiveness gadering to gader*, but *is to send, worst schort profitably gadering together* (*Poet.* 19: 34-6); *obsequy and so mercemercatils and out-mercatils barter* (*Poet.* 166: 4-16); *circumscribed and circumscription* (*Poet.* 161: 4-5); *benewose or momeination* (*Follow.* 193: 33); *princemore or lord* (*Finian.* 148: 12).

Repetition
as an
ornament.

Now and again he seems to use repetition for the sake of ornament and rhythm. Doubling and tripling of words—almost synonyms—even common ones, is with him a habit, occurring over and over again, especially the triple arrangement, where no doubt could possibly arise as to the meaning. The effect on the whole is pleasant: it is familiar to us through the Book of Common Prayer, and takes off something of the general formal matter-of-factness of

¹ e.g. *staid or long, unapproachill*.

circumscribed Rowland Hymen Hymen.

² John of Trevisa's translation of Higden's *Polychronicon*, in *Poly-*

Chronica . . . edited by C. Baskington. Rolls Series, 1889, vol. 22, p. 161.

Pecock's style. Compare, for example, *gile and wyke* (*Donet*, 2/7); *poynnt and pricke of tyne* . . . *couplid and jounyd* (*Donet*, 2/31-2); *conferatib/, comprehendib/, or clousib/* (*Donet*, 16/31). Examples can be found on every page.

Usually, however, the words so coupled together show a nice discrimination in their choice. Each adds its own distinct shade of meaning to the verbal picture, as well as its own particular note to the melody. Such a passage as the following—taken quite at random—is a good example of the scholarly artistry of Pecock's style:—

'þefore y haue made a litil booke to be a declarative of þese pointis and of mo, agens envie and detraccioun and malice, whiche peraventure myȝt rise into summe heereke or redere being moche redier forto suche writingis lette and distroie þan forto enye suche bi her owne laboure fynde, make and multiplie into good occupacioun for cristen lay men, þat þei bi reeding þerinne discouere hem self þe more fro þe worlde and þe fleisch, and þe nyȝer and þe oftir and þe awetliet knyȝte hem and couple hem to god and to his wel willingis, as forto be a bilowe to blowe and pufte vp þe fier of deuocioun in her soule, into banysching awcie þe coorde of vndeuocioun and of vncharite, whiche coorde is modir of moche myslyuing, as þe contrarye beet is modir of moche good lyuing.'¹

It is remarkable to find in so early a writer such a number of carefully built complex sentences. Pecock's style is far beyond that primitive prose that cannot adequately express complicated logical relations. Simple and compound sentences² are sparingly employed, and are then used in the right way to express simple facts or statements equal in importance, e.g.:—

'Sone, comune witt is placid in þe forhede. ymaginacioun is in a selle next aftir folewing, toward þe myddis of þe heed. þanne next is placid flantasie, in þe myddis of þe heed. And nexte to him is sett estimacioun, toward þe hindre eende of þe heed. And mynde is sette in þe nolle bihinde.'³

'And amonge þese comaundementis being meenys into þe getyng of loue, biȝnes to learne is þe first. And so in þis now last seid maner biȝnes to learne is þe first comaundement of þe lawe; and in þe opire bifore seid maner, forto loue god is þe first comaundement of þe lawe. And so my seiying stondiþ wel ynoug with þe seiying of crist.'⁴

¹ *Donet*, p. 6.

is often merely one of punctuation.

² The distinction between the two

³ *Donet*, p. 11.

⁴ *Donet*, p. 113.

Shades of meaning in Pecock's strings of words.

Pecock's careful use of the complex sentence.

Where there is a more complex relationship of main and dependent facts, Pecock is accurate enough, and mature enough, and modern enough to express these facts in their right shades of importance, that is to say, by the complex sentence, and by the complex sentence justly balanced and subordinated, for Pecock's syntax is very rarely defective or slovenly, and the technique, considering the difficulty of the subject-matter, is surprisingly good for this date. The following characteristic passage illustrates various kinds of subordination, and will bear strict analysis:—

‘*fierpirmore, y make protestacioun pat it is not myn entent forto holde, defende, or fauore, in þis book, or in enye opire bi me writun, or to be writun, in latyn or in þe comoun peplis langage, enye erreure or heresie or enye conclusioun whiche schulde be agens þe feiþ or þe lawe of oure lord god. and if enye such it happe me to write or ofire or purpose or holde, defende, or fauour, bi enye vnausidnes, hastynes, or ignoraunce, or bi eny opire maner, y schal be redi it to leue, forsake and retere, mekely and deuoutli, at þe assignementis of myn ordinaries, fadris of þe chirche. In contrarie manere to þis gouernaunce y was neuere ȝit hidirto disposid, y þank my lord god; and y purpose neuere in contrarie wise opir to be, how euer it happe ouer hasty and vndiscreet awaiters and bachiters in opir wise of me feel or diffame. fierpirmore, siþen an errour or heresye is not þe ynke writen, neipir þe voice spokun, but it is þe meenyng or þe vndirstondyng of þe writer or speker signified bi pilk ynke writen or bi pilk voice spokun, and also neuere into þis daie was enye man holde iugid or condempnid for an errer or an heretyk, but if it were founde þat his meenyng and vndirstonding whiche he had in his writyng or in his speking were errour or heresie; þerfore y desire and aske for charite þat noon harder or hastier holding or iuging be made anentis me. And forto knowe what myn vndirstonding and meenyng is, and schal be, in wordis of my writingis, englische and latyn, certis, oon ful goode weie is forto attende to þe circumstauncis in þe processis whiche y make þere bfore and aftir, and whiche y make in opire placis of my writingis. for bi þis weie Seynt Austyn leerned what was þe rizt meenyng in þe wordis of holi scripture, as he seiþ in his ‘book of 83 questiouns’, þe [lij] questioun. And if þis weie be not for alle placis of my writingis sufficient, recours may be had to my persoun forto aske of me, while y am in þis lijf.’¹*

Such a style as Pecock's looks clumsier than it really is, because of its excessive fulness and weight: no element, no side-issue, is

¹ *Donet*, pp. 3-5.

left to the intelligence or imagination of the reader. It is the very opposite of the modern prose of brevity and suggestion. But it cannot be called immature or badly constructed. However much it may be retarded by parentheses, there are surprisingly few incongruities of sentence-build.

In its elements, the style of Pecock and Hooker is similar, though of course Hooker far transcends Pecock in eloquence and majesty of cadence. In the century and a half between the two divines the art of prose had made incalculable advances. But in that ponderousness which is yet never really obscure or inaccurate, both are strikingly alike. They have the same luxuriance of subordinate clauses, though in Pecock it is a luxuriance apt to be wearisome, while in Hooker it is delightful and majestic. We find similar faults—the superabundance of words, the crowding of facts and inferences in space too small to hold them. And we find similar gifts; above all, the art of expressing complex meanings and subtle doctrines with far-sighted and comprehensive accuracy.

Pecock's favourite style—but not by any means his only one, for he writes to suit his ends—may be described as the literary development of the syllogism. In the syllogism he had unbounded faith, believing all but the highest mysteries to be reducible to a form of reasoning:

‘so stronge and so myȝti in al kindis of maters, that thouȝ al the aungels of hevene wolden seie that his conclusioun were not trewe, ȝitt we schulde leewe the aungels sei yng, and we schulden truste more to the proof of thilk sillogisme than to the contrarie sei yng of alle the aungels in hevene, for that alle Goddis creaturis musten nedis obei to doom of resoun, and such a sillogisme is not ellis than doom of resoun.’¹

His arguments, long and short, fall naturally into premises and conclusions, generally with illustrative examples. Very often the quickest way to understand one of his complicated passages is to dot down the argument in logical skeleton form, with the points used to prove or disprove the argument, the points used to prove or disprove these points, and so on.² Pecock's gift for syllogistic argument is immense, and the style is that in which a man of his scholastic training would naturally express himself. It is ponderous

¹ *Book of Faith*, pp. 174–5.

on the Third Commandment, *Donet*,

² Cf. *Donet*, 15/34–16/15; 17/23–18/11; and particularly the teaching

pp. 148–56.

at its best, conceited at its worst, but always refined and dignified. Pecoock's pedantry may be irksome, but we have a certain respect for its discipline. His extreme self-consciousness is annoying, and his questionings often a nuisance. We many a time long to be at the other end of the literary world with the unaffected simplicity of 'Mandeville' or Malory. All the same, Pecoock's style cannot but be said to suit his subject, and to lend to it an elegance and authority of its own.

The essential naturalness of Pecoock's style.

Is it paradoxical to assert that, though Pecoock's style is artificial, it is yet natural? His sentences are of the syllogistic shape because he thought that way. Somehow, in spite of the fact that Pecoock's style never did, and never could, become popular, one feels it is good English. It is difficult to say exactly how this effect is produced. Probably it is chiefly due to the writer's sincerity and amazing energy, to his own intense interest in what he is saying, to his strong conviction that he is writing English for English people in the correct and proper English way. We wish that, like Lord Berners, he would 'brevely come to a poynt';¹ we get out of patience with him, extremely irritated, but somehow he is stimulating, and we plod on. The 'lyzt superficial overreding' he deprecates in *The Book of Feith*² is impossible. We must 'overrede him sadli and oft',² not try to understand by the mere 'hasti smel and smatche'.³ His prose, in spite of its strangeness and difficulty, is alluring. The intricacy of the arguments and the closely-packed thoughts demand stern attention, but once we realize that here is no easy task, Pecoock can be read with sympathy, if not with pleasure.

His employment of the simple narrative style.

If he desires, he can 'putte caas' clearly and directly and concisely. Take, for instance, this passage on the folly of slavishly worshipping Aristotle:

'Whi perfore schulden we algate and for bettir or wors and vttirli cleue to Aristotil, what euer he teche? What was Aristotil opir pan a loue of trouþ, and perfore a laborer bisi forto fynde þe knowyng of treuþ, boþe for him silf and for opire? Many, forsoþe, of oolde philesofris passiden him in þe mathematik sciencis and in astrologie, and many passiden him in methaphisik, and many passiden him in medicinal filosofie. Oouli in logik and in comoun natural filosofie and in moral filosofie he passide þe opire oolde clerkis. And pouz many

¹ Preface to Froissart.

² p. 116.

³ *Book of Faith*, p. 205.

wolen folewe Aristotil for reuerence of Aristotil more þan for reuerence of trouþ to be defendid and publichid, as ful oft such inparfitnes is wonyd to be vsid in scole of filosofie and in scole of dyuynyte, þe more reuþ is; ȝit it likiþ not to me forto so reuerence and folewe Aristotil aȝens treuþ, ffor wel y wote it was neuyr Aristotilis wil þat eny man schulde so do. fforwhi he dide þe contrari whanne he varied from his owen maistir and seide: "A greet freend is plato, but a gretter freend is trouþ."¹

Or the passage on the responsibility of the clergy, if they mislead simple men :

'In a large, wyde parisch, up lond, be an oold symple widowe, or an oold symple husbonde man, to whom a greet famed kunnyng mayster of divinute is curat, and parsoun, and viker. This husbond man is enfoormed, and tauȝt of the seid his famos curat forto bileeve as feith a certeyn article, which in trouthe is an heresie. This man hath no motive, neither can fynde cause, whi he schulde not trowe to his seid curat, and whi he schulde walke wyde forto examine whether his curat techith him riȝtli, or no. And therfore this man cleveþ to the seid doctrine of his curat as stiffeli as he doith to eny other article which he hath leernyd of the same curat to be feith.'²

But, with the next sentence, Pecock reverts to his ordinary complicated style, with the result that even the modern editor cannot allow us another full-stop for eighteen lines.

Pecock can use the rhetorical question very effectively, especially when full of indignation :

His use of the rhetorical question.

'How schal a man drede and aȝenstonde his natural wrecchidnessis, but yf he bifore knewe his natural wrecchidnessis? how schulde a man repente him of hise synnys, but if he knowe his synnys? how schulde a man sette remedies aȝens hise wrecchidnessis and aȝens hise wickidnessis, but if he bifore knewe þe same remedies? . . . how schulde a man haue greet longing desire into heuenward, how schulde he be strong and hard to suffre greet peynes in contynewaunce for heuen, and ȝitt knowe not þat þere is an heuen, or knowe not what heuen is, or what ioies ben in heuen? How schulde a man drede and fle peynes of helle, and ȝitt no þing knowe of hem? how schulde a man be stirid to loue god aboue a man him silf, but if he knewe goddis worþines to be fer aboue mannys worþines? And perfore I wondre how for schame eny man knowleching him silf in louȝest degree a clerk, schulde so iuge, deeme and affeerme,

¹ *Folewer*, pp. 151-2.

² *Book of Faith*, pp. 223-4.

preche and publysch . . . þat it is no nede þat þe peple leerne and knowe ouȝte of the first, ije, ii^e, v^e, vj^e and vij^e maters.'¹

Pecock's use of the homely style. Comparison with Latimer.

Now and again, in moments of passion, he approaches the stinging homeliness of Latimer:

'Arere, therefore, and turne into thi dewe obedience, and bithenke that forto knowe more of Goddis privetees, being above the fynding and myȝte of oure natural resoun, than he wole vouche saaf forto reveele and denounce to us, is a foul stinking presumcioun, namelich if we wolen not ellis fulfille what we knownen, or mowe knowe if we wolen, God have ordeyned us to do.'²

One hardly expects frequent use of the picturesque and the concrete in a writer who lives the life of the intellect to such an extent as Pecock; but now and again he is like Latimer in his use of vivid detail. Our punishments in the life to come are described with great zest:

'In seyng passing horrible þingis, in heering of passing gastful noisis, in smelling moost lopid stinchis, in taasting moost squaymose taastis, in touching, and suffring to be touchid, of moost peynful and moost greuouse þingis to þe touche . . . in abiding wiþ moost loopid and moost hatid companye.'³

He can use, like Latimer, strong, simple, homely terms of great impressiveness. Thus the Seven Deadly Sins and the Seven Works of the Holy Ghost are forcefully described as 'lose gibellettis' and 'pacchis' on the Ten Commandments.⁴

Pecock's use of comparison and illustration.

Like Latimer again, he knows the value of familiar illustration, though he uses it far more sparingly. Nothing could be more effective and convincing than these simple comparisons:

'And, þerfore, þouȝ I brynge not a greet book into a tretice, þe see into a cuppe, or a mounteyn into an ynche, alle men muste holde me excusid.'⁵

The abstruse logical problems of the 'general' and its 'special', and of a thing not existing longer than one of its parts, are thus made clear by simple comparisons:

'No þing is maad of a general and of his special sett to pilk general; þorwþi no þing is more of hem þope so sett to gider

¹ *Donet*, pp. 200-1. The point is that it is not possible to fulfil the law of God, the Fourth Matter, unless we also know the other six Matters.

² *Book of Faith*, p. 219.

³ *Donet*, p. 98.

⁴ *Donet*, pp. 146 and 147.

⁵ *Donet*, p. 177.

þan is þe same symple and syngle special, withoute eny composi-
cioun of him and of his seid general as of ij parties. As if I
seie in latyn þus, "animal homo", in þat I seie no more þan if I
seid þus, "homo". If I seie "a quyck body man", I seie no more
þan if I seid "a man". "Colour whiȝtnes" is no more or opire
þan is "whiȝtnes"; "beest asse" is no more or opir þan is "asse."¹

'No þing, namelich not hauyng lijf, which is maad of two
parties to gider had and abiding, dureþ lengir tyme þan his
þoþe parties duren with him; but whanne euer eny of þo ij
parties ceesiþ to be, þe hool þing of hem boþþ maad ceesiþ to be:
as, siþen an house is maad of þe wallis and of þe roof, it may
not be seid þat þe house duryþ lenger þan whilis with him boþþ
þe wallis and þe roof duren. And also soone as þe roof, which
is oon party of þe house, abiding þe wallis, is takun aweie, so
soone it is to be seid þat pilk house dureth no lengir.'²

He compares the infinity of God, so difficult to grasp in the
abstract, to the way from London to Rome—a thousand miles long
—doubled and redoubled and redoubled again and ever again; yet
that however much doubled, there were a second way new set,
so long that it should always outdistance the other with all its
repeated doubling, so that the first should be 'but as a pricke and
as a poynt in reward of this secunde weie now new sett'.³ And
this wonderful length should be

'sprede . . . in brede so largeli as he dooth in lengthe that
ther is no brynkis of it; and also that he in lijk vnmesurable
wise arise into heiȝte withoute eende of heiȝte, and strecche hym
silk down into depnes withoute eny ground; so that his breed,
his lengthe and his depnes be as large as is now aforeseid his
lengthe.'³

Again he compares God, the Maker of all, and the unmade Being
on whom all things ultimately depend, to the Keeper of a chain
hanging from above,

'for everything made depends on something else, as a chain
hanging down from above may consist of very numerous links,
but must have a keeper somewhere to hold it up.'⁴

Such clear presentation of the abstract makes Pecock's work
appear very concrete.

It is interesting to note in the Introduction to the *Reule*, that
Adoption
of medi-
aeval vision
scheme.

¹ *Donet*, p. 151. ² *Donet*, p. 154.

⁴ Gairdner's monograph on the

³ Gairdner's monograph on the *Reule*, p. 38.

Reule, p. 37.

Pecock, who rarely indulges in rhetoric or the devices of the imagination, employs very effectively the common mediaeval vision scheme. He sees afar

‘a multitude of persoonys ful comely and faire, as it were out from derkenes or a desolate cloude forth going, and toward me to come hem proferyng, of whom was one voice, oo crie, oo desire, under this oon maner protestacioun makyng: “Man, we ben treuthis of vniversal philosophie comprehending lawe of kynde and lawe of feith. We ben out of the lond of resonable soulis long tyme exilid; we ben thilke whiche schulen schewe to thee, in desyrose longyng, and teche how thou schalt boothe knowe, serve and haue thi fynal eende, perpetual ioie and al thyn hertis feedyng.”’¹

These persons, who represent the Truths of Universal Philosophy, are arranged in companies, each company declaring one of the Seven Matters² with which the book deals.

Logical
and artistic
arrange-
ment of
Pecock's
books.

Where Pecock can best claim to be a stylist, even a great stylist, is in order and arrangement, and in the power of marshalling his ideas. His books have in them a good deal of the essay nature—the careful planning, the preliminary statements of objects and scope, the linking up of successive parts, the formal rounding off of the whole. This is not very apparent in the manuscripts, owing to immature punctuation and paragraphing, but it is none the less certain that the author had every topic, every paragraph, every point, very clearly marked off in his own mind. One by one, his paragraphs can be tested by the good old school rule of compressing them into a single sentence. The point nearly always comes out distinct and whole, in spite of the old-fashioned, round-about wrappings. Nothing shows better the folly of accusing Pecock of vagueness and rambling of thought. And as it is with the paragraphs, so it is with the larger sections, which are at once parts and wholes. For the linking up is exceedingly well done. In the *Donet* and the *Folewer* the question of the ‘son’ which introduces the topic of the following paragraph or series of paragraphs, generally arises from the preceding teaching. Then there is the steady essay-like building up of evidence—the careful ordering, not merely stringing, of statements, the proofs of these statements, the deductions from them. And his long laborious

¹ See Gairdner's monograph on the *Reule*, pp. 29–30.

² For list of these, see *Donet*, p. 27.

treatises are natural wholes and therefore works of art. He has a talent for arrangement and perspective. As Gairdner says: 'While writing any work, he had not only determined in his own mind the exact line of argument to be taken from the beginning, but apparently knew pretty well how much ground was to be traversed before he arrived at a particular demonstration.'¹ In the *Reule* he refuses to discuss all possible doubts upon each moral virtue—and this to Pecock meant real self-denial—because it would be so long as to 'disturb the compendiose comprehension for which this present book is pryncipaly maad'.² Hence his work flows naturally; one thing leads to another because of the very exactly preconceived line of thought. No doubt he made elaborate plans and outlines: his training in logic would have taught him the necessity of that. But the artist and creator are behind the mechanic.


In those great English text-books which remain, and which form so small a part of that 'Instauratio Magna' of theology and philosophy which Pecock so laboriously built up, he has given to later and less ambitiously religious and philosophical times an instructive sample of the well furnished mind, untiring perseverance and enthusiasm of the 'clerk' or 'doctor' of the Middle Ages. His talent and sincerity have enabled him to accomplish one of the hardest possible things, the creating, from dry principles and tedious axioms, of educational treatises sufficiently dignified by style and art and thought and wisdom to claim a place as 'literature'. On account of the nature of his subject-matter and the labour of his style, Pecock's appeal will ever be only to a very narrow circle. But his works should be accepted and their merits acknowledged in the generous spirit he himself advocates, both as literature and

'for þe good and profitable trouþis whiche ben in hem, þouȝ manye defaultis be þerwip founde in hem, for to noon it is ȝouun forto knowe al.'³

¹ Gairdner's monograph on the *Reule*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ *Donet*, p. 5.



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¹ See Notes to 2/20, and *Donet*, p. 27.

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[THE FOLEWER TO THE DONET]

[Brit. Mus. Roy. MS. 17 D. ix.]

i^e parti.

2^a 1 Here bigynneþ þe book y-callid² 'þe folewer to þe donet'.²

i^e chapitre.

[S]I þen³ it is so þat in þe first and secund parties of 'þe donet into cristen religioun'⁴ bifore goyng þis present book, ben alle þe poyntis of goddis lawe ful openli vndir a compendi and ful profitabili expressid, whiche we ben bound
5 forto fulfille, and whiche ben largelier sett forþ in 'þe reul of cristen religioun'⁵ and in þe bookis perteynyng þerto; And ferþirmore among þe benefetis of god it is rehersed schortli in þe first parti of 'þe donet', and lengir in þe secund parte of 'cristen religioun'⁶ and in þe bookis to him
10 perteynyng, þat god bi his hiȝest large frenesse ȝeueþ to ech man gracis to enforme him in his resoun and to stire him in his wil into þilke moral vertuose werkis whiche god wolde

The points of God's law are briefly and clearly treated in the *Donet*, and more fully in the *Reule*.

In those books it is explained how God gives men grace to know and perform moral virtuous works.

¹ At the top of folio 2^a (really fol. 1^a; see Introd., Section I, A) is written in a sixteenth-century hand: 'Reginaldus Peacock, *Episcopus* Cicestrensis clar[us] Anno domini 1450. *Educatus* oxon[iæ] in Collegio orialensi.'

² For Method of Transcription, see Introd., Section II.

³ The MS. has never gone through the illuminator's hands. A space is left at the beginning of chapters for an illuminated initial capital, the corresponding 'director' being written in the blank space as a guide.

⁴ Only one manuscript of this work is believed to be extant. This is now preserved in the Bodleian as MS. Bodl. 916. Edited by me for the E.E.T.S. (*O.S.*, No. 156) 1921 (for 1918), Oxford Univ. Press.

⁵ A manuscript of this work, the only one known to exist, has been since 1911 in Mr. Morgan's library, New York. See also Gairdner's monograph on the *Reule*, and Introd. to *Donet*, p. xv, footnote 2.

⁶ See above, footnote 5. In the extant copy of the *Reule*, I am informed, there is no Second Part.

For the doing of
which works
man will be
rewarded.

For the neglect
of which works
man will be
punished.

The moral
virtues are
taught in the
FOUR TABLES¹ of
the *Donet* and in
the *Reule*.

Our sins are the
omission of
these moral
virtues, or the
commission of
their contraries.

All the SEVEN
MATTERS² of
God's law are
taught in the
Donet.

Therefore the
Folewer may
seem unneces-
sary.

But, though the
Folewer is un-
necessary for
lower intelli-
gences, it is
necessary for
higher.

pilk man to do, whanne and where and how god wolde pilk
man hem do, in þe lawe of god; And þanne if a man wirche
with his grace, þat is to seie, if he so obeie þat he reule him
aftir þe informacioun and þe stiring which his grace makip
to him, he and his werk schulen be acceptid of god bi an 5
acceptyng or alowyng grace into a certeyn meede and blis in
heuen; And if a man wirche not with his grace sent and
jouen to him, pilk grace schal be takun away from him and
he schal be þerfore sore punyschid; And also siben al what
a man ouzte forto do in þe seruice of god in þis world is not 10
ellis þan þo moral vertues whiche ben conteynynd in þe foure
tablis,¹ and forto fulfille þo vertues sufficien oure natural
powers and þe seid ȝiftis of grace, and alle þese moral vertues
and gravis ben sufficientli tauȝt in þe first and secund parties
of þe seid 'donet' and in 'þe book of cristen religioun' and 15
in þe bookis to him knytt and annexid; And whiche ben
oure synnes may be knowen competentli bi þe seid moral
vertues, for as mych as oure synnes ben not ellis þan þe
leuyngis of þo vertues vndoon, or þe contraries bi vs doon of
þo vertues; ȝhe, and alle þe vij kyndis of maters² rehercid 20
bifore in þe first parti of 'þe donet' mowe be knowe wel bi
þe first parti of 'þe donet', as for and as mych as it longip
hem to be knowe bi a donet in schortnes, and þei ben knowe
in lengþ bi þe opire now bifore namyd bookis; It myȝte seme
solewe þerfore þat forto make þis present book to be callid 25
'þe folewer to þe donet' is no need, and so forto putte þis
present book in maner of a charge or of birþen vpon men,
semeþ to be not good. But aȝenward, þouȝ to so symple men
and wymmen of witt þat þei neuer schulen mowe leerne | þis 26
present book, and to children, and to opire symple men 30
and wymmen vnto tyme þei wyne into hizer and grettir
leernyng, þe seid 'donet' may suffice as for a donet, wiþout
þis present book; ȝit treuþ is þat not al what is sufficient
and ynouȝ to oon persoon is ynouȝ to an opir persoon, no more
þan what is y-nouȝ in licour to a potel pott is ynouȝ to 35
a galon pott, siben þe nouȝnesse toward persoones is to be
mesurid and to be take aftir her capacite and aftir her
receyuabilnesse, euen as it is of a potel poot and of a galon

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

patt; and þe capacite and þe receyuabilnesse is not lijk greet
 in ech man, as is open bi þe parable in þe gospel, Mathew,
 þe xxv^e chapitre,¹ þat a lord bitoke to oon of his servauntis
 v besauntis, and to an opir ij, and to an opir oon, so þat to
 5 ech of hem þe bitakyng was maad after his power and
 strengþ beyng in him to deinceene þe þing to him bitakun, as
 þe gospel seip þere. And þerfore, siben it is so þat alle
 deedis of goddis lawe ben moral vertuose deedis, fforwhi alle
 deedis wherbi we deseruen meede in heuen ben moral vertuose
 10 deedis, as schal be tauzt aftir in þis present book, to be
 clepid 'þe folewer to þe donet,' it is ful sitt yng to him þat
 may so fer knowe, þat he knowe what longip to a moral
 vertu, þat is to seie, what þingis ben causis to a moral vertu,
 and what þingis ben requyrid to be had to a deede þat he be
 15 a moral vertuose deede, and how moral vertu is dyuerse and
 different from opire vertues whiche ben not moral; and þis
 is tauzt in þe[xv^e] ² chapitre of þis present book. fferþirmore,
 siben moral vertues mowe not be gendrid in vs but bi summe
 knowyngal vertues, as ben feip and prudence, it is lijk
 20 accordyng þat a man sette him to knowe þo now seid
 knowyngal vertues, feip and prudence, and þese he may not
 moost sufficientli knowe but if he knowe how þei ben
 different and dyuers from opire knowyngal vertues, it
 folewith þat it is semeli him to knowe alle þe spicis of
 25 knowyngal vertues, and þis is tauzt in þe [xj^e] ² chapitre of
 þis present book. fferþirmore, siben knowyngal vertues
 and moral vertues ben sumwher in man, and þei ben not
 in his ize, neipir in his eere, neipir in his heele, as in her
 propre to hem receyuyng placis; þerfore it is ful honest to a
 30 man, if he may þerto suffice, þat he knowe how and where
 boþe knowyngal vertues and moral vertues ben in a man.
 And siben knowyngal vertues ben in mannys resoun, as in
 3^a her propir place or receit, and moral | vertues ben in a
 mannys wil, as in her propir place or her receit, it is lijk
 35 honest to a man, if he may, forto knowe his resoun and his
 wil, what powers þei ben, and whiche ben her officis, and
 what difference is bitwixe hem, and how þei ben different
 from alle opire powers of oure soul and of oure bodi; And

The Folewer
 explains fully
 what is meant
 by a moral
 virtue, and how
 a moral virtue
 differs from
 a virtue which
 is not moral.

Since moral
 virtues are
 engendered by
 kunnyngal
 (knowyngal or
 intellectual)
 virtues, the
 Folewer teaches
 the kinds of
 kunnyngal
 virtues.

The Folewer also
 teaches how
 kunnyngal
 virtues
 lie in man's
 Reason, and
 how moral
 virtues lie in
 man's Will, and
 the exact
 powers and
 province of the
 Reason and
 Will.

¹ vv. 14-30.

² Space left in MS. for reference.

All this is taught briefly in the *Donet*, and fully in the *Folewer*.

The necessity of knowing the meaning of Reason and Will, how they differ from each other, and from powers common to man and beast.

This is taught briefly in the *Donet*, and fully in the *Folewer*.

The *Folewer* is in dialogue form.

The *Folewer* is divided into two parts. The First Part explains fully the

namely siben resoun and wil ben þo powers bi oonli which we ben aboue beestis and bettir þan beestis, and pure men, and able to wirche moral vertues, and be þe seruauntis of god, and þerbi to deserue heuen; And al þis is tauzt bigynnyngli in þe first *chapitre* of þe first parti of 'þe donet,' 5 and is tauzt þerwith eendyingli and fulli in þis present book fro þe bigynnyng of herinnè þe iiije *chapitre* into þe eend of þe ix^e *chapitre*. Also treup is þat a mannys natural powers ben to be had, and þat wipout hem a man may not do and wirche þe seid moral vertues of goddis lawe, þouȝ to wirche 10 þe same moral vertues parfitli grace is also requyrid. And if þis be trewe, as it is trewe, þanne folewith þat it is necessari to ech man which wole parfitli kepe þe moral vertues of goddis lawe, þat he wite and knowe bi whiche natural powers he ouȝte, schulde and muste fulfille þe moral 15 vertues and poyntis of goddis law. And siben þo powers ben principalli resoun and wil, for bi hem oonli we ben verili in mankynde and aboue beestis, and bettir þan beestis, and so wirchers of werkis to deserue heuen and to be seruauntis of god, it is ful honest and ful accordyng þat ech 20 man knowe what is his resoun and what is his wil, and whiche ben þe officis and þe werkis of hem, and how þei ben different bitwixe hem silf, and what difference is bitwixe hem and opire powers wipinne vs whiche ben comune to vs and to beestis. And al þis is bigunne to be tauzt in þe first 25 *chapitre* of þe first parti of 'þe donet,' and is eendid in þis present book fro þe bigynnyng of þe iiije *chapitre* into þe eend of þe viije *chapitre* in þis same present book. So þanne of whom þis present book is to be leernyd bi wey of honeste and of habundaunt kunnyng to be had, and not bi wey 30 of neede, and of whom þis same present book is not to be leernyd, it is open bi what is now seid.

In which present book, to be callid 'folewer' to þe seid 'donet of cristen religioun,' y schal procede in foorm of a dialog bitwix þe sone askyng and þe fadir answeyng, as y 35 dide bifore in makyng of þe seid 'donet.'

fierþirmore þis present book schal haue ij parties. In þe first parti of þis book | schal be ȝouun larger doctrine of þe 3^d groundis of moralte and of moral vertues þan is ȝouun in

þe bigynnyng of 'þe donet,' and is ȝouun doctryne ioynyd
þerto vpon natural vertues in man and vpon kunnyngal
vertues in man. And in þe ije parti of þis book schulen be
maad obieccions aȝens þe doctrine ȝouun in þe first parti of
5 'þe donet' vpon þe moral vertues of þe iiij tablis, and
answers schulen be þere ȝouun to þe same obieccions.

To whom euer þerfore schal plesse and like forto knowe
whiche ben in man natural vertues, kunnyngal vertues and
moral vertues, rede he and vnderstonde he þe al hool first
10 parti of þis present book. If eny man be not so lusti and
frike forto learne and knowe þe seid iij gendris of vertues,
lete him bigynne at þe x^e chapitre of þe first parti, and rede
he forþ into þe eend of þe first parti; and so schal he take
leernyng of knowyngal vertues and of moral vertues in her
15 general moralte. And if he haue not so greet corage, or
parauentur not so greet leiser to reede and learne, but þat he
wolde be contentid with knowyng of moral vertues oonli, lete
him bigynne at þe xv^e chapitre, and reede he into þe eend of
þis present first parti, and knytte he þanne þerto þe first
20 parti of 'þe donet' for þe specialte of moral vertues. And
so wiþ goddis grace he schal be delectabli enformyd, as to a
cristen lyuer and toward heuen a wey goer and a iourneier
it is ful accordyng be leernyd.

fferþirmore, for as mych as hooli writt seiþ, *ecclesiastes*, þe
25 1^e chapitre¹: 'Alle þingis ben hard. Who may hem explic
or opene bi word?', And also experience techiþ þat many
ful colorable obieccions mow be maad aȝens sure trouþis, and
þat bi suche men as ben not so ful leernyd as to hem silf it
semyþ þat þei ben, and also bi suche as wolen sette hem silf
30 to be enuyers, and by euer eiþir of þese causis to stire vp
trouble more þan neede is, and bi to fallyng and to cryng of
her frendis and her feleschip; þerfore into my more sikirnesse,
ouer þe protestacioun which y haue maad in þe prolog of
'þe donet' and in þe prolog of 'þe book of cristen religioun',
35 y make þis protestacioun here and now, bifore þe fynal
vtryng and publischyng² of eny of my bookis, englich or
latyn: þat y haue be and schal be of noon opir synguler
disposicioun in alle my writyngis, englich or latyn, þan ben

doctrine of
moral vertues,
natural vertues,
and kunnyngal
vertues.

The Second Part
deals with
objections to the
teaching on the
Four TABLES in
the First Part of
the *Donet*.

To understand
thoroughly the
three kinds of
vertues—
natural, moral,
and kunnyngal
—the whole of
the *Folewer*, Pt. I,
should be
studied.

But for less
ambitious
readers
a shorter course
of reading is
prescribed.

The propositions
of the *Folewer*
are set forth to
be tested, and
accepted or
denied. They
are not truths
which must
necessarily be
believed by all.

¹ v. 8.

² See Notes.

wonyd to be opire writers of her writyngis. fforwhi y
 proteste first pat in noon of my bookis, englisch or latyn,
 y haue affermyd or holde, or schal afferme or holde, | pere 4^a
 vtirli eny conclusioun, principal or secundari, and pat
 whepir he be sett forþ pere namyd a conclusioun or no, but 5
 pat y haue and schal eche of pilke conclusions sette forþ bi
 wey of profre and of forþ purposyng to þe sirt of ech reder
 into þis entent: if þei be founde trewe, þat þei be bi so mych
 þe redier araied and foormyd to be acceptid, holden and
 grauntid of þe reder and of þe heerer for trewe; And, if þei 10
 ben founde vntrewe, þat þe reeder or þe heerer may knowe
 þe bettir of what conclusions he schal be ware, þat he hem
 not holde and graunte, whiche ellis parauenture he wolde,
 and in deede schulde, in sum tyme haue holde and grauntid.
 Also y proteste þat y take and schal take ech argument or 15
 mociouz maad, or to be maad, bi me in eny of my writyngis,
 englisch or latyn, as for argument or mociouz oonli, and not
 as for a proof vtirli, þouȝ for more cleer foorm and forto þe
 more encline men into þe conclusions of þo argumentis, in
 caas þat þo conclusions be founde trewe, and forto make þo 20
 argumentis and þo conclusions þe redier to be take into good
 vse, if þo argumentis be founde to proue, and her conclusions
 be founde trewe, y seie ofte þus, or in eny opir wise lijk:
 'y proue', or 'y schal proue', 'y schewe', or 'y schal'
 shewe', 'y haue prouyd', or 'y haue schewid', 'no man 25
 may seie nay'; and so forþ of opir lijk spechis, whiche at
 sum tyme ben wonyd so to be spoke in arguyng bi word and
 bi writyng, whan þe arguer entendiþ noon opir þan is now
 seid, as may at sum tyme appere bi circumstaunce of his
 processe, or bi sum protestacioun maad bi him; and whiche 30
 also at sum tyme ben wonyd so to be spokun in arguyng bi
 word and bi writyng, whanne þe arguer intendiþ forto make
 as to his semyng vtirli proof, as may be seen to be so bi
 circumstauncis of his procedyng, or bi sum protestacioun bi
 him maad.

35

¹ After *schal*, MS. has a second *schal*, crossed through in red.

to be read
 individually
 * to be read
 as a whole

Such terms as
 'I prove', 'I
 have proved',
 etc., mean only
 that the
 conclusion is
 logically proved
 from the
 premises.

ije chapitre.

[P]Arauenture summe men wolen seie pat in pis present book, and in 'pe book of cristen religioun', and in opire bookis whiche y write for lay men, y write maters passyng pe capacite and pe power of lay men forto po maters
5 vndirstonde; wherto y seie pus of certeynte: pat pei passen not ech lay mannys power which hap assaied hem eer pis day to hem leerne and vndirstonde, how euer fewe lay men haue redde and studied in hem afore pis present day. And
3it y meene not of suche lay men whiche schulden mowe
10 leerne and vndirstonde po writyngis if pei weren maad in
4^b latyn, but of po lay men whiche koupe | not studie and vndirstonde hem if pei were maad in latyn. And 3it fersp^r y seie pus: Be it so pat po writyngis passen ful many lay mennys power and capacite forto poru3 ech place of po
15 writyngis vndirstonde hem, what perof? Schal it be seid as folewyng perof pat no lay men perfore schulden reede and leerne in eny op^r place of po writyngis? Goddis forbode pat it schulde so folewe. fforwhi pe bible in latyn in many of his parties passip pe capacite and pe power of ful many
20 grete clerkis and of grete and kunnyng doctouris, Schulen pei perfore caste aside pe bible, and not rede and studie in eny op^r parti perof? god forbode 3he. and forto seie fersp^r: pou3 po grete clerkis in clerist and listist maner vndirstonde not derk processis of pe bible in latyn, 3it pei ben in sum maner sweteli
25 fed and edified bi redyng perin; and summe whiche han gretter leiser and lust p^rto pan op^r han, wrastlen so long perwith til pei gete competent vndirstondyng perof. And in bope wisis mowe lay men do in processis whiche ben to hem hard and derk in my writyngis, summe in oon of pese ij seid
30 maners, and summe in pe op^r of pe same ij seid maners, as pei han p^rto grace and deuocioun.

Though some of the matters treated in the *Folewer* and other books of Pecoock are beyond the understanding of some laymen, they may be understood by others, and all may derive benefit from studying them.

In the same way clerks derive benefit from the Latin Bible, even though they may not understand some of its truths.

Also if pe book which y haue write in latyn, and which y calle 'pe book of lay mennys bookis', and pe book which y write in englich callid 'pe afore crier', be wel rad and
35 vndirstonde, siben a man schal pere se pat it is ful profitable and, as it were, neede, pat summe writyngis of doctrine and summe writyngis of officiying bi preisyng and bi preier be

Theological books should not be made too easy for laymen, for then they reverence the superior learning of clerks.

maad and be delyuerid to lay men in her owen lay tunge, he schal paraenture se pere ferþir riȝt good cause whi it may be expedient and profitable þat summe of þo bookis whiche ben to be maad in lay tunge, and to be delyuerid to lay men, be so hard þat þei be not liȝtli and esili vnliirstonde 5 of þe wittiest lay men whiche schulen rede and studie and leerne þerinne; fforwhi þerbi summe and many lay men mowe be tamyd and repressid and chastisid fro pride and fro presumpcioun; And þei mowe þerbi leerne þat clerkis schulen be to hem necessari forto teche hem þerin, euen as 10 þei holden now clerkis necessari to hem forto preeche to hem in pulpit maner. And verili, as semyþ to me, þei schulden holde þerin and þerbi clerkis to be þe more necessari to hem, Namelich siþen euer it schal be so þat þe wittis of clerkis in maters of þo bookis schulen passe fer þe wittis of lay men 15 in þo same maters. And so bi occasioun herof þat my writyngis maad to lay men ben so hard in many processis | to 5^a lay men, grettir frendschip, loue and good acqueyntaunce and felawlik comunycacioun and good spendyng of tyme schulen rise and contynue bitwix clerkis and lay men, þan 20 if such hardnes in þo writyngis were not.

May God, who desires that all should understand the SEVEN MATTERS¹ of His law, further the work!

But euermore, o lord, grettist louer of men, and grettist desirer þat þi peple schulden loue togidere and leerne togidere þe vij cheef maters¹ of my writyngis deuysid for lay men, and þat þei schulde speke þerin togidere into eche 25 of hem operis edifyng, perfoorme þou such werk in hem to be exercisid and vsid into þi plesure and into her rewardyng.

Objection is made against Peacock that he does not always bring forward Holy Scripture or the doctors as his authorities.

If the matter is not founded on Scripture or the doctors, to allege their authority would be false.

Now schal y seie what y haue herde to be seid of me: 'þis man seiþ and techiþ mych þing, but he seiþ al of him silf and of his owen heed, fforwhi he alleggiþ not for him alwey 30 hooli scripture or summe doctoures,' herto myȝte be seid aȝen þat pese men comenden and preisen me wheryn it semyþ to hem þat þei discomenden and dispreisen me. Neuerpeles, y wole þerto seie þus: If and whanne y write or speke and teche maters whiche ben not in scripture neiþir in doctouris, 35 as y do, y wolde wite whi and how schulde y allege perfore scripture or doctouris but if y schulde allegge vntrewli?

¹ See Notes.

Also if þe writer of hooli scripture or a doctoure seie and write a þing which he hap not but out of resoun and for resoun, and for þat he leernyd it oonli of resoun, whi schulde not resoun be alleggid for þilk þing and trouþ more and
 5 rapir þan þe writer of þilk processe of scripture, and more and rapir þan þe doctoure? fforsoþe, Aristotiles reul and Austyns reul and resoun wolen so: 'vnum quodque propter quid et illud magis, et cetera.' And þat scripture conteynep mych þyng wipin him which þe writer perof took bi resoun,
 10 lijk as many opire þingis conteynyd in scripture þe writer receyuyd bi feiþ, is open bi what y proue in þe book clepid 'þe represser' in his first parti, and in þe book clepid 'þe iust apprisyng of hooli scripture', in latyn. and seynt Austyn witnessip þe same.

15 And þat ech doctoure wrytyng eny book of dyuynyte takip al þat he writip bi doom of resoun or bi experience of sensual witt, except what eny doctour writip bi rehercyng of eny text of feiþ writen so word bi word in þe bible, as þe doctour it settip in his book, which is ful litil in quantite in
 20 reward of al þe hool opir bulk of his book, and except what he bi argument in resoun dryuyþ and concludip of such text, may be open y-nouȝ to ech clerk which wole go bi and bi ech processe of eny such seid doctouris book fro þe bigyn-
 5^b nyng into þe eend; In so mych þat, þouȝ a doctour conclude
 25 oon feiþ of an opir feiþ, or þouȝ he conclude and teche eny þing which folewith out of feiþ writun in þe bible, and perfore which is groundid so in feiþ and in þe bible, ȝit he may not do so, neipir so write and teche, wipout labour and argument of resoun. What wenen perfore men þat resoun
 30 is, and what argument is, and namelich what þe strong argument of silogisme is, Sipeñ wel nyȝ alle þingis which a man knowip opir wise þan a beest knowip, muste be knowen bi argumentis, and wipout hem muste needis be vnknowe of man? Also þus: If in þo maters whiche y write and teche,
 35 y folewe þe doom of resoun and grounde hem pere, it is not trewe þat y seie, write and teche þerin of my silf and of myn owen heed, as þouȝ y hadde noon autorite for it; but, certis, perof it muste needis aȝenward be trewe þat þerin y seie, write and teche þo maters bi þe largist book of autorite þat

If in certain matters the final authority for Scripture or the doctors is Reason, why should Pecock not give Reason as his authority rather than Scripture or the doctors?

Reason is the authority for many things in Scripture.

So also is Faith.

Reason is the final authority for all matters of divinity other than beliefs acceptable only through Faith.

When Reason is the final authority, it is false to say that Pecock writes out of his own head.

The doom of Reason is the largest book of

authority ever
God made, and
Reason is the
greatest doctor
next to God.

All books have
for their final
authority the
Bible or the
doom of Reason.

The man best
learned in
divinity is the
man best
skilled in
reasoning.

The literal
sense of a text
in the Bible
must be decided
by appeal to
Reason.

Also the truths
concluded from
a text are
decided by
Reason.

And yet clerks
have despised
Reason and the
syllogism.

The importance
of Reason is
pointed out
here, so that
clerks may
reform the error
of their ways.

Such despising
of Reason is
particularly
blameworthy in
preachers.

eu^{er} god made, which is pe doom of resoun, and also bi pe grettist doctour pat is a pis side god him silf, which is resoun. fforwhi, except bookis of mennys positijf ordinauncis and bookis of stories, whiche ben not as in pis present purpos to be spokun of, pere ben noon bookis of vttrist 5 ground and of autorite in maters whiche man may knowe and leerne opir wise pan a beest knowip, saue pe book of feip and pe book of re^{sons} doom, as is now bifore schewid in pis, pat alle opire seid bookis fecchen her autorite fro oon of pese two now seid bookis, pe bible and doom of resoun, and 10 ellis po opire bookis hadden noon autorite. And so, if alle treupis weren cleerli knowen, it wolde appere pat who eu^{er} anentis maters longyng to pe scole of dyuynyte is best and hizest leernyd man in argumentis of resoun and in assoilyng which ouzte be assoiled, he is best clerk; and, but if he be hiz 15 and mych leernyd in argumentyng and in assoilyng by resoun, he is noon hiz clerk in dyuynyte, namelich sipen it may not be knowe which is of eny oon text of pe bible pe dew litteral sense, saue bi argument in doom of resoun, neipir eny treup may be knowe and dryuen and concludid to folewe 20 bi eny text which is expresseli writen in pe bible, saue bi argument in doom of resoun; for perbi pe oolde doctouris leernyden what pei coupen deeme which schulde be pe r^{igt} sense of scripture, as y schewe in opire wrytyngis in latyn.

And zit not wipstondyng al pis, y haue wiste wipin pese 25 vj zeeris passid pat it hap be seid of hem whiche helden hem clerkis: 'fy in resoun, fy in argumentis.' and summe opire wolden lauze and calle 'sophym', | whanne it was alleggid 6^a pat a troupe was prouyd bi sillogisme, whiche is pe strengist argument forto proue that may be. lo, how vnkunnyngli 30 pei wenten to werk whanne pei weneden forto haue seid wel and wiseli! pis y write here for pat suche vnsufficient felers schulden leue such errorr now, if it be in hem now, and also pat such errorr growe not in tyme to come in persoones whiche mowe be preseruyd perfro bi pis present wrytyng; 35 namelich sipen it is ful vnsemeli in prechouris whiche leten hem silf in pulpit to be reulers and reformers and enformers of worpi peple, as bi greet autorite and ouerte ouer pe heerers, be so derk and so vnsufficientli felyng. And

note
description
of preachers

forsope so is ¹ it ¹ vnsemeli eny such prechour, and namelich if he be maistir of dyuynyte, forto make leesyng vpon eny man azen trouþ in coueryng of his defaut and of his fail fro trouþ. Neuerþeles, god forbede þat y or eny opir man schulde feeþe þat writyngis of doctouris weren to be dispisid, or were to be sett at nouzt, or to be sett litil bi, for þo writyngis ben ful profitable, namelich if þei be take into vse bi a good discrecioun.² And þerfore in what reputacioun writyngis of doctouris schulde be take, y teche in a latyn book which y clepe 'þe iust apprisyng of doctouris', and þe same y teche in an opir latyn book clepid 'þe iust apprisyng of hooli scripture', and in opire placis of my writyngis.

Doctors' writings are not to be despised, but to be received with discrimination.

ii^e chapitre.

15 [F]Adir, þe dewe processe and ordre in which þe doctrine of moral vertues, euen as of alle opire maters and treupis to be lernyd, ouzte be maad, is forto teche and sette forþ hem first in general, and þanne aftir in special, and not azenward forto teche and sette forþ hem first in special, and þanne
20 aftir in general; And also forto sette forþ and teche first þe causis and þe bryngyngis forþ of moral vertues, as ben knowyngal vertues; and forto knowe þe placis or parties or powers of oure soul into whiche þoþe knowyngal and moral vertues ben to be receyuyd, holden and kept, as ben resoun
25 and wil; and forto knowe into what eend, profijt and good þo moral vertues ben to be geten and doon, eer þan doctrine is to be maad of moral vertues in her specialtees and in her propre special names; and ellis þe hiþe riht wey and dewe processe or ordre in whiche moral vertues asken to be tauzt
30 and to be lernyd, if þei schulde in parfitist maner be tauzt, is not kept in techyng and leernyng. Wherefore, fadir, sipen þis now towchid processe or ordre in techyng and leernyng moral vertues is not kept, but if þis present book clepid 'þe
6^b folewer | to þe donet' schulde be sett and go afore hem
35 whiche ben assignyd to be þe first and þe ii^e parties of 'þe donet', it semep to folewe þat 3e kepe not þe processe and

Since the *Folewer* deals with general truths concerning the virtues, ought it not to precede the *Donet*, which teaches particular virtues?

¹ MS. *it is*, with the marks of transposition.

² See Notes.

ordre which schulde be kept in assignyng and setting forþ þe two parties of 'þe donet' bifore þis present book callid 'þe folewer to þe donet'. And þerfore it semeth þat aȝens þe foorm and schappe of þoure doctryne þouun in þis present book, þoure aduersaries wolen make chalyenge.

A teacher must adapt his methods to the capacity of his scholars. It is more correct to proceed from general to particular, if the scholar can grasp truths so taught.

Description of the proper course for such advanced scholars to follow.

Sone, herto y answere þus : whanne euer eny techer is to sette forþ his doctrine vpon eny maters or troupis, he may not awaite oonli in which ordre and processe þe maters in hem silf asken to be tauȝt and sett forþ, þat is to seie, if þei schulde be tauȝt in parfitist maner of techyng, but he muste also se to þe capacite of þe leerners, wher þei ben at þe first able to receyue þe techyng to be so lad forþ in þilk same now seid processe and ordre, or no. And if þe capacite and receyuabilnesse be in þe lerners to receyue þe parfitist maner of techyng makable vpon þe seid maters, certis, þanne a defaute is in þe techers delyueraunce and doctryne but if he kepe in þe delyueraunce and in setting forþ of his doctrine such processe and ordre of which þou hast spoke in þyn arguyng : as but if he bigynne first in general, and aftir descende and come down into special. And þat he stable bifore þe causis and þe groundis of þo þingis whiche he is to trete aftir, And þat he zelde, zeue and assigne þe causis and þe whies of ech special trouþ not beyng open in him silf to þe resoun, and so forþ of opire poyntis longyng to dew foorm of parfitist techyng. And so it is open þat for alle hem whiche perto in witt and leiser sufficien, þe formal and wel schapen procedyng in leernyng and kunnyng þe bifore goyng book clepid 'þe donet,' schulde be forto leerne first þe first and þe ije chapitris of þe seid 'donet,' and from þens forto lepe into þe iiije chapitre in þe first parti of þis present book, and rede forþ and leerne from þens þis first parti of þis present book into þe eend ; or ellis, at þe leest, aftir þe seid first and ije chapitris leernyd in þe first parti of 'þe donet,' forto lepe into þe bigynnyng of þe xe chapitre in þis first parti, and from þens rede and leerne into þe eend of þis first parti, and fro þens forto turne aȝen into þe bigynnyng of þe iiije chapitre in þe first parti of 'þe donet,' and forto reede and leerne contynueli from þens into þe eend of 'þe donet.' And aftir al | þis in þis wise kept, go he and entre he þe

first chapitre of þe ije parti of þis present book, and contynue he into þe eend of þis same present book.

Neuerpeles, if þe capacite and receyuabilnes be not in þe learners at þe first and in þe bigynnyng forto receyue vpon
 5 þo maters þe now seid parfitist maner of doctrine and of delyueraunce, sopeli good discrecioun wole þat þe teacher tempre his foorm of techyng and his maner of forþ setting
 10 after þat þe capacite and receyuabilnes of þe learners may bere, and þerinne may profite, into tyme, bi lenger exercising
and vsyng of her wittis in leernyng, her wittis growe vp into clerer list and into larger receyuabilnesse. ffor þus it is doon to children and newe scolers whanne þei bigynnen lerne grammer, and whanne þei bigynnyn to lerne logik, and whanne þei bigynnen lerne lawe cyuyle. Certis, as alle
 15 leernyd men in þese facultees wolen bere *with me* witnesse to alle suche bigynners, doctrine is first bi long tyme to hem mynystrid in her donet, in her summes *and* in her instiues, in such schort breef maner, wipout mynystryng to hem whies and causis of þe treupis to hem mynystrid, 3he, so schortli
 20 þat þo learners muste long tyme lerne vndir credence oonli, which credence þei schulen 3eue to her techers and to her now rehercid bookis wipout cleer sijt hauyng, wher it be trewe or no what þei leernen, til aftirward þei be grownen vp into witt forto se groundabli whi it is trewe al þat þei bifore
 25 oonli trowide and bileeuyde, and ellis þei schulden not profite in þo facultees forto hem leerne sufficientli. fforwhi if to a man in þe bigynnyng þe causis and whies schulden be delyuerid to her resoun and to her examynacioun, her witt schulde be þerbi oppressid, and þei schulden be gastid and discherid forto contynue þe seid facultees, and þei schulden
 30 be into a bakward retornyng rebukid.

And for as mych as y make þe bifore goyng 'donet' and þis present book, and namelich 'þe donet,' for newe bigynners, and as it were for 3onge scolers in þe faculte of goddis
 35 lawe, or of þe dyuynyte in which alle cristen persoones owen to be scolers; þefore in þe makyng of þe seid 'donet' and of þis present book, y confoorme me to þe now bifore spokun discrecioun; and herfore it is þat y sette forþ þe first parti of 'þe donet' in symple breef rehercel of treupis necessari of

For beginners it is easier to proceed from particular to general.

It was primarily for such beginners that the *Donet* and *Folewer* were written: hence the two (considered as one work) proceed from particular to general.

al cristen peple to be leernyd, with þerto knytt þe ije parti, which is eesi and lȳt to be vnderstonde, þat aftir | al þis þe 7^b leerners be þe more able to learne and conceyue þis present book, in which into þe eend of þis first parti is sett forþ abroad¹ what in wey of parfitist doctrine schulde go bfore 5 þe þrid chapitre of þe first parti in 'þe donet,' and which schulde be mengid with þe first and ije chapitris of þe first parti of 'þe donet,' if þe capacite of ȝonge lerners wolde or myȝte it so to be doon suffre and admytte.

The *Folewer*, Pt. I., is rightly placed after the *Donet* for less advanced scholars. It is rightly placed before the *Reule* in that it explains the doctrines taught in the *Reule*.

Neuerþeles, siþen al þe seid 'donet' and al þis present 10 book is maad in ordre and processe to be leernyd bfore 'þe book of cristen religioun,' and þe book 'spredying þe iiij tablis,' and opire bookis in lijk maner to 'þe book of cristen religioun' perteynyng, þerfore, þouȝ þe first parti of þis present book hap not such dew ordre and place in processe 15 and in biholdyng toward 'þe donet,' of which ordre þou hast spoke of in þyn arguyng, ȝit þis first parti of þis present book hap þilk dewe ordre and place in processe and in reward which he hap to 'þe book of cristen religioun,' and namely to þerof þe iije treti in þe first parti. And so þe first parti 20 of þis present book hap in þis book his place and ordre, such as for þe capacite of þe lerners is to hem dewe; and þerwith he hap also in þis same present book his place and ordre, such as in his biholdyng toward þe bookis folewyng him is to him dewe. And herbi, sone, sufficient answer is maad to 25 þyn obieccioun.

If any man who has studied the *Donet* finds the general truths of the *Folewer* too difficult, he may leave the *Folewer* until after he has mastered the more particular teaching of the *Reule*.

But ȝit, not wiþstandyng al þis, if to eny man, aftir þat he is wel and long tyme leernyd and customyd with þe haunt and vse of þe first and ije parties of 'þe donet,' þis present first parti schal be to him ouer hard, y wole þat he lepe ouer 30 þis first parti and sette him into 'þe book of cristen religioun,' and ocupie his witt þerinne bi long leisers of ȝeeris vnto tyme he be more able to vnderstonde derk and hard maters þan he schal be eer he so wrastle with 'þe book of cristen religioun.' And þanne he schal sette þis present first 35 parti in ordir aftir 'þe book of cristen religioun,' and þat for febilnesse of his capacite; riȝt as y haue placid þe same first parti aftir þe first and þe ije parties in 'þe donet' for of alle newe bigynners þe feble capacite.

¹ MS. a brood.

And ferþirmor þis into comfort y schal zeue to alle studiers
 in þis first parti, or in eny opir hard writyng *with* which þei
 schulen wrastle, þat þis benefite þei schulen receyue perbi at
 þe leest, wherof y haue experience at surest, whanne aftir
 5 her long vsid studyng in eny hard to hem mater, þei schulen
 8^a turne hem into opire | maters not so hard to be of hem
 vndirstonde, þanne þo maters schulen be to hem lizt and eesi
 to be vndirstonde, which ellis schulde haue be to hem ouyr
 hard and ouer weriful to be vndirstonde, if her long labour
 10 and vse in þe hardir maters hadde not goon afore — rȳt euen
 as who is wonyd to rede lettris yuel writen and hard to be
 rad, and who is wonyd to lifte heuy weȳtis *with* his armes,
 he schal aftirward mych þe eesilier rede opire bettir writen
 lettris, þouȳ ellis þei schulde haue be to him ouer hard forto
 15 be red, and he schal liztli lifte vp opire heftis, whiche ellis
 he schulde not haue mowe vp lift. And þerfore it is ful
 profitable ech man forto vse him and aqueynte him *with*
 sumwhat to him hard *and* derk maters, and forto not be
 ouer mych coward to leue of þe leernyng of a mater or of a
 20 book for hardnes to his witt in þe bigynnyng; ffor, certis,
 his witt schal perbi take in maner now seid a greet vpreisyng.
 And ferþirmore þe more a man lerneþ and takip into him of
 kunnyng, þe more is his resoun vp liftid *and* ablid and cleerid
 to of ech opir treuþ þe leernyng, not oonli to þe former
 25 lernyd treuþ beyng pertinent, but also þouȳ it be to of þe
 former treuþis lernyng vnperȳnent; as ful sure experience,
 god wote, is herof had, and as proof þerof myȳte be maad bi
 ful fair philosophie, which forto sette forþ here me þenkip
 not as now for þe best. And þerfore it is ful profitable þat
 30 ech man putte his witt into bisynesse of lernyng, neuerþeles
 euer a discrecioun þerin kepyng.

The more
 accustomed the
 mind is to
 grappling with
 difficulties, the
 more easily it
 can master any
 particular
 problem.

And ferþirmore, if to sum persoon in þis present book for
 euer and at alle tymes *and* at alle assaies schal be ouer hard,
 þilk persoon may ful wel leue þe leernyng of þis present book,
 35 and take what he may take in þe opir ie and ije parties of
 'þe donet' and in opire of my bookis. And, þerfore, þouȳ y
 write so mych fulnesse of maters in þis present book, no man
 hap cause þervpon to compleyne him, for no man schal
 constreyne him to leerne it, neipir perbi he schal be lettid

If, after earnest
 striving, the
 Folewer cannot
 be mastered, it
 may be left
 altogether.

fro þe leuyng of it, þouȝ no man schal werne him forto
wraſtle with it; namelich for þouȝ men for febilnes of her
witt ſchulen þerinne erre, ȝit þei ſchulen not þerinne aȝens
oure feiþ periloseli synne, bi cauſe þat welnyȝ al þe doctrine
þerof is oonli of natural reſoun þe philoſophie. 5

iii^e chapitre.

What is the
evidence for the
belief that
a MAN'S SOUL
shall never die,
while a BEAST'S
SOUL shall die?

An effect cannot
exist before its
immediate
cause and longer
than its
immediate
cause. A special
disposition of
bodily matter is
necessary before
the soul of
a beast is
produced.

And when
this special
disposition of
bodily matter
ceases, the soul
of the beast
ceases.

[F]Adir, what skile and euydence may be had for al þat ȝe
han ſeid of mannys ſoul and of beestis ſoul in þe firſt chapitre
of þe i^e parti | of 'þe donet,' where ȝe ſeide þat mannys ſoul 8^b
ſchal neuer deie, and ech beſtis ſoul ſchal deie for euer? 10

Sone, þe euydence which may be take þervpon bi philo-
ſophie in doom of reſoun is piſ: Noon effect may bigynne to
be bifore hiſ cheef next cauſe bigynne to be; neipir eny effect
may dure lenger þan hiſ cheef next cauſe dureþ. but ſo it is
þat ech beſtis ſoul is cauſid, gendrid and brouȝt forþ into 15
hiſ beyng bi þe mater and þe bodi in whom he dwelliþ and
whom he quykenep; not ſo þat how euer þilk mater and bodi
be diſpoſid in qualite, quantite and in membris, þat þanne
and ſo þilk mater and bodi is ſufficient to cauſe and brynge
forþ þe beſtis ſoul, fforwhi herof we ſeen þe contrari to be 20
trewe; but oonli whanne þe ſame mater or bodi is diſpoſid
and alterid in qualite and quantite and in membracioun aftir
þat as to þe kynde of þe ſoul to be gendrid and brouȝt forþ it
is accordyng; and þerfore, rapir þan þilk mater is ſo diſpoſid
may not þilk ſoul be. And bi lijk ſkile, ſipen whanne euer 25
þe next cheef cauſe of eny effect ceſiþ, þanne þilk effect
muſte neediſ ceſe and may no lenger endure, þerfore, as
ſoone as þilk mater is ſliden ferþir from ſuch diſpoſicioun þan
it is accordyng to þe kynde of þe ſame ſoul to haue in þe
mater which he ſchal quykene, þe ſoul muſte neediſ ceſe to 30
be. for it is euydent y-nouȝ in experience þat riȝt as þe ſoul
of a beſt wole not bigynne to be in þe bodi of a beſt vndir
ech maner diſpoſicioun of þe ſame bodi, ſo he wole not abide
and quykene þe bodi vndir ech maner of diſpoſicioun in þe
bodi. And ſipen he is cauſid bi þe bodi beyng vndir ſum 35
certeyn maner of diſpoſicioun, ſo it muſte neediſ be þat he
ſchal deie and ceſe to be bi þe bodi ſliden from ſum maner
of diſpoſicioun.

ffadir, y se þat 3oune proof procediþ wel, so þat 3e 3eue
euydence þat a beestis soul is maad, gendrid and brouzt forþ
into his beyng bi power of þe bodi, whilis þe bodi is in sum
certeyn maner disposid, and not so mannys soul is brouzt forþ
5 and maad bi power of eny mater or of mannys bodi.

Sone, euydence such as may be had as of philosophie, þat
is to seie, of mannys inquisicioun in resoun, is þis: If þe soul
of a beest were vndependent of þe bodi, and not maad and not
brouzt forþ bi power of þe bodi, þilk soul schulde haue in him
10 silf and in his owen substaunce sum wirching which were
not dependent of þe bodi, riȝt as he schulde haue whanne he
9^a were departid from þe bodi. and so he | wolde at sum tyme
schewe þilk wirchyng in sum degree, and be not for euer ydil
þerfro whilis he were in þe bodi; namelich siþen of ech þing
15 þe perfeccioun is parfijtli and fulli had, or namely schewid,
in his wirchyng; and from his perfeccioun, neiþir fro þe
execucioun and schewyng of his perfeccioun, no þing wole
gladli for algatis absteine. but so it is þat we kunne not
aspie þat eny beestis soul wirchip eny deede or werk wiþout
20 þat þerto is requyrid as instrument of his wirchyng sum
parti of þe bodi, and we aspien wel þat mannys soul wirchip
summe werkis wherto he vsip not as instrumentis eny parti
of his bodi, as ben vndirstondyngis, resonyngis, willyngis and
nyllyngis. wherfore we mowe ful likli trowe, take and holde
25 þat a beestis soul in his substaunce is dependent and hangyng
and þerfore causid of þe bodi, and mannys soul is not
dependent, hangyng, neiþir causid of his bodi; namelich siþen
it is not likli to resoun þat þe seid wirchyngis of mannys soul
schulde be, or myȝte be, freer and lasse nedyng þe bodi,
30 and so lasse independent and hangyng fro þe bodi þan þe
substaunce of þe same soul. and þerfore þe substaunce of
mannys soul is fre and independent and vnhangyng, and þerfore
vncausid of his bodi, riȝt as þe seid wirchyngis of mannys
soul ben fre, vndependent, vnhangyng and vncausid of þe
35 bodi, and ȝit mych rapir.

And þanne folewith ferþir: If mannys soul be not maad,
causid and brouzt forþ into his beyng bi power and strengþ
of þe mater or of mannys bodi, certis, it muste needis folewe

What is the
evidence that
with man's soul
the case is
different?

A beast's soul
has no working
apart from the
body.

A man's soul
has certain
workings apart
from the body,
viz. understand-
ing, reasoning,
willing and
nilling.

The workings of
a beast's soul are
dependent on
the body, so his
soul is
dependent on
the body.
The workings of
a man's soul are
independent of
the body, so his
soul is inde-
pendent of the
body.

Hence man's
soul need not
cease with his
body.

pat mannys soul needip not to ceese fro his beyng and to deie bi power and strengþ of þe mater or of mannys bodi; fforwhi ech þing causid anentis his natural beyng and his natural noun beyng, if he eny natural noun beyng schal haue, hangip oonli of his causis, and þe mater or bodi of a man is not 5 natural cause of mannys soul in beyng, as is now bifore tauzt bi likli euydence. Wherefore þe same mater is not cause of þerof þe natural noun beyng, and þanne mannys soul ceesip not to be naturali neipir deiep bi strengþ of þe material bodi, neipir bi eny þing bifallyng to þe same bodi. 10

It is thus clearly proved by Reason that a beast's soul is engendered by, and ends with, the body.

And that a man's soul is not engendered by, and does not cease with, the body.

ffadir, y holde me content as with ful likli euydence in resoun of philosophie whi a beestis soul bigynneþ and eendip to be bi ppower of þe bodi, in þis wise disposid or in þat wise vndisposid, to haue or to kepe with him þe beestis¹ soul. Also y holde me content as with ful likli euydencis of 15 philosophie in resoun, þat mannys | soul bigynneþ not to be 9^b bi strengþ and power of his bodi, neipir he ouzte eende and ceese to be bi strengþ and power of his bodi. And also y holde me content as bi likli euydencis in resoun, þat þe soul of a man schal not deie with þe bodi, but þat he schal be 20 departid from þe bodi; and þat for as mych as þe bodi hap no power in him forto distroie him, as is bifore mouyd, in þat þat þe bodi causip not him, and in opir maner þan, in not causyng þe spirit, a bodi may not wirche into a spirit forto corrupte him and distroie him, as is in opire placis of philo- 25 sophie schewid.

What is the evidence that man's soul was made at the same time as his body, rather than before his body?

Neuerpeles, fadir, bi al þat is bifore of 3ow and of me openyd, it is not euydent in resoun whi we ouzte seie rapir þat mannys soul is maad in þe same poynt and prick of tyme in which he is cowplid to þe bodi forto be soul of þe bodi, þan 30 forto seie þat he was maad of þe hiȝ prince, auctor of kynde, god, bi many ȝeris, in his owen substaunce, free fro eny bodi, eer he was couplid to þe bodi, in lijk maner as he schal be aftir þat he schal be departid from his bodi.²

Satisfactory evidence is difficult to find, but it is reasonable so to believe.

Sone, forsope, y kanne not fynde herof eny mych movyng 35 euydence in resoun whi we schule rapir holde þat mennes soules ben first maad whanne þei ben cowplid to þe bodi, þan þat þei weren bi a processe of tyme bifore in her owen

¹ After *beestis*, MS. has *tis*, crossed through.

² See Notes.

substauncis, riȝt as þei schulen be aftir þe deef of þe bodi
vnto þe day of þe last doom, but þat ech eydence which y
haue herde groundable in philosophie and in resoun, and þat
wheþir þilk eydence be takun vpon þe soul for his substaunce,
5 or for þat he is essenciali or substanciali maad to be a soul or
a foorm of þe bodi, may ful eesili be answerid *and* asoild.
and þerfore herof holde me excusid. y wole þat þou of opire
men leerne what y suffice not þee to teche.

ffadir, what fynde 3e in hooli scripture of þis mater bifore
10 tretid bi philosophie of mennes soulis and of beestis soulis?

What evidence
is there in
Scripture as to
men's souls and
beasts' souls?

Christ declared
that man's soul
cannot be slain.

Sopeli, sone, forto trete what is tauȝt in scripture is not
mych pertinent to my purpos of þis book, as it schal be in þe
book callid 'þe witnessyng of þe iiij tablis'. Neuerþeles,
sumwhat forto eese þee, y seie þus mych at þis tyme, þis :
15 þat mennys soulis ben not causid and maad bi strengþ and
power of her bodies, and þat þei ben not hangyng of her bodies
in kepyng of her beyng, but þat mennys soulis mowe be
departid and abide from þe bodies, y may fynde sufficient
ground in scripture, *Mathew*, x^e chapitre,¹ where crist seiþ
20 þus : 'Nile 3e drede him whiche sleen þe bodi ; forsoþe þe
10^a soul þei mowe not sle ; but more { or rapir drede 3e him
which may leese boþe bodi and soul into helle.' Now vpon
which wordis of crist y argue þus : what euer þing may abide
aftir þat þe bodi ceesiþ to be, it is not causid into his beyng
25 bi strengþ and power of þe same bodi, but þe soul of man
may be whanne þe bodi is slayn and deed, as is open bi
cristis wordis now alleggid ; wherfore out of þe same wordis
it folewith þat mannys soul is not causid into his beyng bi
strengþ and power of þe same bodi. But, certis, sone, what
30 is to be holden herupon, wheþir mannys soul was þoruȝ eny
while eer he was cowlpid to þe bodi or no, and what is to be
seid of beestis soulis þat þei ben bifore and aftir her bodies
or no, y kanne not fynde eny mensioun in hooli scripture.
Who euer kanne fynde, y vouche saaf þat he enforme boþe
35 me and þee, and opire whom he wole.

þe moost likli place of scripture, as ferforþ as y kanne
biþenke me, forto grounde þat mannys soul is togidere and
at oones maad and cowlpid to þe bodi is it which is writen,

The first and
second chapters
of *Genesis* imply
that man's soul
is made at the

¹ v. 28.

same time as his
body, though
they give no
definite proof.

genesis, 10,¹ where it is seid þus: 'God made of nouȝt man to his ymage and lijknēs; to his ymage he made him of nouȝt, a mawle and a femawle he made hem of nouȝt'. And eftsoone it is writen in þe ij^e chapitre of genesis² þus: 'þerfore þe lord god formede man of þe slyme of þe eerþ, and he blew 5 into his façe þe breeþ of lijf, and man was maad into a lyuyng lijf'. But, certis, sone, neuer neiþir of þese two textis now alleggid schewen needisli þat Adamys soul biganne first to be whanne he was cowplid to þe bodi; and þat neiþir for þis þat scripture seiþ: 'God made Adam of nouȝt', neiþir for eny 10 opir þing seid in the same two textis. for if 'makyng of nouȝt' schulde be take and be undirstonde propirli, it is not trewe þat god þanne made Adam of nouȝt, forwhi þe mater of his bodi was bifore; but if we schulde seiþ þat fier makyng fier of þe eire or of watir makip þilk fier of nouȝt, and þat 15 ech man which and whanne now a daies is first quykenyd is maad of nouȝt, which no wijs philesosfre wole graunte. And þerfore þis þat is seid, 'god made Adam of nouȝt', is to be taken and to be vndirstonden vnpropirli forto calle largeli 'makyng of nouȝt' 'makyng into beyng'; as god bifore þe 20 first alleggid text seiþ þus: 'Make we man to oure ymage and lijknēs', where god spekip not of þe makyng of nouȝt. not wiþstondyng y holde to be trewe þat ech mannys soul is togidere at oonys maad and cowplid to his bodi, for opire euydencis whiche y haue in resoun, þouȝ þei ben not more 25 sufficient | þan forto gendre hervpon oonli a þynne opynyoun. 10^b

v^e chapitre.

Why and how
are the FIVE
OUTWARD
BODILY WITS
necessary to
man and the
higher animals?

[F]Adir, of þis what ȝe seiden in þe first chapitre of þe ie parti of 'þe donet', þat in man and in ech parfite and notable beest ben þe v pere seid outward wittis, it needip not to aske 30 eny proof, fforwhi þat þoþe men and þe seid beestis han eche of þe seid v outward wittis is open y-nouȝ in sensual experience. Neuerþeles, fadir, whi and how eche of þe seid v wittis ben necessari to men and to þe seid beestis is not so open. and þerfore, fadir, what ȝe hervpon haue drawe into 35 ȝoure knowyng, helde ȝe now to opire out into her enfoormyng,

¹ v. 27.

² v. 7.

and folewyngli into her gladyng and cheryng, siþen þe
philosofre¹ seip, i of 'methafisik', and open experience it
witnessip, þat 'alle men desiren to kunne', and also 'kunnyng
is as cherful to þe vndirstondyng as bodili lyt is cheerful to
5 þe bodili y3e.'

O, sone, þyn askyng is so honest and so clene and so manli
þat y wole seche my wittis þi questioun to satisfie. Certis,
sone, þou muste take for a ful resonable and a likli ground þat
in parfite and in notable beestis and lyuys kynde failiþ not
10 into hem of her necessities; þat is to seie, kynde, or namlich
god bi kynde, so purueieþ þat noon such beest or lijf failiþ or
lackiþ eny þing which schulde bi resoun be necessari to him
as bi kynde. And þerfore, siþen to euery such beest and lijf
it is necessari him to knowe what bodi bi strengþ of kynde
15 ouzte distroie him and sle him, þat he mete with noon such
bodi, but þat he fle and beware and abstayne forto neize to
suche bodies, it is accordyng to ech such parfit and notable
beest and lijf be 3ouun bi kynde a witt to knowe ech bodi
which bi kynde schulde needis distroie his substaunce; and
20 þis witt is þe witt of touch, ffor, if ne were þis witt of touch
in man and in beest, he schulde as soone entre into an hous
fierid as he schulde into an hous not fierid, and as soone he
schulde sitte vpon þe fier as he schulde sitte vpon þe bench,
and as soone he schulde putte his bodi vpon a scharp swerd
25 as vpon a soft pilowe. And so þis outward witt of touch is to
euery beest and lijf ful necessari, namelich to suche beestis
and lyues þat hem silf from place to place bodili
moven.

The Wit of
TOUCH.

ffirþirmore, siþen it is so þat man or beest may not long
30 endure but if he be dewli norischid, and he may not be dewli
norischid but if þe mete and drynk which he schal take be
11^a to his kynde acordyng, wherfore it is necessari to ech such
beest and to man forto haue a witt wherbi he may and schal
knowe what nutryment, þat is to seie, what mete and drynk,
35 schulen be accordyng to his nurischyng, and whiche schulen
not so be accordyng. and so for þis office it is necessari þat
alle suche beestis and men haue þe witt of taast, wipout which
taast as soone schulde a beest and a man ete to him a mete

The Wit of
TASTE.

¹ See Notes.

discordyng in qualitees of nurischyng as accordyng in qualitees of nurischyng.¹

The Wit of
SMELL.

fferþirmore, siþen it is not conuenyent and profitable to þe kynde of suche beestis and of mennys bodies þat þei be vnder such a iepardi forto abide vnto tyme þat þei mete immediatli 5 with suche bodies as ben corruptyue to her substauncis bi towchyng or bi taastyng, þerfore to suche seid parfite and notable beestis and to men is ȝouun þe witt of smellyng, bi which þei schulen knowe sumwhat afer² what bodies ben vnholsum to be take vnto her nurischyng, and what bodies 10 ben vnholsum if with hem þei maken her nyȝ dwellyng, for þis þat þo bodies bi her yuel qualitees schulen be distroiyng þe bodies to hem neizyng.

The Wits of
SIGHT and
HEARING.

And ȝit ferþir, for as mych as it is conuenyent and necessari þat suche parfite beestis and men abide not alwey 15 in qon place, but þat þei move hem fro place to place, and þat boþe bi her owen stiryng and bi opire beestis or opire mennys steryngis, þerfore it was conuenyent and necessari þat to alle suche beestis and to men schulde be ȝouun þe witt of sizt, bi which þei myȝten move hem silf from place to place 20 wipout hurtyng of her kynde as bi her owen to so moue stiryng; and þat to hem schulde be ȝouun þe witt of heeryng, bi which þei myȝte move from place to place wipout hurt of her kynde, as bi opire beestis or mennys stiryng, warnyng, or callyng. Also it is conuenyent þat suche seid parfite beestis 25 and men haue power to leerne and encrese in knowyng, and þat boþe bi her owen labour and also bi mennys techyng; wherfore it was conuenyent þat to alle suche beestis and to men schulde be ȝouun sizt, wherbi þei myȝten leerne bi her owen labour. ffor as þe philesofre seiþ: 'of alle þe wittis þe 30 sizt schewip to vs moost dyuersitees of þingis'. And also it was conuenyent þat to suche seid beestis and to men schulde be ȝouun heeryng, of which þei myȝten leerne bi techyng of men.

These five outward bodily Wits are given only to men and the higher animals.

And in þis wise y may ȝeue goode skiles whi kynde, or 35 whi god bi kynde, | wolde ordeyne to alle parfite and notable 11^b beestis and to men þe v seid outward wittis, not withstondyng þat of vnparfite and vnnotable beestis god and kynde

¹ See Notes.

² MS. *a fer*.

reken not so mych forto so ȝeue to hem as he ȝeueþ to þe
parfiter and more notable; and þat forto schewe þat god in
his ȝiftis wirchip as to him lust is, and þat he wole haue
dyuers degrees in his creaturis, riȝt as a lord in þis world
5 wole haue and make his meyne not alle to be in oon state or
degre, but many to be in dyuers statis and degrees, and as a
potter makip many pottis not into oon and into þe same vse
and office, but into many and into dyuerse vsis and officis.¹

vj^e chapitre.

10 [F]Adir, ȝe han tauȝt and seide bifore in þe first chapitre
of þe first parti of 'þe donet' þat þere ben in parfite and
notable beestis and in man v inward sensitif wittis. Neuer-
peles, þat þo wittis ben, and þat so many ben, and for what
neede or profite god ordeynyd hem in kynde, ȝe han not ȝit
15 declarid.

Why and how
are the FIVE
INWARD BODILY
WITS necessary
to man and the
higher animals?

Sone, forto declare and schewe þis which þou now desirist
to be declarid, y take þis for a ground in philosophie: þat
powers ben knowen bi her werkis. And þerfore, whanne we
seen and perceyuen ouȝwhere eny notable dyuersite of werkis
20 in kynde, we concluden and holden þerbi þat þer ben in
kynde dyuers powers causyng þo dyuerse werkis. and as
many kyndis of werkis we aspien to be, and what ordre or
processe bitwixe þo kyndis of werkis we aspien bi resoun to
be, so many kyndis of powers we concluden and prouen þerbi
25 to be, and þe same ordre or processe we proven þerbi bitwixe
þo powers to be. Certis, opir wey is þer not in philosophie
to proue eny powers to be had and to be, or eny ordir
bitwixe hem to be had and to be. Out of which ground y
argue ferþir þus: but so it is, as experience schewip, þat
30 suche fyue dyuers kyndis of wirchyngis, as in þe [ie]²
chapitre ben assignyd and spokun of to be wipinforth, bisidis
þe wirchyngis of þe outward wittis, men han, and not in þe
power of resoun, fforwhi beestis han alle þe same, as
experience schewip; And such ordre and rewe is bitwixe þe
35 now seid kyndis of wirchyngis, which ordre is bifore seid to

A power is
known by its
works.

Men and the
higher animals
have five kinds
of inward work-
ings.

¹ See Notes.

² MS. *ij^e*: the reference is to the *Donet*, Pt. I, Chap. i. See above, l. 10.

Therefore it follows that they have five kinds of inward powers, or Wits, corresponding to these five inward workings.

It is necessary to perceive outward sensible things (i.e. things known through the five outward bodily Wits or senses) in their absence, whereas the five outward bodily Wits perceive such things only in their presence.

It is necessary also to be able to differentiate between objects.

And to know the five 'Common Sensibles,' Moving, Rest, Greatness,

be bitwixe hem wipinforþ *in* beest and in man. Wherefore it folewith needis þat v dyuers kyndis of powers ben wipinforþ, bisidis þe outward wittis in man and in beestis, and bisidis resoun and wil *in* man, Out of whiche v inward powers þe seid v dyuers | inward kyndis of wirchyngis muste come ^{12^a} forþ and bē causid, if þei schulden be, and þe same ordre *and* rewe muste be bitwix þe seid inward powers, which ordre *and* rewe is knowen to be bitwixe þe seid inward wirchyngis. Also into proof for þe same purpos y take þe same ground which y tooke bifore in þe v^e *chapitre*, þat god and kynde, ¹⁰ namelich to parfite and notable beestis, failþ not in necessities and in notable accordyng profites to þe same beestis.

And panne vpon þis ground y procede ferþir þus : but so it is þat it is ful accordyng, necessari and profitable þat boþe ¹⁵ parfite notable beestis and men knowe outward sensible þingis not oonli whilis þo þingis ben present, but also whilis þo þingis schulen be absent, þat bi þe knowyng of þo þingis at oon tyme þei mowe be so enformyd vpon þe same þingis aȝens an opir tyme þat þei schulen not be nedi aȝen vpon ²⁰ þe same þing of þe newe to be leernyd. And þe outward sensitijf wittis knowen not her obiectis, same whanne þe same obiectis ben present to þe outward wittis, þouȝ þei alle be not immediat to þe same outward wittis. þerfore it was conuenyent and necessari þat suche beestis and men schulden ²⁵ haue an inward sensitijf witt, or dyuers inward sensitijf wittis, bi whiche þei myȝten knowe outward sensible þingis in absence of þe same þingis. And ferþirmore it is conuenyent and necessari þat suche beestis and men knowe not oonli þe obiectis of þe outward wittis, þat is to seie, þe þingis ³⁰ perceyuyd bi þe outward wittis, but it is also conuenyent, profitable and necessari þat þei knowe hem silf to knowe þo outward sensible þingis, and also þat þei knowe þe dyuersite and þe difference bitwixe þe seid obiectis, and þat þei iuge *and* deme bitwixe þe same seid obiectis *in* maner touchid ³⁵ bifore in þe first *chapitre*.¹ Also it is conuenyent, accordyng *and* necessari þat þo beestis and men knowe þo þingis whiche bifore in þe first parti of 'þe donet', *in* þe i^e *chapitre*, ben

¹ Of the *Donel*, Pt. I.

callid þe comune sensible þingis necessari to be knowen of hem; whiche þingis ben þese v: Mouyng, Rest, Gretnesse, Nombre and ffigure.¹ wherfore it is conuenient, resonable, profitable and necessari þat parfite beestis and men haue oon
5 witt or dyuers wittis wherbi þei mowe haue þese þre now seid last knowyngis. And siþen þo same now seid þre knowyngis mowe not be exercisid and vsid bi oon outward witt, as experience and resoun wel schewen, and þese same now seid þre knowyngis mowe be exercisid and vsid bi oon
10 inward witt, and multitude ouȝte be refusid where þat multitude may be lackid and | avoidid; þerfore þe seid comune witt is seid to be in parfite notable beestis and men, bi which comune witt þe seid iij knowyngis schulen be exercisid and vsid. And siþen þese þre knowyngis ben
15 not exercisid and vsid bi eny oon outward sensitijf witt, as experience and resoun wel schewen in þe first chapitre of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þerfore oon inward sensitijf witt is þerto to be assignyd, which is for skile and resoun of his wirchyng now declarid þe 'comune witt' to be callid.

Number and Figure.

COMMON WIT is the inward bodily Wit enabling men and the higher animals to do the three aforesaid things.

20 fferþirmore, ouer þis þat is now seid, it is conuenient, profitable and necessari parfite notable beestis and men forto holde and kepe bi long notable tyme þe knowyngis whiche ben had bi þe seid inward witt comune, and þat in lengir notable tyme þan þe seid inward comoun witt þerto sufficiþ,
25 for þe liȝt disposicioun forto sooner receyue impressioun þan þe opir aftir him in þilk kynde inward sensitijf wittis han. And herwith so it is bi wey of kynde þat þilk mater of bodi which is wel disposid to receyue, is not wel disposid to holde and kepe, bi cause þat neisch mater or neisch parti of
30 bodi is best disposid to receyue eny prentyng or impressioun, and hard mater or hard parti of bodi is best disposid to holde eny prentyng or impressioun. And þese tweyne disposicions mowe not be notabli or excellentli in oon parti or in oon mater of beestis bodi or mannys bodi, bi cause þat
35 þese now seid two disposicions ben contrari, and þerfore it repugneþ hem to be togidere in oon and in þe same parti. þerfore bi conuenience of resoun þer muste bi god and bi

Common Wit readily receives impressions, but does not long retain them.

IMAGINATION is the inward

¹ See Notes.

bodily Wit
which retains
the impressions
received by
Common Wit.

kynde be ordeynyd an *opir* inward witt forto notabli holde
þe liknessis of sensible þingis and þe knowyngis whiche ben
liztli bi þe comune witt takun and receyuyd. And þefore
for þis office is ordeynyd þe inward witt clepid 'ymaginacioun'
as a tresorie to þe seid comune witt.¹

5

FANTASY is the
inward bodily
Wit which
fancies things
and likenesses
which do not
exist—the
material being
drawn from
experience, but
the special
combinations
being illusions.

fferþirmore, for as mych as we han in experience in sleep
þat, whanne alle þe outward wittis ben sequestrid and not vsid,
þer ben dremes in whiche ben semyngis and iugementis þat
sensible þingis ben doon whiche ben not doon, and þat
þingis ben maad of suche parties of whiche þei ben not maad, 10
as þat a þing be maad of a lions heed, of a gootis bodi, and of
a dragons tail; And forto so make *and* feyne semyþ to be
þe wirchyng of a notable power of þe soul, dyuers fro þe two
inward powers and inward wittis now seid, and to sewe
immediatli vpon þe wirchyngis of þe powers now seid; 15
þefore þe þridde inward witt is to be grauntid to be in
parfite beestis and in | men next aftir þe powers now seid; 18^a
which þridde power is þe fantastik witt forto exercise þe
werk and office now last seid, not resonable to be excercible
and vseable bi eny of þe wittis bifore seid.²

20

ESTIMATION is
the inward
bodily Wit
which perceives
friendship,
enmity, etc. not
discoverable by,
or dependent
upon, the five
outward bodily
Wits, or senses.

And þanne ferþirmore, siþen we han in experience þat
beestis perceyuen many þingis whos knowyngis fallen not
vndir eny of þe outward wittis, as ben natural frendschipis
and natural enemytees and *opire* lijk, and þe þre now bifore
seid inward wittis knowen and laboren oonli vpon þe þingis 25
bifore hem knowen of þe outward wittis; þefore it is trewe
þat god bi kynde haþ purueied to parfite notable beestis, and
þefore mych rapir to man, a such inward sensitijf witt
wherbi þei schulen perceyue and knowe þe now seid obiectis
or þe now seid þingis knowable, which seid power or witt 30
may be clepid 'estimatif power'.

MIND is the
inward bodily
Wit which
retains the
impressions
received by
Estimation.

And for as mych as not þe same parti of bodi is disposid to
wel receyue and to wel holde, *and* eche of þe outward and
inward wittis wirchen in parties of þe bodi as with her
instrumentis, bi cause þat þei ben powers of þe soul which is 35

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

bestial, or in þat þat he is bestial, bi cause þat to alle parfite notable beestis alle þese now seid wirchingis ben conuenient and accordyng; þerfore it is resonable and conuenient þat to alle parfite beestis and to men be ȝouun an inward witt forto
 5 holde bi notable tyme þe lijknessis of þingis and þe knowyngis of þingis perceyuyd and receyuyd bi þe estimatijf power—which receyuyng and holdyng power may wel and accordyngli be clepid ‘mynde’ or ‘myndful witt’ or ‘myndeful power’.

10 And so we mowe haue bi likli resoun þat in ech parfite notable beest, and þerfore mych rapir in man, ben v inward sensitijf wittis, or v inward sensitijf witti powers, pouȝ summe philesofris maken not mensioun of so many.

Hence to man and the higher animals are given five inward bodily Wits.

fiadir, y haue radde and herde þat summe philesofris
 15 holden þe seid comoun inward sensitijf witt wirche not anentis eny outward sensible obiet but while eny of þe outward sensitive wittis wirchip vpon þe same outward sensible obiet. And ȝe now seien þe contrari: þat he may haue his wirchyng whanne and while noon of þe outward
 20 sensitive wittis is in wirchyng.

Some philosophers argue that Common Wit cannot judge of an outward object save when some outward bodily Wit is also judging thereon.

Sone, y wote wel þat summe philesofris so holden and techen as þou hast now rehercid. Neuerþeles, þilk techyng semep not to me best and trewist, and þerfore y schal holde and teche as to me semyþ bettir to be tauȝt, for skile
 25 movyng me, into tyme bi strengir skile into þe contrari y schal be fro myn opnyoun removid. ffor wel y wote for
 13^b noon | opir cause þan for skile of resoun was eny philesofir so movid forto write þat þe inward comoun sensitive witt is neuer in wirchyng saue whanne eny outward sensitive witt
 30 is in his wirchyng; And þerfore into what parti strengir skile of resoun is had, þilk parti ouȝte rapir be holde for trewe.

This opinion does not seem right to Pecoock.

Mi skile into þe parti which y here holde is þis: If þe inward comoun sensitive witt may holde and kepe þe seid
 35 lijknessis or ymagis of colouris, as of whijtnes and of blaknes, bi eny notable tyme sufficient into wirchyng, whanne þo colouris ben absent fro þe outward sensitive siȝt, þe seid

Since Common Wit can for a certain time preserve images when the objects themselves are absent from the outward sight,

it can also judge those objects, through their images, when the objects themselves are absent from the outward sight.

inward sensitive comoun witt may haue his natural wirchyng about, vpon and anentis þo colouris, þat is to seie, whijtnes and blacknes, whanne þo same colouris ben absent bi notable tyme fro þe sizt, fforwli in pilk while þe seid inward comoun sensitive witt hap his nexte obiectis to him present, whiche 5 ben þo likenessis or ymagis of whijtnes and of blaknes, wherefore he may þanne wirche into hem. but so it is þat þe seid inward comoun sensitive witt may kepe and holde wip him þe lijknensis and ymagis of colouris, as of whijtnes and blacknes, bifore seen in þe outward sizt, and pese lijknensis 10 and ymagis he may so holde and kepe whanne þo colouris ben absent notabli fro þe outward sizt, and þerfore whanne þei ben not outwardli seen, in as mych as þe outward sizt may not se and knowe colouris bi eny notable tyme saue whanne þei ben present to him. Wherefore folowith þat þe seid 15 inward comoun witt may wirche vpon þo colouris, and so may knowe þo colouris, and iuge þe oon of hem be not þe opir of hem, whanne þo colouris ben absent bi sum notable tyme fro þe outward sizt. And þanne ferþir þus: whanne eny colour is absent fro þe outward sizt bi eny notable tyme, 20 þe sizt wirchip not vpon and anentis pilk colour. Wherefore folowith ferþir þat þe seid comoun power may wirche anentis colouris whanne þe iʒe sizt wirchip not vpon hem and about hem. And, if þe seid inward comoun witt may þus do about and vpon þe obiectis of sizt in absence of hem fro þe sizt, 25 resoun wole þat he may lijkwise do about and vpon þe obiect of eny opir assignable outward sensitive witt, and þat whanne pilk obiect is absent and out of þe knowyng for pilk while of þe same outward sensitive witt.

If Common Wit can work independently of outward sight, it can also work independently of the other outward bodily Wits.

Reason why, and proof that, the image of an object is retained longer by Common Wit than by the outward sight, and retained by Common Wit when the object is no longer present to the sight.

þat þe seid inward sensitive comoun witt may kepe þe 30 seid lijknensis and ymagis of colouris in her absence fro doom and knowyng of seyng witt, þe motyue and euydence is þis: ffor þis þat þo lijknensis and ymagis ben impressid | in þe 14^a balle of þe iʒe, or ellis for þat þo¹ ben caried with labour of spiritis fro þe ballis of þe yʒen, and fro sizt þer maad, into 35 þe ynnere crossid synow, þo lijknensis and ymagis ben kept and holde in pilk crossid synew, and sizt is maad vpon hem at sum while for a schort sudeyn while in absence of þo

¹ o of þo partly rubbed in MS.

colouris from sufficient presence to þe ize; as experience
schewiþ whanne a mannys yze biholdiþ strongli vpon greet
lizt or hiȝe colouris, and turneþ sudeynli his yze fro pilk lizt
or fro pilk colour, for þanne he schal iuge bi þe sizt of pilk
5 lizt or of pilk colour, þouȝ he haue turnyd perfro his face.
Wherfore, siþen þo lijknensis and ymagis ben ferpir caried bi
office of spiritis, whanne þei ben caried vp into þe foreheed,
where þe seid inward comoun witt sittip aftir felyng of alle
philosofris, þo lijknensis and ymagis schulden bi lengir tyme
10 abide in þe seid comoun witt þan þei aboden in þe sizt or in
þe seid crokid synew; and perfore þei schulden abide in þe
seid comoun witt whanne þe sizt hadde not to do with hem.

And ferpir, whanne euer lijknensis abiden in þe seid comoun
sensitive witt, þe same seid sensitive comoun witt may haue
15 his wirchyng vpon and anentis hem or bi hem vpon þe
outward obiectis. Wherfore folewith þat whanne sizt may
not haue his wirchyng vpon certeyn colouris or liztis, þe seid
comoun inward sensitive witt may haue his wirchyng vpon
þo same seid colouris or liztis. Also a beest, and at þe leest
20 for experience to be had a man, which neuer bifore in sizt of
ij dyuerse colouris, whanne he sawe hem, made iugement þat
þe oon of hem is not þe opir of hem, may in her absence fro
þe sizt iuge þat þe oon of hem is not þe opir of hem; and þis
iugement is iugement of þe seid inward sensitif comoun witt,
25 as þerin filosofris not discorden. and noon opir inward
sensitive witt haþ pilk iugement vpon outward sensible þingis,
saue in ordre aftir þe inward comoun sensitive witt, and so
in maner bi him. Wherfore he haþ pilk iugement bifore eny
opir inward sensitive witt, and þat in absence of þo colouris
30 fro iugement of þe outward sizt.

No more, sone, of þis contrauersie here. Certis, þis mych
wolde not y haue write here in lay tunge, ne were þat y hope
þis present book schal be translatid into latyn tunge; And
paraurenture, if y schulde abstene me here now fro writyng
35 herof in lay tunge, y schulde neuer write it, neiþir in lay tunge
neiþir in latyn tunge, and þat for greet prece of many opire
maters profryng hem silf daili to be writen and to be dely-
14^b uerid into knowyng; And if y schulde seie in my conscience
bifore god: 'þis now towchid is oon cause whi y delyuerid bi

Therefore
Common Wit
may judge of an
object when the
outward bodily
Wit is not judg-
ing thereon.

Why Pecoock
discusses the
matter here in
the common
language.

writing in lay tunge many maters and treupis as þei camen to mynde ouer what y entendid bifore forto delyuere in lay tunge, lest if y schulde haue ouer passid hem forto not haue write hem in pilk while, þei schulden neuyr haue be write of me; And leefir y hadde forto write suche maters and 5 treupis in lay tunge, vndir hope þat aftirward þei schulen come into latyn tunge, þan forto putte hem into perel forto neuier be of me writen.'

If a layman, after earnest striving, finds the matter too difficult, he may pass it over.

What euer lay man schal rede pis book and, aftir longe studi and aftir help takun of clerkis, sum parcel perof he 10 schal not mowe vndirstonde, he hap þerin no wrong neipir hurt, for he may lepe ouer pilk parcel and fede him in opire parties whiche he may with competent labour and counseil with clerkis vndirstonde. ffor so doon clerkis in dyuynyte, and so þei musten needis do, and ellis in bookis of dyuynyte 15 þei schulden neuier þryue.

vij^e chapitre.

What is the evidence for the positions in the head of the five inward bodily Wits?

[F]Adir, what eydence haue 3e þat þe v inward sensitive wittis ben placid bi rewe along¹ in þe heed, and ech in his propre celle, but if, as summe men wolen holde, þat þe 20 fantastik witt is in þe same cellis placid with comoun witt and with ymaginacioun?

That they are placed in the head is proved by the effect upon them of any indisposition of the head.

Sone, þat þei ben alle in þe heed of man and of beest, and þat þei ben in sum mater of þe heed as in her supporter and her instrument to perwith wirche here dewe workis of 25 knowyng, we mowe haue experience. fforwhi if þe heed be hurt or stoppid or indisposid, þe seid v wittis schulen þerbi be hurt or lettid or indisposid, þou3 alle þe opire parties of þe bodi be hool and sound. and þerfore we mowe likli deme þat þei ben sitting in mater of þe heed. And for pis 30 þat þei sitten in such ordre and rewe as þei ben rehercid in þe next chapitre bifore goyng, þe eydencis ben þere in þe next chapitre sufficientli touchid, if þei ben wel spied. Neuerþeles, more þerto perteynyng schal be seid now þus: Siben þe same mater which is mych able to receyue impres- 35

Since the functions of the five inward bodily Wits differ, their positions differ.

For matter which most

¹ MS. *a long.*

sioun of liknessis of sensible þingis ben not moost able to holde suche liknessis of sensible þingis, neiþir þe wirchyngis maad vpon hem; þerfore, as bi mych liklihode, þe comoun witt and ymaginacioun han not oon mater or oon place or oon celle of þe heed, to be comoun to hem boþe. And bi lijk skile oon celle of þe heed may not serue to estimacioun and to mynde, neiþir to estimacioun and to ymaginacioun. Also
 15^a neiþir oon celle may serue for | comune witt and for estimacioun, bi cause þat comune witt perceyueþ not but þo þingis whiche ben perceyuable of þe outward wittis, and
 10 estimacioun perceyueþ þo þingis whiche noon of þe outward wittis may perceyue, as is bifore seid in þe next chapitre. and so þerfore eche of þese now seid iiij inward wittis muste needis haue her propre cellis or propre placis in þe heed.
 15 And, for as mych as it is conuenient and resonable þat he of hem whos wirchyng is first and next knytt to þe outward wittis be sett in þe first place, and he of hem whos wirchyng is from þens next aftir knytt and meetyng with þe outward wittis be in þe secund place, and so of þe þridde; And
 20 herwith it is trewe, as is open bi þe next chapitre bifore goyng, þat þe wirchyng which bifore is assignyd to þe comune witt is next to be had and vsid aftir þe v outward wittis, and þanne þe wirching of ymaginacioun is next to be had aftir þe wirchyng of þe comune witt, and as soone as þese
 25 seid wirchyngis ben had, so soone is redi aftir hem to be had þe wirchyng of fantasie; þerfore it is to be holde þat þe comune witt is placid in þe first celle of þe heed, as in þe forheed; and þe ymaginacioun is in þe secund celle inward fro þe forheed; and fantasie is in þe þridde celle, or in boþe
 30 now seid two cellis togidere; and þanne aftir hem muste needis be loggid estimacioun and mynde; among whiche tweyne estimacioun muste be placid and loggid bifore mynde, bi cause þat þe wirchyng of estimacioun is in processe and ordre bifore þe wirchyng of mynde, as is open bifore in þe
 35 next chapitre. And þis wole sumwhat ȝeue euydence for þis, þat þe v inward sensitif wittis ben placid in þe heed aftir þe maner, ordre and processe bifore spokun and tretid.

ffadir, y haue radde in summe philesofris writyng how þei placen þe power of fantasie bihynde alle þe opire inward

quickly receives impressions, does not long retain them.

According as the inward bodily Wits are more or less intimately connected with the outward bodily Wits, so their positions differ.

Why do some philosophers give FANTASY

the inmost
place?

There is much
diversity of
opinion about
the position of
Fantasy, but
the midmost
position is the
most reasonable.

wittis in þe heed, and 3e placen him in þe middis of þe inward wittis in þe heed.

Sone, herfore be þou neuer a deel disturblid, ffor certis in þis mater þou schalt fynde fewe philesofris accorde in her writyng, bi cause þat eche of hem folewith þe mocoun of his owen resoun. þerfore, sone, sipen no þing is to be holde in þis mater saue what resoun demep to be trewe, and for þat resoun so demep to be trewe, and ellis it were not philosophie, it folewith þat what euer parti hap moost of resoun in þis mater, and is ferpist from inconuenyence, it is 10 best | philosophie and rapist to be holde. And sipen þe wei 15 bifore seid, which placip fantasie next aftir ymaginacioun and in þe myddis of alle þe inward sensitijf wittis, hap most of resoun and is ferpist from inconuenyence, as may be open if al be wel considerid what is bifore seid for proof þerof in 15 þe next chapitre and in þis present chapitre, þerfore, sone, þe placyng of fantasie next aftir ymagynacioun is rapir to be holden for trewe philosophie þan þat he schulde be placid aftir alle þe opire iiij inward wittis, or þat he schulde be placid bitwix estimatijf and mynde. 20

Since Fantasy
comes next
Imagination in
office, it is
reasonable to
put it next in
position.

Also, sone, ouer what is seid for good proof þerof in þe next chapitre bifore and in þis present chapitre, 3it þis mych more may be sett þerto þus: Boþe beestis and men ben occupied oftir in her outward sensitijf wittis þan in her estimatijf witt, as is open y-nou3 to experience, and þerfore 25 oftir þan in her mynde, which serueþ to estimatijf witt. Wherefore boþe beestis and men ben oftir occupied in her inward witt comune and in her ymaginacioun seruyng to þe outward sensitijf wittis þan þei ben occupied in her estimatijf witt, and þerfore oftir þan in her mynde seruyng to þe 30 estimatijf witt. but so it is þat how euer soone and how euer oft beest or man hap had wirchyng of his inward witt comune and of his ymaginacioun, so soone and so oft he is redi forto make compownyngis of þo symple and sengle þingis whiche he perceuyd in his comune witt and in his 35 ymaginacioun. Wherefore bi ordre of kynde anon forþ with at þe next schulde and owip to be zounn to beest and to man þe power of fantasie forto so bi him compowne and togidere ioyne. And þerfore bi resoun fantasie schulde come next

after ymaginacioun in placyng, as he¹ next and oftist comyþ
after ymaginacioun in office and in wirchyng.

Also þouþ þe þingis whiche ben perceyuyd bi estimatijf,
and holden bi mynde, mowe and wolen be compownyd and
5 ioynyd togidere riȝt as þo þingis whiche ben perceyuyd bi
witt comune and holden bi ymaginacioun, ȝit þe fantasie
which serueþ to þis office of compownyng schal bettir serue
forto attende to witt comune and to ymaginacioun in þe oon
side, and to estimatijf and to mynde in þe opir side, if he be
10 putte and be placid in þe myddis of hem alle, þan if he
schulde be placid in þe eend of hem alle. Wherefore, siþen
kynde is ordeynyd as best is, it folewith þat rapir it is to be
holden fantasie to be placid in þe myddis of þe opire iiij
16^a inward sensitijf wittis þan | at þe eend or bihynde þe opire
15 iiij inward sensitijf wittis.

Confirmacion heerto may be þis: how myȝte a candil do so
wel forto liȝtene and clere iiij placis stondyng on rewe, if he
be sett bihynde hem alle, as he may liȝtene and clere hem
alle or serue to hem alle, if he be sett in þe myddis of hem
20 alle forto schyne bifore and after, forþward and aftirward, to
hem alle, namelich if his wirchyng be comune to eche of hem
alle. but so it is þat þe office of fantasie serueþ to þe
ymaginacioun as mych as it serueþ to þe mynde, ȝhe, and to
þe comune witt as mych as to þe estimatijf. And þerfore,
25 sone, if þou loke wel about, þou schalt se þat in reward of þe
philosofie tauȝt to þee vpon þe nombre and placyng and
ordre of þe v inward sensitijf wittis, opir filosofie contrari
herto which þou hast rad is not so mych worþ.

And for as mych, sone, as þou art movid into opynyoun,
30 bicause þou hast radde opire mennys writingis þerto
accordyng, certis, y seie to þee þus: If in euery mater which
may be iugid bi resoun, þou schalt ȝeue þi cleuyng consent
to þe oon parti more þan to þe opir, and oonli for as mych as
þou redist so to be writun eer þan þou resolue and brynge
35 þilk writyng into his open ground of resoun wherþon he is
euydentli foundid, þou schalt as oft go vndir bigilyngis as
baiaard goiþ vndir þe cartis þillyngis, or ellis þus, þou schalt

And as Fantasy
is related to
Estimation and
Mind in the
same way as to
Common Wit
and Imagina-
tion, it is
reasonable to
give Fantasy
the middle
position.

A candle may
light four places
at once, if it be
set in the
middle.

Every man who
is able, should
judge for him-
self by the light
of Reason.

¹ After *he*, MS. has *is*, crossed through in red.

be as oft bigilid as bayard goop vndir þe carte to be pillid, þat is to seie, þou schalt so oft in mys trowyng be bigilid þat ful hard schal be so many whilis to be nombred. 3he, and in maters of feiþ and of mannys pure positijf ordinauncis and lawes, þou3 men crie vpon þee ful lowde, seiung 'þis is feiþ' 5 and 'þat is feiþ', 'þis is lawe' and 'þat is lawe', certis, but if þou abide and se *and* resolute and brynge al what is so seid to be feiþ or lawe into þe pure certeyn groundis wherbi it schal be certeyn þat it is so feiþ or lawe, þou schalt be ful ofte bigilid.

Only ignorant people should rely blindly on their teachers.

Neuerpeles, pilke *persoones* whiche *ben* so low3e and symple in witt, leernyng and kunnyng, þat þei not sufficen to resolute *and* brynge maters of philosophie in to her groundis of resoun wherbi þei *ben* at þe certeynest or at þe moost likli iugeable to be trewe, neiþir maters of feiþ into þe 15 ground wherbi it may certeynli be prouyd bi resoun þat þei owen be takun as feiþ, neiþir maters of positijf mannys lawe into þe ground wherbi it may be openli prouyd bi resoun þat þei *ben* mannys positijf ordinauncis and lawes, owen forto truste and bileeue to her enformers *and* affermers, 20 whom þe fame of peple supposiþ to be in pilke maters trewe, sad, and, as it were, vnbigileable techers, enformers *and* affermers. and so god wole hem holde excusid, þou3 16 þei bileeue amys, and þat bi cause it is not in her kunnyng and power forto do bettir. And aftir þis maner of 25 discrecioun feelide, as me semeþ, Austyn in his book entitlid 'of þe soulis quantite'. *Neuerpeles*, wheþir he so feelide or no, þis discrecioun now tau3t and rehercid is so fyndable in resoun to be trewe þat þou3 no man perof make mensioun in writyng, 3it it is supportable and algatis to be alowid. 30 ffor we mowe not loke aftir þat no þing be trewe but if it be witnessid in writyng, for at þe leest þanne many a trewaunt schulde be excusid from betyng, and many a fals þeeþ schulde be sau3d from hangyng, and many a good man schulde lacke his dewe worþi rewardyng, and 3it not so many, how many 35 worþi treupis schulde lacke of her dewe fame þe knowlechyng *and* þe proclamyng.

What is the evidence that

ffadir, y holde me wel agreed as for þe ordre in placyng of

þe v inward wittis. What seie 3e which is þe eydence þat þe moyng power¹ bi which men and parfite notable beestis mouen hem silf from place to place, is placid originali and fundamentali bihynde in þe nolle of þe heed?

the power of Moving¹ is placed at the back of the head?

- 5 Sone, þe eydence herof is takun bi experience, in which experience it is knowen þat þe synewes of mannys bodi and of parfite beestis bodi, with þe spiritis rennyng in þe synewes, ben þe instrumentis of moyng from place into place. And, siþen enserchers of anothomy, þat is to seie, of pilk kunnyng
- 10 how mennes bodies ben maad, han founde in experience, bi cutting of deede mennys bodies, þat þe synewes of þe bodi bigynnen at þe nolle of þe heed, and þei goen down in þe necke into þe rigge boon, and from ech ioynt of þe rigge boon þei ben braunchid abroad into þe bodi; þerfore þei holden
- 15 þat þe power to move from place to place is sett bihynde in þe nolle of þe heed, where þat first growip out þe bigynnyng of synewes.

Experience teaches that the sinews are the means by which movement takes place, and the sinews start at the back of the head.

note how Peract allows of not authority of experience

viiij^e chapitre.

- [F]Adir, gramerci for al þis þat 3e haue me tauzt. Now
- 20 ferþir þis: þat man hap þilke powers whiche 3e bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þe i^e chapitre, haue clepid 'resoun' and 'wil', is open y-nouz bi experience; fforwhi who euer hap þe wirchyngis of eny powers, he hap þe same powers. but so it is, as experience schewip, man hap þe wirchyngis
- 25 whiche bifore 3e haue seid in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', in þe i^e chapitre, to be þe wirchyngis of resoun and of wil; wherfore he hap boþe resoun and wil, and þerfore herof y wole make no dout. But, fadir,² wherþir it myzte not be seid and holde þat parfite notable beestis maken trewe proposicions in summe
- 30 of her inward wittis, and arguen and prouen in sensible
- 35 þingis and in þo þingis whiche | her inward wittis perceyuen, as men arguen and prouen boþe in sensible þingis and in insensible þingis and in vnbodili substauncis as ben spiritis and aungelis, so þat a beest may argue, conclude and proue
- to him silf oon þing to be of him now first knowen bi an opir þing bifore of him more knowen, as it wolde seme þat

Since experience teaches that man can work the works of REASON and FREE WILL, therefore he must possess REASON and FREE WILL.

Is it not true that the higher animals can argue, form propositions, and deduce conclusions?

¹ See Notes. ² Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

grehoundis doon, whanne þei taken þe wey þwert ouer þe feeld to þe rapir meete with þe haare, þan þei schulde so meete or take þe haare if þei schulde folewe þe haare goyng about þe same feeld in parti or porcioun of a compas, And as foxes and apes doon in many of her wiles wirchyng, of whiche 5 wiles y haue herde wondir taalis, as þat þerof haþ be had sure experience.

It is probable that beasts can argue to some extent.

Sone, it is comounli holde of summe philesofris þat no beest may in his wittes make discurse, þat is to seie, a cowplyng togidere of two treupis to him bifore knowen, forto conclude 10 in foorm of argument þe iij^e treup, and þerbi þe same iij^e treup to be knowen first of þe same beest. Neuerpeles, y se not as 3it eny inconuenyence which wole lette forto holde þat beestis mowe and kunnen forme proposicions, argue and proue and gete knowyng to hem bi argument of verri silogisme and 15 of induccioun about þo þingis whiche þei mowe bi her outward and inward wittis perceyue; pouþ þei not so parfijtli as a man may and kanne argue about þe same þingis and about many mo, riht as oon beest kanne not bi half be so sliþ and wili and so wel argue as sum opir beest kanne. And forto 20 make þis werk of arguyng and prouyng in beestis, myzte serue ful wel þe fantasie or þe estimatijf in þe same beestis. And soþeli, sone, vnto tyme þat þou schalt heere þis opynyoun vnprouyd, y wole þat þou holde it. And, certis, y weene it is eesier to holde þis now seid opynyoun þan forto holde 25 þe contrari comonli holden and writen in summe bookis of philosophie. Neuerpeles, sone, y make me not so sure in þis opynyoun as y do in alle myne opire synguler opynyons 3it hidirto writen, in which y varie from opire mennys þerin holdyngis. 30

An example of such argument on the part of a beast is requested.

Example of argument by a dog who has been beaten for taking pieces dropped from the table.

ffadir, wole 3e vouche saaf to sette forþ sum example of po argumentis whiche beestis maken?

Sone, take an hound which haþ ben oft sore beten for þat he tooke and eete þe fleisch or breed fallyng from þe mete table, and lete þere now falle such a morcel. experience may 35 schewe þat pouþ þis hound haue ful greet lust and desiyr in þe appetitis of his outward wittis forto take and eete þis morcel, 3it he wole forbere. And if he forbere, he muste

forbere bi sum knowyng, and bi þe werk of sum inward witt
17^b wheryn he haþ such a wir|chyng and laboryng: 'Al þing
plesaunt in takyng for which y schal be bete, and more peyne
haue þan is þe delijt and þe eese in þe takyng, is to be
5 forbore. but for þis delectable morcel, if y it take, y schal
be sore beete, and be more peynynd and greuyd þan y schal
be delitid in þis morcel takyng and etyng. Wherefore þis
morcel is to be forbore.' þat þe secund premysse be trew, he
knowiþ as bi opynyoun gendrid in þis wise: 'ffor what eyr
10 þing y was so oft wonyd to be bete, y schal as wel heraftir
be bete, if it bifalle. but for þe taking of suche fallyng
morcelis y was oft bifore beete. wherfore as wel heraftir for
þe takyng of hem y schal be bete, if it bifalle'. þe first
premysse of þis ije argument, þouȝ it be not at surist knowen
15 of þe hound to be trewe, ȝit it is knowen of him to be ful
likli to be trewe. and so þerof þe knowyng is oonli opynyoun,
and þerfore þe knowyng of þe conclusioun is not to him but
opynyoun; which opynyoun neuyrþeles is sufficient to reule
þe hound in þe seid forberyng, riȝt as ofte tymes men ben
20 reulid bi her oonli opynyoun, þouȝ þei haue not verri certeyn
science. And, sone, in lijk maner as þese silogismes ben
formyd in þe seid hound, so ben opire silogismes formyd in
þe same hound, and in opire beestis ful ofte, þouȝ it be not
mych of men considerid, and þouȝ pilke silogismes be maad
25 hastili and quyeli, as þei ben oft made swiftli and quyeli in
men, þouȝ þei be not lettrid and not enformyd in craftial
logik, but endewid oonli with natural and vsual logik, which
neuērþeles is þe same with craftial logik, so þat y take þis
name 'craftial' here largeli for al þat is founden and formyd
30 expresseli bi mannys witt and bisnesse.

ffadir, y trowe þat summe men wolen wondre here vpon
þis, þat ȝe holden so greet wijsdom to be in beestis, þat þei
arguen and prouen, and þerfore þat þei han and maken
silogismes.

35 Sone, so paraenture many wolen wondir if y schulde putte
so greet wijsdom in lay peple þat þe symplis of hem han and
maken silogismes, and þat þe symplis persoon of kunnyng
þat is, may not knowe eny troupe of þo troupis whiche ben not
open to ech resoun, but if he þervpon haue a silogisme, and

Will not men
wonder that
Pecock believes
beasts to have
the power of
arguing
logically?

They will
wonder also that
Pecock believes
unlearned lay-
men to have the
gift of natural
logic.

pat he may not leerne eny ping of þe new wipout þat he haue
 þervpon a silogisme in his vndirstondyng, prouyng þe leernyd
 trouþ bi two premysse beyng more knowen to him þan is þe
 conclusioun of him leernyd and bi þilke premysse concludid.
 and ȝit to ech wise ensercher al þis now seid schal be founde 5
 for treuþ. Also, sone, if y schulde seie þat þe lay peple han
 in her vndirstondyng naturali þe same logik whiche clerkis
 han craftili or doctrinali, many men wolen | wondre hervpon. 18^a
 and ȝit if þis be wel considerid, it wole be founde for trewe.
 And þerfore, sone, more is to be chargid what is treuþ, and 10
 what is not treuþ, þan whervpon men wole wondre or not
 wondre.

All men
 acknowledge
 beasts to know
 these things,
 though some
 attribute the
 knowledge to
 instinct.

Also, sone, forto turne aȝen into it what y haue bifore seid
 of beestis, þei pat denyen beestis to argue and proue to hem
 silf bi silogismes, putten as greet wisdom in beestis as y putte. 15
 fforwhi þe quantite of þe wisdom in a knower is to be
 mesurid bi þe multitude of þe þingis knowen, and bi þe
 worpinesse of þe þingis knowen, and bi þe certeynte in
 þe maner of knowyng. but so it is þat þo clerkis whiche
 denyen an ape and a ffoxe to make silogismes, knowlechen an 20
 Ape and a ffoxe to knowe alle þe same þingis whiche y holde
 and seie þe ape and þe ffoxe to knowe. And ferþirmore þei
 knowlechen þe ape and þe ffoxe to knowe as certeynli and as
 sureli þo trouþis and þingis bi natural instinct or bi natural
 prickyng or stiryng, how certeynli and how sureli y holde and 25
 seie þe same ape and ffoxe to knowe þe same treuþis bi
 silogisme. And þerfore y kanne not mych wite whi beestis
 schulden be wiser bi myn opynyoun holdyng þan bi þe
 opynyoun holdyng of opire men, þouȝ y holde þat beestis
 knowen bi argument of silogisme, and opire men holden þat 30
 beestis knowen bi symple prick and movyng of kynde without
 argument. Wel y wote þat þo clerkis whiche holden þat god
 knowiþ not eny trouþis bi argumentis, holden him þerfore in
 þat neuer þe vnwiser þan creaturis whiche knowen þe same
 trouþis bi argumentis whiche god knowiþ without argumentis. 35
 and so me þinkijþ þei schulden sumwhat in lijk maner fele
 vpon þis present purpos.

Pecock does not
 make beasts any
 the wiser than
 do those who
 attribute their
 knowledge to
 instinct.

Fight is the
 only outward

Mych more philosophie myȝte be tauȝt here about þe

wirchyng of þe v outward wittis, as þis: þat eche of þe outward wittis knowiþ *and* iugiþ oonli of þe þing which is immediat to him, and which is sett euen to him and vpon him, except þe witt of siȝt. fforwhi ellis eche of hem myȝte
 5 and schulde knowe, iuge, and deme how fer or how nyȝ his obiect is from him or to him, þat is to seie, þe þing which is principali knowen bi þe same witt. and, certis, so may noon of þe outward wittis do except oonli þe siȝt. ffor þe siȝt iugiþ of þingis beyng distaunt from him in long space, and
 10 he iugiþ how fer *and* how nyȝ þe þing seen is, which þing seen is clepid 'þe obiect' of þe siȝt; þouȝ paraenture to many clerkis at þe first bluysch it myȝte seme þat þe witt of heeryng and þe witt of smellyng knowen¹ *and* perceyuen her obiectis distaunt from þe seid wittis in place, which is not trewe if it
 15 be wel examyned, and þat for cause which is now bifore seid as for oon cause þerof. |

Wit which can judge of the distance of an object.

18^b Also it myȝte be tauȝt here how ech visible or seable þing which is not knowable bi eny opir outward witt þan bi þe siȝt, heldiþ out abroad² and from him, al about him in euery
 20 wey of space, as fer as to so helde his power serueþ and sufficiþ, and þat sodeynli, his liknesse in þe eir and in þe watir *and* in glasse and in ech bodi which is disposid to receyue liȝt into him; and þat in lijk maner as þe sunne, þe moone and a candil helden forþ her liȝt about hem in ech wey
 25 of space, but if þei be lettid bi wallis or stockis or opire sad bodies not able to receyue liȝt; which now seid lijknesse so helden abroad² sodeynli, whanne it is receyuyd into þe iȝe, þanne bi pilk lijknesse present to þe iȝe, and *with* helpyng and þe wirchyng of spiritis, of whom y schal speke aftir in
 30 þis same chapitre, þe iȝe seep and knowiþ þe þing whos liknesse is so receyuyd into þe iȝe. and pilk same liknesse is aftir takun and receyuyd into þynne bodies clepid 'spiritis'. and þanne pilke liknessis ben caried vp bi þo spiritis into þe comune witt and into þe ymaginacioun, þat þe inward wittis
 35 bi þe seid liknesse mowe knowe þe same þing or obiect which bifore knewe þe iȝe.

How an image is imprinted on the sight and communicated to Common Wit or Imagination.

And in lijk maner þe sown is takun from þe eere bi spiritis, and is caried into þe inward wittis; and þe odour is

The same method of communication exists between

¹ Before *knownen*, MS. has another *knownen*, crossed through in red.

² MS. *a broed*.

the other out-
ward and in-
ward Wits.

The different
kinds of sight-
images
explained.

takun from þe nose bi spiritis, and is caried into þe inward wittis; and of þe taast and touch it is in lijk wise to be feelid and seid, and al for þis: þat bi þese meenes and weies þe inward wittis mowe knowe what þe outward wittis bifore hem knewe.

5

Also it myȝte be tauȝt here how siȝt is maad in dyuers maners, as sum tyme bi riȝt beemes goyng from þe obiect into þe iȝe seyng, as whanne boþe þe obiect and þe iȝe seyng ben in þe same kynde of space, as þat boþe ben in þe eire or boþe ben in þe watir, and þanne þe obiect is seen and demyd aftir 10 his owen verri quantite and in his verri distaunce. Sum tyme siȝt is maad bi broken beemes goyng from þe obiect into þe iȝe seyng, as whanne þe obiect is in þe watir and þe iȝe seyng is in þe eire, or whanne þe obiect is in þe eire and a spectacle of glasse is bitwix þe obiect and þe iȝe, and þanne 15 oft þe obiect seen semyȝ grettir þan it is *and* neer þan it is. And sumtyme siȝt is maad bi reboundid beemys, as whanne þe obiect is seen in a myrrour; in which maner of seyng it wole seme þat a man seep an ymage of his face beyng presentli in þe glasse, and ȝit clerkis prouen wel *and* openli 20 þat it is not so, but he seep in þe glas, bi beemes reboundid aȝen to þe iȝe from þe leed of þe glas, his owen face, which | is out of þe glas and not in þe glas, and he seep noon ymage 19^a in þe glas, fforwhi in þe glas is noon such ymage, þouȝ it seme þat in þe glas is such an ymage. Suche þingis and many 25 mo, ȝhe, and many delectable merueyles *with* þe causis of hem, myȝte be tauȝt her of þe x wittis and of her wirchyngis, and namelich of þe siȝt, which forto teche here is not for my purpos in þis present book. And, þerfore, saue of þis what is bifore seid and tauȝt, for as mych as it availiȝ into þe 30 knowyng of goddis lawe, of his seruice, *and* of good lyuyng, or ellis for þat it prouep or cleerip sum opir what is bifore tauȝt availyng into þe knowyng of goddis lawe *and* of good lyuyng, y wole of alle suche merueylis to be tauȝt abstene here and forbere.

35

ix^e chapitre.

[F]Adir, ben per eny mo powers of þe soul¹ in man or in beest þan þese whiche 3e han in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þe i^e chapitre, and in þis present book now discryuyd?

Are there any more powers of the soul than those previously described?

3e, sone, mo þer ben. fforwhi in mannys bodi and in ech 5 parfijt bestis bodi which we seen goyng among vs ben þre principal regions: þat is to seie, þe nurischyng regioun, þe lijfli regioun and þe witti regioun.

THE THREE REGIONS OF THE BODY: the nourishing, the living (or vital) and the witty (or head).

þe nurischyng regioun is þe fundamental regioun of þe opir two now seid. And þis nurischyng regioun bigynneþ at 10 þe mydreef vndir þe brest, and it conteyneþ dounward þe stomak, þe lyuer, þe splene, þe reynes and þe guttis. And of þis regioun þe principal membir is þe lyuer. And þerfore þe lyuer is þe fundamental membir of al þe bodi, as for nurischyng of al þe bodi. Into werkis of þis nurischyng 15 regioun seruen many powers whiche ben comonli clepid 'kyndeli vertues'; neuerþeles þei mowen be clepid wel y-nouȝ 'powers'. and summe of hem seruen to drawe, summe to defie (þat is to seie, to departe) þe pure from þe vnpure, and summe to holde, summe to putte out, summe to turne or 20 chaunge, and summe to make lijn in qualitees.

THE NOURISHING REGION: its position, organs, and powers.

þe lyuyng or lijfli regioun conteyneþ þe space of þe bodi from þe mydreef vpward vnto þe heed. And in þis regioun þe principal membir is þe hert, and next aftir him is þe lunges, and þanne þe þrote with opire pipes, and þe mydreef. 25 Into werkis of þis lijfli regioun seruen vertues or powers to drawe in þe breþ, and putte out þe breþ, and to make pulse fro þe hert into þe bodi abroad; Also forto make þynne sotil bodies of þe fume of blood in þe hert, whiche þynne bodies ben clepid 'spiritis', and forto sende hem abroad into þe bodi to 30 make strengþ and lijf; and also to make witt and mouyng in 19^b þe heed, which heed is þe witti regioun.

THE LIVING REGION: its position, organs, and powers.

þe bridde regioun is þe heed, to which regioun longen þe v outward wittis and þe v inward wittis bifore discryuyd, with þe moyng power² which is placid bihynde in þe nolle of 35 þe heed, and from þens it goop doun bi synewes or stryngis

THE WITTY REGION: its five outward Wits, its five inward Wits, and its 'Moving Power'.

¹ Cf. 'powers of þe soul', p. 26, l. 35.

² See Notes.

into euery ioynt of þe rigge boon, and from euery ioynt of þe rigge boon into opire parties of þe bodi. And for as mych as þe knowyng of þe powers longyng to þe witty regioun is mych necessari to moral vertuose lyuyng to be lad, and þe knowyng of þe opire powers and vertues longyng to þe 5 nurischyng regioun and to þe lijfli regioun is not so necessari at al degree to moral vertuose lyuyng; perfore y haue more taried about þe discryuyng of þe powers of þe witty regioun þan y haue taried about¹ þe powers and vertues of þe tweyne opire regions. 10

How the powers
of the WITTY
REGION work.

ffadir, teche 3e to me how boþe a beest and a man puttþ þese powers² of þe witty regioun into execucioun of her wirkyngis.³

(1) Perception
by the outward
or inward Wits.

Sone, in þis wise þei wirchen: A beest may not long while lyue and endure, but þat wipin a schort while he takþ 15 knowyng and perceyueþ sum þing beyng wipoutforþ him, and þat bi wirching of summe of his v outward wittis.

(2) Desire of the
thing perceived,
or hatred of the
thing perceived,
by the appetites
corresponding
to the ten Wits.

anoon as he bi eny of his v outward or inward wittis perceyuyþ eny þing, þanne he perceyuyþ it as þing plesaunt and accordyng to him, or as a þing displesaunt and discordyng or 20 hurtyng to him. If þe þing be knowen and perceyuyd as a þing good, plesaunt and accordyng to þe kynde of þe beest, anoon þe appetite of þe same witt so perceyuyng and knowyng coueytþ þe same þing, and þat more or lasse aftir þat þe þing is knowen to be more or lasse good or likyng and accordyng 25 to þe kynde of þe beest. and if þe þing be knowen and perceyuyd as a þing yuel, displesaunt and vnaccordyng, þanne anoon þe appetit of þe same witt so knowyng refusþ þe same þing, and þat more or lasse aftir þat þe same þing be knowen and perceyuyd to be more or lasse yuel and discordyng. 30 þanne ferþir, whanne þe appetit of eny of þe x wittis hap coueitid þe outward perceyuyd þing, þe same appetit coueytþ þat þilk þing be had in þe maner in which it schulde delite and be good to þe beest so coueytyng. And þanne if bodili mouyng be necessari forto so haue þe seid good and delectable 35 þing, þe seid appetit comaundþ or coueytþ þe mouyng

(3) Movement
towards, or
away from, the
thing perceived.

¹ MS. *a bout*.

² i. e. the five outward Wits, the five inward Wits, and Moving.

³ See Notes.

power forto wirche into his movyng. and panne þe movyng
power, which is in þe hyndir parti of þe heed, as obeiyng to
eche of þe witti appetitis, sendiþ forþ from þe hyndir parti
20^a of þe heed into | þe ioyntis of þe rigge, and from þens into
5 opire parties necessari to be movid into þe desirid and
coueytid purpos, suche spiritis as ben bifore spokun of, forto
make movyng of þe bodi and of his parties answeyngli to þe
desiyr and þe coueytyng of þe appetit to be sped and fulfillid;
aud þat more or lasse movyng, strenger or febler, swiftir or
10 slower, lenger or schorter, aftir þat to þe appetitis coueytyng
it accordip.

And, for as mych as þe wittis bifore seid wirchen not
in fredom, but þei needis cost demen and knowen as þei
fynden, and as þei ben movid bi þe þing perceyuyd, and þe
15 appetitis of hem also wirchen in no fredom to coueyte and
to not coueyte, but algatis and needis þei oonli coueyten
or oonli refusen as it is representid and perceyuyd in þe
wittis vpon þe same þing þat it is oonli coueytable or oonli
refusable; þerfore, stondyng þe perceyuyng þoruȝ eny of þe
20 x wittis which a beest hap vpon a delectable þing, it may
not be but þat he coueyte þe same þing and bowe not
þerfro; and stondyng þe same perceyuyng, it may not be but
þat þe beestis appetit wilne and comaunde to þe movyng
power forto move þe membris of þe bodi as it is expedient
25 to haue þe þing coueytid. and it may not be, stondyng þe
same perceyuyng, but þat þe movyng power obeie and
execute þe movyng of þe bodi, as þe witt perceyuyng knowiþ
it to be best meene into þe getyng of þe þing coueytid, in
lasse þan a þing more delectable to þe same beest be in þe
30 meene tyme perceyuyd, and þerfore more þan þis þing þilk
þing be coueytid; or in lasse þan a þing ioynynd and cowplid
to þe getyng of þe same þing move more bi drede forto
refuse þe þing so dred þan þe forseid louyd þing move forto
haue, gete, and reioice þe same plesaunt louyd þing. And
35 lijk necessite of vnchaungeabilnesse and of vnforberable
contynuaunce in hatyng and in comaundyng to þe movyng
power to fle from þe þing hatid, if it be strenger þan is þe
beest so perceyuyng, And also forto¹ folewe aftir and cacche

A beast, having
no Reason,
simply obeys his
sensual
appetites,
unless he fears
some punish-
ment.

¹ After *forto*, MS. has a second *forto*, crossed through in red.

pe ping hatid forto be avengid vpon it, if it be febler pan pe beest so perceyuyng, is kept and doon in a beest whanne he perceyuyþ bi eny of his x wittis sum ping displeaunt and vnaccordyng to his kynde. And so it is trewe þat if an hound se an haare, and knowe þat it be a wilde haare, he 5 may not forbere but þat he coueyte to cacche it, and he may not forbere but þat he comaunde to pe movyng power of his bodi forto renne aftir | as mych as he may, in lasse pan a 20^b more delectable ping be of him in pe meene tyme perceyuyd, or in lasse pan to pe hauyng and receyuyng of pe haare is 10 wonyd bifalle to him a ping so dredful to him þat pe drede perof more moviþ him to fle and forsake pan pe lust to pe haare moviþ him to haue and to take, And of pis dredful ping, and of pe togidere fallyng of it with pe hauyng of pe haare, pis hound hap quyk remembraunce in his ymaginacioun or in 15 his mynde.

Man's REASON
and FREE WILL
should not allow
him to obey his
sensual appe-
tites if by
so doing he
does wrong.

lijk forme and maner of wirchyng bi vnchaungeabilnes and bi azen vnstondabilnes in mannys sensitijf wittis, and in her appetitis, and in her comaunding þat pe bodi be fro place to place mouyd, and in pe comaunding þat pe movyng be putt 20 into execucioun, is had vnto pe tyme pe mater come vp into pe perceyuyng of resoun. And if man wolde suspende his resoun from pe perceyuyng of pe same ping which his sensitijf witt perceyueþ, man schulde wirche no frelier to do or forbere þoruþ al pe processe now seid pan it is seid þat a beest 25 wirchip. but, certis, a while aftir þat pe sensitijf wittis han perceyuyd what longiþ to hem forto perceyue, and aftir þat pe appetitis of hem han desirid and han comaundid, as is now bifore toold, riht soone aftir in man resoun aspieþ and perceyuyþ what pe sensitijf wittis feliden and iugiden to be 30 worpi to be takun or to be forsaken, and what her appetitis desiriden and comaundiden to be goten or to be refusid, and he enserschip what in his court is to be iugid pervpon. and if it be seen to him þat pe ping which pe sensual appetit so desirid to haue be not a good and profitable meene toward 35 oure eend, which is god, he wole iuge þat it is not profitable to vs. and as soone as resoun hap maad pis doom, pe wil ouzte and may refuse it, and in strengir maner comaunde to pe movyng vertu þat he ceese fro movyng, and þat he forbere

to move þe bodi or eny parti of þe bodi aftir it, þan þe
 sensitijf appetit comaundide to þe movyng vertu forto so
 move toward it. and in caase þat resoun se þe þing which
 þe sensitijf appetit desirede to haue and to gete bi mouyng
 5 of þe bodi toward it, be a good and profitable meene ledyng
 vs to godward, þe wil wole consente and acorde with þe
 sensual appetit and comaunde with þe sensual appetit to þe
 movyng vertu as mych as to resoun is seen to be doon in
 avail to vs to gete oure blisful eend, which in sum maner is
 10 god. and if þe wil conforme him not to þe seid wel tried |
 21 doom of resoun, but þat he folewith þe movyngis of þe louger
 sensual appetitis bi þynne and sengle movyngis of resoun
 agens þe parfijt and ful doom of resoun, þanne man lyuyþ
 not as man but as a beest, and he synnyþ and goop fromward
 15 his blisful eend.

x^e chapitre.

[F]Or as mych as þe xxxi^{ti} gouernauncis afore in 'þe donet,'
 in þe ij^e chapitre of þe first parti, ben callid moral vertues,
 y aske þis: what is vertu, and how many maners ben of
 20 vertues?

What is VIRTUE
 and how many
 kinds of virtues
 are there?

To þe first questioun y answer þus: vertu is þe ground
 and þe fundament wherbi and out of which a wircher bryngiþ
 forþ a deede. And perfore ful oft in scripture and out of
 scripture in philosophie vertu is clepid a 'strengþ'. ffor
 25 pleyner vndirstondyng of þis answer, sone, þou schalt wite
 þat if a deede schal be doon, þer muste be a doer which schal
 do þe same deede, and þer muste be a fundement or a ground
 or a principle or a bigynnyng or an heed, bi which þe doer
 schal do þe same deede. and at sum while þer muste be an
 30 instrument wipout which þe doer may not do þe seid deede.
 Ensample herof is þis: If fier schal do þe deede of heetyng,
 he muste haue hete, wherbi as bi a ground of þe hetyng þe
 fier muste do *and* make his heetyng. If a coral stoon schal
 staunche blood, he muste haue a qualite in him, which
 35 qualite muste be a power and a ground wherbi þe coral schal
 do þe deede of staunchyng blood. In lijk maner if y schal
 do and gendre a deede of resonyng, kunnyng, or vndirstondyng,

A virtue is the
 foundation of
 a deed.

y muste haue þe power of resoun as a foundement wherbi y schal do and gendre þe same deede of resonyng or of kunnyng. and also yf y schal brynge forþ, do and gendre a willyng or a nyllyng in my wil, y muste haue þe power which is fre wil, wherbi as bi a ground *and* fundement y schal gendre and 5 brynge forþ in my wil þe same seid willyng or nyllyng ; and so forþ in ech opir deede to be doon of eny creature as wircher or doer. And sum tyme instrument is requyrid, as pou3 a smyþ haue þe craft of smyþe as a sufficient ground and fundement forto make a knyf, 3it he muste haue more 10 þerto, for he muste haue an hamor as an instrument ; and so lijk in many opire caasis of deedis to be doon. But, sone, marke þis : þat þilk foundement or ground or principle wherbi þe doer doop þe werk, is vertu of þe same werk. and so oure resoun is vertu of oure kunnyng, oure wil is vertu of 15 oure willyng and nyllyng and of oure moral vertues, and moral vertues ben vertues of þo deedis into which | þo moral 21^b vertues inclynen oure wil, as schal be seen aftir in þe [present]¹ chapitre of þis ie parti of þis present book. And so ech such seid power is a vertu, pou3 not ech vertu be such 20 a power, for moral vertues ben vertues, but þei ben not suche powers. and þus mych for answer to þe ie questioun.

To þe ije questioun, in which þou askist how many maners ben of vertues, y answeere þus, þre.

Whiche þre ?

25

Natural vertues, kunnyngal vertues and moral vertues.

ffadir, what difference is bitwix þese iij kyndis of vertues ?

Certis, sone, natural vertues ben þo vertues whiche disposen, araien and parfiten a creature or power of eny creature bi 3ift of kynde, and not bi getyng in labour or 30 bisines doon and maad þerto in resoun or wil of þe same creature. and þerfore þei ben powers 3ouun kyndeli into a þing folewyngli vpon þe natural beyng of þe same þing as for her foundement or ground. and þei ben suche as we fynden in herbis, spicis, stones, and in alle opire þingis of 35 kynde ; as in coral to staunche blood, in þe adamaunt to drawe yren, in þe malowis to ceese aking, and so of opire. Wherfore also in þis soort of vertues ben oure outward and

Every power or foundation of a deed is a virtue ; but not every virtue is a power. Moral virtues are not powers.

THE THREE KINDS OF VIRTUE : *natural, kunnyngal, and moral.*

(1) NATURAL VIRTUES are powers arising naturally from the nature of a thing or creature.

Our outward and inward

¹ Space left for reference in MS. See below, p. 47.

inward sensitijf wittis and her appetitis, oure resoun and oure wil, and also þe natural passions of oure wil, of whiche passions it schal be seid aftir in þe xviiije chapitre in þis first parti of þis present book; and of þis kynde of natural vertues is
5 so greet multitude and dyuersite þat þerof kanne not be maad bi vs eny nombre.

sensitive Wits and their appetites, our Reason, our Will, and the passions of our Will are natural virtues.

kunnyngal vertues ben þo vertues whiche disposen, araien and parfiten þe resoun or þe vndirstondyng or þe intellect, so þat bi hem þe hauer of hem, whepir he be man or aungel,
10 is knowyng sum þing, and þerfore þei resten and ben placid in þe vndirstondyng or in þe intellect or resoun, as in her propir place.

(2) KUNNYNGAL VIRTUES are virtues of knowledge, arising in the Intellect or Reason.

Moral vertues ben þo vertues whiche disposen, araien, inclynen and parfiten þe wil forto chese or refuse, and
15 comaunde to be doon or to be left vndoon, what and as resoun or þe vndirstondyng avisidli deemep in sum doom to be doon, or to be left vndoon, or to be doable allowabli. And þerfore þei resten and ben placid in þe wil, as in her propir place.

(3) MORAL VIRTUES are virtues of reasonable choice or refusal, arising in the Will.

20 And so kunnyngal vertues and moral vertues ben not but in þo creaturis whiche han resoun and fre wil, as ben men and aungels. fforwhi kunnyngal vertues ben gete bi labour in resoun, and moral vertues ben gete bi labour in wil; and þerfore kunnyngal vertues and moral vertues
25 ben not but in þo creaturis which han resoun and wil.

Hence kunnyngal and moral virtues are found only in men and angels.

22^a lo, sone, of þe cheef natural vertues beyng in man | is tretid and tauzt in þis first parti of þis book vnto þe bigynnyng of þis present x^e chapitre. And of kunnyngal vertues schal be tretid in þis present x^e chapitre, and fro hens
30 forþward into þe eend of þe xiiije chapitre in þis i^e parti of þis book. Of moral vertues schal be tretid and tauzt fro þe bigynnyng of þe xv^e chapitre into þe eend of þis present i^e parti of þis book. And so a diligent considerer may se þat þe i^e parti of þis present book seruyþ for to trete and teche,
35 and þat in ful necessari maner, þe principal natural vertues in man, kunnyngal vertues in man, and moral vertues in man as in general; of whiche moral vertues so spokun here in her generalte, þe specials ben explid and expressid in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þoruþ iiij tablis. Wherfore, sone, y wene

Where these three kinds of virtues are explained.

Where the particular moral virtues are treated.

THE FIVE KINDS
OF KUNNYNGAL
VIRTUE:
Intellect,
Speculative
Science,
Prudence,
Craft and
Opinion.

(1) INTELLECT is
concerned with
truths self-
evident to
Reason.

KUNNING is
concerned with
truths not self-
evident to
Reason, but
proved by other
truths self-
evident to
Reason.

Facts known by
KUNNING may be
divided into
facts known for
a certainty and
facts only
guessed at.

(2) A fact only
probable or
guessed at is
known as an
OPINION.

A fact known
certainly is
a SCIENCE.

An opinion or
a science is
either practical
or speculative.

If the thing
known is doable
or makable, the
knowing is
Practical
Science or
Practical
Opinion.

(3) If the thing
known is
neither doable
nor makable,
then the know-
ing is
SPECULATIVE

if þis ie parti of þis book be wel considerid *and* weied, he
schal be found riȝt profitable, not oonli to lay men, but also to
clerkis, and so schal also be found þe ie parti of þe seid 'donet'.

ffadir, how many kyndis ben of kunnyngal vertues?

Sone, aftir oon maner of holdyng, which is allowable 5
y-nouȝ, vnder þe nombir of v, as me semeþ, mowe be
comprehendid conuenientli alle kunnyngal vertues.

ffadir, vnder whiche v?

Certis, sone, vnder Intellect, Speculatif science, prudence,
craft and opynyoun.

ffadir, how schal y be sure herof?

lo sone, in þis maner: Al þat is knowen, or it is so
euydent in it silf to resoun þat resoun neediþ noon opir
opener knowable trouþ to proue it bi, and þanne þe knowyng
and kunnyng of it is to be clepid 'Intellect'; or it is not so 15
euydent in it silf to resoun but þat it may be pronyd to
resoun bi an opir treuþ more open to resoun þan it is, and
þanne þe knowyng and kunnyng þerof is to be clepid
'kunnyng'.

þanne ferþir þus: þe þing or þe treuþ which is in þis 20
wise kunnen is kunnen in sure certeynte or in oonli
suspicioun and gesse. If it be kunnyd wipout sure certeynte
and in oonli suspicioun and gesse, þanne þe kunnyng þerof
is to be clepid 'opynyoun'. If it be kunnyd in sure
certeynte, þanne it is to be clepid 'science'.¹

And þanne ferþir þus: If a þing be kunnyd bi oonli
opynyoun, or ellis bi sure certeynte and so bi science, þanne
it is such a þing which is doable or makable, or it is such a
þing which is neipir doable neipir makable, but it is oonli
biholdable or considerable, and þerfore oonli speculable. If 30
it be doable or makable, þanne þe knowyng þerof is to be
clepid 'practik science' or 'practik opynyoun'. If it be
neipir doable neipir makable, but oonli biholdable or con-
siderable, þanne þe science or opy[n]youn þerof is callid 22^b
'speculatif science' or 'speculatif opynyoun'. 35

fferþirmore practik science or opynyoun is departid ferþir,
forwhi practik science, or it falliþ vpon þing doable, and
þanne þilk practik science þerof *and* fallyng vpon it is clepid

¹ See Notes.

'prudence', or it falliþ vpon þing makable, and þanne þe practik science or opynyoun þerof and falliþg vpon it is clepid 'craft'.

And so, sone, siben þer may no þing be knowable saue
5 vndir þese now seid v kyndis of þingis knowable, or v
maners of knowiþg, þerfore me þinkip þer is noon kunnyngal
or knowal vertu which is not conteyned vndir summe of þese
seid v knowal or kunnyngal vertues.

and þerfore þe seid v knowal vertues¹ conteynen alle
10 knowal or kunnyngal vertues; not wipstondyþg þat prudence
is departid into many braunchis and membris: as into þilk
prudence wherbi þe lawis and ordinauncis of god ben knowen,
wherþi þei be etik or politik lawes of kynd, or ellis positijf
lawes of god; and into þilk kunnyng wherbi þe lawes and
15 ordinauncis of þe clergi is knowen; and into þilk kunnyng
wherbi þe lawes and ordinauncis of worldli princis ben
known, wherbi wipout suche lawis maad a man is able
to reule bi resoun þe peple in her togidere lyuyng; and
into kunnyng of marchaundisiþg in biyng and sillyng and in
20 purtenauncis þerto; and into þilk kunnyng which is callid
'yeconomy' or 'husbondri'. And craft also is departid into
many braunchis and membris, as into carpentrie, taylourie,
masourie, and so forþ of opire. And speculatif science is
departid and braunchid forþ into methaphisik, into natural
25 philosophie comoun, and into medicinal philosophie, and into
astronomye, geometrie, arismetrie, and musik, wherof it is not
nede to speke more speciali in þis book.

ffadir, siben it is so þat of þo þingis whiche ben knowen
or trowid bi gesse and opynyoun, summe ben doable and
30 summe makable, and summe ben oonli biholdable or consider-
able, whi ouzte not opynyoun be departid and be braunchid
into membris and braunchis lik to þe membris and braunchis
into which science is departid and braunchid, siben þe þing
whervpon opynyoun falliþ is departid and braunchid in
35 maner lik to þe maner in which is departid and braunchid
þe þing whervpon falliþ science? and so we schulden seie
þat þer is practik opynyoun and speculatif opynyoun, and
23^a of practik opynyoun sum is prudent opynyoun and sum | is

SCIENCE or
Speculative
Opinion.

Practical
Science and
Practical
Opinion are
divided into
PRUDENCE and
CRAFT.

(4) PRUDENCE is
the knowing of
things doable.

(5) CRAFT is the
knowing of
things makable.

Hence there are
five kunnyngal
virtues, viz.

INTELLECT,
OPINION,
SPECULATIVE
SCIENCE,
PRUDENCE and
CRAFT.¹

The subdivisions
of PRUDENCE :—

(a) Prudence
concerning the
laws of God.

(b) Prudence
concerning the
laws of the
clergy.

(c) Prudence
concerning the
laws of princes.

(d) Prudence
concerning
merchandise.

(e) Prudence
that is economy
or husbandry.

The subdivisions
of CRAFT :
carpentry,
tailoring,
masonry, etc.

The subdivisions
of SPECULATIVE
SCIENCE :
metaphysics,
natural
philosophy,
medicine,
astronomy,
geometry,
arithmetic
and music.

OPINION may be
subdivided in
the same way as
SCIENCE.

¹ See Notes.

crafti opynyoun; And of speculatif opynyoun sum is generali philosophik opynyoun, and sum is methafisical opynyoun, and so forþ louzer in departyng.

Sone, al þis y graunte wel, as me þinkþ no man may seie þerto nay. and þerto y haue do sumwhat in my wordis 5 now bifore spokun in þis present chapitre, if þei be wel considerid.

xj^e chapitre.

Teaching is requested on each kunnyngal virtue.

[F]Adir, gramerci of al þis, for al þis likþ me ful wel. Neuerþeles, if it plesse ʒoure grace, y wole gladli here more of 10 þe seid v knowal or kunnyngal vertues, what ech of hem is in him silf.

Sone, aske þou sumwhat of eche of hem bi rewe, and y schal answer.

(1) INTELLECT is knowledge of self-evident truths or axioms.

ffadir, what is intellect?

15

Examples of such axioms.

Sone, intellect is a kunnyng or knowyng wherbi we knowen þe hizest and openest treupis of alle opire treupis, bi whom alle opire louzer and lasse knowen treupis ben prouyd, knowen and out dryuen; as ben þese openest treupis: Al good is to be louyd; Al yuel is to be fled and forsaken; 20 More good is more to be louyd; Ech hool bodi is grettir þan is his parti; ech hool bodi is double greet to his half parti; and so of alle opire lijk, whiche ben so open to be trewe in þe sizt of resoun þat þei mowe not be prouyd bi any opire treupis afore hem more open and more cleer þan þei ben; 25 and perfore þei ben clepid 'principlis' or 'bigymnyngis' or 'heedis' or 'prouers' of opire treupis.

ffadir, what is speculatif science?

(2) SPECULATIVE SCIENCE is the knowledge of speculative truths deduced from intellectual or self-evident truths. Examples of speculative truths.

Sone, it is kunnyng or knowyng wherbi we knowen louzer and derker speculatif treupis dryuen out and con- 30 cludid and prouyd fro and bi treupis knowen bi þilk knowyng which is callid afore 'Intellect'. Ensampl herof is þis: it is science to knowe þat þer ben iiij elementis; þat erp and watir ben heuy, eyre and fier ben lizt; þat alle bodies here binepe wherbi we ben nurischid ben maad of þe seid iiij 35 elementis; þat þer ben iiij complexions; what metis and drynkis wolen nurische vs holsomli, and what wole nurische

vs vnholosomli; and so forþ of opire. ffor noon of alle þese is
 so open þat oure resoun muste needis consente it to be trewe
 into tyme it be prouyd in arguyng bi opire treupis more open
 to resoun, and into tyme þe prouyng and arguyng come vp
 5 into so open *and* eydent treupis þat resoun may not denye
 hem to be treupis, and þat for þei ben so open in doom of
 resoun oonli, or for þat þei ben so open in doom of sensual.
 23^b or sensitijf witt, | and þerwith and þerbi open also in
 resoun. And þanne, for as mych as þese now seid derke
 10 treupis folewen needisli fro and out of þe opire moost cleer
 and open treupis, þerfore we muste needis consente in oure
 resoun þat þese derker ben also treupis. ffor out of treup
 folewith neuer but treup. And what euer folewith out and
 fro treupis is trewe; it may be noon opir. And þis is þe
 15 wey wherbi al kunnyng and al leernyng is had, and wipout
 þis wey it is impossible oure resoun to come bi wey of kynde
 into eny kunnyng or knowyng of eny treup which is not
 mooste open in it silf; þat is to seie, þe derker treup is euer
 prouyd, openyd *and* schewid bi opire treupis opener þan þilk
 20 derker is; and þese opener treupis muste needis be prouyd,
 schewid *and* openyd bi opire treupis opener þan þese ben;
 and so forþ into tyme we come into so open treupis þat to
 hem we muste needis consente, and so we þanne consenten
 at þe first þat alle þe opire whiche we seen folewe out of hem
 25 ben also trewe.

These
 speculative
 truths are true,
 because they
 follow from self-
 evident truths.

Ensample in special of such prouyng may be þis: what euer
 bodies mouen hem silf kyndeli from þe louzist place into þe
 hizer place, ben list kyndeli; fire and eyre so mouen hem
 silf; þerfore þei ben list kyndeli. An opir ensample is þis:
 30 what euer bodies mouen hem silf kyndeli toward þe louzist
 place, which is þe myddis of þe world, ben heuy kyndeli;
 watir and erpe so mouen hem silf kyndeli; wherfore þei ben
 heuy kyndeli. In lijk maner is to be arguyd whanne euer
 eny treup is leernyd in science, þat is to seie, whanne
 35 euer eny treup not openest is lernyd bi a treup more open
 þan he is. And so folewith þat without arguyng is no
 knowyng bi science of eny þing founde. Who euer þerfore
 dispisip makyng of argumentis and sutil exercise þerin,
 as now late ouer many suche han be herd, he schewip him

Examples of the
 method of proof
 of speculative
 truths.

silf be ful blunt in eny treupis fyndyng or hem sureli knowyng.

(3) PRUDENCE is the knowledge which regulates our conduct.

fadir, what is prudence?

Sone, it is a kunnyng or knowyng wherbi we knowen treupis longyng to oure gouernaunce, þat is to seie, it is þe knowyng wherbi we knowen what is to be doon or to be left vndo in oure gouernauncis, and in which maner, in which tyme, *with* what meenes, into what eend, and so forþ *with* whiche opire circumstauncis it is to be do, or left to be vndo, and what is to be suffrid or not suffrid, and in which maner, in tyme and place and meene it is to be suffrid or not suffrid; and so forþ of opire circumstauncis. Also as is kunnyng to knowe how | we schule bere vs to plesse oure maystris, 24^a oure lordis, oure fadris, how to chastise oure children and seruauantis, how to lyue pesabili *with* oure neighboris, how 15 to spende þat we falle not into pouerte, and so forþ of opire lijk deedis and treupis of hem perteynyng to oure gouernaunce; whiche alle muste needis be knowen to be trewe bi opire opener treupis into tyme we come into treupis openyst, as is bifore seid in þe vertu of science. And perfore no prudence kan 20 be had and leernyd wipout arguyng, and sutil and excellent prudence kan not be had wipout sutil *and* excellent arguyng.¹

(4) CRAFT is the knowledge of making.

fadir, what is craft?

Sone, it is a kunnyng wherbi we knowen how þis or þat is to be maad of þe newe in sum outward abidyng mater: as is 25 kunnyng to make an hous, a schipp, a knyf, a cloke, and so forþ of opire lijk; whiche alle mowe not be knowen to be treupis but bi þe same weies which is afore seid in þe vertu of science. ffor bitwix science, prudence and craft is þis oon difference: þat her maters or treupis wherupon 30 þei ben, ben dyuers, and in þis wise dyuerse: þat craft goop vpon treupis of þingis makable bi oure kunnyng and power, as þat a schipp is to be schapid þus, a gowne is to be schapid þus; Prudence is vpon treupis of doable þingis, as þat my fadir *and* modir schulen be plesid yf y do þus to hem, y 35 schal plesse god if y reule me þus; Science is vpon troupis of þingis not of vs makable neipir doable, but aloone biholdable, vndirstondable, or conceyuable of vs, as is þis: þat

¹ See Notes.

þe sunne is movid in ech day a degree, and þat þe mone
is movid ech day []¹ degrees.

fadir, forto aske of þow wheþir þer ben dyuerse and many
spicis of craft or no, and whiche þei ben, it were not but
5 in veyn; forwhi it is sufficientli to me knowe þat þer is
carpentrie craft dyuerse fro masonrie, and þer is keruerie
dyuerse from peyntorie, tailorrie dyuerse from scriuenerie, and
so forþ of many opir craftis. but wheþir þer ben eny
dyuerse spicis of prudence² is not so open and so sensible,
10 and þerfore, good fadir, seiþ þoure feelyng þervpon.

The various kinds of CRAFT are easily known, but teaching is requested on the various kinds of PRUDENCE.

Sone, siþen bi þe diffynicioun or discripcioun or þe
descryuyng bifore sett of prudence, prudence is a kunnyng,
dressyng, reulyng and techyng vs in oure gouernauncis of
doyng and suffryng, out of sensible maters to be perbi
15 chaungid as it is doon in craft, it muste folewe þat as þer
ben dyuerse spicis and kyndis of oure now seid gouernauncis,
so þer muste be dyuerse spicis and kyndis of prudencis
rennyng vpon dyuerse spicis of gouernauncis. And þerfore,
24^b siþen þer is oon spice of kynde | of gouernauncis which
20 conteynþ þe comaundementis and þe counsels of god and of
resoun, and an opir spice of kynde of gouernauncis which
conteynþ comaundementis and ordinauncis of princis and of
her comunalte togidere forto reule peple in a pesable and
comodiose cyuylite, and þe þridde spice or kynde of
25 gouernauncis which conteynþ þe comaundementis and
ordinauncis of prelatis and of þe comunalte togidere forto
reule þe peple in a bisynesse, dressyng hem þe bettir forto
fulfille þe comaundementis and counsels of god, herof muste
folewe þat so þer is oon spice of prudence which is a kunnyng
30 fallyng vpon þe first now seid spice of comaundementis
and counsels; and þis prudence is comonli clepid 'þe lawe
of god', general to lawe of feiþ and to lawe of kynde or
of resoun. And þer is an opir spice of prudence fallyng
vpon þe opir seid spice of gouernauncis, which prudence
35 is clepid 'lawe cyuyte', such as ech rewme haþ to be reulid bi.
And þere is þe iiije spice of prudence, which is a kunnyng
fallyng vpon þe iiije now seid spice of gouernauncis, and þis

Since PRUDENCE is the knowledge which regulates our conduct, the various kinds of Prudence correspond to the various kinds of conduct.

The various kinds of PRUDENCE enumerated :—

(a) God's law.

(b) Civil Law.

(c) Canonical law.

¹ Space left in MS. for number.

² Prudence in general is treated above, p. 49.

Minor kinds of PRUDENCE need not be enumerated.

is clepid 'lawe canoun' or 'lawe of preestis' or 'of þe clergi'. And bisidis þese now seid þre spicis of prudence mowe be founden opire spicis of prudence not fallng vpon gouernauncis to be lad bi strengþ of ordinauncis of man, but fallng vpon gouernauncis of which no lawe of man is maad, as ben 5 many suche in policie and also in marchaundisng and in husbondrie, to gete þe more good of bodi and of eese and of catel. of which prudence crist seide in þe gospel, *lucan*, xv^{je} *chapitre*,¹ þus: 'þe sones of þis world ben more prudent in her generacioun þan þe sones of lizt'. of which spicis of 10 prudence is no neede to make eny mensioun here, and þerfore to speke eny more of hem y wole as now forbere.

(5) OPINION is the knowledge of things uncertain but probable.

ffadir, what is opynyoun?

Examples.

Sone, opynyoun is a trowng wherbi we assenten to eny þing as to be a treup, bi cause of likli euydencis not sure and sikir 15 whiche we haue þerto taken bi mocion risng of þe þing in it silf or of his circumstauncis, þouȝ no persoon seie eny þing þerto forto witnesse it be trewe: as is þis trowng wherbi we trowen þat þis day schal be a reyny day for þat his morowng was reed, or þat to morow schal be a fayre day 20 for þat his euentide is reed, or þat he which is now chosen to be meyre of londoun is richer þan he is which is not ȝit chosen to be aldirman of londoun, bi cause it is so oft wonyd þat greet inquerry and asprie ben afore had among wise men who | is riche and who is not, and how riche oon is and how 25^a riche an opir is for to be aldirman and meyre or no; and so forþ of opire lijk.

xij^e chapitre.

Three objections are brought against the above doctrine of the *kunnyngal* virtues:—
1. Wisdom is usually considered a *kunnyngal* virtue. Why is it not so taken by Pecock?

[F]Adir, y muste argue agens ȝoure doctrine of þe v seid knowal vertues, fforwhi, fadir, y haue herde wiȝsdome to be ȝo nombriȝ boþe of Aristotil² and of doctouris as for oon of þe knowal vertues, and ȝe setten him not in ȝoure nombre of knowal vertues; wherfore it myȝte seme þat ȝoure seid nombre is insufficient. Also, fadir, neipir Aristotil neipir opire comune expositouris holden þat opynyoun is a vertu, 35 and ȝe nombre opynyoun for a vertu; wherfore it semeþ þat

¹ v. 8.

² See Notes.

30ure doctrine is not trewe, or ellis pat þei conceyueden as in
pat amys. Also, fadir, if opinyoun be a knowal vertu, bi
lijk skile feiþ schulde be a knowal vertu, and 3it 3e nombre
not feiþ among 3oure knowal vertues; wherfore it myzte seme
5 þat 3oure bifore goyng nombre is not sufficient forto compre-
hende alle knowal vertues.

Sone, to þi þre now foormyd argumentis y schal answer.

As for answer to þe first argument, þou schalt vndir-
stonde þat in þre maners 'wisdom' is taken. In oon maner

10 'wisdom' is takun for þe worpiest spice of science, and so
'wijsdom' in it silf is science, and no þing ellis þan a
science; neuerþeles it is of hi3e, worpi, digne treupis þe science,
as is methafisik of god and of aungels as fer as natural resoun
may atteyne.

15 In an opir maner 'wisdom' is takun for þe hi3est parti of
ech science, for þe hi3est parti of ech prudence, and for
þe hi3est parti of ech craft; fforwhi in comune speche it is
vsid forto be seid of a ful mych kunnyng geometrer þat he is
'a wise geometrer', and of a ful mych prudent man þat he

20 is 'a wise man of lawe', wherþir it be lawe of god or lawe of
man, or þat he is 'a wise man in gouernaunce' or 'in
husbondrie', and perfore þat he is 'a wise man'; and also in
comune speche it is wonyd to be seid of a ful mych crafti
man in eny special craft þat he is 'a wise crafti man', as 'a
25 wise carpenter', or 'a wise masoun', and so forþ of opire
craftis, and perfore þat he is 'a wise man'. And lijk speche
is founden in þe philesofre and also in scripture, as schal be
schewid forþ in þe book 'spredyng þe iiij tablis' and in
'þe book of leernyng'. And so forto speke in pis ije maner

30 of 'wisdom', we muste graunte þat in pis ije maner þer ben
þre maners of wisdom; fforwhi þer is sciencial wisdom,
which is þe hi3er parti of ech special science assignable;
25 prudencial wisdom, which is þe hi3er parti of ech special
prudence assignable; and craftial wisdom, which is þe hi3er
35 parti of ech special craft assignable.

þe þridde principal maner of takyng 'wisdom' is þis: þat
ech special science, which euer it be, ech special prudence,
which euer it be, and ech special craft, which euer it be,
whanne it is had in moost parfijt wise and in moost curraunt

II. OPINION is
not usually
considered
a kunnyngal
virtue. Why is
it so taken by
Pecock?

III. If OPINION is
taken as
a kunnyngal
virtue, why is
not FAITH so
taken?

ANSWERS TO THE
THREE OBJEC-
TIONS.

I. The three
manners in
which the term
'Wisdom' may
be taken:

(1) WISDOM is
the best and
highest
knowledge or
'science', such
as metaphysics.

(2) WISDOM is
knowledge in
the highest
degree of any
science,
prudence, or
craft.

Hence one may
divide WISDOM
taken in the
second manner
into:

(i) SCIENCIAL
WISDOM.

(ii) PRUDENCIAL
WISDOM.

(iii) CRAFTIAL
WISDOM.

(3) WISDOM is
the most
perfect, most
current and
readiest know-
ledge of each
science,

prudence and
craft.

To be able to
teach a science,
prudence, or
craft, is a token
that one has
wisdom there-
in.

and in redi maner, panne pilk science, prudence or craft is a 'wisdom' in comparisoun and in reward to þe maner in which it was had bifore rawli and vncurrauntli or vnredili. and of þis maner of takyng 'wijsdom' meneþ þe philosophir whanne he seiþ þus: 'þe token of a wise man is to mowe teche'; as þouȝ he hadde seid þus: what euer a man kanne in science, in prudence or in craft, til he so kan it þat he may parfijtli it teche, he is not 'wise' þerinne, neipir it is to him a 'wijsdom'; but as soone as so redili, currauntli and parfijtli he kanne it þat he may it teche, panne he is þerinne ¹⁰ 'wise'. And if he be þerinne 'wijs', needis it is to him a 'wijsdom', and not eerst. And so þe meenyng of þe philosophre is þis: þat to mowe teche is a token whepir he be 'wise' or no, which takip vpon him to be 'wise'. And þis myȝte not be seid of þe philosophre but if he schulde meene ¹⁵ þat ech techeable kunnyng, whanne it is so parfijtli kunnyd as is now seid, it schulde be clepid a 'wijsdom'. wherfore folewith þat he alowide þis now seid maner of takyng 'wijsdom'. and þis same maner forto take 'wisdom' seynt bernard alowide, whanne he wole þat a kunnyng whanne it ²⁰ is had so þat it sauerip, panne to þe sauerer in it it is 'wijsdom'; not wipstondyng, o my sone, þat þis last maner of takyng 'wijsdom' is not so allowable and so conuenient as ben þe opire maners now bifore tretid.

Hence, in what-
ever manner the
term 'Wisdom'
is taken,
WISDOM is
sufficiently
included in
SCIENCE,
PRUDENCE and
CRAFT.

Now, sone, siben it is open þat in which euer of þese ²⁵ maners 'wijsdom' be takun, he is sufficientli and pleyntli conteynyd wipinne þe boundis of science or of prudence or of craft, and 'wisdom' is not takun famoseli in eny opir maner þan in þese maners now seid, it folewith needis þat þe nombre of knowal vertues owip not to be largid, neipir may ³⁰ be largid bi setting of wijsdom vnto hem; fforwhi al wijsdom is with hem and in hem al redi.

Since the
highest degree
of knowledge in
each prudence
or craft entitles
a man to be
called 'a wise
man', know-
ledge of the
highest truths,
as of meta-
physics or di-
vinity, entitles

Wherfore, siben a man for þat he hap þe ouerer parti of prudence is callid not oonly 'a wijs, prudent man', but he is callid absolutli 'a wise man', and for þat he hap þe ouerer ³⁵ parti of a notable craft or of marchaundisyng he is callid not oonly 'a wise crafti man' or 'a wise marchaunt', but he is callid | absolutli 'a wise man', goddis forbode be it if a man ²⁶ haue þe ouerer parti of hizer and digner kunnyng þan is

prudence or þan is marchaundisyng or craft, as þe ouerer parti of methafisik or of dyuynye, but þat rapir and more he be clepid not oonli 'a wise methafisicien' or 'a wise dyvyn', but also absolutli and vttrli þus, 'a wise man'; bi
 5 as mych as methafisik and dyuynye ben worþier kunnyngis þan is prudence or marchaundisyng or craft, for thei goon vpon worþier maters þan ben þe maters whervpon goop prudence, marchaundisyng, or craft, as is open bi þe next *chapitre* here bifore goyng. Also how ellis schulde a þing
 10 which is a 'wisdom' be in a man, and 3it 3eue not to þe man þis denomynacioun or namyng to be þerbi 'wijs'? May greet whijtnes be in al a boon or in al a stoon, and 3it not 3eue to þe boon or stoon þis denomynacioun or namyng to be 'whijt'? 3he, ferþir to aske, whi is þe seid prudent man
 15 namyd and seid to be 'a wise man'? Certis, not but for in him is a 'wijsdom', which þerfore muste needis 3eue to him þis denomynacioun or namyng to be 'a wise man'. Wherfore bi lijk skile, if in an opir man be an opir 'wisdom' lijk greet or gretter, lijk good or bettir, as is þe wisdom of methafisik
 20 or þe wisdom of dyuynye, mych rapir he is to be denomyned or be namyd þerbi 'a wise man'. Also þat he þerbi is to be seid 'wise', no man may avoide. þanne þus: sipen he is þerbi 'wise', he is þerbi and þerinne 'a wise creature' or 'a wise god'. And if he be þerbi and þerin 'a wise creature',
 25 what opir wise creature, y preie þee, is he þerbi and þerinne, if he be not þerbi and þerin 'a wise man'? Also y aske what creature is 'wise' bi pilk wisdom? þou maist not seie þat eny creature saue þis man. Wherfore if y schulde here eny man seie þat 'grettist clerkis ben not wisist men' if
 30 perchaunce þei ben not prudentist men in þo gouernauncis whervpon goon or mowe go lawis of men, or þei ben not kunnyngist to wynne bi marchaundisyng, y kepte here noon bettir þing of his mouþ forto proue him no wise man but to be a fool, eer y schulde passe fro him if he wolde
 35 abide.

a man to be
 called even
 more justly
 'a wise man'.

Also in þis mater þus: I aske what maner men seien þat 'grettist clerkis ben not wisist men', wheþir ben þei leernyd men in lawe, as ben sergeauntis or iuges in þe kyngis lawe of englond, or ben þei riche marchauntis and kunnyng

Hence greatest clerks are wisest men, even though they may not be wisest in such matters as

buying and selling, or the government of the realm.

in wyunnyng bi marchaundisyng? Comonli suche marchauntis ben oftist wonyd forto holde in her | witt and seie 26^b with her moup pat 'grettist clerkis ben not wijsist men', and pat for grettist clerkis kunnen not make bargens into greet wyunnyng, neipir be war of lossis, so wel as pei kunnen. 5 panne wole y argue azens eche of hem þus: grettist clerkis ben not wisist men in pi reputacioun, for pat pei ben not wijsist in marchaundisyng. and so it is pat grettist sergeauntis and iugis in pe kyngis lawe of englond, and grettist of pe kyngis counseil forto reule pe rewme, ben not wijsist in 10 marchaundising. Wherefore neipir pei ben wijsist men as in pi reputacioun. and so panne perbi wole falle pat þou schalt be holde and schalt perin verili be a fool in pi reputacioun. If eny of pe seid iugis and sergeauntis wole haue in his conceit and in his moup to seie pat 'grettist clerkis ben not 15 wijsist men', and pat for clerkis kunnen not moost in her faculte of lawe, Certis, azens hem proceden pe argumentis biforn maad here azens hem and azens marchaundis and crafti men togidere. But ȝit ouer al it y schal argue azens hem speciali here þus: So it is also pat grettist and wijsist 20 marchaundis kunnen not moost in pe same faculte of lawe. Wherefore in her reputacioun schulde folewe pat wijsist marchaundis ben not wijsist men.

Many clerks are as wise in worldly prudence as the wisest layman, and, in addition, they are wise in knowledge of the highest truths, which the layman is not. Hence greatest clerks are wisest men.

An opir is pis: he, which euer he be, pat wole seie so was neuer so prudentli wijs in which he glorieþ, but pat many 25 clerkis han passid him in prudent wijsdom. And also he neuer sawe so prudent a man in worldli prudence which is not or was not a clerk, but pat many men whiche ben or weren clerkis weren as prudent as pilk man is or was, and pat bope in englond and in rome and in opire cuntrees. 30 And ȝit eche of þo clerkis ouer it hadden what pe opir assignyd excellent prudent man hadde not; fforwhi with pe seid excellent prudence which eche of pilke clerkis hap or hadde, he hap or hadde pe kunnyng of clergi, which pe opir prudent man neipir hap or hadde neipir kan haue, and also 35 pe prudence of etik reul forto kunne kepē him fro vicis contrari to pe lawe of god. A lewde lay and a lewde play. is þerfore forto þus seie: 'grettist clerkis ben not wijsist

men', as folewip wel of what is now schewid and prouyd. Also þus: If he vndirstonde þis seiſyng of alle clerkis, he seiþ what is openli vntrewe, for in greet nombre many of hem ben and han be excellentli prudent. If he vndirstonde it of
27^a summe grete | clerkis oonli, and not of alle grete clerkis, ȝit he seiþ not trewe; fforwhi þese tweyne may not stonde togidere þat eny man be a greet clerk bi þe ouerer parti of eny hiȝ and worpi kunnyng, but þat he haue a 'wijsdom', ȝhe, and a worpi 'wijsdom'. and þanne for þis þat þis seier
10 seep not þis, he schewip him silf to be þerin a fool, forwhi he pretendip or makip him to be wijs, wheryn he errip and failip. þerfore if eny man schulde make þis chalenge aȝens clerkis, lete him be of more kunnyng þan þis seier is.

fforþirmore, aȝens þe same boþe soortis togidere y argue
15 and proue myn entent þus: I putte caas, here be iij compaynes of men, of whiche ech man in þe i^e company is hugeli habundaunt in preciose stoonys; ech man in þe ije company is mych habundaunt in iewels of goold and of syluer; ech man in þe iije company is mych habundaunt in fellis of
20 scheep and in lepir and in wolle and in cloop. No man of þe iije company may sei^e treuli þat habundauntist men of þe i^e company or of þe ije company ben not richist men; forwhi þouȝ þo men of þe i^e or of þe ije company han not richessis of þe iije company, ȝit þei han opire richessis fayrer,
25 worþier and of gretter valew, or of lijk greet valew, and lijk redi to be sold for money bi caas, and ouer it in þe mene tyme þo richessis stonden into grete stides. Wherfore bi lijk skile, if þer be iij compaynes, of whiche ech man in þe i^e company is mych habundaunt in natural filosofie,
30 methafisik and scole dyuynyte, ech man in þe ije company is mych habundaunt in cyuyl lawe of englond, ech man in þe iije company is mych habundaunt in kunnyng of marchaundisȝyng, folewith needis þat no man of þe iije company may sei^e trewli þat men of þe i^e or of þe ije now seið company
35 ben not wijsist; fforwhi, þouȝ þo men of þe i^e or of þe ije company han not greettist of wijsdom beyng in þe iije company, ȝit þei haue opir wijsdom, ffor þei han kunnyng which is prouyd algatis to be wijsdom, ȝhe, fayrer, delectabler and more necessari þan is þe kunnyng of þe iije now

When wealth or wisdom is of different kinds, one cannot deny the title 'wealthy' or 'wise' to a man possessing one kind, because he is not wealthy or wise in another kind. The man wealthiest or wisest in the most valuable kind is the wealthiest or wisest man of all.

seid cumpany, and perfore þan is þe wijsdom of þe now seid iije cumpany.

* Hence greatest clerks are wisest men, for theirs is wisdom in the highest truths.

I kanne not se perfore but þat to ech man which seiþ þat 'grettist clerkis ben not wijsist men', myzte forþ with be seid þat it is noon opir wise trew þan is it what a man seiþ 5 whanne he makip a leesyng, *and* whanne he spekip a foli. and þis he may kunne mayntene and proue bi what is schewid here in þe bfore goyng processe. | And ouer al þis 27^b adaunting of ech such presumptuose seier, holdyng him silf to seie trewli and wiseli, whanne he seiþ vntrewli and 10 vnwiseli, myzte be seid þus: 'In þis þat þou seiest þat "grettist clerkis ben not wijsist men", in which seiying þou myztist be maad schamyd for rebuk, if þou woldist abide arguyng and pledyng into þe eend, y seie þus: Suche wisist men whiche þou callist "wijsist men" ben neipir kunnyngist 15 men neipir wijsist men, fforwhi þei han not grettist and worpiest kunnyng, neipir þei han grettist and worpiest wijsdom; for þei han oonli wijsdom of prudence or of marchaundisyng or of craft, which neipir is grettist wijsdom neipir worpiest wijsdom, as apperip bi what is here bfore 20 schewid and prouyd.' Ech perfore such seier arere he fro such seiying into tyme he answeere sufficientli bi cleer wrytyng into þis now maad his rebukyng; and ellis he muste lese his wijsdom for þat he puttip him silf in oonli chidyng wipout schewyng for his parti kunnyng of iustifyng and sufficientli 25 groundyng. More herof is writun in 'þe book of leernyng'.

* To deny that greatest clerks are wisest men is to blaspheme the wisdom of God.

No man hap cause forto penke þat y procede and speke here ouyr scharpli in þis mater and azens þe now spokun seiers or affirmers; fforwhi azens whom myzte y allowabli be suffrid to speke or write scharpli, if y schulde not be 30 allowid forto speke *and* write scharpli azens þo seiers or affirmers which in her seiying blasfemen þe hiz wijsdom of god? Certis, in þe seiying or affermyng of þe now spokun seiers and affirmers is conteynyd, and of her seiying *and* affermyng folewith, þat þe hizest wisdom of god in erþe, 35 which is in hizist and grettist clerkis, is not hizest wijsdom in erþe. So þanne, if þei were so wijs þat þei vndirstoden her owen bfore rehercid seiying or affermyng, þei schulden haue remorce in her conscience þat þei euer spake pilk speche,

beyng so vnwijs in it silf *and* beyng a speche so diffamose to her neizboris, and beyng so blasfemose azens it which is þe hizest wijsdom of god in erþe, and schal perseuere in heuen into worschip of god, whanne þe opire seid wisdomes schulen
 5 haue maad her eend here in þis lijf. þerfore rapir ouer litil and ouer neischli y haue write azens þis vnwijsdom, þis vice and synne, and azens þe vsers þerof, þan ouer mych or ouer scharpli, Namelich for þat y haue not herde opire men speke or write eny þing worþ azens þis so greet default.

10 Now forto come to Aristotil, which in his vj^e book of
 28^a 'etikis' nombriþ | wijsdom for oon of þe intellectual or knowal vertues, it may be seid þat his entent was þere forto make vs knowe how many knowal vertues *ben in* her gendris or in her spicis or in oon wise or opir wise. And in þilk
 15 wey of procedyng in which he wente, and in which summe opire goon in folewyng him, wijsdom may be nombriþ as oon of þe knowal vertues, namlich aftir his entent, which was þat we schulden knowe þe treuþ, þouþ not aftir moost cleer and kunnyngful mynstryng to vs. but for as mych as y
 20 procede in an opir foorm and wey of dyuysioun, and ȝit in oon and þe same mater, and forto in an opir maner notifie þe same treuþ of knowal vertues; þerfore, þouþ in my maner and foorm of procedyng wijsdom comeþ not a place forto be numbrid expresseli as oon of þe intellectual or knowal
 25 vertues in open nomynacioun, it folewith not þat Aristotil and y in þe þing in it silf and in þe veri filosofie discorden. þus mych is y-nouþ for answer to þi first argument.

As to þi i^je argument, y may answere þus: þouþ Aristotil and summe opire doctouris holden not opynyoun to be a
 30 vertu, y may not do þerto. ȝit so mych may be had þat Aristotil denyep not opynyoun to be an intellectual vertu. but, certis, pilke same doctouris whiche denyen opynyoun to be a vertu, graunten feiþ to be a vertu. And how þese stonden togidere þat feiþ, in þilk maner as þei taken feiþ,
 35 schulde be a knowal vertu, and þat opynyoun schulde be no knowal vertu, no man may resonabli wite, neipir þei hem silf wisten whos names y wole not here discouere. And þerfore, if open euydence of treuþ be more in my side þan in her side, it is no spedi argument forto argue þus as þou hast

Aristotle's enumeration of Wisdom among the *kunnyngal* virtues is due to his following a certain method of division.

Though Pecoek does not enumerate Wisdom, it is included among his *kunnyngal* virtues.

II. Aristotle does not deny that OPINION is a *kunnyngal* virtue. Doctors who do so, and who yet make FAITH a *kunnyngal* virtue, are certainly wrong.

Pecoek has more evidence of truth on his side than they.

arguyd: 'summe doctoures seien þe contrari to my seid doctrine, þerfore my doctrine is not trewe'. And þus mych for answer to þi ije argument.

III. The nature of FAITH.

(1) FAITH, properly speaking, is the acceptance of a thing affirmed as truth by a person who, on certain evidence or likely evidence, is worthy to be believed.

Examples of truths so accepted by Faith, and which cannot be proved by Reason.

It is clear that FAITH, properly taken, is included under SCIENCE or OPINION, according as to whether the evidence for the truth of the affirmer is sure or likely.¹

As for answer to þi þridde argument, þou muste wite bfore what is feip, namelich such feip as we þerof now 5 spekun in þis book, which is feip getun bi oure owen labour, and þerbi þou schalt se answer to þi þridde argument. ffeip takun propirli is a knowyng wherbi we assenten to eny þing as to trouþ, for as mych as we haue sure euydencis, or ful notable likli euydencis grettir þan to þe contrari, þat it is 10 toold and affermyd to vs to be trewe bi him of whom we haue sure euydencis, or notable likli euydencis grettir þan to þe contrari, þat þerinne he not lyed.¹ as is oure knowyng þat god is þre persounes and oon in substaunce, þat | þe secund 28^b persoun is boþe god and man, þat he was born of a mayde, 15 þat baptym ouzte be receyuyd, and eukarist ouzte be vsid, and so forþ of opire articlis, whiche alle we taken as for treupis, and consenten hem to be treupis, bi cause we haue notable likli euydencis strengier þan to þe contrari þat crist, which is god, and of whom we knowen þat he may not lie, 20 affermede hem to be treupis, and tauzte hem to vs bi hise apostlis and bi his scripture, þat we schulde take hem as for treupis, not withstondyng þe same treupis mowe not be prouyd to be treupis in proces of arguyng open to oure resoun bi mocion takun of þe same treupis wipout þe seid to vs 25 maad affermyng or reuelyng.

Now, sone, if feip propirli takun is such a kunnyng as is now discryuyd, it solewith þerof þat feip hap two spicis or braunchis, of whiche þe oon is certeyn and sure science, and þe opir is opynyoun oonli. And siþen þilk spice of feip, 30 which spice is sure science, is a spice of science, and directli and euenli conteynynd wipinne science bfore discryuyd and nombrid; and þilk spice of feip, which spice is oonli opynyoun, is a spice of opynyoun, and directli and euenli conteynynd vdir and wipinne opynyoun bfore discryuyd and nombrid, 35 it solewith herof openli þat as for neipir spicis of feip propirli takun þe nombre of knowal vertues owip to be maad larger þan is þe nombre of þe v bfore sett and rehercid.

¹ See Notes.

In an opir maner feip is takun vnpropirli for þe trouþ or þe mater or þe þing which is bileuyd bi feip propirli takun; and in þis maner we seien þat þis article, 'crist is god', is feip. but, certis, feip takun in þis maner is no vertu, 5 neipir eny knowyng or kunnyng, but it is þe treup knowen. and, þerfore, þat þe nombre of knowal vertues may be largid bi setting to of þis vnpropir feip, no man may suppose. And þus mych, sone, for answer to þi þridde argument.

ffor more cleryng of þis answer, sone, þou muste vndir- 10 stonde þat bitwix þe first spice of feip propirli takun and opire spicis of science whiche ben not feip, þer is noon opir dyuersite saue þat þis feip is prouyd and gendrid sureli bi eydence takun vpon sum trusti persoones affermyng and tellyng; and þe opire spicis of science ben prouyd and gendrid 15 bi eydence takyng in consideracioun and in biholdyng vpon þe causis or effectis or opire natural circumstauncis of þe þing or þe trouþ knowen. Also bitwixe þe secund spice 20 of feip and opire | spicis of opynyoun whiche ben not feip, þer is noon opir dyuersite saue þat þis secund feip is takun and concludid in argument and gendrid likli bi eydencis takun vpon sum persoones affermyng which is not likli to lie; and þe opire spicis of opynyoun whiche ben not feip ben concludid, takun and gendrid in argumentis or liklihode 25 oonli bi eydencis takun in consideracioun and biholdyng vpon natural circumstauncis of þe þing or þe conclusioun so trowid and likli concludid. and so feip propirli takun, as it conteyneþ þese two now seid spicis, is in it silf a spice of pilk kunnyng which, with intellect, departiþ knowyng into intellect and kunnyng; which kunnyng is departid into opynyoun 30 and science in þe x^e chapitre bifore of þis book.

An opir maner of holdyng, also ful mych allowable, may be þis: þat þer ben vj intellectual, knowal, or kunnyngal vertues whiche ben þese: Intellect, science, prudence, craft, opynyoun and feip. But þanne aftir þis holdyng, science may not be 35 take for kunnyng strecchyng him silf so largeli as he is take bifore in þe x^e and xj^e and þis xije chapitre; neipir opynyoun may be take for kunnyng strecchyng him silf so largeli as he is take bifore in þe x^e and xj^e and þis xije chapitre; but out of pilk large science þere spokun is to be

(2) Sometimes FAITH is wrongly taken to mean the fact accepted instead of the power of accepting.

A fact cannot be a virtue, hence FAITH in this sense cannot be included in the kunnyngal virtues.

The difference between FAITH and the other kinds of SCIENCE or OPINION is that in FAITH a fact is proved by some trusty person's statement; in the other kinds of SCIENCE or OPINION by causes or effects or other natural circumstances.

Hence FAITH is a branch of KUNNYNG.

If FAITH is added to the five kunnyngal virtues, SCIENCE and OPINION must be taken more narrowly. *

SCIENCIAL FAITH and OPYNYONAL FAITH will then be included under FAITH, and FAITH will be the sixth *kunnyngal* virtue.

SCIENCE must then be more narrowly described as the knowledge of truths deduced by intellectual virtues from the thing or its circumstances, but not arising out of the witness of any person.

And OPINION must then be more narrowly described as the knowledge of truths uncertain but probable, arising out of the thing or out of its circumstances, but not arising out of the witness of any person.

And then FAITH will be divided into SCIENCIAL FAITH and OPYNYONAL FAITH.

It is no matter whether FAITH is ranked as a sixth *kunnyngal* virtue, or included under SCIENCE and OPINION.

The Book of Faith in Latin deals with this subject more fully.

take oon porcioun which is pere callid 'sciencial feip', and out of pilk large opynyoun pere spokun is to be take oon porcioun which is pere callid 'opynyonal feip'; and pese two porcions ben to be gaderid togidere and to be sett into oon kunnyngal vertu to be clepid 'feip', and to be nombrid þe 5 vje kunnyngal vertu. And panne þe science which is to be left for þe ije kunnyngal vertu muste be discryuyd more narowli þus: þat he is a kunnyng wherbi we knowen a louȝ and a derk speculatiȝ treuþ dryuen out and concludid and prouyd fro and bi vertues of intellect risyng out of þe þing in 10 it silf which is to be leernyd, or out of his circumstauncis, and not bi strengþ of eny persoones witnessyng. And opynyoun, which is to be left for þe ve kunnyngal vertu, muste also more narowli be discryuyd þus: Opynyoun is a knowyng wherbi we knowen not certeynli and vndoutabili, 15 but oonli likli, and þat bi likli eydencis risyng out of and bi þe þing in it silf to be trowid, or bi summe purtenauncis or circumstauncis of it, and not bi strengþ of eny persones testimouȝ, þat it is trewe.

Of | feip bifore in pis chapitre discryuyd ben two spicis or 29b two maners or two porcions: Oon which may be clepid 'Sciencial feip', for þat he is lijk to þe seid science as for certeynte of þe kunnyng, þouȝ he be vnlijk to science in þe opir now seid condicioun. An opir maner or parti is 25 which may be clepid 'opynyonal feip', for þat he is lijk to þe seid opynyoun for defaut of certeynte or for oonli liklihode, þouȝ in þe opir seid condicioun feip be dyuers fro opynyoun.

Now chese þe reder whiche of pese two weies he wole folewe and holde. I rekke not mych wheþir of hem be holde, 30 siþen pere is no greet dyuersite þat is to be rekkid bitwix hem as anentis þe þing in hem, namelich anentis feip, aftir þe oon wey or aftir þe opir wey; but þe moost to be rekkid is þe dyuersite of namyngis, what is science and what is opynyoun, aftir þe oon wey and aftir þe opir wey; of which dyuersite y make no greet fors.

More of þis mater, sone, þou schalt se in 'þe book of feip' 35 in latyn, for þis mych as is now seid is y-nouȝ here.

xii^e chapitre.

[F]Or as mych as þat in þe two nexte chapitris bifore
 goyng and also in opire placis, y varie from þe holdyngis
 and affermyng of þe philesofre and of hooli doctouris; þerfore
 5 þat y be not iugid þerinne to be mad or proud, it is neede
 þat y write sumwhat here what is for myn excuse and
 defense in so varyng. Alle men witen wel þat Aristotil made
 not filosofie, but þat he was a scoler and a learner of
 filosofie, and a laborer to knowe þe troupis of filosofie as
 10 opire men weren; so þat filosofie, for þat þat it is a
 kunnyng of resoun þoruȝ alle hir treupis, in her silf was eer
 Aristotil was born, and schulde haue so be into þis present
 day, þouȝ he hadde no word writun of filosofie. Wherefore
 if he writiþ eny þing which bi þe principiis of filosofie is
 15 founden trewe filosofie, it is to be acceptid, and if he writiþ
 eny þing azens trewe filosofie, it is to be left. and
 philosophie in it ilf, bi his principiis and first groundis,
 muste be iuge in argument and doom of resoun whepir
 Aristotil do so or no, þat is to seiȝe, whepir he writiþ a treup
 20 of filosofie or no, and wherinne he doop so, and wherinne
 he doop not so; for ellis he were a maker of filosofie and of
 here treupis, and not þerof a learner.

Aristotle did not
 make philo-
 sophy; he only
 studied it. So
 that when his
 principles are
 found to be true,
 they are to be
 accepted; when
 found to be false,
 they are to be
 refuted.

And in lijk maner no doctour of dyuynyte which euer was,
 was auctor or maker of dyuynyte or of eny troup of dyuynyte;
 25 but eche of hem was oonli a scoler and a lerner and a laborer
 30 in dyuynyte forto fynde and knowe of dyuynytees treupis
 as many and as sureli as he kouþ þerto atteyne, as opire men
 weren and ben. and what he lernede or trowede to haue
 lernyd, he leste to his successouris for his greet loue and
 30 charite; so þat dyuynyte þoruȝ alle hise treupis was as in it
 silf eer pilk doctoure was born, and schulde haue so be in hir
 silf into þis present day, þouȝ pilk doctour hadde neuer
 writun eny word of dyuynyte. Wherefore if more or opir þan
 is open þat dyuynyte bi his principiis mynystriþ to pilk
 35 doctour, pilk doctour vttriþ and writiþ for dyuynyte, he is
 not þerinne to be receyuyd; and if it may be schewid bi
 principiis of dyuynyte þat he writiþ eny þing azens þe trewe
 dyuynyte, he ouȝte þerinne to be forsakun, þouȝ he wenede

Since the
 doctors did not
 make divinity,
 they are to be
 believed only
 where their
 teaching is
 found to be true.

The truth of a doctor's teaching on divinity must be judged by its conforming to the axioms of divinity, or to conclusions deduced by Reason from such axioms.

The grounds and principles of that part of divinity which is *not* Faith are the same as the grounds and principles of philosophy. For this kind of divinity is philosophy.

The grounds of that part of divinity which *is* Faith are the texts and processes of Holy Scripture taken in their literal meaning, as decided by Reason.

For even the famous doctors, Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome and Gregory, had no special inspiration revealing the literal meaning of such texts.

Augustine decided the literal meaning of a text by reasoning.

him self to haue writun accordyngli to þe principlis of dyuynyte; and ellis he were a maker of þe treupis in dyuynyte. and how dyuynyte with his principlis schal trie wheþir writers of hir writen trewli of hir or no, þe groundis of dyuynyte ben þe domes, with and bi discourses of resoun 5 maad bi silogisme reulid in sum maner of þe þre figuris, bi and at þe surest open craft ȝouun in logik þerþon. And þe principlis or heedis of þese groundis ben þe treupis whiche ben so open þat þei needen noon opire opener treupis bfore to proue hem. þis now seid discourse in doom of resoun is as 10 a see free for euery man þerinne to rowe and to fisse, and who þat þerinne best kanne rowe, and kanne bfore opire rowe, he hæþ þe maystrie and is more þan opir þerinne to be folewid.

þe groundis of þilk parti of dyuynyte which is not feip, with 15 þe principlis or heedis þerof, ben þe same or lijk whiche ben now bfore seid to be groundis and principlis of philosophie. ffor þe veri trouþ is þat þis parti of dyuynyte is not ellis þan philosophie. þe groundis, forsoþe, of þilk parti of dyuynyte which is feip, ben þe textis and processis of sum parti of hooli 20 scripture in her littoral vndirstondyng. and which is þe trewe and verri littoral vndirstondyng of hooli scripture, doom of resoun muste trie, examyne and iuge bi argument of open sure silogisme, takyng euydencis from þe significacioun of þe wordis and from þe circumstauncis of þe processe bfore 25 goyng and aftir folewyng, or from opire placis of scripture þerto biholdyng. fforwhi opir wey or meene into getyng of þis knowyng which is þe verri littoral vndirstondyng of scripture, kanne not be founden nopir ymagyned to be, but if eny persoun wole pretende þat he hadde special or synguler, 30 sure and sikir reuelacioun or inspiracioun | of god, tellyng to 30^b him þat þis or þat is þe verri trewe littoral vndirstondyng of þis text or of þat text in hooli scripture. but, certis, noon such persoun was Ambrose, or Jerom, or Austyn, or Gregori, or eny opir writer, as y proue vndoutabli bi her owen 35 writyngis in 'þe book of iust apprisyng doctouris'. Neuerþeles, with þe opir seid meene of nature, wipout myracle or reuelacioun or inspiracioun, Austyn, oon of þe cheef dukis of hooli doctouris, holdip him content. and with þilk meene of

kyndeli resoun he foonde al pat he foonde to be þe verri
litteral vndirstondyng of hooli writt; as it may be takun of
what he þerof writip in þe þridde book 'of þe trynyte', and
in 'þe book of 83 questions', þe [lij]¹ questioun, and in opire
5 placis of his writyngis, as y schal sumwhere ellis þan here
proue; namelich if eny opir to be þe verri litteral sense and
vndirstondyng of eny parti of scripture be not sufficientli
knownen to be had in þe tyme of þe apostlis, and of hem
allowid vpon þilk same parti of scripture, as herof y write in
10 oon of þe 'bookis of feip' and in 'þe book of iust apprisyng
hooli chirch'.

þe principlis of þese now seid groundyngis ben treupis so
open in oure knowyng þat þei needen not into her proof eny
opir opener treupis hem prouyng.

15 If eny man wole seie þat of dyuynyte ben opire groundis
þan þese now seid, fforwhi priuate and special reuelacions or
inspiracions opir wise þan bi þe comune maner doon to opire
men weren maad to oolde holi doctouris, boþe forto knowe
and teche treupis not conteynynd expresseli in scripture, and
20 also forto knowe which is þe verri litteral vndirstondyng
of holi scripture, certis, herazens ben in 'þe book of iust
apprisyng of holi scripture' so strong skiles maad bi testimony
of þe same oolde holi doctouris and bi opire eydencis þat þo
skiles mowe not be azenseid and assoilid.

25 ffadir, happili men wolen feele and seie þat þou3 what 3e
han now seid azens þe ouermych lenyng to þe philesafir and
to hooli doctouris in dyuynyte be trewe, 3it it ou3te not be
seid or be openyd to þe lay peple.

Sopeli, sone, forto write to þe comune peplis þis what þou
30 hast now towchid two causes me movent: oon is if y not varie
from þe philesafir and from hooli doctouris at sum while, y
schal needis mayntene an vntrouþ in stide of trouþ. And if
y varie and dyuerse me from hem in myne affermyngis
31^a whanne neede | is, and putte not for me such a bokeler and
35 a defense which now here and in opire placis of my writyngis
y haue putte, þanne wolen myne aduersaries bihynde my back
allege to þe comune peple sentencis of hooli doctouris azens
myne affermyngis, and þerbi make þe comune peple wene þat

The principles
of these grounds
of Faith are self-
evident truths.

Where it is
proved that the
doctors had no
special revela-
tion of the
truths of
divinity.

Laymen should
be taught that
it is wrong to
depend blindly
on Aristotle and
the doctors;
otherwise
Pecock will be
blamed when
his teaching
differs.

¹ See Notes.

myne affermyngis ben vntrewe, and make þe comune peple dispise or leue my writyngis. into þe ful greet harm of þe same comune peple. And þerfore y haue leefe to araie my bokeler bifore þe strook come þan leue such a bokeler vnaraied, or purueie for it ouer late aftir þat þe strook is smyten.

Peacock also wishes to show up the folly of certain clerks who depend slavishly on the doctors.

An opir cause is forto take away þe greet rudenesse which ouer many clerkis ben yuue, which rudenesse is þe ouer mych cleuyng to doctouris writyngis. bicause þo clerkis biganne to studie and lerne in þilk wéy. and þei kunne not eesili brynge hem sili out þerfro; which default soþeli hyndriþ mych þe þrift of soole and of sure leernyng and of kunnyng. not þat y meene doctouris fyndyngis and her deýuarauncis to vs maad in her writyngis to be dispisid. or to be ouer litil sett bi. goddis forbode y schulde so meene or feelee. for y haue openli written me to feelee herof þe contrari. but y meene and feelee þat þei be apprisid and sett bi. as it is declarid and prouyd in 'þe book of iust apprisyng of hooli scripture' and in an opir book callid 'þe iust apprisyng of doctouris' þat þei ougten be apprisid and be sett bi. What is more to be seid of þis mater is not to be seid here. but in more accordyng place it is tretid and declaryd. god for his greet goodnes into þe profit of al his cristen church brynge clerkis out of þilk rudenesse wherinne þei ouermych wipout dew examynacioun elcuen to writyngis of doctouris. and wipout þe resoluyng of þo writyngis into þe groundis and principis of þe faculte to which þei perteynen; for ellis þei schulen neuer be sure feelers neþir seers, neþir be worpi to be clepid 'leernyd men'. but as children þei muste al þilk while be vndir credence of opire. and so be oonli vnsure trowers and not prouyng knowers.

xiiiij^e chapitre.

Belief in the assertion of a probably trustworthy person other than God is to be termed 'Faith', because it is that kind of Opinion

[F]Adir, what seie þe herto? If y heere openli and sureli a certeyn creature not god telle and afferme earnestli to me a certeyn poynt. and þerwip y haue likli euydencis þat þe same creature is so trewe þat he wole not vttrili lie. or namelich þat in þe now seid to me toold poynt he liede not.

31^b whepir þis credence is to be clepid 'feip',¹ not wipstondyng it is not reuelid or toold to vs bi god whom we knowen may not lye, but bi a creature which may lie?

which has
already been
described as
Faith (i. e.
Opynyonal
Faith.)²

Certis, sone, it muste needis be seid þat þi trowyng in þis
5 caase is to be seid 'feip', forwhi þi trowyng in þis caase is
a knowyng as sure as is an opynyoun; and ȝit þis þi knowyng
is not intellect neipir wisdom neipir science neipir prudence
neipir craft, as is open afore bi þe x^e chapitre, neipir it is
opynyoun, as is open bifore in þe x^e and x^je chapitris, where
10 opynyoun which is not feip is discryuyd and departid fro feip.

Wherefore, siþen þi trowyng is a knowyng, it folewip þat it is
to be seid a feip. and þerfore, sone, y wole wel þat we mowe
and owen forto ȝeue feip to creaturis, and not oonli to god,
and þat not oonli oure credence to goddis affermyngis is feip,
15 but also oure credence to creaturis affermyngis is feip. herto
accordip ful wel þe comune speche of peple seiying þus: 'y
ȝafe feip and credence to him' or 'to his wordis'; and so forþ
of opire lijk spechis, not wipstondyng þat principali and
cheefli þe trowyng and credence which we ȝeuen to þo poyntis
20 whiche god affermede and schewide to vs immediatli or
mediatli we clepen in moost comune talkyng oure 'feip'.
And þis feip we clepen 'catholik feip', þat is to seie, vny-
uersal or general feip, and þe same feip we clepen 'ortodox
feip', þat is to seie, riȝt feip.

25 ffadir, bi þe discryuyng which ȝe haue afore maad of feip,
it semyþ to me if þe ȝouun discripcioun of feip be trewe, þat
feip muste be gendrid into vs bi such an argument maad of
vs silf in oure owen resoun þus: what euer þing þis persoon
affermyþ and tellip in þis caase to vs is trewe; þis mater or
30 þis poynt þis persoon affermeþ and tellip to vs; wherefore þis
poynt is trewe. and of euer eipir of þe two premyssis goyng
bifore þe conclusioun we muste needis haue so likli eydencis
þat to þe contrari apperen to vs noon so grete eydencis.
and al þe whilis þis argument gendrip in vs feip vpon þe seid
35 poynt into tyme grettir eydencis come forþ to vs vpon þe
contrari of eny of þe boþe premyssis þan ben þe eydencis
now apperyng for þe same premysses. and if þis be trewe þat
wipout such an argument feip may not be gendrid, bi lijk

Faith in a con-
clusion cannot
last longer than
the remem-
brance of the
argument by
which the con-
clusion was
proved.

¹ Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

² See above pp. 62, 64.

skile feip may not endure and be kept in oure vndirstondyng wipout kepyng of þe same argument in oure resoun and vndirstondyng.

Sone, þou seist ful soop, and y | alowe wel þi witt þat þou 32^a dryuest so wel forþ out of myn afore goyng discripcioun or 5 discryuyng of feip al þat þou now hast seid.

If the evidence for the conclusion is known for a certainty to be true, the conclusion is *Sciencial Faith*.

ffadir, þanne ferþir y aske of 3ow þus: what if of euer eipir of þe seid premyssis concludyng for feip, y haue not oonli likli eydencis, whiche ben clepid in scolis of logik 'probable eydencis' or 'probabilitees', but y haue sure 10 certeynte bi kunnyng or bi experience, wherþir pilk argument schal conclude and proue in oure resoun feip or no?

Sone, y holde and seie þat pilk argument schal conclude feip, but not feip which is opynyal feip, but feip which is sciencial feip. and þou3 þis speche of þese two dyuerse feipis 15 be merueylouse to uewe, þerof þe heerers holde þei her pacience vnto tyme þei heere of 'þe book of feip',¹ and þanne þei schulen þis speche wel alowe.

Sciencial Faith can exist in Heaven.

ffor it semyp herbi þat it is not inconuenyent to graunte þat feip schal be in heuen, nameli sciencial feip; forwhi þei 20 þat ben in heuen han þis argument in her resoun: what euer god affermeþ to vs is trew; god affermeþ to vs þat oure ioie schal be perpetual, neuer to ceese; wherfore it is trew. lo, sone, þe ie premys aungels knowen bi science, for it may be prouyd vndoutabli; and þe ije premysse þei knowen bi open 25 and sure experience; and þerfore þei knowen þe conclusioun bi sciencial feip more sureli þan bi opynyal feip. and þerfore, siþen science is not opynyoun, but þei ben dyuerse knowyngis, it muste be þat sciencial feip is not opynyal feip, but þat þei ben dyuerse feipis. and also muste needis be þat 30 in pilk argument wherbi þe treup is concludid² and prouyd wherof is opynyal feip and as of it is opynyal feip, þe boþe premyssis muste be knowen oonli bi likli eydencis, not in vttrist degree sure, but so likli þat to þe contraries ben not had eydencis so likli; or ellis at þe leest oon of þe 35 premyssis muste needis be such oon as is now seid; and ellis opynyal feip is not bi pilk argument gendrid.

In *Opynyonal Faith* part at least of the evidence must be probable, but not certain.

Since the Apostles saw

ffadir, if þis be trewe, it my3te seme þat þe apostlis hadde

¹ See Notes.

² MS. c5 [at end of line] *concludid*.

not opynyal feip vpon þo articlis vpon whiche we han now opynyal feip; fforwhi þei sizen openli in experience crist which was god, and þei herden openli in experience him telle to hem þe articlis whiche we now bileeuen, þat is to seie, þat
 5 pre persoones ben in godhede, and þat þe ije persoon is maad man, and born of a mayd, and so forþ. Wherefore it wolde seme þat þei hadden not of þese articlis opynyal bileeue, riȝt as aungels han noon opynyal bileeue in heuene of þo
 32^b troupis whiche þei heeren þere | god to telle and afferme
 10 to hem.

Christ by actual experience, and Christ is God, was not their faith in His teaching
Sciencial Faith rather than *Opynyonal Faith*?

Sone, þis which þou now art about to proue solewith not, and þyn argument which þou now hast maad prouep not, and þis þou schalt riȝt wel se þus: þe argument which þe apostlis hadden in her resoun vpon cristis tellyngis and affermyngis
 15 was not lijk to þe argument whiche aungels now han in heuen vpon goddis tellyngis to hem þere; fforwhi þe argument which þe apostlis hadden in her resoun muste needis haue be þis: what euer god affermep to vs is trew, and owip to be bileeuyd of vs; eche of þese seid articlis god affermep to
 20 vs; wherefore eche of þese seid articlis is trew and so to be bileuyd of vs. Now, sone, take hede. þe secund premysse in þis argument was not openli bi experience knowen of þe apostlis, as is þe secund premysse of þe aungels argument bifore maad of hem in heuene; but þe secund premysse in þe
 25 now seid apostlis argument felle oonli vndir opynyal bileeue to hem, and was prouyd to hem bi an opir argument in her resoun, which was þis: eche of þese articlis þis man affermep to vs; and þis man is god; wherefore eche of þese articlis god affermep to vs. and lo, sone, how eftsoones aȝen þe secund
 30 premysse in þis maad argument was not open to hem bi experience, but it was takun of hem bi opynyal bileeue bi opire likli argumentis maad renne vpon his greet myraclis and opire deedis whiche myzte not likli togidere be doon saue of god, and þouȝ perof was not at þe fullest to hem þe
 35 certeynte, but sufficient liklihode of probabilitie. And so is þyn argument, sone, assoilid.

The Apostles' Faith was *Opynyonal Faith*, based not on the certainty that Christ was God, but on the probability.

ffadir, aȝens þis what ȝe han seid, þat feip schal be had in heuene, it semede þat þe apostil poul, i^e *corrinthies*, xii^e *chapitre*, spekip where, as it semyþ, he puttip þis dyuersite

Does not Paul assert that, though Charity will exist in Heaven, Faith will not?

bitwix feip and charite, þat charite schal be in heuene and feip schal not þere be.

Paul does not mean that there will be no *Sciential* Faith in Heaven, but that the conclusions of *Opynyonal* Faith will be self-evident truths in Heaven.

Sone, bi þat þat poul dyuersip feip from charite in þe same place now allegid, may not be prouyd þat þere schal be no feip in heuēn, more þan may be prouyd þat þere schal be no science in heuene. and þis y warante if þe seid hool chapitre, ie *corinthies*, xiije, be wel þoruȝ out lokid. but, certis, þe wordis of þe apostil þere mowe stonde in her treuþ for þis, þat mych feip now had here in erþ toward god schal be avoidid in heuene: as þat god is man, god suffrid deep, 10 marie is a mayde aftir hir child birþ, and suche opire poyntis and artielis whiche schule þere openli in hem silf be knowen, þouȝ no charite which now is in erþe toward god nedip or schal be in heuene avoidid; and þis charite | is 33^a more excellent þan is feip. but soþeli herof folewiþ not þat 15 al feip schal be avoidid in heuēn, in þis wise to vndirstonde þat no feip schal be had in heuene.

Many doctors hold a contrary view to Pecock.

Wel y wote, sone, þat many doctouris in her writyngis holden þe contrari of my seiȝng now here, but þat may not lette me forto holde what y kanne openli proue, whilis þei 20 her parti kunnen not openli proue. but of suche maner alegcauncis of doctouris what is to be holden schal be openli tauȝt, feelid and seen, with goddis grace, in 'þe book of Just apprisyng of holi scripture', and bettir in þe book callid 'þe iust apprisyng of doctouris'.

Is it not true that whatever truth is known by Faith is known by judgement of Reason? As is proved by these examples.

ffadir, of þis what ȝe han seid in þis present chapitre it folewith þat what euer treuþ is knowen bi feip is knowen, or at þe leest it is knowable, bi doom of natural resoun; fforwhi what euer treuþ is knowen bi feip it is knowen, or at 25 þe leest it is knowable, bi such an argument: what euer he 30 þat liede not perinne affermede, is trewe; þis he þat liede not þerinne affermede; wherfore þis is trewe. þe secund premysse is probable bi þis argument: he þat is god affermede þis; he þat is god liede not; wherfore he þat liede not affermede þis. þe first premysse of þis argument 35 is prouyd þus: he þat dide þese myraclis, and þerwith affermede þat he was god, was nedisli god; he þat dide þese myraclis whilis he seide þat he was god, affermede þis;

wherfore he þat is god affermede þis. or ellis in þis wise :
 he in whom þe prophecies of god to come and his myraclis
 and wirchyngis and techyngis accorden, was god ; he þat
 affermede þis article was he in whom þe seid prophecies and
 5 his werkis and techyngis accorden ; wherfore he þat affermede
 þis article is god. lo, fadir, alle þese argumentis ben lad
 forþ wipin þe power and myȝt and liȝt of oure natural
 resoun ; wherfore, siþen it is knowen bi þis maad resoun þat
 þis persoon may not lie, and perwith it is knowen bi sure
 10 experience of heeryng and of resoun þat he hæp maad his
 affermyng to vs vpon eny article beyng bifore aboue þe
 takeabilnes of oure resoun, certis, oure resoun in his owen
 myȝt and liȝt may proue þat it is trewe.

Sone, al þis y graunte. What wolt þou haue herof ?

This is true.

15 ffadir, y wole haue herof þat ȝe spake wipout nede bifore
 in þe i^e chapitre of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', whanne ȝe
 seide þere þat 'a man owip to lyue aftir doom of resoun and
 of feip', and þat 'moral vertu is a deede of þe wil doon
 answeyngli to þe doom of resoun or of feip' ; fforwhi it
 33^b were y-nouȝ to seie þus : 'A man is | bounden to lyue aftir
 þe doom of resoun', And 'moral vertu is a deede doon
 answeyngli to þe doom of resoun'. And, if it be soop to be
 seid þat al oure feip is to be knowe bi doom of oure resoun,
 and þat al moral vertu is to be doon aftir þe doom of oure
 25 resoun, and we haue no resoun saue natural resoun, and al
 oure resoun is oure natural resoun, forwhi we haue no resoun
 ȝouun to vs bi myracle but oonli bi kynde ; it folewith þat
 it is to be seid þat al oure feip is to be leernyd and had bi
 and aftir doom of oure natural resoun, and al moral vertu is
 30 to be doon aftir þe doom of oure natural resoun, And al þat
 a man owip to do morali vertuoseli is to be doon aftir þe
 doom of oure natural resoun.

Therefore if all
 our Faith is
 dependent on
 our Reason, was
 it not unneces-
 sary to assert in
 the *Donet* that
 a man ought to
 live according to
 Reason and
 Faith ?

Sone, y graunte al þat þou now hast concludid, and y
 knowleche þat for no nede y seide bifore in þe i^e chapitre of
 35 þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þese wordis þus : 'aftir þe doom of
 resoun or of feip', but for more cleernes, and also for þat þer
 ben two dyuers maners of domes in resoun ; of whiche ij
 maners oon is accordyng oonli to feip, and an opir is
 accordyng to science and to opynyoun beyng not feip, as is

It was said for
 the sake of clear-
 ness, because
 there are two
 kinds of judge-
 ment by Reason:
 (1) according to
 Faith ;
 (2) according to
 Science and
 Opinion which
 is not Faith.

open in þe eend of þe xij^e chapitre bfore in þis first parti of þis present book. and þefore haue me excusid.

Will not people wonder at Reason being thus placed above Faith when usually Faith is placed above Reason?

A truth dependent on Faith is beyond our Reason in that it cannot be proved by Reason, but necessitates Faith in an affirmer.

But whatever truth is accepted by Faith should be acceptable to the judgement of Reason.

Hence Faith cannot exist without the consent of Reason; for though Reason cannot actually prove the truth affirmed by the teller, Faith must accept this truth only on the consent of Reason.

ffadir, happili many men wolen wondre whi ȝe graunten oure natural resonyng to haue so mych place about þe gendryng and þe contynuyng of feip, fforwhi it is comuneli seid þat maters of feip ben aboue oure natural resoun, and if oure natural resoun myȝte atteyne to proue eny article of oure feip, pilk article were noon article of feip.

Sone, þe maters or þe treupis whiche ben to be bileeyd bi feip ben in þis wise aboue oure natural resoun: þat þei in hem silf mowe not be prouyd of vs certeynli to be trewe, neipir likli to be trewe, bi eny euydencis takable from þe same maters [or]¹ treupis in oure natural resoun, wipout a teller and affermer to vs þat it is trewe; as is þis treup: þre persoones ben oon god; a mayde childide god; and so forþ. Neuerþeles, with al þis now seid, ȝit whepir eny of þese poyntis or eny opir such poynt or article ouȝte to be bileeyd of vs bi feip or no, oure resoun muste deme. and to þis þat eche of hem ouȝte be bileeyd of vs bi feip for a trouþ, oure resoun muste haue euydencis, and so grete euydencis þat to þe contrari he hap noon so grete. and ellis we mowe neuer eny of þo poyntis or articlis bileeue, fforwhi it is impossible oure vndirstondyng or oure resoun to trowe or to consente to eny þing as to be a trouþ without euydence mouyng so strongli | oure vndirstondyng and resoun to so trowe and consente þat to þe contrari is not had and perceyuyd eny euydence so strong. and þefore oure natural resoun hap such an interesse to feip þat wipout doom of oure natural resoun feip may not in vs be gendrid neipir contynued, neipir eny article of þe feip may of vs be knowe or take for trewe; pouȝ oure natural resoun bi him silf, wipout an opir to him a teller þat it is trewe, may not proue þis or þat wherof feip is to be trewe, or þat þerof ouȝte to be feip; and þat bi cause þat þis or þat is trewe oure resoun may not fynde bi euydencis takable fro þis or þat in it silf, as he may of opire þingis whos knowyng he hap bi science or bi opynyoun not beyng feip. And þefore, how mych euer god telle and afferme to vs, but if we make in oure natural resoun doom takun bi suche argumentis as ben bfore sett,

¹ MS. of.

we mowe vpon noon of þo affermyd trouþis bi god make to
 vs feiþ. And ferþir, if to tweyn contrari parties we haue
 euydencis, it is impossible oure resoun to trowe þis parti
 more þan þe contrari parti, but if to oure resoun be presentid
 5 strengir euydence more movyng oure resoun to þis parti þan
 is eny euydence movyng to þe contrari parti, and it is
 impossible oure resoun to trowe þilk parti which hap in oure
 resoun febler euydencis þan hap his contrari. and also no
 treuþ is leernyd or may be leernyd without argument rennyng
 10 þervpon descendyng from þe more knowen þing into þe lasse
 knowen þing in þe resoun and vndirstondyng of þe lerner.
 and no treuþ may be leernyd neipir confermyd, no falshed
 may be aspied or reprouyd or vnprouyd, þat is to seie, be
 schewid þat he is a falshed, saue oonli bi argument in lijk
 15 maner now seid in þe resoun of him þat heerip or þerabout
 laborip. and ech such argument muste be maad of two
 premyssis takun bifore þe conclusioun, eer he haue his ful
 strengþ to proue. and al þis is trewe boþe in leerid men
 and in lay men and in ech persoon, þouȝ þerto be not taken
 20 ful mych hede þat it is so. But herof, sone, no more in þis
 book. More of þis se þou in 'þe book of feiþ' in latyn.

xv^e chapitre.¹

[F]Adir, bifore in þe x^e chapitre, soon aftir þe bigynnyng,
 3e haue discryuyd what ben moral vertues, seiyng þus: þat
 25 moral vertues ben disposicions or araiyngis parfityng
 and inclynyng þe wil forto chese and refuse, and comaunde
 to be doon or to be vndoon or to be doable allowabli,
 accordyngli to þe avisid doom of prudence in þe resoun or to
 þe feiþ in resoun. Now y aske, fadir, of ȝow v questions:
 34^b first, whi | þo seid vertues of þe wil ben clepid 'moral'?
 Also y aske wherfore þei seruen? Also how þei ben gendrid
 in oure wil? and also how many spicis þer ben of hem? And
 whiche bi name ben þe spicis of hem?

Five questions
 on the moral
 virtues:

- (1) Why are the moral virtues so called?
- (2) What is their office?
- (3) How are they engendered in the Will?
- (4) How many kinds are there?
- (5) What are the names of these kinds?

Sone, as to þe first askyng, whi þe seid vertues, þat is to
 35 seie, þe araiyngis or disposicions of þe wil, ben clepid 'moral',

The answers
 thereto:

¹ See Notes.

(1) The moral virtues are so called because they teach men to be well mannered—'mannered' and 'moral' having the same meaning.

They teach men to be well mannered, or moral, because they incline the Will to obey the behests of Reason, and it is through ruling his life according to Reason and Free Will that man is better than beasts.

(2) The office of the moral virtues is to incline the Will to obey the behests of Reason.

this is þe cause: Alle þo seid vertues in þe wil bi which þe wil is disposid, araied *and* inclynyd to obeie in þe maner now seid to prudence or to feip in resoun, ben suche þat þei longen to maners, fforwhi bi hem we ben wel manerid; *and* þerfore þei ben suche for whiche we ben to be seid 'goode men' or 'hooli men', and for whiche we ben rewardable; and þerfore þei owen be clepid 'maneral vertues' as forto speke in pleynest englisch. And siþen 'maneral' and 'moral' is al oon to seie in englisch, þerfore þei ben clepid also 'moral vertues'. And if þou wolt wite whi a man is to be seid 'wel manerid' for þat he getip to him and vsip þe now seid vertues, certis, þe cause is þis: þe grettist natural honeste þat may be kept and doon of man in þis lijf is þat he lyue, bere and gouerne him as his ouerer nature and his kyndeli powers in which he is aboue beestis nature asken; but so it is þat man surmountip in kynde louzer beestis bi þis, þat he haþ resoun and fre wil, which louzer beestis han not. And so it is þat þese ij powers, resoun and fre wil, han naturali þis ordre bitwixe hem: þat þe resoun schal first *and* bifore schewe forþ what deede is to be doon or to be left vndoon wipinforþ or wipoutforþ, or what deede is doable allowabli or semeli wipinforþ or wipoutforþ: and þanne next þat þe wil chese pilk deede if he be schewid to be doon or be doable, and þat þe wil refuse an opir deede which is presentid to be not doon or to be not doable semeli *and* allowabli; and þat þe wil neipir chese neipir refuse neipir aftirward comaunde to þe opire powers and to membris of þe bodi forto execute þe same in outward wirchyng, or forto forbere þe executyng of eny outward deede, eer þan avisose doom of resoun go bifore such now seid presentyng or presentment to þe wil or bifore þe wil. wherfore folewith þat a man is to be seid 'wel manerid' in his wil and in þe lowzer powers to whom wil comaundip, whanne he haþ þe now seid vertues placid and abidyng in his wil, aftir whom and bi whom and with whom he him reulip.

As for þi ije | askyng, wherfore or wherto þese moral or maneral vertues seruen, it is answerid now bifore as in general þat þei seruen forto enclyne, bowe, dispose, araie and parfite þe wil forto obeie to prudence or to feip in resoun,

pat is to seie, þat þe wil wille *and* nylle, chese and refuse,
 and comaunde to opire powers of the soul þis or þat to be
 doon or to be left vndoon accordyngli to þe doom of prudence
 or of feip *in* resoun; And þat for as mych as þerin stondip
 5 mannys grettist natural honeste, bewte *and* fairnes and
 preseeblines; 3he, *and* þerin stondip þe hizest and fullist
 pure natural eend into which man is maad, and þerfore his
 best pure natural good.¹ ffor if it hadde not plesid god
 forto haue callid man into an hizer eend þan is his pure
 10 natural eend, certis, noon hizer eend or good man while he
 lyuyd in þis lijf, neipir his soul aftir his departyng fro þe
 bodi, schulde haue þan þis honeste, þat is to seie, forto bi
 natural resoun learne and knowe of god and of his werkis as
 mych as he myzte bi his natural myzt wynne to, and *in* his
 15 conuersacioun *and* lyuyng forto chese and refuse in þe wil
 accordyngli to þe doom of resoun, and forto execute þilk
 chesyng and þilk refusyng accordyngli to þe same doom of
 resoun.

This obedience
 of Will to the
 behests of
 Reason
 (directed by the
 moral virtues) is
 the highest
 natural end of
 man.

But ferþirmore, for as mych as bi oure feip we han leernyd
 20 þat god hap callid man into an hizer eend, which is forto be
 blisfulli richid perpetuali *in* þe sizt of god, þerfore more
 speciali y may seie þe same answer *in* parti þus: þat þe seid
 moral vertues sitting in oure wil seruen forto brynge vs as
 meenes to oure eend, oure perfeccioun and rest, to which we
 25 ben fynali or eendli aboue kynde ordeynyd bi oure maker,
 god. ffor þei ben þe seruicis, or leden into þe seruycis,
 whiche god askip of vs in þis lijf to be doon to him, and þei
 ben þe poyntis of his lawe askid to be kept and fulfilled of vs
 in þis lijf, þat for þilk seruice so doon of vs to him here, he
 30 accepte vs and alowe vs and take vs, to him forto be ioiffully
 and blisfulli restid for euere in him in an opir lijf aftir þis
 lijf to come.

The practice of
 the moral
 virtues procures
 for man his
 higher or super-
 natural end, joy
 in the next life.

If eny man wole herazens obiecte, beryng on hond vpon
 god þat he depryueþ men from her natural eend bi þis, þat he
 35 ordeyneþ for hem an opir eend which is supernatural or
 aboue natural eend, answer þerto is þat þe seid supernatural
 mannys eend hap in it silf al þe good of þe opire seid natural
 35 eend of man, *and* mych | more good ouer it. And þerfore

This higher
 supernatural
 end is nobler
 than the highest
 natural end, and
 includes all the
 blessings of the
 natural end.

¹ See Notes.

god doop no more wrong or harm, losse or damage, to man in pis, þat he callid man into þe seid supernatural eend in stide of his natural eend, þan if in stide of a peny dew to man he wolde ȝeue to þe same man a groot or a noble.

That this is true may be known by the *kunnyngal* (*knowyngal*) virtues, particularly by *Opynyonal* Faith.

ffadir, how schal y wite þat pis is trewe?

5

Sone, bi þe knowyngal vertues bifore discryuyd in pis first parti of pis present book, þe x^e and xi^e chapitris, and nameli parfijtli and fulli bi þilk kunnyngal vertu which is clepid 'opynyonal feip'.

The nature of *Opynyonal* Faith may be learnt from Holy Scripture and from various books of Pecoock.

ffadir, where schal y leerne þilk feip?

10

Sone, in hooli scripture, and also where it is to leerne feip þou schalt be tauȝt in 'þe spreding of þe iiij tablis', and in 'þe book of feip', in 'þe book of Just apprisyng hooli scripture', and in 'þe book of þe chirch' in latyn.

(3) How moral virtues are engendered in the Will:

(a) The *kunnyngal* (*knowyngal*) virtues, particularly Faith, inform man as to God's existence, and that He is both our best natural end and also our best supernatural end.

(b) Man then desires this end.

(c) Prudence and Faith inform man that this end cannot be attained save by the performance of moral virtuous deeds.

As to þi iije askyng, how þe seid moral vertues ben gendrid in oure wil, y answer first in general þus: Whanne man is leernyd and enformyd bi knowyngal vertues, and namelich bi feip, þat þer is a god, and þat he is oure maker and oure eend in whom we schulen haue oure fynal or eendli perfeccioun and rest and oure best good, and þat wheþir he biholde his bifore seid natural eend or his bifore seid supernatural eend, þanne anon man willip and desirip forto come to pis eend and to haue pis eend for þe honeste perof. and aftirward, whanne pis man is ferþir leernyd bi prudence or bi feip in resoun þat pis eend may not of vs be geten and had without meenes ledyng vs toward it, and þat þese meenes muste needis be deedis of oure worpiest powers, and namelich of þo powers bi whiche we ben men and aboue beestis (þat is to seie, deedis of resoun and of wil) and þat þese deedis han bitwixe hem kyndeli pis ordre þat resoun wirchip bifore in schewyng what þe wil schal chese or refuse, comaunde to be do or to be left, and þat þe wil chesip or refusip and comaundiþ answeyngli to þe schewyng maad fro resoun, and so þat þe now bifore discryuyd moral vertuose deedis ben þe meenys ledyng vs into þe seid eend, and ben perfore þe poyntis of goddis lawe and of his seruice, as is also tauȝt in þe ie parti of 'cristen religioun', þe ije treti þe []¹ chapitre; þanne man desirip and coueitip forto take to him

(d) Man then desires to per-

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

þese seid moral vertuose deedis, *with* al it which is necessari
and requyrid to be had for þe hauyng of þo moral vertuose
deedis, þat bi hem he schal be acceptid to reioce his natural
eend or his blisful eend and his souereynest good. And so
5 in þis now seid wise he is movid forto gendre moral vertuose
werkis or deedis in him into his wil:

how þanne *aftr* al þis þe moral virtues of þe same deedis
ben gendrid in þe wil, now schal y seie. Whanne man is
36^a instruc[t]id and leernyd bi feip *and* sumwhat bi prudence
10 þat meeke werkis ben to be doon for þe entent now bifore
seid, þanne þilk man chesip in his wil forto occupie him in
suche meke werkis; and he comaundip and biddip in his wil
to alle opire powers forto so do and so leue vndo þat þe seid
meke werkis be not lettid, but þat þei be ofte y-doon, and þat
15 þe contrari werkis to hem be not doon. Whanne þis is doon
of þe man, and *aftr* þat he hap hauntid bi leiser and processe
of tyme suche werkis of meeknes, *þer* schal be gendrid in his
wil a disposicioun and a qualite which schal inclyne *and*
dispose and able and lizte þe wil forto contynue his now seid
20 haunt of meke werkis whiche he hap bigunne, mych more þan
þe wil was þerto inclyned, ablid *and* liztid in þe bigynnyng
whanne he entride þis haunt. and 3it, *aftr* þe gendryng
of þis now seid disposicioun in þe wil, þe same disposicioun
wole growe into such a degre þat it schal be stable *and*
25 vnmoueable, or vnaweidoable, or vnaweyfallable fro þe wil, in
lasse þan ful greet contrari haunt be maad long tyme in
proude werkis contrari to þe now bifore seid haunt. and
whanne þis disposicioun is comen into þis now seid degre
of stabilnes and of vnremouabilnes, þanne it is clepid an
30 'habite'; which disposicioun and habite, whanne þei schulen
be gendrid in maner now seid bi occasioun of haunt in deedis
longyng to gendre hem, þei wolen inclyne, bowe and dispose
þe wil into meke werkis lijk to þe meeke werkis bi whom þe
same disposicioun and habite were gendrid. and þis dis-
35 posicioun or þis habite is to be clepid 'meeknesse', or 'þe
moral vertu of meeknesse'; and þe meeke werkis goyng bifore
his gendryng in vse and haunt, and þe meeke werkis folewyng
his gendryng, into whiche meeke werkis þe seid disposicioun
or habite inclyneþ, owen not to be clepid 'moral vertu' or

form these
moral virtuous
deeds and
inclines his Will
to occupy itself
with them.

(e) By perform-
ance of these
moral virtuous
deeds, a disposi-
tion inclining
the Will to occu-
py itself with
like virtuous
deeds is en-
gendered.

Which disposi-
tion, when well
established,
becomes a habit.

And this dis-
position or
habit, inclining
the Will to
occupy itself
with virtuous
deeds like those
by which the
disposition or
habit was
engendered, is
termed a 'moral
virtue'. This
should be dis-
tinguished from
a 'moral
virtuous work'.

'moral vertues', or 'meeknes' or 'meeknessis', but þei ben to be clepid 'meke werkis' and 'moral vertuose werkis', þat is to seie, werkis of moral vertu and of meeknesse; for in þe maner now seid þei perteynen bifore or aftir to moral vertu, which is meeknes. And in lijk maner as y haue seid 5 of þe moral vertu which is meeknesse, and of his bifore goyng and aftir folewyng werkis, in þe same wise it is to be felid, conceuyd and seid of ech opir moral vertu and of his bifore goyng and aftir comyng deedis: as ben myldenesse, largesse, clenness, honeste, pacience, and opire nombrid bifore in þe 10 ie parti of 'þe donet'. and þus mych as for answer to þi þridde asking.

Man is rewarded for the moral virtuous work, not for the habit or moral virtue.

ffadir,¹ wheþir schal a man haue mede for þe vertu aloone which 3e han clepid 'a sumwhat fixe disposicioun' or 'a 36^b more fixe' and, as it were, 'unremouable habite'; or ellis he 15 schal haue meede for þe werkis bi which þe vertu is gendrid, and into whiche werkis þe seid vertu whanne he is gendrid inclyneþ?

Sone,² soþeli a man schal be rewardid for þe werkis goyng bifore and comyng aftir þe gendryng of þe vertu, and not for 20 þe disposicioun or habit oonli. ffor, certis, þou3 a man hadde as many suche disposicions or habitis as it were possible him to haue, if it were possible him to haue hem wipout þe werkis goyng bifore or comyng aftir, whiche werkis longen to þe seid habitis or vertues, he schulde neuer haue meede for 25 hem, neþir his fynal blisse for hem; fforwhi in þe werkis able to go bifore or to folewe þe disposicioun or þe habite stondip þe seruice of god, whanne þei mowe be doon wipout lett; and not in þe hauyng of þe habitis or of þe vertues aloone, but in as mych as þei inclynen and bryngen þe wil to chese 30 and desire þe deedis, and, folewyngli bi þe wil, þe opire powers into werkis. ffor, as Aristotil seiþ, ri3t as no bodili strong man was rewardid in þe hil olympe in tyme of ioustis and of opire turnementis and maistries for þat he was bodili strong and my3ti to do grete maistries, but ech man þat was 35 þere rewardid was rewardid for þe deedis whiche he dide bi his bodili strengþ; so, seiþ he, no man is rewardid for his

Aristotle is of this opinion.

¹ Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

² After Sone, MS. has a second sone, crossed through in red.

vertues, whiche ben habitis resting in þe wil, but þei ben
rewardid for þe werkis doon into whiche þe vertues and
habitis inclynen, and so for þe habit and his werkis togidere,
and þat for as mych as þe habit makip þe werkis þe bettir.

5 And if þou wolt haue strengir witnessis to þis purpos þan is
þe wnesse of Aristotil, loke þou, my sone, into a sermoun
which y made in latyn to þe clergi, which sermoun bigynnep
þus: 'Montes israel ramos vestros germinetis et fructum
vestrum afferatis',¹ and in þe þridde principal þerof þou
10 schalt haue for þis purpos faire witnessis of hooli scripture.

Further
evidence of its
truth may be
found in a Latin
sermon of
Pecock's.

ffirþirmore þou schalt wite þat in allowable maner of
spekyng þe werkis goyng bifore þe gendryng of a vertu
whiche gendren þe same vertu, and lijk werkis folewyng þe
gendryng of þe same vertu into whiche werkis pilk same
15 vertu inclynep, ben wonyd to be clepid vndir þe same name
vndir which name þe same vertu so gendrid and so inclynyng
is clepid. And so a meek werk, wheþir he go bifore or
comyng aftir þe gendryng of meeknesse, is clepid 'meeknesse',
and is clepid 'a moral vertu', and so a mylde werk is clepid
20 'a moral vertu of myldenesse', and a pacient werk is
37^a clepid 'paciencie' and 'a | moral vertu', and so forþ in lijk
maner of þe werkis of euery moral vertu in þe ie parti of 'þe
donet' namyd and rehercid.

A moral virtu-
ous work is
often called by
the name of the
moral virtue
which engen-
ders it.

lo, sone, now y haue declarid to þee whiche ben moral
25 vertues in propir maner to speke; and how moral vertues
ben gendrid; and how þei han werkis goyng bifore her
gendryng and werkis comyng aftir her gendryng; and how
þat þo werkis goyng bifore and comyng aftir ben clepid
vndir þe same name with þe vertu or habite to which þe
30 werkis longen; and how for þe werkis is oure fynal meede
and reward to be ȝouun. And bi al þis now seid þou maist
knowe, o my sone, how þou schalt feelee and conceyue liztli
and eesili what a moral vice is, which is contrari to moral
vertu. ffor it is a disposicioun or an habite gendrid in þe
35 wil bi werkis azens þe doom of prudence or of feip, and
þerfore bi werkis contrari to þe werkis wherbi moral vertu is
gendrid in þe wil. And pilk viciouse habite inclynep þe wil
into werkis lijk to þe werkis of which he was gendrid, or bi

A moral vice is
the contrary of
a moral virtue,
and a moral
vicious work the
contrary of a
moral virtuous
work.

¹ Ezechiel, xxxvi. 8.

whos occasioun he was gendrid; and in þe werkis of pilk viciose habite stondip þe blame and þe punyschyng; and þo werkis beren in comune speche þe name of þe habite, to be clepid in lijk maner 'a vice' as þe habite is clepid; and so euery moral vertu hap a contrari vice,¹ and euery vertuose 5 werk hap a contrari viciose werk: as to meeknesse pride is contrari, to myldenesse wrap is contrari, to clenness of nuris- chying glotonye is contrari, and so forþ of opire.

xvje chapitre.

(4) The kinds of moral virtues and (5) their names.

These are to be found in the FOUR TABLES of the *Donet*.

[A]S to þi fourþe and fifþe askyngis, special answer is 10 maad bi þe first parti of 'þe donet' schortli, and also answer þerto schal be maad in þe ie parti of 'cristen religioun', þe iije treti, and bi 'þe book of sentence'. Neuerþeles þat þi questions passe not alle here wipout answer, y seie here to hem in general pus: Alle þe fre inward deedis of þe wil, 15 as ben alle fre willyngis and nyllyngis, fre chesyngis and fre refusyngis, and alle oure opire outward deedis comaundid bi þe wil to be doon, as ben oure spekyngis, etyngis, drynkyngis, slepyngis, marchaundisyngis, preiyngis, and so forþ of opire deedis whilis þei ben reulid and gouernyd boþe in hem silf 20 and in here circumstauncis bi prudence in þe doom of resoun or bi feip, and also þe disposicioun and habite gendrid in þe wil bi strengþ or bi occasioun of þe now seid deedis aftir þat þo deedis han be vsid and customyd in haunt, ben moral vertues: as ben meeknesse, myldenesse, sobirnes, chastite, 25 liberalnesse, and so forþ of opire. and of þese moral vertues 37^b ben maad þe iiij tablis of goddis lawe, comprehendyng þe xxxj general vertues or poyntis, of whiche summe ben comaundementis and summe ben counseilis.

The contraries of the moral virtues are the moral vices.

And if þis be trewe, þanne alle þe contraries of þese now 30 seid deedis, þat is to seie, alle þe fre inward deedis of þe wil, as ben alle fre willyngis and nyllyngis, fre chesyngis and fre refusyngis, and alle oure opire outward deedis comaundid bi þe wil to be doon, as ben oure spekyngis, etyngis, drynkyngis, slepyngis, marchaundisyngis, preiyngis, and alle suche opire, 35 if þei be doon, reulid and gouernyd in hem silf or in eny of

¹ See Notes.

her notable circumstauncis aȝens þe precept of prudence, and aȝens þe precept of resoun or of feip, and also þe disposicioun or þe habite gendrid in þe wil bi strengþ or bi occasioun of þe now seid deedis, *after* tyme pat þei haue be vsid and customyd in haunt, ben moral vicis and synnes, for which we ben to be seid badde and yuel y-manerid *and* worpi to be punyschid: as ben pride, wrap, glotonye, lecherie, auarice or conetise, and so forþ of opire. and þei ben contraries to þe seid moral-vertues: as pride is contrari to meeknesse, wrap to þe contrari to myldenesse, and so forþ of opire.¹

ffadir, whi in processis here bifore goyng ȝe seien oft vndir disiunccioun þus: 'bi prudence or bi feip'?

Sone, þe cause is pis: Summe of oure moral deedis and gouernauncis we mowe knowe bi oure natural resoun to be doon, wipout reuelacioun of hem fro god, as ben pese: pat we be sobre, pacient, iust, louyng oure neiȝbor, *and* so of many opire gouernauncis. Summe opire of oure moral deedis and gouernauncis we mowe not knowe to be doon bi oure natural resoun oonli, wipout help of reuelacioun fro god; but pat þei ben to be doon of vs we knowen for pat it is reuelid *and* tellid to vs fro god pat þo deedis *and* gouernauncis ben to be doon: as ben baptizyng and eukarising or hoselyng. And euen as prudence in þe doom of resoun schewip, directip, ledip *and* reulip into moral deedis *and* gouernauncis of þe first now seid soort, so feip in doom of resoun muste needis schewe, directe, lede *and* reule vs into þe moral gouernauncis of þe ije now seid soort. So pat as prudence is þe iȝe, þe leder and directer to *and* into þe wil anentis oure moral gouernauncis takable *without* certifiyng maad to vs from god aboue kynd, so feip is þe iȝe, þe leder and directer to oure wil into and anentis oure moral gouernauncis whiche we schulden not be movid to kepe and fulfille saue for certifiyng which god makip | aboue kynd and aboue oure natural resoun to vs perof. and perfore, sone, not al in veyn y haue seid so oft bifore vndir disiunccioun þus: 'bi prudence in oure resoun or bi feip in oure resoun'.

ffadir, siþen it is so pat þe wil in his inward and outward wirchyngis muste conforme him to þe doom of resoun, if

Why a distinction is made between Prudence in doom of Reason and Faith in doom of Reason. Some moral deeds are known by Reason to be necessary, without their necessity being revealed by God: these are directed by Prudence.

Others are not known by Reason to be necessary, save by revelation: these are directed by Faith.

What is meant by this DOOM OF REASON to which

¹ See Notes.

Will must conform?

The DOOM OF REASON must be sufficiently proved or weighed, otherwise the deed of the Will is not moral.

The various kinds of IGNORANCE leading to a doom of Reason insufficiently weighed, and therefore to a deed of the Will not morally virtuous.

þe wil schulde wirche wel and riȝtli as ȝe han now tauȝte, þis wolde be largeli and sadli seid : which is pilk doom of resoun to whom wil ouȝte so him conforme ?

Sone, pou seist soop. þerfore into more special certifying þervpon þan is ȝit made, y seie ferþir þus : þe doom of 5 resoun muste be sufficientli had ; fforwhi what euer principil or cause of moralte is not sufficientli had, þe effect which comþ fro and bi him, and needis requyriþ him, muste be vnsufficient in moralte, and what effect is insufficientli brouȝt forþ into moralte is not moral. Wherefore, sipeþ þe doom of 10 resoun is oon of þe principal groundis and causis of moralte, and wiþout which a deede of þe wil may not be moral, as is schewid wel bifore, it muste needis be þat if þe doom of resoun be insufficient, þe deede of þe wil is not sufficientli moral.

And þanne ferþir þus : for as mych as doom of resoun 15 is not sufficientli had but if he be avisose and be had in deliberacioun and in sufficient avisement and be not ouer hasti, And also but if he be cleene fro ignoraunce of riȝt doom, and also cleene fro errour contrari to riȝt doom which schulde in þe mater be had ; þerfore deede of þe wil folewyng 20 ouer hasti doom of resoun is not morali vertuose neipir morali good, pouȝ þe deede of þe wil falle as it wolde falle if þe doom of resoun hadde be sufficientli avisose ; Also mych rapir þerfore neipir deede of þe wil doon in ignoraunce had in þe resoun þat þe deede is doon or þat it is not doon, which 25 ignoraunce is callid 'ignorancia facti', is morali vertuose or morali good, pouȝ þe deede of þe wil falle as it ouȝte haue falle bi avisose doom of resoun, and with wityng þat þe deede of þe wil were doon ; Neipir deede of þe wil doon in ignoraunce had in þe resoun, which is lack of riȝt knowyng 30 which schulde be in þe resoun, and is callid 'ignorancia negacionis' and 'ignorancia negatiua iuris', or doon in ignoraunce which is errour, contrari to riȝt kunnyng which schulde be in þe resoun, and is callid 'ignorancia dispositionis' and 'ignorancia erronea iuris', is morali vertuose 35 or morali good.¹ þese folewyngis or argumentis ben openli sure ynouȝ. þus mych, sone, as in general for þe resons side and his doom.

¹ See Notes.

As for þe willis side, certis, his choice of þe deede which
 38^b he schal chese and do *with*inforþ in | him silf, or comaunde
 to be doon in *opire* powers of þe soul or of þe bodi wipinforþ
 or wipoutforþ, muste be fre fro sum certeyn maner of
 5 constreynnyng heraftir in þe *xxij^e* and *xxii^e* chapitris to be seid.
 And if forto make his choice þe wil be constreynyd in sum
 certeyn maner heraftir in þe *xxij^e* and *xxii^e* chapitris to be
 seid, pilk constreynnyng muste be in preferringg þe more good
 to be take or doon bifore þe lasse good to be take or doon, or
 10 in preferringg þe lasse yuel to be avoidid or scapid bifore þe
 more yuel which ellis schulde not be avoidid or ascapid; and
 ellis þe folewyng of pilk constreynnyng is not vertuose.

Redili, sone, in þis processe loke þat þou resolute and
 reduce into þis ground al what þou hast forto iuge forto haue
 15 moral goodnes or forto lacke moral goodnesse. And be þou
 not about forto iuge, declare *and* teche a deede of þe wil
 doon in ignoraunce or doon in constreynnyng forto be not
 vertuose as for þat it is not voluntari or wilful, or for þat he
 hap not y-nouȝ of voluntari or of wil, as þe comoun scole in
 20 moral filosofie hap be in my dayes; for, certis, sumwhat bi
 what is now here bifore goyng, and sumwhat bi what schal
 be seid aftir in þe *xxv^e* chapitre of þis present i^e parti, pilk
 holdyng and sentence may be inprouyd. ffor how euer fers
 and strong þe wil may be forto chese a deede whanne þe
 25 resoun is wipout ignoraunce, lijk feers þe wil may be forto
 chese and wille þe same deede whanne þe resoun stondip
 in ignoraunce, and þat whepir pilk ignoraunce be ignoraunce
 callid 'ignorancia negacionis,' þat is to seie, nakid lack of
 trewe knowyng, or whepir pilk ignoraunce be 'ignorancia
 30 dispositionis,' which is errour contrari to knowyng of þe
 treup.¹ And perfore forto seie a deede of þe wil doon in eny
 such ignoraunce to be not voluntari,² and þat for as for þis
 þat he is doon in ignoraunce or bi ignoraunce,³ is not wel
 seid. Also lijk fersli þe wil of a man constreynyd bi greet
 35 peyn chesip *and* willip a deede for þe tyme of his constreynnyng,
 how fersli he willip an *opir* deede out of pilk constreynnyng
 which is vertuose, ȝhe, and more fersli. Wherefore forto seie
 þat þis deede of þe wil doon in constreynnyng is no vertuose

If constraint is
 put upon the
 Will, the deed
 of the Will is
 not morally
 virtuous, unless
 the constraint
 be simply the
 necessity of
 choosing the
 greater good, or
 escaping the
 greater evil.

It is not correct
 to say that a
 deed of the Will,
 done in or
 through ignor-
 ance or under
 constraint, is
 not virtuous
 because it is not
 voluntary. It is
 voluntary; but
 it is not virtuous
 because of the
 insufficiency of
 the doom of
 Reason prompt-
 ing it.

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

³ See Notes.

deede, and þat for þis þat he is not voluntari, or for þat he
 haþ not y-nouȝ of volunte, is not best to be seid. þerfore, o
 my sone, þese deedis to be not morali vertuose whanne þei
 ben not morali vertuose, reduce þou into a lack and a default
 had in þe resoun, bi þe instruccioun now | here bifore ȝouun 39^a
 to pee, and not into a lack or default had in þe wil, þouȝ þe
 comoun moral scole haþ be vsid in opir wise.

The relation
 between Reason
 and Will. Doom
 of Reason settles
 the circum-
 stances of the
 moral virtuous
 deed of the Will
 as well as the
 actual deed it-
 self.

Now ferþir, sone, forto procede into what y haue bigunne
 forto lede forþ þee of resons doom and of þe willis
 choice. Certis, whanne resoun is sufficientli avisid forto 10
 deme in doable mater, and is cleene from ignoraunce and
 from errour, and whanne *perwith* þe wil is redi and applied
 to folewe þe doom of resoun, forsoþe, þanne whanne a deede
 is needis to be doon, or at þe leest worpi to be doon, such
 a couplyng is bitwixe þe resoun and þe wil. þe resoun 15
 bigynneþ þus: he ȝeueþ notice, doom and knowyng þat þilk
 deede is needis to be doon, or is worpi and allowable to be
 doon, as þe mater askip. but ȝit þis is not y-nouȝ to þe wil
 forto chese it and wirche it wipout more notice or knowyng.
 þerfore resoun castip herto doom and notice þat þilk deede 20
 schulde be doon vpon not ech kynd of mater whervpon he
 myȝte in deede be doon, but vpon certeyn mater or certeyn
 obiect. And ȝit þis is not y-nouȝ to þe wil wipout more
 schewyng maad to him forto chese and wirche. but þe wil
 muste abide what resoun wole deeme vnder what circum- 25
 stauncis þilk deede schal be doon vpon or about þe seid mater
 or obiect: as into what eend, siþen it were foul and vnsemeli
 a resonable creature forto do his werkis into noon prefixid
 and bifore markid purpos and eend. And siþen noon eend
 a þis side þe vttrist eend moueþ sufficientli, and as resoun 30
 wole þat it move, but in strengþ of þe vttrist eend, which
 is principal eend, and eend of alle opire eendis beyng meenys
 toward him, and þis eend is god, or þe hauyng of him bi þe
 bifore seid natural maner, or ellis bi þe bifore seid blisful
 maner; þerfore resoun schewip þat þis eend ouȝte be entendid 35
 in doying þe seid deede, and þat god, þe maker of al, be
 plesid and his ordinaunce þerin be *perfoormyd*. Also þe wil
 muste abide þe doom of resoun in what place, in what tyme,
 in what maner, bifore what *persoones*, bi what meenes or

helpis, pilk deede schal be doon. And perfore resoun enditip
and openep to þe wil or bifore þe wil þat pilk deede schal be
doon in such place, and not in what euer place a man may
wole, and in such certeyn tyme and in such maner oonli,
5 and bifore suche persoones, and with suche helpis oonli, and
ellis not; and so forþ of opire mo iugementis longyng forto
falle vpon circumstauncis. Also pis doom of resoun ouzte be
39^b doon bi advise|ment; and þanne, aftir pese iugementis of
avidid resoun makyng oon hool ful avidid iugement to þe
10 purpos, þe wil may procede vertuoseli in chesyng or refusyng
and comaunding into executioun answeyngli to þis hool
iugement of resoun maad bi prudence or maad bi feip, or
ellis in parti maad bi prudence and in parti maad bi feip.

If pou wolt se þis same seid to þee more speciali, lo þus:
15 A man hap neede forto ete and drynke whanne he felip his
bodi to feynt for long absteynyng þerfro; but ȝit eer he schal
vertuoseli chese wipinforþ forto ete and drynke and execute
pilk chesyng into wipout forþ, he muste abide vnto tyme
resoun iuge þat þe deede of eetyng and lijk wise of drynkyng
20 is to be chosen and doon. and ȝit ferþir, for as mych as a
man as bi þis iugement myzte ete dritt or venym or erpe,
resoun muste be abiden vnto he iuge þat breed and fleisch and
fisch and suche opire bifore knowun holsom meetis ouzten be
eete; and in þis þe resoun ȝeueþ iugement vpon what mater
25 or obiect þe deede schal passe. And ȝit for as mych as a man
myzte eete þo meetis into opir eend and purpos þan into his
helpe and strengþ, and into opir purpos and eend þan forto
þerbi be strong to serue god in his lawe kepyng, and forto
come into his fynal rest and last perfeccioun and eend;
30 perfore resoun in his demyng settip to þat þe wil chese þis
etyng into þe now seid eend. Also þe wil with al þis myzte
chese to eete at mydnyȝt, or while þe hiȝ masse in an haliday
were a doying, Also in þe strete or vpon a donghepe, also
teryng his mete with his hondis wipout knyf, and deuouryng
35 without chewyng bi his teep, as sum beest deuourip his mete
wipout chewyng, And also he myzte eete among swyne and
opire beestis, and þanne wil dide not pilk deede of eetyng
vertuoseli. perfore resoun demep ferþir with what is now
demyd bifore, þat þis deede of eetyng be doon in such tyme

An example of
the circum-
stances of a
moral virtuous
deed.

as is wonyd be callid 'mele tyme', and in such place as is in halle, parlour or chambre at a meet table, and with þese helpyngis as ben a knyf and his teep, and with þis felawship as ben of men kynd; and so forþ of opire circumstauncis whanne and if doom of resoun iugip þat þei ben requyrid to 5 be had, and þanne þe wil hap sufficientli wherbi he may morali vertuoseli do þe seid deede of eetyng.

If the deed is done in wrong circumstances, it is a moral vicious deed.

If the deed is done without sufficient knowledge of the right, it is not a moral virtuous deed.

If the deed is done unwittingly or without consulting Reason, it is not a moral virtuous deed.

The 'circumstances' of a deed are its purpose, time, place, &c.

And if aȝens eny of þese doomes þe deede be doon, þe deede is morali vicioseli doon; 3he, and if wipout eche of þese doomes þe deede be doon, | he lackip of his moral vertuosenes. 40^a And so, ferþirmore, if a man schal wirche vertuoseli, he muste haue þe kunnyng of þis which y haue now last rehercid, which kunnyng is kunnyng of lawe or of rȳt, þat is to seie, kunnyng wherbi þe man knowip what is lawe, what is rȳt, to be vertuose. And also he muste haue a 15 kunnyng or a knowyng of deede, þat is to seie, he muste wite wheþir he do eny deede or no; and if he doop he muste knowe what he doop, which is þe deede which he chesip to do or to forbere wipinforþ or wipoutforþ. Also, for as mych as it is seid þat he muste so chese bi doom of prudence or of feip in 20 resoun, perfore he muste do it avisedli bi deliberacioun, and not to do it as if a man dide a deede in his sleep or in opir maner, not wityng þat he eny þing doop, or what he doop.

ffadir, whiche ben callid 'circumstauncis' of a deede?

Sone, þese þei ben: þe eend or purpos for which þe deede 25 is doon is oon and þe principal circumstaunce of pilk deede; þe maner of doying pilk deede is an opir circumstaunce of þe same deede; þe tyme and þe place in which þe deede is doon, þe meenys and helpis and þe instrumentis bi whiche þe deede is doon, and þe persoones anentis whom þe deede is doon, 30 and þe maner of þe persoon doying, and summe opire mo ben circumstauncis of þe deede. and alle þese muste accordyngli to þe doom of prudence in resoun or of feip in resoun stonde about þe deede whilis it is in doying, if and whanne resoun wole haue hem forto about þe same deede stonde. Whi ben 35 þei callid 'circumstauncis'? for þei ben not of þe deedis substaunce or of þe deedis beyng, but þei about stonden þe deede, and þe deede may be and stonde vnchaungid in him silf, þouȝ þei be away,¹ or þouȝ þei be chaungid in hem silf.

¹ MS. *a wey*.

ffadir, now late sumwhat bifore 3e made mensioun of a disposicioun and of an habite gendrid in oure wil bi strengþ, or at þe leest bi occasioun, of deedis had bifore in vsage and haunt. seie 3e sumwhat more þerupon what meenen 3e bi
 5 þilk disposicioun and habite, þat 3oure conceit *and* entent be þe bettir knowen, for þis mater is sumwhat straunge and vnwonyd to be talkid.

A disposition or habit engendered in the Will is an inclination of the Will to perform moral virtuous deeds, which inclination is produced through the performance of similar deeds.

Sone, þe course of kynde is þis : þat if a man vse him silf oft in deedis of meeknesse or of eny opir vertu or of eny vice, þer
 10 schal be gendrid in his wil a disposicioun inclynnyng þe wil forto do likyngli and plesauntli lijk deedis of vertu or of vice, |
 10^b bi whos vsage þilk disposicioun was gendrid; and so strong þis disposicioun may be maad in þe wil bi long vsage in þe seid deedis þat þilk disposicioun may not lyztli be left and
 15 be putt away; ¹ and þanne whanne it is so firme and stable, it is clepid an 'habite'; and þe strengir it be and þe more stablid in þe wil, þe stronglier it inclyneth *and* stireþ þe wil forto vse and haunte suche werkis of whiche it was gendrid, so fer forþ þat, bi strengþ of þilk disposicioun or habite, þe
 20 man schal wirche *and* suffre likyngli and plesauntli þo werkis or deedis whiche wolde ellis be ful hard and lopesum to be wrouzt or suffrid, ne were þe seid disposicioun or habite bi vsage of deedis y-gendrid. And þis disposicioun
 and habite ben clepid vndir þe same name of 'vertu' or
 25 of 'vice' vndir which name of 'vertu' or of 'vice' þe deedis ben clepid bi whos vsage it is gendrid; as þe disposicioun or habite gendrid bi vse of meeke deedis is clepid 'vertu of meeknesse', þe disposicioun or habite gendrid bi vse of proude deedis is clepid 'pride,' þe disposicioun or habite
 30 gendrid bi mylde deedis is clepid 'myldenesse', and þe disposicioun or habite gendrid bi vse of chaast deedis is clepid 'chastite', þe disposicioun or habite gendrid bi vse of leccherose deedis is clepid 'lecherie', and so forþ of opire. and þus mych, sone, as for þilk disposicioun and habite.

The disposition or habit is a moral virtue, named after the moral virtuous deeds through the performance of which it was engendered.

35 ffadir, if 3oure now maad answer be trewe and sufficient to my iiije and ve askyngis, þerof folewith þat no deede of doying or of suffryng or of forberyng is a seruice to god or a poynt of his lawe, but if it be a moral vertu and a moral vertuose deede hauyng alle þe condicions and propirtees

Hence no deed is a service to God unless it is a moral virtuous deed with all its properties and circumstances.

¹ MS. *a wey*.

requyrid to a moral vertu aftir þe maner of doctrine bifore sett in þis present i^e parti, in þe [xvj]¹ chapitre. And so ech deede of vs doon without sufficient avisement and doom of oure resoun, and ech deede doon of vs wipout entent forto þerbi come to oure last eend, which is god, is no moral vertu, 5 neiþir a seruice to god of his lawe.

Sone, at þis y graunte, wherof more openyng schal be maad aftir in þe [xxj]¹ chapitre.

xvij^e chapitre.²

Is it true that every moral virtue, when carried too far or not far enough, is a moral vice?

[F] Adir, y haue herde seie bifore þis tyme þat ech moral 10 vertu sittip in þe myddis bitwixe ij moral vicis, of which oon vice is in þe ouer habundaunt side, and þe opir is in þe failyng side, from þe brede or þe poynt which resoun demep þe deede to be doon; as þus: vertuose eting stondip in such a certeyn brede or lengþe of a quantite | in etyng þat aftir þe 41^a doom of resoun forto so mych ete is vertuose, and þerfore to ete more þan in þilk brede of quantite is viciouse, and forto ete lasse þan in þilk brede or lengþe of quantite is also viciouse, bi cause þat euer eipir of pese ij etyngis is azens þe doom of resoun. And in lijk wise vertuose spekyng is so bi 20 doom of resoun in such a myddis of spekyng in a certeyn lengþe or brede of spekyng, þat in þe oon side is þe vice of ouer mych spekyng, and in þe opir side is þe vice of ouer litil spekyng, bi cause þat þe oon is more þan resoun demep, and þe opir is lasse þan resoun demep to be doon. Neuerþeles, 25 wheþir it is so of ech opir moral vertu or no, fadir, y desire þat ȝe seie ȝoure good and wise avise.

This is true of some moral virtues, but not of all.

Sone, þat it is mych and oft so as þou hast now rehercid, y graunte wel. but, certis, it is not so alwey of ech moral vertu; forwhi where euer and whidir euer and how euer þe 30 doom of resoun fallip vpon a deede to be doon or to be left vndoon about a mater or obiect, þere, þidir and so moral vertuosite of þe same deede, for þat it is folewyng þe doom of resoun to be doon, fallip vpon þe same deede about þe same mater or obiect, wheþir þe deede be hiz or lowe, mych or litil, 35 about his mater or obiect, or ellis wheþir þe deede be ouȝt or

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

² See Notes.

nouȝt about his mater or obiet. And perfore, sone, pou schalt vndirstonde þat sum vertuose deede is to be doon bi doom of resoun vpon a mater or an obiet as it is diuisible, as eting, drynkyng, spekyng, pleiung, and so forþ of many opire. and
 5 ech such vertuose deede haþ ij vicis, oon fallyng in þe oon side vpon ouer mych of þe mater, an opir fallyng in þe opir side vpon ouer litil of þe mater, saue whanne þe doom of resoun demeþ þe deede to falle vpon þe mater in his hizest poynt or degre, or vpon his lowist poynt or degre; as if it
 10 were in sum caace seen to resoun þat pou ouȝtist sette þee no lower þan in þe roof of an house forto defende þee fro greete flodis; and if in sum opir caace resoun schulde deme þat pou ouȝtist not sette þee in hizer þan in þe lowist pament of þe house, and þat forto defende þee azens greet heete of þe
 15 sonne. sum vertuose deede is to be doon bi doom of resoun vpon his mater or obiet, not as it is diuisible, but as it is to himward hool and vndepartable or vndiuisible; as is þis vertu to loue god, to loue a man. And, pouȝ such vertu may not haue ij vicis about him, oon in þe oon side and an opir in þe
 20 41^b opir | side, as bi takyng more of þe mater or of þe obiet þan resoun demeþ to be takun, and bi taking lasse of þe mater or of þe obiet þan resoun demeþ to be taken; ȝit such a vertu may haue ij vicis, oon in þe oon side falling in ouer mych or ouer hiz degre more þan resoun demeþ vpon þe
 25 same indiuisable mater or obiet, an opir in ouer litil or ouer lowȝ degre vpon þe same indiuisable mater and obiet, except if it be so þat þe doom of resoun deme þe vertu to be doon in hizest degre doable vpon þe same obiet.

Ensample herof is þis: siþen resoun demeþ þat y ouȝte
 30 loue my neiȝbor, and not in hizest degre of loue, perfore my vertuose louyng with which y loue him may haue in þe oon side me to ouermych loue my neiȝbor, and in þe opir side me to ouer litil loue þe same neiȝbor. but, certis, bi cause resoun demeþ þat y ouȝte loue god in hizest degre of loue, for
 35 with al myn hert, soul and strengþ, perfore þis loue with which y ouȝte loue god haþ not a vice in þe encrecyng side with which loue y myȝte loue god in hizer degre of loue þan y-nouȝ, or þan resoun demeþ to be doon. But my vertuose loue toward god may haue a vice in þe fallyng side with which

When the matter of a moral virtuous deed is divisible, e. g. eating, speaking, &c., then when carried too far, or not far enough, the moral virtuous deed becomes a moral vicious deed; unless Reason demands the deed to be performed in its highest or lowest degree.

When the matter of a moral virtuous deed is indivisible, e. g. loving God or loving our neighbour, then the performance of the moral virtuous deed to a higher or lower degree than demanded is morally vicious; unless Reason demands the deed to be done in the highest degree.

Examples.

y may loue him lasse þan y-nouȝ, þat is to seie, lasse þan resoun demep þat y schulde loue him.

When a moral virtuous deed consists in forsaking any matter, as, e. g., in the case of chastity, it becomes vicious if more or less of any of its circumstances is taken than Reason demands.

fferþir more, sum vertuose deede biholdiþ bi doom of resoun a mater or an obiet not forto vse it, but forto leue it, and to forsake it vttilri; as is þe deede of chastite, or þe forsaking 5 of al glori and of al worschip and of al hiȝ beryng of a man toward eny opir man. and, certis, such vertu hap not in þe fallýng side of his mater eny vice, forwli no man may more forsake eny mater or obiet þan forsake it vttilri. Neuerþeles, ech maner vertu now in þis processe spokun of, þat is to seie, 10 in alle þe pre maners now bifore seid, may in þe oon side of him haue a vice takýng more of sum circumstaunce þan resoun demep to be takun, and may in þe opir side of him haue an opir vice takýng lasse of sum circumstaunce þan reson demep to be takun; fforwli þouȝ no deede of chastite 15 may take lasse of fleischli comunýng þan resoun demep to be takun in þilk chastite which is vertu, ȝit of sum circumstaunce longýng to vertuose chastite, sum chastite may take lasse þan resoun demep to be takun, and sum chastite may take more of þe same circumstaunce longýng to vertuose chastite þan 20 reson demep to be takun; as þat sum persoon is ouermych entirmetýng with þe occasions whiche wolen lede fro chastite, and so of summe opire circumstauncis; or ouer mych fleep | þe occasions ledýng sumwhat froward chastite, as if 42^a he wolde neuyr se eny woman neþir here speke of eny 25 woman; and so forþ of opire suche.

This is true also of moral virtuous deeds whose matter is indivisible.

And also, þouȝ no deede of loue to god may take hiȝer degre þan vertuose loue to god takip, ȝit in þe oon side a loue to god may of sum circumstaunce longýng to þe loue of god take more þan resoun demep to be taken; and in þe opir 30 side a loue to god may of sum circumstaunce longýng to þe loue of god take lasse þan reson demep to be takun; as þouȝ y loue god aboue¹ al þing, and with al myn hert, ȝit y may loue him with ouer mych and ouer long tyme þinkyng vpon him or spekyng of him or heeryng of him; and in þe opir 35 side y may loue him aboue al þing, and þerwith ouer litil þenkyng and ouer litil spekyng and heeryng bisette about him, or of his loue þe contynuyng. And in lijk wise it

And of moral virtuous deeds

¹ MS. a boue.

myzte be ensamplid in þe opire vertues bifore spokun of in þe first soort, whiche fallen vpon a mater diuisible; þat is to seie, þei mowe haue vicis in þe oon side bi reryng þo vicis into ouer hiȝ degree of feruour, or ouer hiȝli takyng sum
 5 circumstaunce longyng to þe verri vertu; and in þe opir side þei mowe haue vicis bi ouer lowe settyng þo vicis in degree of feruour, or takyng ouer litil or ouer lowe sum circumstaunce longyng to þe vertuose deede bi doom of resoun; and al þis may be, bisidis þe opir first before seid taking of vicis in þe
 10 oon side and in þe opir side of þe same now seid maners of vertues.

whose matter is
 diuisible.

lo, sone, pouȝ bi þis what y haue seid in þis present chapitre forto answeze to þi movid dout be trewe, ȝit þis also is *perwith* trewe: þat it is litil nede to aske þe questioun
 15 and dout which bifore in þis present chapitre pou haste askid, and litil neede it is forto wite and knowe al þis what y haue now tauȝt and seid in þis present chapitre about þe answer to þi questioun, siþen þis is trew and prouyd in þis present book þat, how euer resoun demep a deede of oure wilful
 20 conuersacioun to be doon, so pilk deede is a moral vertu; and þat whepir resoun demep mych or litil, hiȝ or lowe, with þis circumstaunce or pilk circumstaunce, to be takun or left of þe mater or þe obiect of þe same deede. Neuerpeles, who so kanne not holde him content with þe doctrine which is
 25 y-nouȝ to neede, lete him take what is tauȝt in þis present chapitre more þan is y-nouȝ to nede, pouȝ it be not more þan y-nouȝ to treup.

The matter of
 this chapter is
 not really neces-
 sary, since its
 truths have al-
 ready been
 covered by the
 statement that a
 deed is morally
 virtuous if
 performed as
 Reason deems it
 should be.

xvii^e chapitre.¹

[F]Adir, it semep þat mo þingis ben moral vertues and
 2^b moral vicis þan oonli þo þingis whiche ȝe han assignyd in ȝoure processe now last seid to be moral vertues and moral vicis; fforwhi we feelen wel þat in oure wil ben loues, hates, desiris, dredis, angris, schames, sorewes, rouþis, ioies, gladnessis; and of eche of þese now rehercid kyndis summe
 3^b ben goode and summe ben badde; as loue toward þe þing which resoun demep to be louyd is good, and þe loue toward

Should not love,
 hate, anger,
 dread, &c., be
 considered
 moral virtues or
 moral vices, ac-
 cording as they
 obey or disobey
 the doom of
 Reason?

¹ See Notes.

þe þing which resoun demep to not be louyd is yuel; *sum* angir is good, as angir anentis defautis, and *sum* is badde, as angir to þingis not viciose; and in lijk maner *sum* hate is good, and *sum* hate is badde, *sum* desijr is good, and *sum* desijr is badde, and so of þe opire now rehercid kyndis. 5
 Wherfore it wolde seme þat þo of hem whiche ben goode ben to be seid moral vertues, and þo of hem whiche ben badde ben to be seid moral viciis; fforwhi, siþen summe of þo ben goode and summe badde, and for hem and bi hem men ben callid and namyd to be 'goode' and 'badde' in maners, 10 as is to seie, wel y-manerid men and yuel y-manerid men, y wote not what y schulde make of hem bi þoure owen bifore goyng declaracioun and discryuyng of moral vertues, but if y schulde call hem 'moral vertues' and 'moral viciis'.

These are not actions or works of the Will, but Passions or sufferings of the Will.

Sone, pese þingis whiche þou hast now rehercid to be in 15 oure wil, þat is to seie, delectacioun and dolour folewyng vpon þe siȝt and heeryng in oure vndirstonding or resoun, and as ben loue, hate, desijr, drede, ben not accions or wirchyng deedis of þe wil, but þei ben passions, þat is to seie, suffryngis of þe wil, for bi hem þe wil suffriþ oonli and 20 not doop; as bi loue in þe wil we ben born and movid toward a þing now beyng or present, knowen or trowid to be accordyng to vs; bi hate in þe wil we ben born and movid fromward a þing now beyng or present, knowen or trowid to be discordyng to vs. And þerfore loue and hate ben passions 25 and suffryngis in oure wil, and not actijf or wirching deedis of oure wil, so þat þe wil bi hem suffriþ and not doop. And in lijk maner it is of desijr and drede in reward of þingis to come, knowen or trowid to be accordyng or not accordyng to vs. Also angir is not ellis þan a lust or affeccioun or an 30 appetit of punyschyng to be ȝouun for trespase; and siþen þis lust, appetit, or affeccioun may ful alowabili be in þe lowȝ sensual appetit and also in þe wil, folewiþ þat angir, which is a passioun, may wipout reproof be in þe lowȝ sensual appetit and also aboue ¹ in þe | wil.

43^a

Passions are engendered in the Will through the lower appetites, with-

But, sone, ferþir it is to be vndirstonde þus: þat pese passions mow be in oure wil wipout al fre avisid bisnesse of vs in oure resoun forto gendre hem in þe wil, and wipout al

¹ MS. a boue.

fre avised bisnesse of vs in oure wil forto gendre hem þere ;
 but þei ben in oure wil at tyme wheþir we willen or nyllen
 avisedli ; and þouȝ we wolde neuer so fayne avisedli, we
 kunne not putte hem away anon whanne þei ben had ;
 5 neþir we mowe anon at oure willyng haue hem if þei ben
 away vnhad. and þanne þei ben to vs, as it were, natural
 passions gendrid in oure wil bi occasions of certeyn natural
 disposicions and passions in oure louȝer sensitif appetitis,
 and bi oure natural complexioun in þe hool bodi or in sum
 10 principal parti of oure bodi, and þat for as mych as þat þer
 is an affynyte and neȝborehode and a knyting togidere of
 oure soul to þe bodi. And þerfore þe doom of resoun is
 derkid ful oft hastili and, as it were, vnschapli bi passions
 of þe louȝer wittis ; and bi þis vnschapable peruertid doom in
 15 resoun ben gendrid needisli in þe wil passions lijk to þe
 passions whiche ben in þe louȝer appetitis. and þese pas-
 sions, for þat þei ben natural and not getun to vs bi long fre
 bisnesse and labour of oure vndirstondyng and of oure wil
 togidere, but ben gendrid bi opire natural causis þan is oure
 20 resoun and fre wil, ben neþir moral vertues neþir moral
 vices, neþir for þe hauyng of eny of hem we ben worpi to be
 preisid or worpi to be blamyd, or worpi to be seid wel
 manerid or yuel manerid, or worpi to be rewardid or worpi
 to be punyschid ; neþir for þe lack of eny of hem we ben
 25 worpi to be preisid or blamyd, or worpi to be seid wel
 manerid or yuel manerid, or worpi to be rewardid or pun-
 yschid ; fforwhi for þingis whiche ben not in oure power to
 haue or not haue, we mowe not afir eny resoun be preisable
 or dispreisable, rewardable or punyschable, good or badde
 30 morali, and þerfore not to be seid wel manerid or yuel
 manerid. And suche þingis ben alle þo þingis whiche ben
 to vs natural and kyndeli, as if a man be born into a febilnesse
 of bodi or into a febilnesse of siȝt or of heeryng, what is he
 þerfore witable morali ? and if a man be born into strengþ of
 35 bodi or into quyk siȝt and cleer heeryng, what is he þerfore
 preisable morali ? and so lijk doom is in alle þingis whiche
 36 we han bi kynde, þat is to seie, naturali. and in | lijk
 maner it is to be seid of passions whiche ben in eche of
 þe appetitis of oure outward and inward sensitif wittis, as

out the assist-
 ance of Reason
 and Free Will.

Hence these
 Passions are not
 moral virtues or
 moral vices.

ben delectacioun and dolour, and whiche ben in oure bodili hert, as ben gladnesse and sorynesse, loue and hate, desijr, angir and drede.

Though the Passions are not moral virtues or moral vices, the Will acts morally virtuously in directing their use or disuse according to the doom of Reason or Faith.

For some of these Passions strengthen our bodily nature, while others are harmful to it.

A Passion in a certain degree may strengthen; in another degree it may harm.

The Passions are like meat and drink, or like poison; like a staff helping, or like fetters hindering. And the use or disuse of the Passions as directed by the Will may be morally virtuous or vicious.

Neuerpeles, pouȝ þe seid natural passions ben not in hem silf neiȝir good neiȝir yuel morali, and perfore ben not moral⁵ vertues or moral viciis, ȝit about hem as forto refreyne hem whanne þei mouen aȝens doom of resoun or of feiȝ, and as forto cherische hem whanne þei mouen answeyngli to þe doom of resoun or of feiȝ, is a morali good bisnesse ful greet in þe wil, with bisnesse þerto sett in þe vndirstondyng.¹⁰ But ȝit for pleyner vndirstondyng of it what is now seid, pou schalt wite, o my sone, þat summe of þese seid passions ben comfortyng and strengþing oure bodili kynde, and summe hurten and feblen oure nature and bodili kynde, as vpon euer eipir of þese seid parties we han surist experience, and¹⁵ philesofris expresseli þervpon techen þe causis. and of hem þat conforten oure bodili kynd it is oft trewe þat in sum quantite and mesure or haunt or contynuaunce takun, þei conforten, and in sum opir mesure and quantite, haunt and contynuaunce, þei discomforten oure bodili kynd. fferþir-²⁰ more, eche of þo seid passions had helpiȝ and forþerip us, namelich at sum while into deedis of moral vertu to be gendrid, and eche of þo passions in sum maner had and kept lettip vs þerfro, as also vpon euer eipir parti now seid we haue oft experience. Wherefore bi good resoun þo passions²⁵ whiche conforten oure kynd mowe be liknyd to mete and drynk, and þo passions whiche hurten oure kynde mowe be liknyd to venym and poysoun. Also þo passions as þei helpen and forþeren vs into doying of moral vertu mowe be liknyd to a staf helpyng vs to iourneie, and þo passions as³⁰ þei letten vs from wirchyng of moral vertu mowe be liknyd to fetris or gyues. Wherefore folewith ferþir þat euen as pouȝ it be so þat mete and drynk, venym and poysoun, ben neiȝir moral vertues neiȝir moral viciis, ȝit about hem and vpon hem, as about and vpon his mater about and vpon which he³⁵ ouȝte wirche as for his obiect, is a certeyn spice of þe moral vertu of clenness, takyng and vsyng metis and drynkis in mesure and maner in which þei conforten kynd, and refusyng and forsakyng venym and poysoun vtirli, and | mete and⁴⁴

drynk in þe maner and mesure in which þei peyren kynd,
whanne þe man may and kanne so take and refuse, and
whanne he may not or kanne not so take and refuse fallip
þervpon þe moral vertu of pacience; so it is in þis purpos
5 þat þouȝ passions of þe first seid dyuersite ben neipir moral
vertues neipir vicis, ȝit if and whanne a man wole *and* is sett
forto counforte his bodili nature and kynd bi passions about
hem and vpon hem, as vpon his obiect and mater wherabout
and vpon which he ouȝte be and wirche, is a spice of þe
10 moral vertu of clenness in takyng þo passions whiche ben
confortyng as fleischli goodis, and in refusyng vtirli or in
parti þo passions whiche ben hurtyng as fleischli yuelis, aftir
þat it lijþ more or lasse in þe mannys power; And if it lijþ
not in þe mannys power forto so leie a side vtirli, or so
15 abate þe causis vpon whom hangen þo passions, þanne to þe
vertu of pacience it longip to take þe greuance a worþ.
And bi lijķ skile whanne a man wole and is sett forto vse
passions into þe opir now seid fruyt *and* profijt, folewith
ferþir þat, euen as þouȝ it be so þat a staf and a schakil ben
20 neipir moral vertues neipir moral vicis, and ȝit about and
vpon hem as about and vpon his obiect or mater about and
vpon which he haþ to passe and be, is a spice of þe vertu of
honeste, in þe staf takyng and in þe schakil a side þrowyng
whanne he wole iourneye, if he may so þe staf chese and þe
25 schakil forsake; and if he may not hem so chese and forsake,
þat he make forþ his iourney wipout staf and wip schakil
bi þe vertu of douȝtinesse or of goostli strengþ; so in þis
purpos þouȝ passions, in þat þat þei, as takun in þe secund
dyuersite bifore seid, ben neipir moral vertues neipir moral
30 vicis, ȝit about and vpon hem as about his obiectis or maters
about and vpon whiche he ouȝte passe and be, is a spice of
þe moral vertu of honeste in hem fauoryng and suffryng to
be and move as worldli goodis, whilis and as þei moven not
agens resoun, but *with* resoun; or in hem refusyng vtirli or
35 abatyng as worldli yuelis, if and whilis and as þei moven
agens þe doom of resoun, if for þe while it be in þe mannys
power forto refuse and leie a side vtirli or abate mych þe
causis whervpon hangen and abiden þo passions so lettyng;
And if it lijþ not in his power forto so leie a side or mych

abate þe seid causis, þanne to þe moral vertu of douȝtinesse it longiþ | forto not spare and not forbere eny vertu, þouȝ 44^b þei so withdrawen and ben about to lette; and to þe vertu of pacience it longiþ to take a worþ þe greuance which þerbi comeþ, if eny þere bifalle. 5

Hence, though the Passions may serve to our spiritual profit, if they are ruled morally virtuously by the Will according to the doom of Reason, they are not in themselves moral virtues or moral vices.

and so algatis eche of pilke passions may serue into oure goostli profijt, and noon of þese seid passions, wheþir þei be in oure wil or in eny sensitijf appetit or in þe natural power of oure fleischli hert, is a moral vertu or a moral vice, and þat wheþir it be in oure power to make him abide or go 10 away, to be eneresid or abatid, bi oure wirchyng into his natural causis, or no. and cause whi noon of hem is a moral vertu or a vice, and þat we ben not bi hem morali good or badde, is for noo[n]¹ of hem is a deede chosen or comaundid bi fre wil, but ech of hem is, lijk as is heete or 15 cold in oure bodies, causid bi natural causis dyuers fro oure resoun and fro fre wil; and þefore, þouȝ we mowe at sum while putte away or abate such heete bi puttyng away or abatyng of his causis, and þouȝ pilk puttyng away² or abat- yng may be a moral vertuose deede, and ȝit þe heete so putt 20 away or abatid is neiþir a moral vertu neiþir a moral vice; so it is in þis present purpos of passions, wheþir þei be in oure wil or ouȝwhere ellis in opire powers of oure bodi.

When the soul is freed from the body, the Passions of the Will will be more fervent than the Passions of the lower appetites.

fferþirmore, it is to wite þat þouȝ þe seid passions of delectacioun, of dolour, of gladnesse, of sorynesse, of loue, of 25 hate, of desijr, of angir, of rouþ, and of drede, beyng in oure sensual appetitis and in oure bodili hert, ben mych scharper and smelter and feruenter þan ben lijk namyd to hem passions in þe wil whilis oure soul is ioynyð to oure bodi in þis world; ȝit whanne oure soul schal be departid from oure 30 now had comberose bodi, and þe lowd cri of þe now seid sensual passions schulen ceese and not be had, and oure soul schal be free, vnlettid, to haue his ful kyndeli wirchyngis þoruȝ out alle his kyndeli powers, and schal haue siȝt vpon þingis as faire to his biholdyng þanne as ben now 35 þingis faire to oure bodili siȝt in þis world, and schal heere to his heering as delectable þingis as ben eny songis delectable now to oure sensual heeryng in þis lijf, his passions of

¹ MS. *noon*.

² MS. *a wey*.

delectacions vpon pilk faire pingis of him seen, and vpon
 pilke meri pingis of him heerd, and his gladnesse and his
 sorynesse and his loues and his hatis and his desiris, his
 angris and his roupis and his dreedis, whiche alle he may
 5 haue eer he be putt into his heuenli blisse, mowen be as
 45^a scharp, quyk, feruent *and* brymme | as ben þe opire seid lijk
 namyd delectacions had in þis lijf in þe sensual appetitis,
 and mych scharper, for causis in opire placis of my writyngis
 expressid. and summe of þese passions schulen serue into
 10 þe blisse *and* reward whiche oure soul schal haue in heuen,
 if we schulen be sauýd; and summe opire of þese passions
 schulen serue into þe peyn and turment which oure soul
 schal haue in helle, if we schulen be dampnyd, as herof
 sumwhat more schal be tauzt in þe ije^e parti of 'cristen
 15 religioun', þe vje^e treti.

fierpirmore, þouþ schame¹ of a man, whepir it be in þe
 louzer parti or in þe hizer parti of þe soul, is not ellis as in
 substaunce þan a drede of his vngloriýng, namli in his owen
 presence, with a sorinesse aftirward þat pilk vngloriýng is
 20 bifalle, þat is to seie, drede lest his hiznesse or glori be lassid
 in his owen p^resence, with a sorinesse for it whanne it is
 falle; and þerfore euer eipir of þo schames may wel y-nouþ
 be conteynynd vndir þe passioun of drede and of sorinesse
 togidere as a spice or spicis togidere of drede and of sorynesse
 25 in þe same parti of þe soul; 3it, for more pleyennesse, bi þis
 name 'schame' in euer eipir parti of þe soul, y vndirstonde
 þe seid drede and sorow of vngloriýng; and bi þis name
 'drede', takun bi it silf, y vndirstonde alle opire spicis of
 passional drede dyuerse from drede of vngloriýng; and bi þis
 30 name 'sorynesse' or 'sorew', takun bi it silf, y vndirstonde
 alle opire spicis of passional sorew dyuers from sorew had
 for vngloriýng in þe presence of þe man vngloried. and þe
 contrari passioun to schame here spokun may be clepid 'bold
 desijr' or 'bold ioie', or vndir sum opir name lijk.

35 Mich more ful fair and ful hard filosofie myzte be tauzt
 of þe seid passions which is of ful fewe or of noon whom y
 knowe kunnyd; but þis mych is y-nouþ for moral leernyng
 about hem, namelich here for þis present litil book. No man

It is convenient
 to take the term
 'Shame' as
 covering fear of
 debasement and
 sorrow for de-
 basement; the
 term 'Dread' as
 covering all
 other kinds of
 fear; and the
 term 'Sorrow'
 as covering all
 other kinds of
 sorrow.

The contrary to
 Shame is Bold
 Desire or Bold
 Joy.

Where further
 teaching on the
 powers of the
 soul after it is
 freed from the
 body, and on the
 powers of

¹ See Notes.

angels, may be found.

A famous doctor¹ holds that the Passions, believed by Pecock to be in the Will, are only in the lower appetites. In the Will he puts only Willing and Nilling.

This is incompatible with the doctrine of the Passions of spirits and angels, and the doctrine of degrees of bliss in Heaven and degrees of punishment in Hell.

Augustine and other doctors hold the contrary view to this doctor.¹

And he is not consistent himself in his teaching thereon.

redyng here what y haue now write of þe soulis heeryng whanne he is departid from þis corruptible bodi, wondre þerof vnto tyme he schal here what more schal be seid of such a soulis knowyng powers and of aungels knowyng powers and of her spechis, as y hope, in 'þe book of 5 questions', or ellis in 'þe book of sentence'.

fñadir, gramerci for al þat 3e now haue seid. and al þis þat 3e han now seid of passions in þe wil and of lik to hem passions in þe louzer appetitis, y holde and take to be trewe, notwipstondyng þat y haue redde | in a ful famose doctouris 45^b book¹ þat loue, hatered, desijr, drede, angir, schame, sorew, ioie, gladnesse, as þei ben passions, ben oonli in þe louzer appetitis and not in þe wil. for in þe wil, as he feelide and tauzte, ben oonli symple deedis whiche ben willingis and nylyngis aloone, and noon opir passions ben þere þan 15 willyngis and nylyngis, pouz þe willyngis and nylyngis mowe be clepid 'passions' in an vnpropir maner of speche.

Sone, y wote wel of what doctour þou meenyst, and y am wel waar þat he writip and holdip in sentence as þou hast now rehercid. Neuerpeles, pouz þilk doctour¹ hadde be my 20 fadir, y wolde and muste needis varie from him in þis now towchid poynt. fñor, certis, no man may euydentli or likli so feelee, holde, or teche how þat aungels and vnbodili spiritis, not ioynyd to bodies and not blissid in heuen, mowe be ioied and soried, delitid and heuyed, gladid and ferid, and sum- 25 tyme more and sumtyme lasse, as no man may seie nay but þat þei mowe so be, and whi oon soul in heuen schal haue more ioie þan an opir, and whi oon feend in helle schal haue more sorew þan an opir þere, but if þer were more in her wil þan pure willyng and nylling oonli. 30

And, ferþirmore, pouz þilk doctour¹ holdip so as þou now hast rehercid, opire doctoures holden þe contrari, as Austyn in þe ix^e book 'of goddis cite', þe iiije chapitre,² and opire newer whiche y wole not name. 3he, and ferþirmore, certis, þilk same doctour¹ which denyep, 1^a 2^e, *quaestio* 22^a. 35 articulo 3^o, passions to be in þe wil, holdip and seip, 1^a 2^e, *quaestio* 59^a, articulo 5^{to}, affections to be in þe wil, and 3it ferþirmore ioie, as it is a passioun, to be in þe wil.

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

And so y kanne not wite but þat boþe he is contrari to him silf, and also wipout sufficient skile he forberip in þe first place alleggid forto clepe affeccions 'passions'. and þerfore, sone, lete vs passe ouer þis contrauersie.

xix^e chapitre.

[F]Adir, gramerci for al þat is to me seid. neuerþeles y am in my conceit and consideracioun movid forto of ȝoure hiȝ kunnyng aske þus: wherto wolde god ordeyne suche as now ben bifore rehercid passions to be gendrid in þe louȝer
10 appetit and in þe wil? It wolde seme þat þei ben ordeynyd in veyn; fforwhi oure resoun sufficiþ forto schewe to vs what is of vs to be doon, and what is of vs to be left vndoon; and oure wil is sufficient forto wille, chese and comaunde to be do þat þat resoun schewip and iugip to be doon, and forto nylle,
46^a refuse and comaunde to not be do | þat þat resoun schewip and iugip not to be doon; and þe moving or þe motijf power is sufficient to execute alle þe comaundis of þe wil maad to be doon in þe outward side of man; wherfore it semyþ forto ordeyne eny more þan þus to man aboue þat þat he haþ in
20 his sensual parti comune to him and to beestis is forto ordeyne in waast.

Sone, forto enquire whi it plesid god forto ordeyne þe seid natural passions to reste in oure wil, sauerip sumwhat of curiosite and of veynnesse. it wolde seme y-nouȝ to vs forto
25 knowe þat in trouþ þer ben suche natural passions or movyngis in oure wil, and forto knowe how we owen to gouerne vs anentis hem, þouȝ we knowen not whi god ordeynyd hem; þat is to seie, we owen forto refreyne hem whanne euer þei moven vs aȝens þe avisid doom of resoun,
30 and we owen to cherisshe hem whanne euer þei moven and stiren vs answeyngli to þe avisid doom of resoun. Neuerþeles, o my sone, þouȝ god ordeynede not hem for eny neede which we haue to hem, as þyn argument wel prouep, ȝit y kanne schewe þat god ordeynede hem for oure greet profit,
35 and þat þus: If eny of þe seid passions move and stire vs in oure wil accordyngli to þe doom of resoun, þanne þilk passioun helpip and cherip þe wil to þe esilier and delect-

Is there any need for these Passions of the lower appetites and the Will?

There is no need for the Passions, but they all serve for our profit if rightly controlled by the Will according to Reason.

ablier wille, chese and comaunde þe same deede to be doon to which þe same passioun moveþ and stirip, and so þerbi þe vertuose deede is doon þe more sureli; and if eny of þe seid passions move and stire vs in oure wil discordauntli to þe doom of resoun, þanne þilk passioun, bi þat pat 5 it is about to lette oure wil forto wille, chese and comaunde answeyngli to þe doom of resoun, it encresip þe vertuosenes and goodnes of þilk same willyng, chesyng and comaundyng, if þei be doon; and so bi þilk passioun setting him silf aʒens þe dew wilnyng, chesyng and comaundyng, oure 10 merite is encresid and oure mede is hizid. and þerfore open it is þat whepir oure passions in oure wil move vs in oure wil answeyngli to þe doom of resoun or aʒens þe doom of resoun, 3it euermore þei mouen for oure profijt and good.

Is it wrong to make use of the Passions, especially ANGER, in preaching against vice?

ffadir, if al þis be trewe what 3e han seide in þis present 15 *chapitre* and in þe opir next bifore goyng *chapitre* of passions in þe wil and in þe louzer appetit, what schulen we seie of þe comoun peplis clateriŋ in þis caas? A prechour seyng and bipenkyng þat certeyn persoones vicioseli beren hem in seiŋg or in eny opir wise demenyng, and þat þei doon þerbi 20 harm, openli purposip and takip vpon him forto vndirnyme hem | and blame hem with provis makyng þat þei ben in þe 46^b wrong side; and þis vndirnymyng he doop so scharpli as him þenkip þat neede or profit þerto askip, and þat for þe boold aʒensholdyng and defendyng which ellis myʒte be maad 25 aʒens his vndirnymyng executed in open prechyng. Muste þis needis be doon amys?

As there are different kinds of preaching, so there are different means to be used therein. Passions are justifiable for a certain purpose in preaching.

Nay, sone, forwhi sum <prechyng>lijk wel serueþ into blamyng of men for her vicis and mys beryngis whiche þei doon, as sum opir <prechyng>serueþ into preisyng and com- 30 mendyng of opire men for her vertuose and good beryng. In many kyndis, forsoþe, mowe open solempne sermons be made; for summe mowe be made forto renne vpon þe declar- yng of vert[ue]s¹; summe opire forto renne vpon þe declar- yng of vicis; summe opire forto preise vertues; summe opire 35 forto dispreise vicis; summe forto commende persoones for her good vertuose gouernauncis þat þei be cherid forto þerinne contynue, and þat opire take ensample forto hem

¹ MS. *verteus*, but probably a scribal error.

folewe; summe forto blame and vndirname opire persooones
 for her viciose or vntrewe speking and doyng, namelich if it
 be openli vsid and growip into hurtyng; summe forto moue
 bi craftiose spechis þe heerers into deuocioun; summe forto
 5 moue bi opire craftiose spechis þe heerers into of summe
 gouernauncis þe hatered and detestacioun; summe forto
 exalte god in summe of his excellent nobiltees; and summe
 forto magnifie his seyntis for her dignytees; summe sum-
 what for doctrine; summe for warnyng; summe for exhort-
 10 yng and preiyng; and summe for vndirnymyng, reprouyng
 and blamyng. And of so many dyuerse chaungis whiche
 mowe be made, good it is forto in sum tyme take þe oon
 maner of preching, and in sum opir tyme an opir maner
 of prechyng, as þe purpos which he entendip it askip. And
 15 sipeu into what euer eend a man may allowabli procede forto
 it atteyne and gete in prechyng, he may take and vse
 allowabli þe meenys whiche profiten into þe getyng and
 hauyng of þe same purposid eend, þefore suche wordis,
 countenauncis, gesturis and vttrauncis, þhe, and passions, he
 20 may allowabli take in his prechyng whiche seruen as profit-
 able meenes into his fynal purposid entent getyng. for so
 wole resoun, so wole þe techyng and wrytyng of men in
 rethorik of oratori craft, of which, certis, open solempne
 prechyng is a parti, so also techip vs hooli scripture, and of
 25 crist and of prophetis þe ensampl yng.
 47^a ffadir, if þis be trewe, þanne is þis not | needis aȝens
 charite a precher forto vndirname and blame scharpli open
 viciose spekers or doers, þhe, and prechers, and forto take þe
 passions whiche naturali and spedili þerto seruen?
 30 No, sone, forwhi as it perteynep to charite forto comende
 what and whom is to be commendid, and þat with vse of
 countenaunce, gesture and passions þerto perteynyng and
 forperyng; so to charite it perteynep forto dispreise, blame
 and reproue what and whom is to be discomendid, and þat
 35 with vse of countenaunce, gesture and passions into pilk
 parti seruyng and profityng; þhe, and lijk as to a man stond-
 yng his charite longip forto loue eny þing what is morali
 good, so to him stondyng his charite longip forto hate eny
 þing what is morali yuel. And þefore if he may preche

Sharp speaking
 and the employ-
 ment of the
 Passions is not
 uncharitable, for
 Charity hates
 all that is evil,
 just as it loves
 all that is good.

And a preacher
 may justifiably

preach against
evil with the
passion of
Anger.

Yet a certain
preacher¹ has
been blamed as
uncharitable, in
that he exposed
with just Anger
misdeeds of cer-
tain preachers.

agens yuel with þe passioun of hate, whi not as wel he may
preche agens yuel with þe passioun of angir, sipen lijk hooli
or alowable it is to haue passioun of angir anentis yuel, how
hooli or alowable it is to haue passioun of gladnes anentis
good?

5

ffadir, not wipstondyng al þis, y wiste whanne a precher,¹
þenkyng þat need was forto reprove mys beryng prechers,
warnede summe of his felawship þat he wolde preche into
þe now seid entent, and opir wise þan he euer prechid bifore.
And also, for his purpos for þe tyme of him entendid was 10
opir þan eny purpos into which he prechid bifore, and for
þat he wolde be þe bettir conceuyd and vndirstonde of þe
heerers in his spekyng and demenyng anentis his entent and
purpos, he made a long antetheme vndir declaracioun of pese
wordis of poul to bisshop Timothy: 'Argue, obseca, increpa, 15
emenda in omni paciencia, et doctrina,'² forto iustifie þat a
precher may blame, vndirneme and rebuke, and bi so mych
þe bettir vndirneme and blame þat it be made with doctrine
of open proof perwith rennyng, and þat al such doying stondip
wel with pacience, and þerfore lijk wel with charite, and þat 20
he may take þe meenys whiche philosophie techip and
admyttip into such an eend and purpos to be doon, namlich
whilis he þerin prouyd þat wel ny3 al þe lawe of god is not
ellis þan moral filosofie. certis, such an antetheme he
ladde bi space of long tyme, which to summe ful mych plesid, 25
In so mych þat summe of þe heerers profrid gold oft forto
haue had pilk long antetheme writen for deynte had þerof.
Neuerþeles, for þat þe precher þerof was not wonyd to write
his solempne | sermons, and for þat he was 30oun to greet 47
bisinessis, he not took þe labour forto delyuere it. But what 30
for al þis so preciose and so deliciose bifore send in þe
antetheme, whanne he procedid in þe bodi and substaunce
and cors of his sermoun vndir þis theme: 'Amici mei et
proximi mei aduersum me appropinquauerunt et steterunt,'
in vndirnemyng and blamyng certeyn prechers, and þat for 35
as mych as he wolde þat his werk schulde take effect, he dide
it scharpli and not wipout profis perto brouzt, þe peple, for
what causis boþe god and wijs men knowen wel y-nou3, beere

¹ See Notes.

² 2 Timothy, iv. 2.

blaming
preacher
just

hem anentis þe seid precher as wijlde, vnresonable beestis in many kyndis crueli, vnmanli, vncurteisli and vntrewli, with contynuaunce of long tyme. And in special þei clateriden herinne so vnwijsli þat he schulde be þanne out of charite, 5 fforwhi he spake with passioun of angir. and how vnwijs is þis ground and motyue, it is open bi what is now bifore bi 3ow tau3t so groundli.

Sone, y wote of whom þou meenist and penkist in al þis þi compleynt, but þerazens suffraunce is oon remedie into 10 tyme peple chaunge and falle fro her furie, and be more disciplinable forto rede or here what is to be take for treup. Crist techip in þe gospel þat wipin xij houris of þe day chaung may be maad in men; þerfore mych rapir in xij 3eris. fforsoþe, sone, if treup þerof schulde be seid wipout 15 hint of charite and into warnyng þat þei not so do aftir þis day, þe peple in þo daies and in þilk mater beere hem as half mad or as half wood, fforwhi who berip him so sturdili as þei diden azens doom of resoun azens her owen experience, 3he, and in diffamyng crist and þe prophetis, berip him silf 20 þerinne as half mad or half wood. And þat þe peple so dide þanne and þerinne, lo, sone, y trowe þou maist be certified þus: Resoun and filosofie and techyng of rethoricions and of oratouris wole þat what is natural meene into an eend be take into þe bryngyng forþ of þilk eend, and þat 25 passions ben such a meene, namlich siþen neipir loue neipir gladnes neipir hate neipir sorynes neipir angir or eny opir natural passioun is in it silf vice or syn, but is ordeynyd of nature and of god forto be a speedful spoor and meen into good, so þat he passe not þe boundis which doom of resoun 30 into þilk eend lymtyþ and assignep to þilk passioun. Also ech notable mannys experience schewip wel þat ful oft þe king, þe duk, þe bisshop, þe meir, þe opir officer, sendip for men into þis entent þat he rebuke hem wel and scharpli with angri countenaunce, þat þe effect of amendement be had þe 8^a bettir, 3he, and with angir anentis þilke defautis and anentis þo persoones as for þo defautis. þe husbondman doopli3k to his wijf, to his children, to his meyne. Whanne þese vndirnymers ben not iugid to be þerfore out of charite, God forbede but þat men my3ten be lefulli angri with defautis and with men

One must have patience until the misguided people who blamed the preacher for his just Anger see their error.

For that it is an error, is shown by Reason and philosophy, since the use of Anger is a natural means to an end, and is not uncharitable.

for her defaultis, and ȝit al *with* charite, ȝhe, and comounli *with* more charite þan þei whiche wolen not *with* suche defaultis and persoones be angri. Redili bi lijk skile it schulde be seid þat no man myȝte *with* charite hate yuel or persoones as for her yuel oonli, siþen hate is a passioun. 5 And ȝit þat þis is vntrewe, we mowe biside resoun leerne of holi writt seiȝng þus: 'perfecto odio oderam illos; inimici facti sunt mihi.'¹

That Anger
against evil
things is justifi-
able, isshown by
the action of
Moses in casting
down the Tables
of stone.

Herþirmore þat þe bifore seid peple diffameden prophetis and crist, for as mych as of her pretensioun comeþ and 10 folewith þat prophetis and crist weren out of charite, lo, sone, se þou þus: Moises which, as holi writt seiþ, was myldist of men, was so deep in passioun of angir anentis þe peple of israel for her mysberyng þat whanne he came doun of þe hil of syna fro þe presence and þe homeli talkyng *with* 15 god, and bare þe tablis of þe lawe writun *with* þe fyngir of god, he castid þo tablis into þe eerþ so hard þat þei were þerwith brokun, and þe text of hooli writt seiþ pere þat he was angrid hugeli, as þe effect of his doying and beryng pere wel schewide. 20

And by the
Anger of Christ.

Crist also among þe wordis of his prechyng to hise apostlis seide to petir þus: 'Go a bak, þou sathanas, þou sauerist not whiche þingis ben of god.'² he seide of þe herod þus: 'Seie þou to pilk fox.'³ And if eny man pretende so greet a curiosite anentis þe persoon of crist þat he lackid þe 25 passioun of angir, he may go whistle til he leerne bettir. for crist toke in his manhode al what was of natural condicioun to pilk manhode, þouȝ he toke not syn, for it is not natural. Certis, bi lijk curiose pretensioun he schulde seie þat crist hadde no sorow neipir soore neipir hate neipir loue, 30 for þese ben passions, and ech passioun may be wipout syn.

And by the
Anger of John
the Baptist.

Also holi seynt Johan Baptist in his prechyng to peple which came to him, seide þus: 'O ȝe broodis of addris, who techiþ ȝow for to fle fro vengeance?'⁴ and so of opire boistose wordis which he þanne and pere spake. and forto 35 excuse Johan þe Baptist fro passioun of angir takun and vsid for a good entent wha[n]ne⁵ it is not nede forto so

¹ Psalms, cxxxix. 22.

³ Luke, xiii. 32.

² Matt. xvi. 23.

⁴ Matt. iii. 7; Luke, iii. 7.

⁵ MS. *whane*.

excuse crist, as y haue now schewid, is not but a feynyd ping
[or]¹ an vngroundid ping, and a curiose vanyte. þus mych,
sone, is y-nou3 as for þe schewyng of it what y | last now
seide y wolde to þee schewe, and into blamyng what is worpi
5 be blamyd and to be amendid.

ffadir, y canne not wite and consente liztli þat eny
precher whilis he prechip his long sermoun, maad bi greet
auiſe and seid bifore a greet and a notable audience, canne
for pilk while haue eny passioun of angir, pou3 he speke for
pilk while wordis bifore studioseli auiſid and poyntid in
rewe and ordre and foorm and sownyng into angir, and pou3
he make his countenaunce and his gesture bi auiſe and
studi bifore pointid forto be so þanne maad; fforwhi in pilk
while he is so mych ocupied in his vndirstonding and in his
5 mynde and in labour to speke out in heizt, and forto kepe þe
gretli auiſid foorm of his so long a tale, þat his wil and his
louzer appetitis schulen be mych vacaunt fro her wirchyng and
suffryng as for pilk while. And if þe wil and þe louzer
appetitis be so vacaunt in pilk tyme, þei schulen not be
redi forto be ocupied in passions for pilk while, but if it be
in þe passioun of drede lest he faile and kepe not his rizt
cours and his demenyng bifore of him poyntid to be þanne
kept. certis, þis greet attendaunce in þe witt and mynde
and þe passioun of feer wolen so ocupie him þat he schal not
5 be mych into opire passions lad in pilk while. In lijk
maner it is with hem whiche maken long parliament spechis
so curiose as now a daies ben wonyd to be maad bifore þe
kyng and þe lordis. And in lijk maner it is with ambas-
siatouris and opire oratouris in makyng of her proposicions
bifore þe pope or worldli princis, and þat for causis now
touchid.

Sone, pou seist herynne ful trewli. And as to þe preacher
of whom we haue now spoke, not wipstondyng þat it is
iustificable pou3 he hadde had in his tyme of prechyng þe
5 passioun of angir, as is open bi what is tauzt bifore of
passions fro þe biginnyng of þe xviije chapitre hidirto, 3it y
durste swere vpon a book þat he hadde no passioun of angir
in pilk tyme, neipir y wote how he coupe in pilk while haue
had leiser forto take him passion of angir, and þat for causis

How can a
preacher or
speaker who is
entirely occu-
pied with the
deliverance of
his speech and
the dread lest
he fail, fall into
the passion of
Anger?

→ note
long sermon

He cannot,
strictly speak-
ing, fall into the
passion of
Anger, though
that passion
would be justifi-
able. Hence the
famous preacher
before men-
tioned cannot
really be accused
of Anger.

¹ MS. for.

But people are
so set against
this famous
preacher that it
is difficult to
persuade them
of his innocence.

*How possible
is it to
persuade
them?*

The conclusions
of this preacher
cannot be gain-
said, though the
principal one,
viz. that bishops
are not bound to
preach, has been
rudely denied as
a sophism.

bi þee now expressid. But what while peple is brynnli sett
in an outragiosenes, hard it is anoon and sudeynli forto
it redresse; As it was hard and impossible forto redresse
anoon þe furie and madnes of þe peple spokun and doon at
þe toure hil of londoun and in þe cite for þe brennyng of 5
a preest doon þere, not wiþstondyng þat greet bisynes was
doon þerazens bi auto|rite of the kyng, and dyuerse solempne 49^a
sermons weren made for þe redressyng þerof, Neuerþeles
with mych vnþank and reprooffþeuyng and castyng þerfore
vpon þe prechers whil þe tyme of þe furie and madnes 10
durid.

þus mych, sone, is y-nouȝ here of þis mater of deede which
þou haste brouȝt in now among þe opire chapitris of philo-
sophie. ffor to speke ferþir of þe principal mater, which is of
bisshopis boond to preche, and which is conteynyed in con- 15
clusions¹ publisshid bi þe same seid precher and in certeyn
perto accordyng writyngis, haþ no place here, neiþir it is
for to be discussid here. y wote wel þe conclusions wolen be
holde for trewe of ech greet-leernyd man in dyuynyte or in
lawe of canoun while þe world schal dure. And y wolde 20
wite what clerk wole take vpon him forto answe to þe
proofis of hem; ffor no clerk ȝit hidirto into þis present day, bi
more þan vj ȝeer passid aftir þe bigynnyng of the strijf,² durste
take vpon him forto answe to þe proofis of hem, þouȝ summe
clerkis han be ful redi forto argue and make motyues azens hem 25
and azens sidehalf maters, which is ful list and esi in reward of
þe answeyng to þe proofis of hem; ȝhe, and ful bare and nakid
and vnsufficient into þe cleeryng of þe principal questioun
or of þe strijf. how rudeli, as is brouȝt me to eer, summe
hiȝe degreed men in dyuynyte beren hem in þe seid principal 30
mater, seiying þat y procede noon opir wise þan vndir a
sophim, for as mych as y procede vndir a distinceioun of
prechyng, lijk as þe kunnyngist clerkis þat euer were hadden
deynte forto lede forþ her maters and her ententis vndir
distinceioun, and þat for þe more cleeryng to be had þerbi! 35
greet rouþ and pite myȝte and ouȝte be had vpon so greet
clubbisshenes in so greet graduatid dyuynys. Redili and
forsope þei schewen wel in her pilk seiying þat þei hem

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

silf knowen not what a sophim is. And if her seid seiying were trewe, þe fayrist foorm of techyng in erpe in questionable mater were not ellis but sophim, 3he, and mych of þe best doctryne maad in dyuynyte, lawe and filosofie were not 5 ellis þan sophim. Alas! þat such feelyng and such speche schulde be had in hem whiche ben holde grete clerkis, and ben grete prechers!

ffadir, a3ens þis what 3e han seid so fauorabli into þe passioun of angir, my3te be alleggid what is writun in þe 10 comoun had versified book drawn out of þe wijs sawis of þe greet oold sage Catoun, where it is seid þus: 'Impedit ira animum, ne possit cernere verum.'¹ þat is in englich 19 þo forto | seie þus: 'Angir lettif þe witt forto knowe þe treuþ, which ellis he schulde knowe.' And also it is rad of an oold 115 sage which to his seruauant offendyng him seide þus: 'þou schuldist abie yf y were not angrid.' In which seiying, as it semyþ, he menede þat his angir wolde haue movid him forto haue passid dew mesure in punyschyng; wherfore it wolde seme þat it is not allowable, or at þe leest it is not com- 20 mendable, forto haue, holde, and execute þe passioun of angir.

Sone, al what þou hast now alleggid a3ens angir, it is to be vndirstonde of angir beyng out of dew mesure to þe hauer of it, and not of angir had in dew mesure to him which hap it. ffor, certis, euen as wijn derkip a manyns 25 witt and wijn clerip a manyns witt, aftir þat it is takun in vndew or dew mesure to þe taker, so it is of angir. In so mych þat summe men beyng naturali mych flewmatik in her hertis and in her heedis, kunnen not haue cleerli her wittis, neipir feruentli y-nou3 her willyngis, vnto tyme þei be wel 30 chafid in angir, and bifore þei ben dul, derk and slow, as ouer þe sikt of resoun y haue had bi þe knowlechyng of summe beyng in þis disposicioun and beyng ri3t discreet forto asprie such a chaunce bifallyng. And perfore, euen as vndir what reulis wijn is to be take or to be fled, of summe 35 more, of summe lasse, and of noon or of fewist to be vttilri refusid, namelich if vndir þe name of wijn y vndirstonde boþe wijn of grape and wijn of corn, as ysaac² in his 'book of

Is not Cato right in saying that Anger hinders knowledge of truth?

This saying of Cato applies only to unmeasured Anger. Anger in right measure is good, as is wine taken in right measure.

¹ 'Impedit ira animum, ne possit cernere uerum'; *Catonis Disticha*, ii. 4 (ed. Baehrens, *Poetæ Latini Minores*, vol. iii, p. 223). ² See Notes.

dietis' callip wijn, so vndir lijk reulis it is to be considerid and doon anentis þe passioun of angir. And þefore what þou hast brouzt forþ of vnmesurable angir had, dooþ noon azenstondyng to what y haue here bifore seid of angir beyng to þe persoon it hauyng mesurable. And lijk as wijn wel 5 takun makip þe quicker into good werk, so dooþ angir takun in dew mesure. difficulte is to summe men, as to colerik men and men þat han hoot and drie hertis, forto take angir in his oonli dew mesure, and þefore summe of þo ben about forto noon angir receyue. and difficulte is for 10 summe men forto drynke wijn in his oonli dew mesure, and þefore þei forberen wijn al for euer, and in þat þei lacken summe goodis which wijn myzte do to hem. and þis is y-nou3, o my sone, for answer to þyn obieccioun.

WRATH, which is a free deed chosen by Free Will [and one of the Seven Deadly Sins] must not be confused with ANGER, which is a Passion either of the lower appetite or of the Will.

If eny man redyng what y haue tauzt fro þe bigynnyng 15 of þe bifore goyng xvij^e chapitre hidirto happe forto trowe þerin to be includid þat if a man may haue leefully | angir 50^a anentis his nei3bor, he may haue lefulli wrap anentis þe same nei3bor, or þat if angir may stonde with charite, wrap may stonde with charite, or þat if wrap be a3ens charite, angir is 20 a3ens charite, he hap nede forto leerne þe difference bitwix angir and wrap, which difference he may leerne bi what is tauzt in þe i^e parti and in þe ije parti of 'þe donet',¹ and in þe iije treti of þe i^e parti of 'cristen religioun', ioynyd þerto what is seid in þis present book of moral vertu and of 25 moral vice. Among whiche þingis into þe seid difference tauzt, he schal mowe se þat angir is a passioun of þe wil or of þe lou3er sensual appetit, and wrap is a fre deede chosen freli bi þe wil. þefore and for opire causis þe trowyng now rehercid is not good.

30

xx^e chapitre.

Is it a good thing to strive to lay aside the Passions?

[F]Adir, y aske ferþir þus: Is it eny þing worþ a man forto assaie to leie aside² and to lacke vttrli alle þe seid natural passions in þe lou3er appetitis or in þe ouerer wil, and forto lyue in pees oonli vndir þe doom of resoun, and 35 vndir þe willyngis and nylyngis, chesyngis and refusyngis and comaundyngis of þe wil?

¹ pp. 64 and 105 of E.E.T.S. edition;

² MS. *a side*.

Sone, pou schalt vndirstonde þat in þe oold tyme þer was a sect of philesofris whiche weren clepid 'stoikis', and þese weren born an hond forto holde þat moral vertu stondiþ not with passions, but þat it longiþ to moral vertu forto exclude
5 passions vttrilri, And þerfore, vnto tyme a man haue putte fro him alle passions, he is not morali vertuose.

The Stoics were said to hold that moral virtue should exclude the Passions altogether.

An opir sect in þe same daies was of philesofris whiche weren clepid 'Paripatetici', and of which sect fadir, fynder and patrone was Plato, and next aftir him was Aristotil.
10 And þese philesofris helden þat it longiþ not to moral vertu forto exclude vttrilri passions,¹ fforwhi þanne moral vertu schulde make þe louzer appetit to be void from his natural wirchyng, 3he, and void from al wirchyng, in as mych as þe sensual appetit hap noon opire wirchyngis þan his passions,
15 which þing were a vice in nature. but þese philesofris heelden þat to moral vertu it longiþ to refreyne þe passions if þei stiren azens þe doom of resoun, or ellis to refreyne þe wil þat he not wille, chese, refuse and comaunde answeyngli to þe passions whilis þei mouen azens þe doom of resoun,
20 And forto suffre alle suche passions to stonde and haue her mocion and her forþ whanne and whilis þei mouen as resoun iugip, for þanne þo passions helpen forþ and esien and
50^b alizten moral vertues into her werkis, and þerfore in þat | þei ben goode and doon good, as is here bifore seid.

The Peripatetics that the Passions should be obedient to the moral virtues.

25 þis wey of paripatetikis is holden for trew of alle men. And þe opir seid wey wherof stoikis weren born an hond is holden of alle men to be vntrewe. ffor, certis, sone, forto þus assaie is not but a þing in waast and in veyn. ffor, sobeli, pou schalt eerst þi bodi distroie and brynge it into
30 deep, þan pou schalt alle þe kyndis of þe seid natural passions vttrilri remove fro þee, and hem fulli leie aside; fforwhi pou maist not lyue but if þi bodi haue his foure humoures: blood, flewme, coler and malencolie; and pou maist not lyue but if
þi hert haue his hoot and drie complexioun, þi brayn haue
35 his cold and moist complexioun, þi stomak his coold and drie complexioun in his ouerer parti, hoot and moist complexioun in his neperer parti, þi lyuer his hoot and moist complexioun; pou maist not lyue but if coler be in þi galle, and but

The doctrine ascribed to the Stoics is untrue; the doctrine held by the Peripatetics is true. For it is impossible to lay aside the Passions altogether, since the Humours and Complexions of the body necessarily engender Passions in the lower appetites, and these engender Passions in the Will.

¹ See Notes.

malencolie be in þi splene. And, certis, if al þis be in þi
 bodi, þou schalt not ascape but þat þou schalt needis haue þe
 seid natural passions in þi bodi, þat is to seie, in þi sensual
 outward and inward parti and in þe appetitis *perof*. And
 if þe passions be in þe appetitis of þe sensual parties, þei 5
 wolen needis bi kynde gendre in sum maner to seie lijk to
 hem passions in þe ouerer appetite, which is þe wil; and þat
 bi cause þe louzer appetite and þe hizer appetite in man ben
 knytt togidere sumwhat lijk as two whelis in a klok, of which
 þe oon is redi forto soone moue þe opir. Or ellis, at þe 10
 leest, þe louzer appetite and þe resoun in man ben so
 cowlid and ioyned togidere bi kynde, þat þe louzer appetite
 wole *peruerte* þe resoun into sodeyn hasti doomes accordyng
 to þe passions in þe louzer appetitis, and þanne anon forþ
 with þe wil is redi sudeynli to consente to pilk hasti doom 15
 maad in þe resoun. And so bi oft suche doyngis, passions
 schulen rise in þe wil lijk vnto hem whiche ben in þe louzer
 appetitis; riȝt as, if two whelis be ioynyd togidere, whanne
 þe louzer whele is ouȝwhere mouyd, he mouiþ þidirward þe
 ouerer whele, bi cause þei ben cowlid togidere; so it is 20
 kyndeli bitwix þe louzer seid appetite and þe hizer seid
 appetit, which is þe wil, þat þei ben cowlid togidere in
 affynyte; and þat immediatli as to summe clerkis it plesip, or
 at þe leest as to summe opire it plesip mediati bi meene
 of þe resoun, þouȝ þe louzer appetite may not into þe wil 25
 immediatli wirche, þat is to seie, wipout meene, as summe
 doctouris holden, bi cause þe louzer appetit is, as it were, 51^a
 material, and þe wil is pure *spiritual*. And þerfore þe louzer
 appetit may not immediatli move þe hizer appetit, which is
 þe wil. which fundamental skile of þe opynyoun semep to 30
 be feble, for if it were strong and sufficient for þe opynyoun,
 it semyþ bi lijk cause þe louzer appetit myȝte not wirche
 forto move resoun, sipeen resoun is a power *spiritual*. And
 þerfore þou maiste neuer putte vtirli aside¹ fro þee þe seid
 natural passions fro þe louzer appetitis and fro þi wil. 35

The Passions
 may be kept in
 check by keep-
 ing in check the
 Humours of the

þou maiste wel abate sumwhat in þee þe passioun of wraþ
 bi þat þat þou maiste lasse in þe þi coler; þou maiste abate
 sumwhat in þee þi enuye bi þat þat þou abatist in þi bodi

¹ MS. *a side*.

malencolie; þou maiste abate liztnes and wantownesse bi þat
 þat þou abatist þi blood; þou maiste abate heuynesse bi
 þat þat þou abatist in þi bodi flewme, and namelich if þou
 remoue from þyn hert *and* from his regioun groce heuy
 5 malencolik humoures. but, certis, forto lacke vttrli for
 algatis alle seid passions it may not be in þi power, and þat
 for causis now seid. and þerfore caste þou neuer forto reule
 þee opir wise in hem saue þus: þat if eny passioun moue
 þee azens þe avised not hasti doom of resoun, if he be hize
 10 and brymme, þanne be þou about to slake and lasse him, and
 algatis refreyne so þi wil þat he not wilne and chese
 answeyngli to þe same passioun. and if eny passioun move
 þee accordauntli to þe avised not hasti doom of resoun,
 þanne cherische þou him and holde him, and wilne and chese
 15 and comaunde in þi wil answeyngli to him, and þanne þerbi
 þou schalt haue a vauntage, for þilk passioun schal be
 a spor to þi wil forto þe quyklier wilne, chese, comaunde and
 execute þe iugement and þe avised doom of resoun. And if
 þou be about to do more, þou schalt falle and brynge þi silf
 20 into worse plite, as summe men han into her harmes asaid.
 Be þou þerfore, my sone, wijs in þis, þat opire mennys fallis
 be to þee lernyngis to kepe þee from þi fallis.

body, but they
 cannot be utter-
 ly dispensed
 with.

The Passions are
 to be obedient, to
 the doom of
 Reason, and
 then they are an
 aid to the Will.

Of þese two now seid sectis, sone, þou maiste rede in þe
 book of Austyn, which he made, 'of goddis cite,' in þerof þe
 25 ix^e book and in þe iiij^e chapitre.¹ and þere þou maist marke
 wel how þat oon man þanne a philesosir, beyng of þe seid sect
 of stoikis, was in a schipp with opire men to passe ouer þe
 see. and not wiþstondyng he helde him silf a vertuose man
 aftir his sect, 3it whanne þe tempest was so greet þat þerof
 30 semede appere perel of deef, þis seid philesosire waxe pale for
 feere. Wherefore aftir þe ceesyng of þe tempest he was
 51^b scornyd of his | opynoun which men trowede him to holde
 bi his sect; and as to hem it semede þis philesosire of stoikis
 sect was cauȝte with a defaute azens his sect, into which
 35 default he wenede not forto haue falle. but, certis, þis
 philesosire took out of his male a book conteynyng þe
 filosofie and þe sect of stoikis vpon what þei heelden of
 moral vertues, and schewide þe writyng of þe seid book to

Where more
 information
 concerning the
 Stoics and
 Peripatetics
 may be
 obtained.

The doctrines of
 the two sects
 are really the
 same.

¹ See Notes.

The Stoics did not really hold that the Passions could be dispensed with.

This doctrine of the impossibility of dispensing with the Passions seems contrary to the famous division of moral virtues into:
(1) virtues purging the soul,
(2) virtues of a purged soul,
(3) virtues of God, who never had Passions.

There is no truth in this division.

a wijs man in þe same schipp þanne beyng, whos name was agellius. and whanne þe writyng was wel examyned, it was founden þat þe feelyng which stoikis hadden of moral vertues was not dyuers from þe feelyng which paripatetikis hadden of moral vertues, but al þe dyuersite which was bitwixe hem 5 was not but in wordis oonli and in fame of þe peple wipout þe trouþ, which ful oft is founde ful vntrewe, vnsubstancial and perilose. And so it was founden þat þe sect of stoikis weren wrongli born an hond. And bi þis, sone, þou maist knowe þat neuer of eny wijs sect it was holde þat moral 10 vertues schulden not stonde with passions, or þat a man owip or myzte bi strengþ of moral vertues delyuere him from alle passions.

ffadir, aȝens what ȝe han now tauȝte is had in fame such a distinccioun or a particioun of moral vertues wherin it is seid 15 þus: þat summe moral vertues ben purgyng þe soul, summe ben of a purgid soul, and summe ben whiche neuer hadde to hem passions. þe first kynde of moral vertues is in bigynners and in hem þat ben with passions bisi wrastlers; þe secund kynd is in hem þat han excludid from hem alle 20 passions; and þe iiije is in god. And if þis distinccioun or particioun of moral vertu into þe now seid iij membris be trew, þanne þe secund membre now seid is expresseli aȝens ȝoure now ȝouun doctrine.

Sone, y haue good mynde of þis now aleggid distinccioun, 25 but y telle þee þou maist not holde to be goold al þat glorieþ, and þou maist not holde to be trewe al þat is writun or holden vp in greet fame, no more þan þou ouȝtist holde alle tidyngis to be trew whiche ben openli noisid, neipir al to be gospel what is in pulpit y-prechid. but riȝt as tydyngis herd 30 owen to be examyned eer þei be bileeyd, so writyngis owen to be examyned bi þe groundis of þe faculte to which þei perteynen eer þei be takun to be trewe. And serpir to seie þus: but if þou woldist leue and forsake resoun and experience, and but if þou woldist trowe þat þe sect of stoikis 35 helden þe secund membre of þe seid particioun, not wipstondyng þat þe contrari is schewid bifore bi þe stori which Austyn | writip in þe place now alleggid, y wote not wherto 52^a þou schuldist be movid forto alowe þe seid particioun of

moral vertu into þe seid iij membris. be ware perfore, sone,
and truste þou not to euery spirit neipir to eueri wynd, for
manye opire ful famoseli holden sentencis y myȝte brynge
into rehercel here, as þese: þat bisidis þe intellectual or
5 knowyngal vertues expressid in þis present book, and bisidis
moral vertues bifore towchid generali in þis same book, þer
ben vij ȝiftis of þe holi goost, and þer ben vij blessidnessis,
and þer ben xvj fruytes of charite; of whiche al togidere þe
gaderyng and þe trefyng, with al þat þerto is perteynyng,
10 makip a ful greet bulk in writyng, and a greet labour,
occupacioun and distraccioun in oure wittis fro of opire
necessari þingis þe lernyng, and from opire good businessis in
oure resoun a lettyng; and al semeþ to be not worþ a peese
for eny good þat þerbi schulde come into mannys holi con-
15 uersacioun aboue what is in þis present book, and in 'þe
donet', and in þe bookis of 'cristen religioun', with þe
bookis to hem perteynyng, seid of knowyngal and moral
vertues to þee ȝouun in teching. And ȝit ferþir þer kanne
no man haue eny ground to proue þe seid multiplicite or þe
20 seid multiplied dyuersite in þe þingis now rehercid, saue
oonli multiplicite and dyuersite of wordis and of spekyng or
of namyng, bi which þei ben þoruȝ dyuerse placis of scripture
dyuerseli y-namyd. and forto multiplie þingis or persoones
bi cause of þe multipliynge of namys oonli is a ful childli þing,
25 as is open to ech mannys resoun.

xxj^e chapitre.

[F]Adir, bifore in þe xve and xvje capitris, in notifying
to vs what þingis ben moral vertues, ȝe seide þat þe willyngis
and nyllyngis of oure wil, and þe deedis comaundid bi þe wil
30 to be doon, and þe disposicioun and þe habite gendrid bi hem
or bi occasioun of hem ben moral vertues, so þat if þei
accorden with þe doom of resoun, þat is to seie, so þat if
resoun avisidli iuge and deme hem worpi to be doon. ffadir,
if þe doom of resoun be so vnlackabli requyrid and so
35 necessari to moral vertues, it folewith herof þat what euer
grete werkis a man doo, þouȝ þei were so grete as forto
sauie men from deef, if he do hem not bi such avisement and

A deed is not
morally virtu-
ous unless
Reason advises
it to be done for
God's service.

deliberacioun þat he doop hem for þat resoun wole hem to be doon for god, þo werkis ben not morali vertuose, and if þei ben not morali vertuose, þei ben not morali good neipir meritori neipir rewardable.

The process by which a deed becomes morally virtuous :

(1) Reason must decide whether the deed may be a means towards our highest end, or no.

(2) Then, by counselling, Reason must decide the circumstances by which it may be such a means to our highest end.

(3) Then by choice of the Will, the deed, as a means to our highest end, is decided upon, or no.

This choice is a moral virtue or a moral virtuous deed.

A deed is only morally vicious :
(1) if, after Reason has decided it is a

Sone, y graunte wel | al þat þou hast now concludid, and 52^b
þerfore take hede what processe muste be had wipinforþ eer
þan a mannys deede be good and vertuose morali, and þerfore
eer þan it be þe seruice of god, and eer þan it be rewardable.
Certis, sone, resoun muste haue deliberacioun, avisying and
resonyng whepir pilk deede be able to be a meene toward 10
oure eend or no; and whanne it is founde þat pilk deede
may be such a meene, þanne resoun muste enquire and
fynde with what circumstauncis pilk deede is able to be oure
meene toward oure last eend. and al þis enquerri and
enserche and fyndyng in þe resoun is clepid 'counselyng'; 15
fforwhi counselyng which a man hap wipinne him silf is not
ellis þan an enserch and an enquerry and fyndyng about
meenes toward þe eend. Whanne resoun hap sufficientli
counselid, þanne þe wil, for dew ordre and knyttyng which
he hap to resoun, schal be mouyd to wille or nylle, and to 20
chese or refuse and comaunde to be doon or to be left vndoon
forto gete oure last eend, which is god, what resoun hap iugid
to be doon or to be left vndoon for getyng of þe same eend.
and þis werk of þe wil is clepid 'choice'; and it is about
þe same meenes toward þe eend aboute whiche meenes þe 25
resoun bifore counselide and iugide þat þei ben meenes to
gete oure eend. And þis choice, with comaundis þerto
perteynyng and maad in þe foorm and processe now seid, is
a moral vertu or ellis a moral vertuose deede. and ellis how
euer greet werk and what euer greet werk be willid of þe 30
wil, and be comaundid bi þe wil to be doon bi opire powers
of þe soul, if it be not doon bi þis seid choice toward oure
eend and for oure eend to be þerbi getun, and bi strengþ of
þe counselyng bifore maad in þe resoun, it is not a deede
good morali, neipir it is meritori, but it is doon casuali or 35
ellis vnformali þat it lackip his moral goodnesse.

ffadir, if þis be trewe þat 3e haue now seid of good and
vertuose werkis morali, bi lijk skile no deede schulde be
yuel and viciouse morali but if avisement and knowyng were

had bifore in þe resoun þat a deede ledip vs to godward, and not withstondyng such knowyng is had bi avisement and counselyng, oure wil leueþ and refusip þilk deede aȝens þe bifore had counselyng of resoun; or ellis oure wil doop, 5 chesip and comaundip þilk deede so knowen to be meene toward god, but ȝit not wiþ his dewe circumstauncis; or aȝens his dewe circumstauncis, as parauenture not for god, or in vndew tyme, and so of opire circumstauncis; or ellis 53^a if avisement and | knowyng be had bifore in þe resoun þat 10 a deede lettip vs from oure last eend, which is god, and þat fallip oft tymes for as mych as þilk deede is contrari to þe deede which bi þe bifore sett doctrine ledip vs to god, and ȝit, not wiþstondyng such knowyng y-had bi avisement and counseilyng, oure wil willip and chesip þilk deede aȝens þe 15 bifore had counselyng of resoun. fforwhi god is not redier to wijte, blame and punysche þan he is to preise, þanke and rewarde, and, þerfore, if he wole not preise, þanke and rewarde a mannys deedis but if þei be doon with avisose knowyng had þifore þat þei ben ledyng toward god, and but 20 if þei ben doon with afore¹ choice of hem toward god and for god to be bi hem had, it folewith þat also or ellis mych rapir god wole not dispreise, blame and punysche eny mannys deedis but if pese ij þingis ben had, þat is to seie, þat deedis be avisoseli bifore knowen to be meenes toward god, and, 25 not wiþstondyng þis knowyng, þilke deedis ben freeli refusid, or ellis þei ben chosen, but not vndir her dewe circumstauncis, or ellis with vndewe circumstauncis; or ellis deedis ben avisidli bifore knowen to be aȝens god, and not wiþstondyng þis knowyng þilke deedis ben freli chosen to be doon, and 30 þerfore aȝens god. And so pese ij kyndis of moral yuelis now rehercid conteynen alle moral yuelis.

Sone, al þis bi þee reducid and concludid y graunte, for it is open y-nouȝ in resoun. Wherof also as folewyng y graunte þat who euer wolde make a confessioun, schrift or knowlechyng 35 to god or to preest vpon alle þe spicis of moral synnes or vicis, he muste bigynne at þe first poynt of þe i^e table and renne bi rewe þoruȝ alle þe poyntis of þe iiij tablis beyng of comaundement bifore in 'þe donet' discryuyd, and þoruȝ alle

means towards our highest end, (a) the Will refuses to perform it at all; or

(b) does not perform it with due circumstances; or

(c) chooses to perform it with undue circumstances;

(2) if, after Reason has decided it is a hindrance to our highest end, the Will chooses to perform it.

God is not readier to punish than to reward, and will not punish a man for a deed unless it is proved to be morally vicious.

Therefore a man, when confessing his sins, must go through every Point of Pecoock's FOUR TABLES, confessing how he has broken God's law by committing any moral vice.

¹ MS. *a fore*.

her spicis *pere* nombrid, and *poru3* of ech spice ech circum-
 stance, and at ech spice of eueri poynt he muste make *iiij*
 knowlechyngis. *pe* first is *pat* he haþ *pilk* spice vndoon.
pe ije is *pat* he haþ doon *pilk* spice, but not *with* eche of his
 dewe circumstauncis, and in *pis* knowleching he muste renne 5
poru3 ech circumstance dew bi doom of resoun to *pilk* spice,
pat is to seie, avisosenesse, eend, maner, place, tyme, oop,
 vow, helpis of kynde, gracis, and manye suche *opire*. Neuer-
 peles it is to be considered here *pat* summe of pese cir-
 cumstauncis muste needis be had *with* ech moral vertuose 10
 deede, and ellis he is not a moral vertu, as ben avisosenesse,
 eend, maner, tyme and place; and summe *opire* circumstauncis
 ben not requyrid to be at ech vertuose deede, but at summe
 vertuose deedis and not | at ech, as vow and oop. *pe iije* 53^b
 knowlechyng is *pat* he haþ do *pilk* spice, but *with* to eche of 15
 his dewe circumstauncis *pe* contrari circumstance; and in
pis confessioun he muste make as large a course as he made
 in *pe ije* now bifore sett knowlechyng. *pe iiije* knowlechyng
 is *pat* he haþ do *pe* contrari deede to *pilk* spice, as if *pe*
 spice of vertu be a spice of meeknesse, he muste knowleche 20
pat he haþ be proud in *pe* spice of pride contrari to *pilk*
 spice of meeknesse; and if *pe* spice of vertu be a spice
 of pacience, he muste knowleche *pat* he haþ doon *pe* spice of
 vnpacience contrari to *pilk* spice of pacience. And certis,
 open it is *pat* forto make such now seid *iiij* knowlechyngis at 25
 ech spice of eueri poynt of comaundement conteynynd in *pe*
iiij tablis bifore sett in '*pe* donet', in *perof* *pe ie* parti, were
 ouer long to be seid bi tunge, and ouer long to be writun bi
 penne. And *perfore* no man vndirstonde me *pat* y was about
 forto make a confessioun or schrift at fullest of alle spicis 30
 and maners of synnes whanne y settide forþ a schrift in '*pe*
 book of dyuyne office' in fridaies matyns, and in his gretter
 extract or outdrau3t, pou3 y was about *pere* forto sette forþ a
 deuout and a profitable confessioun.

Christ said that
 every idle
 word should be
 accounted for at
 the last day,

ffadir, y haue mynde *pat* crist in *pe* gospel, *mathew*, 35
xije chapitre,¹ seip *pat* of ech ydil word we schule zelde a
 rekenyng in *pe* day of doom, and pus crist wolde not haue

seid, but if he hadde meenyd þat an ydil word were synne. And sipen as þer ben ydil wordis, so þer ben ydel lauzyngis, ydil seyngis, ydil heeryngis, ydil walkyngis, 3he, and parauenture wel ny3 ech kynde or spice of deede which may
 5 be maad vertuose may be doon ydeli and may be maad ydel, fforwhi ech deede is doon ydeli whanne it is doon and not for þe eend and entent for which bi doom of resoun he ou3te be don; wherfore ech idil speche, ech ydil seyng and heeryng, and ech ydil deede in what euer spice of dede he be, is synne.
 10 And if þis be trewe, y aske of 3ow, fadir, in whiche of þe foure bi 3ow now rehercid kyndis of knowlechyngis þe schrift and þe knowleching of an ydil word and of opire ydil deedis is conteynynd?

apparently
denouncing
idle words as
sin.

Sone, for answer to pyn askyng þou schalt vndirstonde þat
 15 alle þo deedis which ben doon wipout sufficient consideracioun and avisement afore had vpon hem and vpon eny antecedent or afore¹ goyng deedis wityngli ledyng into hem, ben out of þe kynde of al moralte, so þat þei ben neipir morali good neipir morali yuel; fforwhi þei lacken þe ground and þe first
 20 roote bi which þei schulden be morali deedis, which ground or
 54^a roote is aviseful² consideracioun | to falle vpon hem or vpon deedis beyng her bifore leders eer þei be doon; fforwhi þere mowe noon of oure deedis be morali good or badde saue þo whiche we doon as men beyng in a state aboue³ beestis. but
 25 so it is þat bi vse and wirchyng of no powers we ben more worpi þan beestis or in a state aboue beestis, saue bi wirchyngis of oure resoun and wil doon in þe ordre dew to þo powers; wherfore oonli bi wirchingis of oure resoun and wil doon in þe ordre dew to þo powers, oure deedis ben morali good or badde.
 30 and, ferþirmore, þe wirchyng of resoun is to make consideracioun and avisement, and þe insufficient wirchyng of eny power is not to be acceptid and alowid whanne his parfite and sufficient wirching may be had. Wherfore folewith þat oure deedis ben not morali good or morali badde wipout sufficient avise-
 35 ment of resoun fallyng vpon hem immediatli or at þe next, or ellis mediatli bi her antecedent deedis, þat is to seie, her afore goyng forþ leders, causers and forþ bryngers deedis, whanne þilk sufficient avise may be had. And so euery morali

This statement considered. Deeds which lack that due consideration which is the basis of a deed's morality, are neither morally good nor morally bad.

Every morali
virtuous deed

¹ MS. *a fore*.

² MS. *a viseful*.

³ MS. *a boue*.

and every moral
vicious deed is
done with due
consideration.

No deed may be
done with due
consideration
unless its end
taken into
account.

A deed or word
duly considered;
and so morally
virtuous or
vicious, may be
idle in three
ways :

(1) The end to
which it was
wrought, may
not be attained.
These idle
deeds may be
morally vir-
tuous, and
Christ did not
mean these were
sin.

(2) A deed or
word may be
idle when it
is not done to
the highest end.
Christ de-
nounced such as
sin.

vertuose deede muste needis be doon *with* a sufficient p^{er}to
avisement had vpon him silf or vpon his antecedent or afore
goyng and causyng deede, whanne it is knowen to p^{er} doer
pat pilk aforegoyng deede wole or schal so cause. And ech
moral viciouse deede muste needis be do *with* a sufficient p^{er}to
avisement had vpon him silf, or vpon his antecedent or afore
goyng *and* causyng deede, whanne pat it is knowen pat pilk
afore goyng deede wole or schal so cause. fferp^{er}more, sone,
pou schalt vndirstonde pat no deede may be doon of vs
avidilli but if it be doon vndir entent for sum eend *and* 10
effect p^{er}bi to be had withpinne vs silf or without vs silf; ffor-
whi we mowe not do eny deede avidilli but if we be movid
bi eny p^{er}ing forto do pilk deede; wherfore at p^{er} leest forto
conforme vs to pilk moving we doon eche of oure avidid deedis.

fferp^{er}more, sone, pou schalt vndirstonde pat in p^{re} maners 15
oure sufficientli avidid deede may be seid to be ydil and
in veyn. Oon is if oure avidid deede be doon of vs vndir
entent for a certeyn eend and effect p^{er}bi to be had and
to be brouzt forp, and zit pilk eend and effect is not p^{er}bi had
and brouzt forp; as if y lauze vndir pis entent pat p^{er} heerer 20
schulde lauze *with* me, and zit he not p^{er}bi is maad lauze; or
if y speke a word vndir pis entent pat p^{er} heerer schulde be
maad p^{er}bi p^{er} merier, and he is not p^{er}fore p^{er} merier. but
certis, of suche ydil deedis takun and vndirstondun in pis
maner, crist meenede not whanne he seide pat of ech ydil 25
word we schulen zelde a rekenyng; fforwhi deedis in pis
maner beyng | veyn and ydel mowe be ful vertuose morali 54^b
and of ful greet merite, as if y laboure p^{or}uz vj daies togidere
forto turne a wickid man from his wickidnesse, and pouz y
may not brynge it about, zit my labour is ful vertuose and 30
meritori.

In an op^{ir} maner oure deedis mowe be seid to be ydil and
veyn, pat is to seie, whanne p^{er} ben not doon for oure
gloriose blisse, neip^{ir} p^{er} ben doon as forto be meenys into
pilk oure gloriose blisse. As if y lauze vndir pis entent pat 35
p^{er} heerer schulde lauze *with* me *with* a lauzyng not helping
toward myn neip^{ir} his blisful eend; or if y speke a certeyn
word vndir entent pat p^{er} heerer be p^{er}bi maad meri and glad
with such myrthe and gladnesse pat neip^{ir} y neip^{ir} he p^{er}bi

neizēp toward myn or his blisful eend. *and* so pouȝ pese
 deedis of þis secundu maner be prosperose aȝens þe ydilnesse
 and veynnesse of þe first maner, ȝit þei ben ydil *and* veyn
 with ydilnesse and veynnesse of þe ije now seid maner.
 5 And of ydil wordis and deedis in þis ije maner crist meenede
 whanne he seide þat of ech ydil word we schulen ȝeelde a
 rekenyng in þe day of doom; and riȝtli *and* iustli, forwhi
 such a deede is not circumstauncid with his dew eend where
 and whanne it myȝte be circumstauncid with his dew eend.
 10 In þe iije maner oure deede may be seid ydil whanne it is
 of vs doon vnder entent for a certeyn eend and effect þerbi to
 be had and be brouȝt forþ, and ȝit þilk eend and effect schulde
 be had, doon and be brouȝt forþ pouȝ þilk deede were not
 doon; as yf y wolde preie þee to loue a certeyn man, and
 15 ȝit þou woldist loue him neuer þe lasse and neuerpelattir
 pouȝ y not so preied þee for him. And in þis maner oopes
 ben seid to be sett to affermyngis or denyngis in veyn and
 in ydel, whanne þe affermer or denyer schulde be bileeuyd
 neuer þe lasse and neuer þe latir, pouȝ he schulde not sette
 20 þe oop to his seiȝng of affermyng or denyng, namelich siþen
 an oop is such a circumstaunce þat he ouȝte not be sett to
 a deede of affermyng or of denyng in speche, or in opir signe
 occupiȝng þe stede of speche, saue whanne it semyȝ to þe
 affermer or denyer þat þe heerer wolde not ellis sufficientli
 25 bileeue, as schal be tauȝt and declarid in þe book 'sprediȝ
 þe iiij tablis'. And þus mych, sone, is y-nouȝ for answer to
 þi last bifore maad askyng.

(3) A deed or word may be idle when the end to which it was wrought can be attained without it. Oaths and vows are idle when a matter is believed without them.

xxije *chapitre.*

[F]Adir, þanne ferþir þus. If al þis which ȝe han grauntid
 30 be trewe, þanne þerof folewith þat what euer deede be doon
 wipout such afore¹ avisose knowyng now seid, it is not vice
 35 and synne; but þat | lack of þe seid avisose knowyng, which
 lack is ignoraunce, schal excūse þilk deede fro vice *and* fro
 synne; And also what euer deede be doon wipout fre choice
 35 of it is also no vice neþir synne; And so what euer deede
 a man be constreyned to do, it is no vice neþir synne.²

Should it not follow that deeds done in ignorance or under constraint are not moral vices?

¹ MS. *afore*.

² See Notes.

Deeds done in ignorance are not moral vices, provided that the ignorance consists in not knowing that the doing or the not-doing of a deed is against the doom of Reason.

The circumstances in which this ignorance excuses sin.

Sone, þis þat þou hast now concludid of ignoraunce is trewe. Neuerþeles, vndir þis maner it is trew: þe ignoraunce bi which a man vnknowiþ his deede which he doop, or þe vndoyng of a deede comaundid to be doon, to be aȝens resoun, and þerfore to be aȝens goddis lawe, excusip him from synne in þilk deede or in þilk vndoyng or absteynyng, so þat þilk ignoraunce be cause whi he doop þe deede or leueþ þe deede vndoon; þat is to seie, if he hadde þe kunnyng contrari to þilk ignoraunce, he wolde not do þilk deede or forbere þe opir deede; And so þat he avisedli and wilfulli was not cause whi he hap þilk ignoraunce, and þat bi eny þing þat he dide afore or lefte vndo afore, which þing so doon or so left vndoon he wiste wel wolde brynge him into þilk ignoraunce; or ellis if it was out of his power to haue þe kunnyng contrari to þilk ignoraunce; or ellis if it longide not to his state and his degre and to his leernyng to haue þe kunnyng contrari to þe seid ignoraunce. Certis, in þese now seid caacis ignoraunce of a man doyng a badde deede or forberying a good deede comaundid, excusip him from synne in þilk deede or in þilk forberying, and þat wheþir þilk ignoraunce be ignoraunce of riȝtwisnesse or ignoraunce of deede, þat is to seie, wheþir it be ignoraunce bi which he vnknowiþ his deede to be aȝens riȝtwisnesse and lawe of resoun or of feip, or wheþir it be ignoraunce bi which he vnknowiþ what he doop, þat is to seie, wheþir he doop þilk deede or no, as it fariþ with a man doyng a deede in his sleep or in his madnesse or in his drunkenesse. and bisidis or out of þese now rehercid caacis neuer neiþir ignoraunce excusip a man from synne in þe deede which he doop, or in þe leuyng a good deede of comaundement vndoon vndir þe same ignoraunce.¹

Insufficient knowledge is ignorance of sufficient knowledge, and so excuses sin under the same circumstances as does ignorance.

ffadir, y perceyue wel in whiche caacis ignoraunce or vnkunnyng excusip þe vnknower from gilt of þe deede, of which deede þe ignoraunce is cause þat þe deede be doon. neuerþeles, fadir, for as mych as not oonli ful ignoraunce but also vnsufficient knowyng in þe doer, is oft cause of erryng in gouernaunce, y may wel aske wheþir such vnsufficient knowyng schal excuse from gilt as ful and vtirli ignoraunce schal excuse, | or no.

¹ See Notes.

Sone, wipout suffiience of kunnyng longyng to eny effect, þe effect may not be brouȝt forþ and doon, and so vnsuffi-
 cience of kunnyng longyng to eny effect is an ignoraunce
 of sufficient kunnyng longyng to þe same effect. and þerfore
 5 waite wel what y haue now seid vpon ful ignoraunce, whanne
 it schal excuse or not excuse, and al þe same is trewe of
 vnsuffiience of kunnyng, whanne it schal excuse or not
 excuse, for such vnsuffiience is an ignoraunce in reward of
 þe suffiience.

10 fferþimre, as anentis it what þou concludist as it were of
 vnfre choice and of constreynyng. Certis, forto wite how it
 is trew and how it is vntrew, þou muste heere mych more,
 fforwhi þou muste heere and wite what is þus to seie, and
 what meeneþ þus to seie, 'þis þing is bi violence constreynyd';
 15 and in how many maners þis speche may be vndirstonde, 'þis
 þing is bi violence constreynyd'. And þerfore, sone, take
 heede what y schal teche and seie.

In v maners þis speche, 'a þing is constreynyd', may be
 vndirstonde, and in þe iiij maners of hem it is to be vndir-
 20 stonde þat a þing is constreynyd bi violence, but in þe ve
 maner is constreynyng, but not violence. þe ie maner is þis:
 þat bi sum opir outward þing he is maad to do or cece from do-
 yng or abstayne from a deede, what he wolde not so do or leue
 vndoon bi his owen inward kynde.¹ þe ije maner is þis: þat
 25 þe þing bi sum opir outward þing to him is lettid forto do or
 abstene or leue vndoon what he wolde bi his inward kynde do.
 þe iiije maner is þis: þat sum opir outward þing doop with
 him and bi him sum deede which he in his owen kynd wole
 not do bi him silf and bi vertu or strengþ of him silf, neþir
 30 doop now þilk deede opir wise þan as an instrument of þe
 opir seid outward þing vsyng and demeenyng him into þe
 seid deede. þe iiije maner of constreynyng bi violence is
 whanne a persoon is putt into choice wheþir he wole do þis
 deede or leue vndoon a deede, or suffre þilk peyn, losse, hurt,
 35 or harm, and is certified and pretenyd þat but if he do þis
 deede, or forbere or abstene fro a certeyn deede, he schal
 suffre þilk peyn, losse, hurt or harm; or ellis þat but if he
 wole take þe lasse good in stide of þe gretter, he schal forgo

The exact mean-
 ing of 'a thing
 is constrained
 by violence'
 must be con-
 sidered, before
 one can say such
 a deed con-
 strained is not
 a moral vice.

This phrase 'a
 thing is con-
 strained' may
 be understood in
 five ways, four
 being concerned
 with constraint
 by violence, the
 fifth with con-
 straint, but not
 by violence.

(1) A thing
 would be con-
 strained if it
 could be forced
 by some other
 outward thing to
 do or to not do a
 deed that it
 would not do or
 leave undone by
 its own inward
 nature.¹

(2) A thing may
 be hindered by
 some other out-
 ward thing from
 acting accord-
 ing to its
 own inward
 nature.

(3) A thing may
 be forced as the
 instrument of
 some other out-
 ward thing to do
 a deed which it
 would not do by
 its own nature.

¹ See Notes.

(4) A person may be threatened with punishment, if he does or does not do a deed, or if he does not take a lesser good instead of a greater good.

Is not there a fifth manner of constraint by violence, when a power other than Free Will is constrained to perform its own working?

po bope goodis; and perfore pilk persoon chesip and takip þe lasse semyng yuel to him, which ellis, if ne were þis þretenyng of þe more yuel, he wolde not chese *and* take.

fadir,¹ wheþir not may be putt and holde þe v^e maner of 5 constreynyng bi violence, | which schulde be þat ech power 56^a opir þan fre resonable wil is nedid forto wirche his determyned oon maner of werk for þe while into þe obiet presentid and applied dewli to him, and may not abstene fro pilk werk, neiþir chaunge into an opir maner of wirchyng, 10 for pilk while stondyng þe obiet lijk wise disposid and lijk wise presentid and applied. As may it not be seid þat þe ize or þe seyng power is constreynyd forto se whijtnes and iuge it as whitnes, if and whanne and while þe whijtnes is presentid to him? and so lijk of alle opire powers dyuers fro þe 15 ouerer wil.

(5) This is the fifth manner of constraint, but is not constraint by violence, since it is natural to the power to so work.

No, sone, such constreynyng as is, bi violence we mowe not putte to be and holde; fforwhi where euer such constreynyng is, pere þe deede is doon which schulde not be doon bi as mych as schulde ellis ligge in þe doer, or is doon opir 20 wise þan schulde be doon bi as mych as ellis schulde be bi þe doer. but so is not whanne þe whijtnes mouep þe ize or þe visife power to se pilk whijtnes and to deme it as for whijtnes; neiþir so it is in þe wirchyng of eny power, dyuers fro þe ouerer wil, into his kyndeli obiet applied to him kyndeli. 25 wherfore y kanne not holde with þis forto seie þat eny power dyuerse fro wil is constreynyd violentli or bi violence whanne he wirchip naturali his natural werk in to his obiet to him presentid *and* applied. Neuerþeles y kanne not se but þat in pese wirchyngis may be putt and holde to be a 30 constreynyng which is not bi violence, but of natural neede forto wirche wipout chaunge and wipout fredom and liberte. But 3it herof folewith not þat þe fadir in heuen is constreynyd forto loue his sone in godhede, bi cause he muste needis loue him and may not forbere; neiþir þat a blisful aungel in 35 heuen is constreynyd forto loue god seen of him, for þat þe aungel muste needis loue god so seen of him, and may not abstene while he soo seep him; for pese louyngis, not wipstondyng her vnchaungeabilnessis, ben doon freli, and so ben

¹ Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

not doon þe seid deedis of opir natural powers dyuers fro þe resonabil wil.

In þe first maner bifore seid forto speke of constreynnyng or of violence suffryng, certis, in pilk maner no creature may
 5 be constreynyd namelich bi an opir creature and actyueli to do; fforwhi no creature, fre or vnfre, quyk or not quyk, bodi or not bodi, may be a doer azens his owen kynd, and perfore bi eny opir outward þing he may not be maad þat he be
 56^a a doer azens his owen kynd; | fforwhi þanne his kynd
 10 schulde do azens his owen kynd, And so þerof wolde folewe þat þe same þat is kyndful were not kyndeful, in as mych as it were azens þat þat is kyndeful. and so it is open þat as impossible as it is þat a stoon be maad þat he him silf move vpward, or þat fier be maad forto þat he move him silf down-
 15 ward,¹ so it is impossible to make þat eny creature do azens eny deede which to so do is azens his nature and kynde. And perfore in þe first maner bifore sett and seid, no creature may be constreynyd to do, euen as in þe v^e maner of constreynnyng bifore seid ech creature may be constreynyd and
 20 is constreynyd to do and to suffre, except þe ouerer wil, þouȝ not bi violence, as is bifore seid.

(1) The first manner of constraint by violence is impossible, since nature will not act against nature.

In þe ije of pese seid iij maners of vndirstondyng it is to be seid þat a stoon liggyng vpon þe roof of an house is constreynyd bi violence in þat þat he is lettid to descende
 25 down as he willip bi his kynde to descende, and so of fier, if he be holde þat he ascende not as he bi his kynde willip to ascende.

(2) The second manner is possible, since a thing may be hindered from following its nature.

In þe iije maner of vndirstondyng it is to be seid þat if y take a mannys hond and perwith y smyte þe same man in
 30 his face, his hond is constreynyd to bete pilk face. And also in pis iije maner it is to be seid þat a stoon with which whilis y bere in myn hond y smyte an opir mannys heed, and y breke perwith his heed, is constreynyd bi violence in þat þat myn hond wircip bi pis stoon apd with pis stoon an actyue deede
 35 of smytyng or sum opir actyue doyng deede, as with an instrument of my doyng; which actyue or doyng deede pis stoon doop not principali, but y do pilk deede principali bi þe stoon and with þe stoon as bi an instrument to þe same

(3) The third manner is possible, since a virtue or quality may be forced on a thing, rendering that thing the instrument of another outward thing, and constraining it to perform a deed contrary to its nature.

¹ See Notes.

seid my doying. In lijk maner it is of alle þingis casten forþ
 fro þe first caster, as if y þrowe a stoon or if y scheete an
 arow opir wise to wirche þan þei wolen bi her kynde to
 wirche, it is to be seid þat þe first caster, as is myn hond or
 þe bow, gendrip a movyng qualite or a movyng vertu into þe 5
 stoon or into þe arow, which vertu is alwey ioynyd with
 þe stoon or with þe arow whilis he so wirchip in his out
 þrowyng til he cese. and þilk vertu so contynueli in þe
 seid while couplid to þe stoon or to þe arow vsip þilk stoon
 or arow as his instrument forto wirche al þat is doon bi þilk 10
 stoon or arow azens her wil of kynde in þilk out castyng.
 And þilke actyue or doying deedis ben verili deedis of þilk
 vertu | principali, and not deedis of þe stoon or of þe arow 57^a
 principali; for þouȝ þe stoon haue a wirching, ȝit he wirchip
 not and doop not þilk wirchyng bi him silf and bi his owen 15
 strengþ, as in a beyng restid, but in strengþ of þilk vertu,
 and in as a beyng movid; riȝt as we ouȝte now feele and
 graunte to seie þat þe seel of þe seeler makip not þe prent in þe
 wexe, but þat þe seeler makip þe prent, þouȝ þe seeler makip þe
 prent with and bi his seel as with and bi his instrument into 20
 þe seid makyng of þe prent. And þerfore, sone, considere þou
 wel þat al þing þat is seid to be constreynyd in þis iiije maner
 forto do an actyue doying deede, doop not þilk deede in
 opir wise þan as an instrument to a deede doop þilk deede;
 and treup is þat an instrument to a deede is ioynyd to þe 25
 next wircher of þe same actyue deede, and þe instrument
 is not wircher of þe same actyue deede principali and þouȝ
 his owen strengþ in beyng restid, but in strengþ of an opir,
 and in beyng movid.

(4) The fourth
 manner is
 possible only in
 the case of a
 person possess-
 ing Reason and
 Free Will.

(5) The fifth
 manner applies
 to powers other
 than the Will,
 which work
 naturally but
 under con-
 straint, though
 not under con-
 straint by
 violence.

In þe iiije maner may no þing be constreynyd saue a 30
 persone hauyng resoun and þerto ioyned ouerer wil.

In þe ve maner euery þing wirchyng or suffryng not bi þe
 ouerer wil, which is clepid 'fre wil', is constreynyd to do
 and suffre, þouȝ he so do or suffre naturali. neuerþeles, þis
 constreynyng is not bi violence whanne he doop or suffrip 35
 naturali, as is bifore tauȝt.

Now, sone, forto brynge al þis processe of constreynyng
 vnto þe purpos of þyn argument. mannys wil hap ij maners
 of deedis, fforwhi he hap inward priuey deedis whiche he may

hide and kepe pryuey fro ech opir man, as ben summe willyngis and nyllyngis, chesyngis and refusyngis, not beyng comaundyngis to opire powers forto wirche sensibli and apperyngli wipoutforþ, and summe comaundyngis to powers
 5 forto wirche her werkis beyng not sensible into withoutforþ; Also he hap summe inward deedis whiche he may not kepe priuey fro opire men, but þat þei schulen needis be knowe bi her effectis, as ben comaundyngis bi whiche he comaundip to alle opire outward sensityue and motyue powers of þe
 10 soul þat þei wirche her outwardli sensible deedis accordyng bi kynde to hem.

There are two kinds of deeds of the Will :

(a) Inward deeds which may be either hidden or not hidden from another man.

And also mannys wil hap outward deedis comaundid to be do bi þe same wil, as ben seyng, heeryng, spekyng, walkyng, smytyng, and alle opire deedis of eny power of þe soul or of
 15 þe bodi whilis þilke deedis ben comaundid of þe wil þat þei be doon. and þouȝ þese now | seid deedis ben deedis of opire powers of þe soul and of þe bodi þan of þe wil, ȝit þei mowe be clepid 'deedis of þe wil' for as mych and in as mych as þei ben comaundid bi þe wil þat þei be doon bi
 20 þe opire seid powers of þe soul and of þe bodi.

(b) Outward deeds.

þanne ferþir þus : as towchyng þe seid inward deedis of þe wil, wheþir þei be willyngis or nyllyngis not beyng comaundyngis, or wheþir þei ben comaundyngis into outward sensible deedis, þei ben so priuey to þe wil whos deedis þei ben, þat noon
 25 opir creature may atteyne to þe wil and to hem forto lette þat þei ben not doon of þe wil, if þe wil wolde do hem. And þerfore mannys wil in his now seid inward deedis may not of eny creature be constreynynd in þe ije maner of constreynyng. fferþirmor, noon opir creature may come in so nyȝ to mannys
 30 wil þat þilk creature myȝte vse þe seid mannys wil or þe seid inward priuey deedis of mannys wil as instrumentis into eny wirchyng deede to be doon bi þe same creature, which wirching deede þe mannys wil or þe seid inward deedis of þe mannys wil kepen not wirche and do. Wherefore mannys
 35 wil as in his seid inward deedis may not be constreynynd in þe iije maner of constreynyng. Neipir into þese same inward so priuey deedis of þe wil, neipir into þe forberyng of hem whiche ben not comaundyngis into outward sensible deedis to be doon, mannys wil may of eny opir man be bi violence

The inward deeds of man's Will which may be hidden from another man, cannot be constrained by violence in the second manner.

Or in the third manner.

Or in the fourth manner.

cōstreynyd in þe iiije maner of violence constreynyng; forwhi into no þing may eny creature be constreynyd in þis iiije maner, but if þilk þing be aspied and be open and knowen to þe þretener þat he is or not is. Wherefore, siþen þe willer may make eche of þese seid deedis so priuey þat þe þretener 5 schal not asprie wheþir þei ben or not ben, folewith þat into noon of hem to be, neiþir into eny of hem to not be, þe þretener may constreyne bi violence in þe iiije maner.

The inward deeds of man's Will which *cannot* be hidden from another man on account of their effects, cannot be constrained in the second or third manner, but they may be constrained in the fourth manner.

Certis, into þe opire seid inward deedis of þe wil which þe man þretener may make be knowen of him wheþir þei be or 10 not be, as ben comaundyngis of þe wil þat outward sensible deedis be doon or be ceesid fro doying, a man may not be constreynyd in þe ije maner neiþir in þe iiije maner of constreynyng bifore seid; but, forsoþe, in þe iiije maner bifore seid of constreynyng, a man may into hem bi an 15 opir man pretenyng be constreynyd, and þat for þe þretener may asprie wheþir þei ben or not ben as bi þe outward sensible werk which schulde be comaundid to be or to | be 58^a ceecid.

Man's Will may not be constrained in the first manner.

And in þe first maner of constreynyng mannys wil may not 20 be constreynyd forto do and wirche eny inward or outward deede which þe wil wole not bi his kynde wirche; fforwhi in þis first maner of constreynyng no creature may be constreynyd, as is bifore schewid.

The outward deeds of man's Will may be constrained in the second manner.

As touchyng þe bifore seid outward sensible deedis 25 comaundable bi þe wil þat þei be doon, as ben etyng, drynk- yng, walkyng, smytyng, and alle opire outward sensible deedis of eny power in þe bodi and in þe soul, þe wil may be constreynyd bi an opir outward creature in þe ije maner of constreynyng; fforwhi þouȝ y in my wil comaunde to þe 30 moving power of myn hond þat he move myn hond to smyte, ȝit an opir man may holde myn hond þat he smyte not; and so forþ of opire comaundable deedis bi þe wil. But in þe iiije maner of constreynyng no creature may constreyne my wil anentis þe seid deedis comaundable bi my wil; fforwhi þanne 35 þilk creature myȝte in þe iiije maner constreyne my wil forto comaunde an outward deede to be doon, and so my wil schulde be constreynyd in þe first maner anentis his inward deede which is comaundyng, and þat is false, as is now bifore

But not in the third.

schewid. Neuerpeles, into þe now seid outward deedis of þe wil a man and his wil may be constreynyd in þe iiije seid maner of constreynyng, as apperip openli y-nouȝ.

They may be constrained in the fourth manner.

3it forto brynge louȝer þis processe into þe purpos of þyn
5 argument, if y se my neiȝbor goyng toward þe watir forto drenche him silf, y ouȝte bi vertu of charite forto nylle his drenchyng, and forto wille defende him fro drenching aftir my power, and þerfore forto comaunde in my wil to my feet þat þei bere me toward him, and to myne hondis þat þei holde
10 him. But stondyng al þis þat y so nylle and wille and comaunde, if y be lettid þat y may not go to him and holde him, y am excusid from synne in þis þat y not go to him and not holde him, for y am in þis constreynyd in þe ije maner. But, certis, for as mych as y may not be constreynyd and
15 lettid in þe ie, ije, iiije or v^e maner, but þat y may nylle his drenchyng and wille his defendyng, and comaunde to my bodi þat it be movid toward him and holde him; þerfore, but if y so nylle and wille and comaunde as now is seid, in lasse þan y be lettid in þe iiije maner bi þretenyng of a grettir yuel
20 ellis to bifalle, y synne, þouȝ y be lettid and constreynyd in þe ije maner fro execucioun of þe outward deedis perfoormyng.

Example.

There is no sin in the non-performance of a deed, if its performance is hindered as in the second manner. The sin lies in the command of the Will not to do a good deed, or to do an evil one; unless the Will is constrained in the fourth manner, in which case, in certain circumstances, there is no sin.

xxiiije chapitre.

[F]Erþirmore, for as mych into oure now here had
58^b principal purpos, which is forto | declare þe ije conclusioun
25 concludid in þe bigynnyng of þe xxije chapitre, it is not forto speke of eny of þe seid maners of constreynyng saue of þe iiije maner, as is open y-nouȝ; And also, for as mych as in þe seid iiije maner of constreynyng a man or his wil may be into a deede to be doon, or into a deede to be cecid bi him or into
30 a forberyng, constreynyd bi a peyn or an opir deede þretenyd beyng not wors to þe man þan schulde be þe deede or þe leuyng of þe deede which ellis he wolde do or make to cece; And aȝenward it may be so þat in þe seid iiije maner of constreynyng þe peyn or yuel þretenyd schulde be wors to þe
35 man þan schulde be þe deede or þe þing which ellis he wolde chese and do or þe absteynyng; þerfore y seie now here þus
1 mych: þat if þe man constreynyd consente and do eny þing

The circumstances in which a deed constrained by violence in the fourth manner is, or is not, sin.

When a man is constrained, by

the threat of a greater evil, to do any deed or leave undone any deed, the deed, or the not doing of that deed, is *virtuous*.

If constrained by the threat of a lesser evil, the deed is *vicious*.

If constrained by the threat of an equal evil, the choice of either course is *virtuous*.

Sin towards God is a greater evil than is bodily pain or loss of worldly goods, so if a man under constraint chooses the sin towards God, he acts *viciously*.

There can be no possibility of choice between two sins towards God.

Hence a deed constrained in the fourth manner may be virtuous, or may be a venial sin or a deadly sin towards God.

good or yuel, or leue vndo good or yuel, for þe pretenyng maad to him of a grettir yuel, he doop vertuoseli y-nouȝ; for he doop aftir doom of resoun, which wolde þat in a perplexite bitwixe ij yuelis, þe lasse yuel is to be chosen, for þe lasse yuel in pilk skile hap him as a ping good. And aȝenward, if 5 þe man constreynyd bi pretenyng of yuel to him, consente and do eny yuel or leue vndoon good for þe pretenyng maad to him of a lasse yuel, he doop not þerin vertuoseli but vicioseli. and if þo ij yuelis be lijk greet, he doop not vicioseli but vertuoseli, which euer of þe bope sidis he chese, 10 so þat alle opire circumstauncis be in ener eipir side lijk. Wherefore; siþen syn to god, namlich deedli synne, is grettir yuel to eny man þan schulde be losse of eny worldli good for it silf, or þan schulde be eny bodili peyn for it silf, or eny worldli or fleisthli delectacioun for it silf, a man perplexid 15 bitwix such seid peyn or losse in þe oon side in lasse þan he do such seid synne in þe opir side, doop vicioseli if he forsake þe peyn and chese forto do þe syn; ffor he in his perplexite bitwix peyne or losse and synne chesip þe more yuel for ascapyng of þe lasse yuel. Neuerþeles, þouȝ a man may 20 stonde in such a perplexite bitwix peyne or losse of good and syn, of which he muste needis and ouȝte chese þe oon, ȝit he may neuer stonde so perplexid bitwixe ij synnes to god þat he muste needis or ouȝte chese þe oon, for þanne goddis lawe were not iust in þis, þat a man were bounde to synne. 25 þe, it wolde folewe þat, for as mych as he were bounde into a syn, pilk syn were no syn, and so þerof wolde folewe contradiccioun. And ȝit vndir þis generalte forto seie more speciali, | y procede þus: þe deede into which a man is 59^a constreynyd in þe seid iiij^e maner is a good deede anentis 30 god, þat is to seie, is a moral vertu of his lawe to which he is bounde, or to which he is not bounde; or þe deede into which þe man is constreynyd is an yuel deede anentis god, þat is to seie, is a moral vice contrari to goddis lawe, which vice is venyal syn or deedli syn. If þis man chese þe deede 35 spokun in þe i^e membre of þis distinccioun for avoydyng of eny bodili peyn, losse, or hurt, how litil euer it be or how greet euer it be pretenyd to him, he doop not vicioseli but vertuoseli, and þat whepir into þe same deede he be bounde

bifore bi þe lawe of god, or not bound but counseilid oonli. And if þis man chese þe deede spokun in þe ije membre of þis present distinnecioun for avoidyng of eny bodili peyn, losse, or hurt, how euer litil or greet it schulde be, he þerin doop
 5 not vertuoseli but viciوسeli. and whi it is so, cause is open þat he chesip þe more yuel to him bifore þe lasse yuel to him.

ffirþmore, it may be so þat þe deede into which a man is constreynyd in þe seid iiije maner is a deede good and profit-
 10 able to þe man him silf, but not fallyng vndir þe bidding of god to be doon, as is forto wyne or haue xx pound in money, and suche opire; or it is a deede yuel to þe man him silf, but not forbode of god, as forto 3eue out for nouzt xx pound of his money, and suche opire. If he be constreynyd
 15 into þe deede of þe former now seid membre bi pretenyng of peyn lasse or more, he doop vertuoseli in chesyng pilk deede. And if he be constreynyd into þe ije now seid membre bi pretenyng of gretter yuel þan is þe refusyng of pilk deede, he doop vertuoseli. and if þe yuel pretenyd be lasse yuel to
 20 him þan þe refusyng of pilk deede, he in chesyng pilk deede doop viciوسeli, neuerþeles not synnyng deedli. And if þe yuel pretenyd be lijk yuel to þe refusyng of þe deede, he doop vertuoseli y-nou3, wher euer of þe boþe sidis he take. Al þis apperip bi what is here bifore tauzt.

25 ffadir, y þanke 3ow for al þis good informacioun to me makyng and 3euyng. Neuerþeles, fadir, 3e muste clere me here with vpon summe specialtees beyng vndir 3oure general doctrine now 3ouun, and þanne y hope y schal be in rest.

I putte caas, fadir, þat in þe nyzt þeues comen to 3oure
 30 house, whanne 3e ben in 3oure bedde, and þei setten daggers to 3oure brest, pretenyng forto sle 3ow but if 3e telle hem
 50^b where 3oure tresour is, and but if | 3e go and delyuere 3oure tresour to hem. is not in þis caase bi þis [þ]retenyng¹ 3oure wil constreynyd in þe first maner in his willyng, bi
 35 which 3e willen to telle bi movyng of 3oure tung where 3oure tresour is hid? And is not 3oure wil constreynyd in þe first maner forto comaunde to 3oure tung, to 3oure feet and to 3oure handis forto telle, go and delyuere, siþen 3oure wil

Or it may be virtuous or vicious towards oneself.

If thieves threaten to slay a man unless he discloses the whereabouts of his treasure, is not the deed of disclosure constrained in the first manner?

¹ MS. *tretenyng*.

schulde not and wolde not haue maad þis willyng or comaundyng and spekyng, goyng and delyueryng, if ne hadde be maad to 3ow þis þretenyng?

The Will in this case is *not* constrained in the first manner, because the delivering is not done against the Will.

No, sone, it may not be seid þat in þis caase y am constreynyd aftir þe i^e maner neipir aftir þe ije or iije maner, 5 to so as is now rehercid wille, comaunde, speke, go and delyuere; fforwhi a man is not constreynyd in þe first maner to do eny deede, but if he be maad do hem aȝens his wil and not with his wil. but, certis, in þis caase y do not eny of þe seid deedis aȝens my wil, for y do hem with my wil and bi 10 my wil; fforwhi my wil bryngiþ hem forþ and comaundiþ hem to be doon; wherfore y am not in þe first maner constreynyd. Also my wil is not constreynyd in eny of þe seid maners into þe seid deedis, forwhi no power of my soul or of my bodi may brynge forþ willyng and comaundyng 15 pat speche, goyng and delyueraunce be doon, saue oonli my wil. and, perfore, siþen my wil bryngiþ forþ þe seid willyng and comaundyng, sche bryngiþ not forþ and comaundiþ hem not aȝens hir wil; for þanne sche schulde brynge forþ and comaunde aȝens hir silf, and in pat sche schulde brynge forþ 20 and not brynge forþ þe same þing, comaunde and not comaunde þe same þing, wille and nylle þe same þing, which is not trewe.

Neither is the Will constrained in the second or third manner, because no power of the soul or body may will the delivery of the treasure except the Will.

But the outward deeds of the Will are constrained in the fourth manner, because it is a greater evil to lose one's life than to deliver one's treasure.

but y am constreynyd and my wil is constreynyd into þese deedis in þe iije seid maner of constreynyng, fforwhi al 25 pat y do in þis caase is þis: I considere in my resoun how greet yuel it is to me forto seie where my tresour is, and forto delyuere my tresour; And y considere how greet yuel it is to me forto lese my bodili lijf; and y considere þat it is lasse yuel to me vttrre and delyuere my worldli tresour þan to lese 30 my lijf; and y considere þat y am so sett bitwixe þese two yuelis þat, but if y vttrre and delyuere my seid tresour, y schal leese my bodili lijf; perfore bi doom of resoun, which is þat of two yuelis þe lasse is to be suffrid or takun rapir þan þe grettir, y turne my wil forto wille my tresour to be vttrid 35 and delyuerid, and to comaunde my tung forto speke and | so 60^a to telle where my tresour is, and to þe feet forto go where it is, and to myn hondis forto delyuere þe same. And so al þis þat y do is doon of me bi wil, þouȝ it so be þat y wolde not

so bi wil comaunde forto speke, go and delyuere, if þis pretenyng were not present at me and mynystride to me.

Neuerpeles, sone, it nedip not algatis forto seie and holde in þis case þat y or my wil is constreynynd in the iiije maner into þe bfore spokun priuey deedis of my wil which y may wel hide fro my constreyners, as ben nyllyngis þat þei haue my seid tresour as for heris, and nyllyng þat þei bere it away with hem, and willyng þat þei leue it with me, and willyng þat þei delyuere it azen to me as myn, and suche opire priuey inward deedis. for alle þese inward deedis y may kepe withinforþ in þe seid caase of constreynyng, þo constreyners it not wityng; þouȝ y may not kepe priuey, þo constreyners vnwityng, wheþir y haue or not haue þe comaundyng þat my tung telle where my tresour is, or þe comaundyng þat my feet go to þe place where it is hid, and þe comaundyng þat myne hondis putte pilk tresour into her hondis, as y may not kepe priuey to me, hem not wityng, wheþir y haue or not haue my seid tellyng, goyng and delyueryng. but as y and my wil ben constreynynd in þe iiije maner into þese þre now seid outward deedis, so y and my wil mowe be constreynynd in þe iiije maner into þe comaundyngis in þe wil bi which y and my wil comaunde þo þre outward deedis to be doon.

þhe, o my sone, yf y schulde seie ferþir, y myȝte seie þus: þat þouȝ þe seid constreyners myȝten and wolden constreyne me in þe iiije seid maner forto speke outwardli þese wordis to hem, 'y ȝeue to ȝow al þis tresour, and my ful ynnest priuey willyng is þat ȝe haue þis tresour for ȝouris'; or if þei askiden of me þus, 'Is it þi ful willyng ynnest and priueist þat we haue þis tresour for ouris?' and y seie with my tung wipoutforþ, 'þhe, it is my willyng', etcetera; ȝit nedip not be þat y and my wil be constreynynd in þe iiije seid maner into þis, þat y ȝeue to hem my seid tresour, or þat y make þe seid tresour to be heris; fforwhi it nedip not to be þat y and my wil be constreynynd in þe iiije seid maner into þis, þat y seie þo wordis assertyueli, but, stondyng al þe violence of þo constreyners, y may seie þo wordis wipout assercioun makyng bi hem, as y do whanne y seie, 'god is not' in þis verse of þe sawter, 'þe vnwiȝs | man haȝ seid god is not',¹ And as y do whanne y seie, 'þe wey of god is

The inward deeds of the Will which may be hidden from others, are not constrained in the fourth manner.

But the inward deeds of the Will which may not be hidden from others, are constrained in the fourth manner, as the outward deeds of the Will are constrained.

Words may be said without asserting anything.

¹ xiv. 1; liii. 1.

Or as sounds only, with no meaning attached to them by the speaker; or with a meaning different from that attached to them by the hearer.

Hence the inward private deeds of the Will are not constrained.

If the inward private deeds of the Will that may be hidden from others, are constrained because of ignorance that they need not be constrained, there is no sin, and the deed done underconstraint is virtuous, provided that the evil threatened is greater than the evil into which the Will is constrained.

vnriȝtful', seiȝng what is write, eȝekiel, xviije¹ and xxxiiije² chapitris, 'ȝe iewes seien þe wey of god is vnriȝtful'. Also y may speke þo wordis materiali as suche sownys oonli, wiþout significacioun takun of me vpon hem, and y may speke hem in an opir signyficacioun and meenyng þan in whiche þe 5 constreyners trowen me to speke hem. And so, siþen þis is trewe þat þo men mowe not constreyne me and my wil in þe iiije maner into eny þing which y may hide fro hem or make hem trowe þat y do it whanne y not do it, folewith þat it is not nedis to be grauntid þat þei constreynen me into þese 10 now seid deedis whilis y kepe þe contraries of þo deedis so priueli to me, hem it vnwityng.

Neuerþeles, sone, if y were not of so greet kunȝnyng forto knowe þat y myȝte do in so priueli hidyng as y haue now seid, or if y were not in pilk while þervpon wel remembrid 15 and avised forto so priueli hide myn inward deedis, y schulde þanne be constreynyd not oonli into þe seid iij outward deedis and into þe iij inward comaundyngis bi which þese iij outward deedis ben doon, but also into þe opire seid inward deedis in which y wole þat þis tresour be heris, and þat þe 20 lordschip and riȝt þerof passe fro me into hem, and þat þei bere it with hem, and also into making of assercioun accordyng þerto bi þese wordis, 'y ȝeue ȝow al þis, and y wole þat al þis be ȝouris, y wole þat ȝe bere þis with ȝow'; and al þis y schulde do þanne vertuoseli y-nouȝ. fforwhi if y be in an 25 hous bisett with myne enemyes forto sle me, but if y fiȝte and defende me, y am constreynyd forto abide in þe hous, and forto not fle, and forto fiȝte in defendyng me, if y se þat y am þerto strong y-nouȝ, þouȝ þer be a priuey dore vnknownen to me, bi which, if y it knewe, y myȝte þoruȝ it fle, or þouȝ þer 30 be a priuey place in þe hous vnknownen to me in which y myȝte me sureli hide. but, certis, if y be of pilk kunȝnyng þat y knowe pilk dore or pilk priuey place, and if y be for þe while þervpon wel remembrid, y am not constreynyd forto abide and forto fiȝte aȝens myne assailers in me defendyng. 35 And þerfore bi liȝk skile so it is in þis present purpos. If y knowe how y may hide and kepe priuey what y haue now bifore seid, it may not be seid treuli þat y am constreynyd

¹ v. 25.

² vv. 17, 20.

into it. And if y haue not pilk kunnyng or pilk avisement
for þe tyme, y may wel be constreynyd into it, and bi pilk
61^a constreynnyng y am excusid þat | y do not amys, but y do
vertuoseli, so þat þe yuel þretenyd be grettir to me þan is þe
5 yuel into which y am constreynyd. In lijk maner it is to be
feelid if y be constreynyd in þe iiij^e maner þat y swere, 'bi
god y wole þis tresour be þouris; Bi god almyzti y ȝeue it to
ȝow; I vowe to god y schal neuer aske to haue it; I swere
bi god y schal brynge to ȝow in such a day and such a place
10 þus mych money'.

xxiii^e chapitre.

[F]Adir, azens what ȝe han now tauȝt y may argue bi two
principal argumentis. þe first argument is þis: If it be
vertuose and leful to ȝow in þe bifore seid caase þat ȝe
15 delyuere to ȝoure constreyners al ȝoure seid tresour, and þat
ȝe seie to ȝoure constreyners in wordis þus, 'I ȝeue ȝow al þis
tresour', and þerwipal if it be vertuose and leful þat ȝe hide
ȝoure meenyng, and þat ȝe not meene and entende as þe
heerers bi þo wordis in her propir signyficacioun vndirstonden,
20 folewith þat it is leful to ȝow for to in þis caas deceyue ȝowre
seid heerers, and forto lie and make leesyng to hem in deede
ocupiying þe stide of word, and forto lie and make lesyng to
hem in word, and forto make a fals oop þat ȝe wolen brynge
to hem in such a day and such a place xx^{ti} pound, and ȝoure
25 entent is forto not so brynge to hem; which is holde to be
vntrewe, so fer forþ þat alle doctouris accordyngli holden þat
forto saue al þe world fro myschef a man schulde not make
eny leesyng.

þe ije principal argument is þis: If it be vertuose and
30 leful to ȝow in þe seid caas forto go into þe place where ȝoure
tresour is, and forto with ȝoure hond putte it into þe hondis
of ȝoure constreyners, and forto seie in voice þus, 'Al þis y
wole to be þouris, Al þis y ȝeue to ȝow', and ȝit kepe entent
contrari to þese outward deedis and wordis, folewith herof
35 þat bi lijk skile, In caas ȝe were constreynyd in þe iiij^e seid
maner forto go into þe temple in which is sett an ydol callid
'baal' or 'astaruth', and forto take an encenser and caste [t]vs¹

Does it not
follow:

(1) That lying
and deceit are
lawful?

(2) That if a man
is constrained to
the outward
worship of false
gods he does not
sin, provided
that the inward
deeds of his Will
are not in
accord?

¹ MS. vs. See Notes.

bi encensyng bifore þe ydol, and forto seie þus, ' hail, my god, baal', or þus, ' y knowleche and y bileene and y take þee, baal, for my god', al þis were leeful and vertuoseli doon of 3ow, so þat 3oure inward willyng and 3oure inward meenyng, intencioun and vndirstondyng be not accordyng to þese 5 deedis and to þese wordis.

(1) It does not follow that lying is lawful.

There can be no lie without positive assertion, and since in the above case there was no assertion, therefore there was no lie.

Sone, for answer to þi first now maad argument, y seie þat what pou concludist forto folewe of myn bifore doctrine folewith not þerof; ffor of my bifore doctrine folewith not þat y may lie a leesyng leefulli and vertuoseli to my seid 10 constreyners. And cause is for | þat y may make no lesyng 61^b bi eny wordis to my neizbor wipout þat y seie þo wordis assertyueli, þat is to seie, but if y make assercioun to my neizbor bi hem, and wipout þat þe ping so assertyueli seid be vntrewe, and þat þerbi þe assercioun be vntrewe. And, 15 sipen in þe caas bifore sett y make noon assercioun to my constreyners, neipir in deede neipir in word, pou3 þei trowen þat y do, and pou3 it semep to hem þat y do, þerfore in þe seid caas y make no leesyng. And ferþirmore to seie, sipen it is not in þe power of suche constreyners forto wite of an 20 opir man wheþir he make wipinforþ assercioun or no, and what meenyng and vndirstondyng he haþ in his wordis and deedis, it is not in her power forto constreyne in þe iiije maner eny man into leesyng of word or of deede, or into forsweryng, if he haue þis bifore tau3t kunnyng forto hide 25 his ynnest willyngis and nyllyngis and his vndirstondyngis, meenyngis and ententis.

Does it not follow, since such deceit is lawful, that there can be no trust or friendly communication among men?

ffadir, if this answer be trewe þat it may be leeful and vertuose to 3ow and to ech opir man forto bigile, deceyue and delude 3owre neizboris bi word and bi deede, or opir 30 signe occupyng þe stide of word, and bi oop, 3he, so oft and so fer forþ for to hem bigile, folewith þat þerbi schal be distroied al sure homeli and to be bileeyd and trustid comunycacioun and togidere cyuyl bargenyng, 3he, al freendful cyuyl togidere lyuyng and dwellyng; which were an 35 vnsufferable þing.

Though such deceit is lawful in the case of unlawful constraining, it is

Sone, þis folewip not; fforwhi pou3 such a deceyuyng and a dowbilnes makyng be leeful anentis vnleful constreyners, folewith not þat þe same be leeful in caas out of constreyng,

or in caas of leeful constreynyng. And alle men mowe se
lytli þat þouȝ such deceit or doubilnes be vsid in caas of
vnleeful constreynyng and tyranrie, ȝit þerbi schal not falle
þis myscheef þat no man schal bileue ofir or truste to ofir,
5 and þat cyuyl cohabitacioun schal be distroied. But, certis,
mych rapir such deceit bi which suche tyrannys mowe be so
deceyuyd and deludid, schal turne þe more into þe avail of al
þe comounte.

not lawful in
other circum-
stances. It is
profitable to the
state that such
evil-doers
should be de-
ceived.

ffadir, þanne bi lijk skile ȝe ouȝten holde þat leeful it were
10 to ȝow forto lie bi leesyng and forto forswere to suche
vnleeful constreyners, þouȝ out of caas of such vnleeful
constreynyng.

Does it not
follow that it is
lawful to lie and
forswear to such
unlawful con-
strainers, even
though not
under unlawful
constraint?

Sone, if leesyng, as weel not sworn or leesyng sworn, be
not vnleeful but oonli for þat it lettij men forto bileue and
15 truste to ofire, and for þe hurt which it schulde do aȝens
cyuyl togidere dwellyng and contractis making, þin argument
62^a now maad procedij wel. But, o my sone, | alle men whiche
holden lesyng to be so odiose and so yuel in alle caacis as is
comounli holde, þouȝ it be not sworn, and þerfore mych rapir
20 if it be sworn, musten seie þat leesyng hap his malice not
al perof, but of sum ofir þing beside al þe yuel which is
pretendid to come bi it in þe now seid maner to þe comounte.
Of þis mater, sone, þou maist se larger disputyng in 'þe book
of questions' in latyn.

It would be law-
ful if lying were
wrong only in so
far as it affects
the good of the
state.

But lying is
wrong for other
reasons.

ffadir, if þis were knowe of malefactouris þat men con-
streynyd mowe take such a vantage to hem anentis her
constreyners as ȝe han now tauȝt, suche malefactouris wolden
not truste to þe wordis of ȝeuyng and to þe wordis of
bihetyng and to þe wordis of sweryng doon bi þe persoones
30 constreynyd. And þanne many persoones schulden be sleyn
of suche malefactouris whiche now from deep scapen, bi
cause þat her constreyners trusten to þe wordis of þe
persoones constreynyd.

If it were known
to malefactors
that deceit
under con-
straint is lawful,
would they not
slay their
victims rather
than be deceived
by them?

Sone, þouȝ such a myscheef schulde falle bi occasioun of þe
35 ȝowyng of a treup, ȝit þe chaunce or happ or fallyng of pilk
myscheef schulde not make pilk þing to be ofir þan a treup,
þouȝ it myȝte make þat it ouȝte not or schulde not be vttrid
and publishid for a treup, which ellis were to be publishid
for a treup, if pilk myscheef were not likli þerof occasionarili

The truth of the
above state-
ments is not
affected, even
though it may
be wiser not to
publish them.

to solewe. And of pis, wheþir pis treup bifore tauȝt ouȝte be vttrid and publiſſhid or no, and wheþir it be expedient þat it be putt into vse or no, is not longyng to myn entent in pis present place forto trete. And þerfore, sone, as þerof abide into opire placis of my writyngis to be maad in latyn more sustanciali.

If thieves are about to slay a man, and he then offers them treasure and promises not to betray them on condition they spare his life, deceit on the part of the victim is excusable, because it is the choice of the lesser evil.

ffadir, what if y be in pis caas : þat þeeſis ben in wil vttrli and about forto sle me, and þei profren not forto spare me if y wole bihete forto brynge hem good, or forto not vttr hem and biwrie hem ; but y in my side preye to hem lowȝli and make sewte to hem bisili þat þei spare me for þat y schal bihete to hem or swere to not discouere hem, and forto brynge to hem in a day xx^{ti} pound ; Am y ferþir from defensis bi ȝow tauȝt for þat þe profre bigynneþ in pis caas in my side and not in her side ?

15

Sone, y kanne not se but þat, as into þe purpos of þi questioun and into þin entent, al oon it is wheþir þei bigynne forto profre to þee and þou her profre accepte, or þou bigynne forto profre to hem and þei þi profre accepte ; fforwhi in euereipir caas þou art constreynyd, for in euer eipir caas þou art putt bitwixe ij yuelis or bitwixe ij þingis to be doon, of whiche neuerneipir þou ellis woldist do, and þou chesist it which semþ to þee as þanne and so þe lasse yuel | forto avoide þe gretter yuel ; and þerfore þou art bitwixe þo ij yuelis constreynyd, and þat wheþir þe profre word bigynne at þo þeeſis or bigynne at þee þi silf, for as in þat is noon acqyting fro þe seid constreynyng. Namelich such constreynyng may be where noon such profir is in eny parti. And þerfore what fauour or avauntage þou myztist haue in caas of her profyng, þou maist haue if þyn go bifore ȝo profyng, as semþ to me now and here.

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25

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Outward worship of false gods under constraint is excusable, unless it causes other men to be really idolatrous, or God to be blasphemed.

ffadir, answeze ȝe now to my ije principal argument.

Sone, answer to þi ije principal argument may be þis : As for eny vice of ydolatrie which myȝte be putt vpon me, y myȝte wel y-nouȝ do and speke as þou hast concludid me forto may do and speke in caas of þe seid constreynyng. But, certis, yf y schulde do amys in þo deedis and wordis, þilk viciosite schulde come laterali ; as if þerbi opire symple cristen men schulden be-sclaundrid, þat is to seie, for her sympilte

35

schulden be made lizt forto falle into verri ydolatrie, for pat
y am so notable a persoon, and perwith þei ben not enformyd
vpon my priuey seid hidyng of myne ententis and vndirstond-
yngis; or if perbi þe enemyes of oure feiþ schulden in a greet
5 degre þe more blasfeme god and oure cristen religioun, and
þe scharplier pursewe it, and þe more trowe þat it schulde be
fals, for as mych as y, beyng a prelat or sum opir notable
doctoure, forsake in her semyng þe same cristen religioun; or
if perbi sum opir such lateral myscheef schulde falle. And
10 þerfore, if noon of þese or opire lateral myscheefis ben likli
perbi to falle, it schal not be to me vnleeful and vnuertuose,
but schal be to me leeful and vertuose, stondyng summe
circumstauncis forto do and speke as þou hast concludid me
in þe caas forto may do and speke. fforwhi forto so do and
15 speke accordip with þe doom of resoun, and noon text of
scripture makyng to vs catholik feiþ is *perazens*. 3he, and
more to seie, holi scripture, as it semeþ, it allowith, *iii^{jo}*
Regum, v^e *chapitre*, fforwhi naaman of sirie, whanne he was
clesid fro his lepre bi help of þe prophet helise, he seide þat
20 he wolde neuer fro þens forþward be ydolatrer, neiþir he
wolde worschipe eny god saue þe verri god of israel. Neuer-
þeles he desirid to be alowid and excusid if he worschupid
priueli verri god in þe temple of þe fals god Remmon, whanne
his lord, kyng of sirie, wolde entre into þe temple of his fals
25 god remmon forto worschipe remmon, and wolde in þe same
63^a while lene on þe hond of him, þat is to seie, of þe seid | naa-
man. And herto þe prophet helise answeride and seide þus:
‘go þou in pees,’¹ and hervpon naaman wente forþ in pees.
Wherof may be take þat þe prophet helise alowide wel what
30 naaman desirede forto be þerin excusid and alowide, and ellis
þerto and þervpon he wolde not haue dymysid and sent forþ
naaman in pees, but rapir he wolde haue correctid him, and
wolde haue forbode to him what he so desirede forto be in it
excusid and alowid. þus mych here for holi scripture; Not
35 withstondyng þat for þis present purpos is y-nouz, if resoun
be for it, and holi scripture, in such place as where he
delyuerip feiþ, is not *perazens*.

ffadir, helpe 3e me forþ in ij questions whiche y schal aske
of 3ow, and paraentur as for now and here, y schal not in þis

Naaman was ex-
cused for out-
ward idolatry,
as he wor-
shipped God in
his heart.

After the victim
has promised or
given the

¹ 2 Kings, v. 19.

yuel pretenyd; and pilk þing is not in þis caas, for y go ferþir þan y am constreynyd to go about þe tresour to come vnto þe lordschip of hem and forto be heris, and þat y schulde geue it to hem. Wherefore y may not putte vpon eny þan vpon my silf, siþen with ful knowyng and remembryng of my 5 defense, y lefte my defense, and þerbi y fille depper into my preiudice þan þe deede of constreynyng droue to.

fadir, y holde me content with þis answer to my first questioun.

It is the law that no constrainer has the right to constrain, or the right to claim goods so constrained. Hence the victim does virtuously :

(1) to refuse to hand over his goods so constrained,

(2) to reclaim his goods so constrained.

Sone, þouȝ þou holde þe contentid with þis answer, ȝit y 10 may helpe þee ferþir bi strengþ of positijf lawe maad bi þe consent of þe same constreyners. And so y may seie þat þese constreyners han consentid to lese her riȝt forto aske or haue bi dewte eny of þese seid goodis or deedis to be doon to hem; and þerfore y am fre fro boond to paie and to fulfille 15 þe seid goodis or deedis to hem, and y may aske restitucioun aftir þat y haue so delyuerid or paid þo goodis or deedis to hem. fforwhi þou wost wel, sone, how euer earnestli, verili and effectuali, wiþout þe caas bifore putt, y bynde me in an obligacioun to paie to þee xx^{ti} pound, or how euer earnestli 20 y ȝeue to þee xx^{ti} pound, þouȝ y swere þerto forto do so, ȝit if þou renounce and forsake þi riȝt to aske and to haue þis xx^{ti} pound, which riȝt þou schuldist haue bi vertu of my seid promys or my seid ȝift, þou maist not aske þese xx^{ti} pound, neiþir y am bounde to paie þee þese xx^{ti} pound. 25 Euen so it is in þis present mater and in þis present caas; fforwhi whanne a lawe is iustli maad bi consent of al peple or of þe more parti of þe peple, and vsid and contynued bi þe more part of þe peple as for a lawe, ech persoon of pilk peple is bounden bi resoun and in lawe of kynde to kepe it; 30 and ech persoon of þe same peple renounciþ and forsakiþ al riȝt longyng to him which is contrari to þe execucioun of pilk lawe. but so it is þat for a lowable cause and a resonable cause, and þerfore iustli and profitabli, þis lawe was maad and alowid and executid, þat no man schulde bynde an opir 35 and no man schulde be bounde of an opir in eny such caas as is bifore sett of violent drede; þat is to seie, þat ech man schulde renounce and forsake al riȝt to him growyng bi þis, þat if he were about to bynde eny man in maner of þe

64^b caas | now bifore sett of violence and drede. Wherefore
 euery persoon is bounden bi resoun and perfore bi lawe of
 kynde to conforme him herto. And so bi pis y am fre þat y
 neipir am bounde to profre, neipir þei mowe iustli aske what
 5 y 3aue or promysid in caasis bifore seid of so greet violent
 drede. And if y haue paied, y may aske it a3en, and þat
 boþe in consience and in court of mannys lawe. and in
 pis wise ben sufficient and trewe answeris maad to pi dowtis.

fforsoþe, sone, pis ije answer were good and esying mych,
 10 if it kouþe be founde þat eny positijf lawe of þe general
 chirch is maad, such as pis ije answer presupposiþ to be
 maad; or þat bi þe hi3 prince and his comounnalte, vndir
 whom suche constreyners lyuen, is maad such a positijf lawe
 which þe ije answer supposiþ to be. and ellis, sone, þou
 15 muste stonde to þe former answer. fforsoþe, as fer as y haue
 radde in lawe of þe chirch in þe titlis and chapitris of
 matrimony and in þe title and chapitris of vsure, where rapist
 such now spokun positijf lawe of þe chirch schulde be
 writun, if eny such were, y kanne not fynde þat þer is eny
 20 such; for al þat is seid þere in eny text a3ens suche
 constreyners into pis present purpos is seid as bi autorite of
 resoun and of lawe of kynde, which is oon of goddis lawis,
 and not as bi making of eny positijf newe ordinaunce þerof.
 And as for þe lawe of þe kyng of england, what is iugid bi
 25 iugis a3ens suche constreyners, al is take to be lawe of resoun,
 which þei callen her comoun lawe. and, as y trowe, no
 positijf statut of þe kyng and of þe lond is maad þervpon
 seruyng into pis present purpos. Now, sone, averse þee what
 is now to be feelid.

30 ffadir, what if y argue þus: A man constreynyd doop
 vertuoseli in doying accordauntli to his constreynyng in caasis
 bifore of 3ow expressid; wherefore his constreyners bi her
 constreynyng maken him to do a vertuose deede.

Sone, pis may be grauntid.

35 ffadir, þanne y argue ferþir þus: þese constreyners in her
 constreynyng maken a vertuose deede to be doon of þe
 persoon constreynyd, perfore þe constreyners in so constreyn-
 yng doon vertuoseli.

Sone, pis argument which þou now last makist is not

This law is not a
 new one set
 down by the
 Church or State,
 but it is the law
 of Reason.

When a man
 does a virtuous
 deed under con-
 straint, is this
 virtuous deed
 due to his con-
 strainers?

Do not the con-
 strainers then
 act virtuously?

A constrainer
 does not act

virtuously if he
constrains a
man to do
a deed which
otherwise he is
bound not to do,
or not bound
to do.

A constrainer
who constrains
a man to do a
deed which he
ought to do, but
will not other-
wise do, does act
virtuously.

And the deed
thus done is a
virtuous deed,
though not so
virtuous as if
done volun-
tarily.

How is it that a
borrower may
virtuously re-
claim interest on
a loan, even
though, at the
time of borrow-
ing, the inward
private deeds of
his Will make
no reservation
that he will not
pay that
interest?

And even
though the
lender does not
constrain him to
borrow?

The lender does
constrain the
borrower to pay
this interest, in
the fourth man-
ner of constrain-
ing.

worþ; fforwhi þe vertuosenes of a deede is dependent of þe avisose and cleer or cleen doom of resoun in þe doer, as is bifore sufficientli tauzt. And for as mych as noon avisose and cleer, clene doom of resoun wole þat þo constreyners of whilche we han ȝit hidirto spokun, constreyne so eny man, 65^a fforwhi þei constreynen a man into a deede which he is bounde forto not do, or into a deede which ellis he is not bounde to do, but ellis may chese forto do it or leue it vndoon, þefore þis deede of constreynyng is not morali vertuose.

fforsoþe, of opire constreyners whiche in caas constreynen 10 a man into a deede which he were ellis bounde to do, and ȝit wolde not do, it myȝte be þat her deede of constreynyng were morali vertuose for folewyng of resoun; and also þe deede into which þe man is constreynyd is also morali vertuose, þouȝ not so morali vertuose and good as þilk deede schulde 15 be if þe same man schulde and wolde do it wipout such constreynyng.

ffadir, my iȝe questioun is þis: how and whi is it þat a man which for neede of pouerte hæþ borowid of an opir man xxi pound vndir couenaunt forto paie aȝen þefore 20 xxiiij pound, whanne and aftir he hæþ paied þe seid xxiiij pound, he may sewe and constreyne þe leener forto restore to him þe iiij pound, as þat þe borewer made neuer þe seid iiij pound to be good and propre þing of þe leener, not wipstondyng þat þe borewer consentid with deedis and wordis wipout- 25 forþ and with deedis withinforþ, wipout eny reclaym of eny deede wipinforþ, and also not withstondyng þat þe leener constreynep not þe borewer forto in so deere a maner borewe?

Sone, þe cause whi þe seid borewer may aske restoryng of 30 þe seid iiij pound, not wipstondyng þat he makip no reclaym bi outward or inward deede of wil in þe tyme of þe couenaunt making, is for þat þe borewer is constreynyd of þe leener in þe iiije maner of constreynyng bi þretenyng of gretter yuel forto so couenaunte and forto so dere borewe vndir couenaunt 35 and boond to paie vsure. and þefore þis is not trewe which þou presupposist forto aggregge þe hardnes of þi questioun, þat þe leener constreynep not þe borewer in þe seid iiije maner. And forto se þat þe leener so constreynep þe borewer,

take hede. þe riche man, knowyng þe poor man to be in
nede for to borewe, and þe same riche man beyng of power
wipout hurt or damage forto releue his nede, and ȝit nyllung
it helpe and releue, holdip bi what in him is þe same poor
5 man in þe same neede. and so bi as mych as þe seid riche
man holdip þe poor man in pilk pouerte and nede, in lasse
þan þe poor man wole borewe of him vndir couenaunt to
65^b paie þe valew borewid and vsure | ouerplus, he constreynep þe
poor man to paie pilk vsure bi þretenyng of grettir yuel,
10 which is þat he wole not ellis helpe þe poor mannys neede,
and þat ellis bi as mych as in him is he wole holde þe seid
poor man in his pouerte. And þat þe liggyng of þis poor
man in his pouerte and nede is grettir yuel to him þan paie
þe vsure of iiij pound, is open; fforwhi ellis he wolde not
15 chese forto so borewe and paie þe seid vsure rapir þan he
wolde abide in his seid pouerte and nede. And so, sone, it
is now declarid þat þe leener leenyng to a nedi man vndir
couenaunt of vsure, which ellis wolde not leene to þe poor
man, constreynep in þe iiij^e seid maner bi þretenyng of
20 gretter yuel þe same poor man forto paie vsure.

Wherefore þouȝ þe borewer, for þat he kanne not, or
remembriþ him not, how he may withdrawe and hide his in-
ward consent and his inward vndirstondyng, meenyng and
ententis, and þefore consentip with al his partinent willyngis
25 and consentis and vndirstondyngis accordyng to þe pre-
tensioun and þe feynyng and sown of his wordis, wipout
eny inward reclaym; ȝit þe borewer, whanne he paieþ þe
vsure of ouerplus, he makip not pilk vsure to be good of þe
leener, for cause bfore seid, þat lordschip ȝeuyng and lord-
30 schip translatyng ben of such nature þat þei ben not made
wipout inward willyng and consent fulli and wipout inward
and outward reclaym.

And aȝenward, if þe seid nedi borewer kanne wel y-nouȝ
hide his priuey meenyngis or vndirstondyngis, and make þat
35 þei not accorde with þe outward semyng, and is þerof wel
remembrid in tyme of þe borewyng, and ȝit wole not conforme
him þerto, and wole not þerbi defende him aȝens þe tiranrie
and constreynyng of þe leener, y kanne not se but þat he
makip þe vsure and ouerplus to be good of þe leener, whan

If the borrower
does not priv-
ately refuse to
pay this unjust
interest, because
he does not
know, or does
not remember,
how to so in-
wardly refuse,
then the interest
is not paid with
full consent of
the Will, and
may therefore
be justly re-
claimed.

If the borrower
knows how to
privately refuse
to pay this un-
just usury, and
yet does not so
privately refuse,
then the in-
terest is paid
with full con-
sent of the Will,
and may not be
justly re-
claimed.

he paieþ it to þe leener; *and* þerefore he may not conscienceli aske it aȝen of þe leener, for he may blame and wijte him silf it, if eny man may so do þat he wolde go ferþir þanne in his deedis þan he was constreynyd to bi his nede and bi inþite and straitnes of þe leener. þus y answe-re to þi ije^e 5 questioun here, accordyngli to þe first answer here bifore maad to þi first questioun.

The law against unjust usury is a law of Reason, and not a positive ordinance of Church or State.

And if þou kouwist fynde eny positif statute of þe al hool chirch or of þe pope him silf admyttid, allowid and vsid of his al hool peple þat suche leeners beyng constreyners schulde 10 haue no lordschip vpon þe vsure paied to hem, þou myȝtist haue answer to þi ije^e questioun bi þe ije^e answer maad to þi first questioun. But, soþeli, noon such posityue ordinaunce | maad y canne not fynde in þe title of vsure, for al what is 66^a þere seid aȝens suche leeners¹ beyng constreyners into þis 15 present purpos is seid and presupposid to be trewe in lawe of kynde and of resoun, wipout nede of positif lawe to be maad þervpon. ffor large knowyng to be had in mater of vsure þou maist se, o my sone, in þe book which y haue maad 'of vsure'.

20

xxv^e chapitre.²

Is it true that a man wills and at the same time kills a deed done under constraint?

[F]Adir, y haue herde seid of clerkis in her talking, and it is also so writun in bookis, þat of men stondyng in suche caacis as ben bifore sett it is to be seid þat þei willen and nyllen oon and þe same outward deede, and þat þei chesen 25 and refusen oon and þe same outward deede, and þat þei comaunden and wernen to þe same louȝer powers and to þe membris of þe bodi, and so þat þer schulde be a medlyng of willyng and nyllyng togidere in þe willis of þo men whilis þei stonden in suche caacis of semyng violent constreynyng. 30 ȝhe, ferþirmore, þei seien þat in such caas þe man constreynyd nyllip vttirli and parfijtli þe principal outward deede which he doop, and he willip not þilk deede but as sumwhat and inparfijtli and lasse þan he nyllip þe same deede.

35

A thing cannot

Sone, y wote wel þat men so seien *and* so writen as þou

¹ MS. *leeners*.

² See Notes.

now hast rehercid. Neuerpeles, y holde al pilk seiying ful vntrewe; fforwhi euery ping as it is in deede or in beyng or in kynde or in þe nombre of creaturis, so it is. And but if it be in deede or in beyng or in kynde and in þe nombre of
5 creaturis, it verili is not. And if it verili is not, certis, of it and of a ping þat verili is, is maad noon togidere medlyng. but so it is þat in caacis now seid of me y haue not in deede and in beyng or in kynde and among creaturis beyng eny nyllyng þat my tresour be delyuerid, or eny comaundyng þat
10 my tung schulde be stille, and þat my foot schulde reste. noon suche deedis ben now in me and in my wil, in deede and in treup among þe creaturis of al þe world, þouȝ y knowe wel þat þo deedis of nyllyng and of wernyng y wolde make to be verili in me, if y were out of þis caas bfore putt of
15 me. Wherefore it is not trewe forto seie þat in þis caas þer is in me a medlyng of willyng to delyuere my tresour and of nyllyng to delyuere þe same tresour; but it is trewe þat in þis caas þer is verili and parfitli and vttirli in kynde and in beyng, as summe creaturis of god, a willyng to delyuere
20 and dele my tresour; and þer is no nyllyng perto at al, þouȝ þer wolde be such nyllyng if y were out of þis caas. |

66^b Also y proue þe same þus: cause is þer noon whi it schulde be seid þat in þe seid caas þer is in me a nyllyng to delyuere my tresour, but bi cause þis, þat þouȝ pilk nyllyng
25 be not in deede, it is in consideracioun and in knowyng, bi as mych as it is treuli considerid and knowen þat, if ne were present þis drede of yuel comyng, þer wolde be in me and in my wil pilk seid nyllyng, as clerkis writen hervpon. But panne y argue þus: In lijk consideracioun and knowyng my
30 silence and my rest from goyng and my cloos hidyng of my tresour ben, bi as mych as it is trewli considerid and knowen þat, if ne were þis drede present to me, þer wolde be in me þe now seid silence, rest fro goyng and cloos hidyng of my tresour. Wherefore bi lijk skile it schulde be seid þat in me
35 ben togidere¹ silence and discoueryng bi^{*} speche, goyng forþ and restyng from goyng, cloos hidyng and cleer openyng bi word, and þat þese contraries weren togidere in me medlid, which is openli fals. And also it wolde folewe þat euermore wel nyȝ euery willyng in vs haȝ a contrari nyllyng medlid

both be and not be.

Under constraint the deed is willed, and cannot at the same time be nilled; though it would be nilled if the constraint were removed.

It is said, for example, that the nilling to deliver the treasure exists in the mind at the time of the constraint to will the delivery of the treasure, because this nilling would exist if the constraint were removed. This belief is obviously impossible, or it would follow that every willing could have along with it its contrary nilling, and every deed along with it its opposite.

¹ MS. *to gidere*.

with him; fforwhi al most *per* is no þing which we willen, but þat, if ne were sum caas in which we ben, þe contrari nyllyng schulde be in vs; And *per* is ful nyȝ no þing which we nyllen, but þat, if ne were sum caas in which we ben, þe contrari willyng schulde be in vs. *per* is no spekyng in vs, 5 no sittynge in vs, no movynge in vs, but þat, if ne were sum caas in which we ben, þe contrari silence, þe contrari stondynge, þe contrari resting, schulde be wilfulli chosen of vs. Wherefore if þe bifore seid opynyoun were trewe, it wolde folewe þat euermore wel nyȝ euery willyng in vs haȝ with 10 him medlid his contrari nyllyng, and euery outward deede in vs haȝ with him medlid his contrari deede, or his priuacioun or lak of him silf, which forto seie *and* holde is not but a trifle. fferþirmore, if we schulen speke of priuey willyngis and nyllyngis goying bifore suche seid comaundyngis of þe 15 wil, *and* beyng not suche seid comaundyngis, open it is þat of what euer þing we haue suche a willyng in caas of þe seid constreynynge, we haue noon contrari priuey nyllyng of þe same þing, as is now bifore in þis present chapitre prouyd; And of what euer þing we han such a priuey nyllyng, we han 20 not of þe same þing a contrari willyng, as also is here in þis present chapitre prouyd.

Does Aristotle mean that such a deed as casting merchandise into the sea under peril of death, is

(a) both voluntary and involuntary;

(b) utterly involuntary, but only partly voluntary.

ffadir, what if it be seid þat Aristotil in þe iije book of hise 'etikis', and alle þo whiche folewen him, In caas þat a man beyng | in perel of þe see and constreynyd bi feer of 67^a deep castip out into þe see his marchaundisis, Or if he be constreynyd bi sum tyran vndir perel of deep þat he bete his owen fadir, meeneden not þat þis man haȝ togidere ¹ a willyng and a nyllyng vpon oon and þe same outward deede, but þei meeneden and vndirstoden þat þe outward deede is 30 togidere voluntari *and* involuntari, þouȝ more involuntari þan voluntari;² and þat þilk outward deede is vttili involuntari, and he is not voluntari but sumwhat and lasse, for oonli he is voluntari into a certeyn eend and purpos, which is saluaciounⁿ of þe doers lijf?

35

A deed cannot be both voluntary and involuntary.

Sone, aȝens þis y may procede þus: If þe seid castyng out of marchaundisis into þe see be voluntari and also involuntari, as Aristotil and his folewers seien, y aske whi *and*

¹ MS. *to gidere*.

² See Notes.

wherof pilk outward deede of castyng hap his denomynacioun
 or namyng þat he is callid 'voluntari'? If pou seie þat he
 hap pilk namyng bi þe willyng had þerof in þe wil, þanne y
 argue and conclude to folewe bi lijk skile þat, if pilk deede
 5 be worpi to haue þis namyng to be callid 'involuntari', he
 hap pilk namyng bi þe nyllyng had þerof in þe wil. and so
 togidere¹ ben had willyng and nyllyng in þe wil vpon oon and
 þe same outward deede, fro which conclusioun bi pyn now
 maad answer pou art about to fle. If pou seie þat þis out-
 10 ward deede hap his namyng of 'voluntari' bi þe willyng
 þerof had al redi in þe wil, and he hap his name of 'in-
 voluntari' bi þe nyllyng þerof, not which is now in þe wil
 but which were and schulde be in þe wil, if ne were þis cir-
 cumstaunce of tempest and of feer of more losse þan, of þe
 15 marchaundisis, certis, þanne of þis answer y may argue to
 folewe þat þis outward deede of out castyng is more voluntari
 þan involuntari;² fforwhi þe cause ȝeuyng þe name of 'volun-
 tari' is in kynd, and is had presentli in beyng, and þe cause
 ȝeuyng þe namyng of 'involuntari' is not in beyng, and
 20 what euer cause except fynal cause causip, he causip more
 whanne he is þan whanne he not is. and ȝit not wipstond-
 yng þis, Aristotil and his folewers seien þat pilk deede is
 vttrli involuntari, and is not voluntari but as sumwhat for
 into a certeyn purpos.³ Also of þis last answer y may argue
 25 to folewe þat whanne a man risip fro his bed, þe deede of
 doying on his clopis is involuntari, ȝhe, and vttrli involuntari;
 þe deede of a mannys walkyng, iorneiyng, spekyng, ȝhe,
 welnyȝ ech outward deede which a man doop, is vttrli
 30 involuntari; fforwhi to ech such deede were a nyllyng in þe
 wil, if ne were a constreynyng into it bi peyn or losse more
 drad and semyng more yuel þan þe seid outward deede of
 cloping: and so of ech opir now seid outward deede.

If pou seie þat þis seid outward deede of castyng mar-
 chaundisis into þe see hap his namyng of 'voluntari' and his
 35 namyng of 'involuntari' bi and fro þe movyng of þo mar-
 chaundisis into þe wil, And þerfore, for as mych as þo
 marchaundisis movent þe wil forto holde hem, ȝhe, movent þe
 wil vttrli forto holde hem, þouȝ for and into a special eend

For, if the deed
 is termed
 'voluntary' be-
 cause of the
 willing in the
 Will, it must
 be termed 'in-
 voluntary' be-
 cause of the
 nilling in the
 Will. Then
 willing and
 nilling would
 exist together,
 which is im-
 possible.

If the deed is
 termed
 'voluntary' be-
 cause of the
 willing now
 existing in the
 Will, and 'in-
 voluntary' be-
 cause of the
 nilling which
 would exist in
 the Will if the
 constraint were
 absent, then the
 deed should be
 more voluntary
 than involun-
 tary.

If the deed is
 termed 'utterly
 involuntary'
 because the
 merchandise
 moves the Will
 never to cast it
 into the sea, and
 'partly volun-
 tary' because
 the merchandise

¹ MS. to gidere.

² See Notes.

³ See Notes.

moves Reason and the Will to cast it at this present time into the sea, then the deed is for the present time voluntary and cannot be involuntary.

pei moven þe wil forto out caste hem, þerfore þe out castyng of hem is vttrirli involuntari, þouȝ sumwhat and as for a special eend entendid þilk same castyng is voluntari—þat þis answer is vntrewe y may proue. fforwhi þese marchaundisis moven not þe wil in eny tyme saue in þe tyme which is now 5 present, as is open y-nouȝ to ech clerk; and in þis tyme present þei moven not þe wil saue bi þe presentment which resoun makip to and bifore þe wil, as noon outward þing may move þe wil into a deede of vertu wipout meen of þe resoun and of his doom presentid to or bifore þe wil. And so it is 10 þat in þis tyme present þe resoun haþ not doom þat þo marchaundisis ben to be kept within þe schipp, but reson haþ þis doom þat þei be cast out of þe schipp, as y putte caas þat resoun be not ocupied ferþir þan so in þis present tyme about hem. Wherefore þo marchaundisis moven not þe wil in 15 þis present tyme þat þei be kept, but þei moven oonli þe wil in þis present tyme þat þei be cast out for a liztyng of þe schipp. and so þyn answer is vntrewe.

Every deed doomed by Reason is done for a special purpose. So, if this casting out of the merchandise is not utterly voluntary, no deed doomed by Reason is utterly voluntary; which is absurd.

Also, sone, y preie þee, seie þou to me what outward vertuose deede or eny deede doon bi doom of resoun, is doon 20 opir wise þan for and into a special eend entendid of þe doer? fforsope, noon, as is provid bifore in þe [xvi]¹ chapitre. Wherefore, if for þis cause þat þis castyng out is doon for and into a special eend entendid of þe caster, þis castyng is not vttrirli voluntari, but as sumwhat inparfitli, folewith þat ech 25 moral vertuose deede and ech deede doon avisidli bi resoun is such þat he is not vttrirli voluntari; for ellis þe cause assignyd bi þee and bi Aristotil and his folewers is not worþ, whi þe seid out castyng is not vttrirli a voluntari deede.

If the casting of the merchandise into the sea is not utterly voluntary because it is done only for a certain purpose, then for the same reason it cannot be utterly involuntary.

Also þus: if aftir Aristotil þe seid castyng is not vttrirli 30 voluntari, for as mych as he is not voluntari but for and into a special eend, which is saluacioun of lijf, folewith bi lijf skile | þat þe same castyng is not vttrirli involuntari, for as 68^a mych as also he is not involuntari but for and into a special eend, which is saluacioun of þo marchaundisis. and so 35 Aristotil is azens him silf. And also folewith þat þe willyng to kepe þo marchaundisis wipin þe schipp, if eny such willyng þanne be, is not vttrirli voluntari, for þilk willyng is

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

to a special eend. And if þis be trewe, semep to folewe bi
 lijk skile þat þe answeyng þerto nyllyng forto caste hem
 out, is not vttrli voluntari, and so is not vttrli a nyllyng,
 sipen he is into a special eend. And al þis so concludid is
 5 aȝens Aristotil pere, and ȝit it is folewyng of his opire
 seiyngis pere.¹

Also, sone, Aristotil in þe book allegid, þat is to seie, in þe
 iije book of his 'etikis,' seiþ þat þe seid casting is medlid, for
 it is togidere voluntari and involuntari; and he seiþ þat þe
 10 seid castyng is more voluntari þan involuntari; and herwith
 he seiþ þat þe seid castyng is not vttrli but as sumwhat
 voluntari, but þe seid castyng is vttrli involuntari. how þese
 seiyngis mowe stonde togidere wiþout inconuenyence, it is
 not liȝt to se.¹ Also forto seie þat þe deede which is not
 15 voluntari but as sumwhat, is þerbi more voluntari þan he is
 involuntari bi þe skile in which he is vttrli involuntari,
 semep lakke trouþ.

Also, soon aftir pere where in his maner he tretip of
 involuntari bi ignoraunce, he puttip difference bitwix
 20 'involuntari' and 'not voluntari' or 'noon voluntari,' seiynȝ
 þus: þat it ouȝte be callid 'involuntari' which no þing
 mouep þe wil, and it ouȝte be callid 'not voluntari' or
 'noon voluntari' which sumwhat mouep þe wil and not
 parfitli.² Of which difference so puttyng semep to folewe þe
 25 contrari of what he holdip pere a litil bifore. ffor out of
 þilk difference semep to folewe þat þe said castyng out of
 marchaundisis schulde be namyd 'not voluntari' or 'noon
 voluntari,' ȝhe, and schulde not be namyd 'involuntari,'²
 namelich sipen it semep þat he presupposip þo marchaundisis
 30 move þe wil into her kepyng, þouȝ y so not presuppose.
 and so hard it wole be to saue Aristotil pere fro contradic-
 cioun.

Whi þefore schulden we algate and for bettir or wors and
 vttrli cleue to Aristotil, what euer he teche? What was
 35 Aristotil opir þan a louer of trouþ, and þefore a laborer bisi
 forto fynde þe knowyng of treuþ, boþe for him silf and for
 opire? Many, forsoþe, of oolde phikesofris passiden him in

Aristotle is not
 consistent in his
 conclusions on
 these points.

Aristotle's dis-
 tinction be-
 tween 'involun-
 tary' and 'not-
 voluntary' or
 'non-voluntary'
 seems to Pecoock
 to further con-
 fuse the argu-
 ment.

It is foolish to
 follow Aristotle
 when he ob-
 viously goes
 wrong.

¹ See Notes.

² See Notes.

þe mathematik sciencis and in astrologie, and many passiden him in methaphisik, and many passiden him in medicinal | filosofie. Oonli in logik and in comoun natural filosofie 68^b and in moral filosofie he passide þe opire oolde clerkis. And þouȝ many wolen folewe Aristotil for reuerence of 5 Aristotil more þan for reuerence of trouþ to be defendid and publischið, as ful oft such inparfitnes is wonyd to be vsid in scole of filosofie and in scole of dyuynyte, þe more reup is; ȝit it likiþ not to me forto so reuerence *and* folewe Aristotil aȝens treuþ, ffor wel y wote it was neuyr Aristotilis wil þat 10 eny man schulde so do. fforwhi he dide þe contrari whanne he varied from his owen maistir *and* seide: 'A greet freend is plato, but a gretter freend is trouþ.'¹ And, siþen Aristotil was not opir þan an encercher forto fynde out trouþis, as opire men weren in his dayes and bfore his dayes, and now 15 aftir his daies ȝit hidirto ben, and he failide in ful many poyntis boþe in natural filosofie and in moral filosofie, as schal be maad open in opire placis, and as ech large ensercher of trouþis into þis present day hap failid,² And siþen his seiying is not holde in þo poyntis, whi is it not leeful and holi 20 forto go from his seiyingis as oft euer he schal be founde in such lijk caas? And so it is in þis present purpos.

If the deed is to be considered a moral virtuous deed, a man under constraint must consult his Reason before he does a deed which otherwise he would not do.

Now, o my sone, aftir al þis what is tretid fro soon aftir þe bigynnyng of þe xxije chapitre hidirto, take þou hede how þat al it is seid and tauȝt forto ȝeue cleer vndirstonding to ij 25 conclusions³ whiche þou in þe bigynnyng of þe xxije chapitre concludist to folewe out of my doctrine into þidir bfore goyng. þerfore forto applie what is tauȝt fro þe bigynnyng of þe xxije chapitre hidirto to þe ij conclusions þat þei haue her dew vndirstondyng, and namelich forto wite how þi ije 30 þere concludid conclusioun is trewe, and how it is not trewe, take kede what y schal now seie with al þat is bfore seid. If a man be sett in drede of peyn to come or in peyn present, wherfore he is stirid forto turne and chaunge his wil into opire deedis þan he wolde do if pilk drede and peyn to him 35 were not, ȝit he muste in pilk chaungyng and turnyng of his wil reule him bi þe avisose doom of resoun; *and* ellis he chaungip not *and* doop not vertuoseli and meritorili, but

¹ See Notes.² See Notes.³ See p. 121.

vicioseli and synfulli, riȝt as þe doom of resoun muste be
 folewid, chosen and fulfillid of ech opir man beyng out of
 such now seid caas, if he schulde do eny deede vertuoseli
 and not viciouseli. and so herof folewith þat he muste
 5 considere in resoun whepir it is lasse yuel to him to falle
 69^a into þe | peyn pretenyd or to chaunge his wil. and if it be
 seen in resoun þat it is lasse yuel to chaunge his wil þan to
 suffre þe peyn, þanne he owip to chaunge his wil, and ellis
 he doop viciouseli. and if he se in resoun þat it is lasse
 10 yuel to him to suffre þe peyn þan to chaunge his wil, þanne
 he owip to suffre þe peyn and not chaunge his wil, and ellis
 he doop not vertuoseli but viciouseli and perfore synfulli.

ffadir, what if after al þis y wolde aske of ȝow whepir a
 man may be constreynyd in þe iiije seid maner bi delectacioun
 15 into a deede which ellis he wolde not do, or into þe forbering
 of a deede which ellis he wolde not forbere, how myȝte þis
 questioun plese ȝow? y myȝte argue þat in caas of my
 questioun were made a constreynyng, and þat for as mych
 as pilk delectacioun chaungip þe mannys willyng, ȝhe, and
 20 bryngip into him a newe willyng which ellis schulde not be
 had, ȝhe, and þis doop bi strengþ of mocion or of movyng,
 wherfore perin is to be seid constreynyng.

Sone, y wolde þat þow tokist good hede to what y haue
 tauȝte bifore of constreynyng in þe iiije seid maner bi many
 25 chapitris, þat into a deede or into a forbering of a deede
 a man may be constreynyd in þe seid iiije maner bi peyn
 instaunt or instondyng, and bi pretenyng of peyn to come or
 to be ȝouun, and also bi damage or losse now instondyng, or
 bi pretenyng of damage or losse to come or to be brouȝt in.
 30 And perbi, sone, þou maist liztli bi lijk skile conclude þat
 into a deede which ellis a man wolde not do, or into for-
 beryng of a deede which ellis a man wolde not forbere, he
 may be constreynyd in þe iiije maner bi pretenyng þat his
 delectacioun which he now hap schal be take from him, and
 35 also by pretenyng þat delectacioun which he desirip and hopip
 to haue in tyme to come schal be lettid þat it come not to
 him. fforwhi in þis caas þis man were noon opir wise
 constreynyd in þe seid iiije maner þan bi damage or losse of
 good now had, or bi damage or losse of good comyng. and

Reason must
 judge whether it
 is a lesser evil
 for him to un-
 dergo the pun-
 ishment threat-
 ened, or to do a
 deed which
 otherwise he
 would not do.

The lesser evil
 must be chosen,
 or the man com-
 mits sin.

Can there be
 constraint in the
 fourth manner
 by promise of
 delight as well
 as by threat of
 punishment?

A man may be
 constrained in
 the fourth man-
 ner by the
 threat that de-
 light shall be
 forfeited. For
 this is simply a
 threat of punish-
 ment by the loss
 of some good
 thing.

A deed constrained by the threat that delight shall be forfeited, may be either virtuous or vicious.

A deed done because of some delight to be thereby attained, is not constrained if the desire of the delight arises naturally, apart from a constrainer.

If the desire of the delight to be thereby attained does not come naturally, but is constrained by God or the devil, then the deed is constrained in the fourth manner, and may be either virtuous or vicious.

þat a man may be constreynyd in þe iiije maner forto do or forbere, and þat vertuoseli, 3he, and may be constreynyd in þe iiije maner forto do or to forbere, and þat vicioseli, bi damage of good and bi losse of good, wheþir it now be or wheþir it be in comyng, þou hast leernyd bifore, and no man may þerto seie nay. þerfore needis bi what is tauȝt bifore it is trewe þat a man may be constreynyd in þe seid iiije maner forto do or forbere, and þat vertuoseli, 3he, and may be constreynyd in þe iiije maner forto do and forbere, and þat vicioseli, | by pretenyng of takyng away¹ delectacioun^{69b} now had, or bi pretenyng of lettyng delectacioun hopid to be had, siþen delectacioun is a good, and sum delectacioun may be a greet and a notable good, and þerfore of it þe damage or losse may be greet, 3he, and worse þan is þe seid deede, and worse þan is þe seid forberyng of an opir deede.

15

But, certis, sone, if in þi questioun askyng þou vndirstondist þat desijr or hope into a delectacioun to come myȝte be seid constreyne a man in þe iiije seid maner into a deede or into forberyng of a deede, into which deede or into which forberyng he is lad bi movyng of pilk delectacioun or of pilk desijr or hope into delectacioun, and into which deede or forberyng he ellis schulde not go, þanne it is ferþir to be considerid wheþir pilk desijr and hope risiþ oonli of him silf; and in þis caas y holde not þat it is to be grauntid how euer straungeli and feruentli þe man þerbi be lad, 3he, and þouȝ ellis he wolde not do pilk deede, or þouȝ ellis he wolde not þe opir deede assignable forbere. And cause whi is þis: What risiþ of him silf and of noon opir persoon is not bi constreynyng into him doon of eny opir persoon.

If pilk desijr or hope be putt into him not accordyngli to his owen willyng, but aȝens his willyng, as bi god or bi þe feend, y kenne not defende as now but þat bi such a passioun þe man may be constreynyd in þe iiije seid maner forto do or forto forbere, and þat vertuoseli, 3he, and in the iiije seid maner vicioseli, aftir þat riȝt doom of resoun hap forto iuge of pilk passioun þat it is gretter or lasse yuel to þe man into whom it is putt by þis present caas. fferþirmore, forsoþe, sone, y kenne not wite but þat in lijk maner and vndir lijk distinceioun it is to be seid of delectacioun had presentli in

35

¹ MS. *a wey*.

a man, whē^{pir} it may be seid constreyne þe hauer of it, or no. ffor such delectacioun may be putt into a man aȝens his willyng and aȝens his fre chesyng, and it may bi doom of riȝt resoun be iugid to be more yuel þan sum certeyn deede
5 or sum certeyn forberyng. And lijk mych a man may lope and grucche aȝens þe delectacioun beyng in him, and aȝens desijr aftir delectacioun, as he is lopi and grucchyng aȝens sum certeyn greet peyn.

Neuerpeles, forto iustli and vertuoseli do a deede contrari
10 to goddis comaundement, or forto iustli and vertuoseli leue vndoon a deede of him comaundid, may not such delectacioun or eny opir passioun constreyne in þe iiije seid maner, as is open bi techyng bifore rennyng. If y seie heryn amys,¹ y am redy into amēdement,² and so y am anentis alle my
70 holdyngis | vndir what euer tenour of wordis for certeyn motyves y hem write.

And so fynali forto seie to þis, þat a deede be morali vertuose or morali viciouse, is requyrid as for þe first conclusioun þat he be doon wityngli of þe doer, and þat þe doer knowe for þe
20 same while þat þe deede be good or yuel, or knowe it bifore whanne he wityngli and willyngli ȝaue wey forto falle into þis deede.

Also as for þe ije conclusioun into þis, þat a deede be morali vertuose or viciouse, is requyrid þat he be doon so freli
25 þat he lakke constreynyng of þe ie maner and of þe ije maner and of þe iiije maner and of þe ve maner; but it is not requyrid þat he be freli doon bi lackyng of all constreynyng of þe iiije maner. ffor it may be þat pouȝ a deede be doon bi sum constreynyng in þe iiije maner of constreynyng, he is
30 morali vertuose, and þat pouȝ he be doon bi sum constreynyng in þe iiije maner of constreynyng, he is morali viciouse, as may be seen bi þe seid large processe of chapitris here bifore goyng.

ffadir, ȝit ferþir for more cleeryng to be had vpon þe now
35 rehercid two conclusions, y may argue aȝens þe same ij conclusions. And aȝens þe first of hem þus: þe philesofire in his iije 'book of etikis'³ seiþ þat sum man dooþ vice bi

A deed constrained by some delight to be thereby attained is not virtuous if done or left undone contrary to God's law.

It follows from the preceding arguments:

(1) That a deed to be morally virtuous or morally vicious must be done knowingly, and must be known to be virtuous or vicious, either at the time of doing, or at the time of doing some other deed which might cause the doing of this deed.

(2) And it follows that a deed constrained in the fourth manner may be either virtuous or vicious.

Is Aristotle right in saying that ignorance is the cause of sin?

¹ MS. a mys.

² MS. a mendement.

³ Chap. i.

ignoraunce, so þat ignoraunce is cause whi þe syn or þe vice is doon; 3he, and ferþirmore he seiþ þere þat ech morali viciose and yuel man is in þat ignoraunt.¹

A man does not commit sin unless he knows that he sins; hence a sin cannot be committed in ignorance.

Answer herto is þis: no man doop eny viciose deede vicioseli but þat he haþ þerto kunnyng and wityng as cause 5 þerof, and þerfore doop it wityngli, þouȝ sum ignoraunce be þerwith rennyng as cause of þe same; fforwhi whanne ignoraunce is cause whi a deede is doon, and þat wheþir pilk ignoraunce be such þat þe doer knowiþ not þat he doop þe deede, as it may be in a drunkid man sleyng an 10 opir man, or wheþir þe ignoraunce be such þat þe doer knowiþ not þe deede to be viciose and synne for sympilte, or wheþir þe ignoraunce be such þat þe doer trowiþ þe deede to be not viciose and synne, as it may be in a man beyng an heretik, 3it ferþir distinccioun is to be maad þus: ffor, or it is so 15 þat þe doer of þe seid deede was cause of his seid ignoraunce þus, þat he kepte a gouernaunce which he wiste wel y-nouȝ wolde ful likli brynge him into þe seid ignoraunce, and wiste þat pilk ignoraunce ful likli wolde brynge him into þe doying of þe seid deede; or ellis þat he dide not his diligence forto 20 kepe him from þe causis of pilk ignoraunce whilis he knewe þat he entirmetid with þe causis whiche bi liklihode wolen brynge him into þe seid ignoraunce, and þat þe | seid 70^b ignoraunce wolde brynge him into þe seid deede.

The doer (1) may be the cause of the ignorance, in that he so acted as to bring him into this said ignorance, which he knew would probably cause him to commit this deed; or, (2) may not have kept himself from the causes of this ignorance, which causes have brought him into this ignorance, and so into the deed.

In (1) the doer commits the deed knowingly, and so sins.

In (2) the doer commits the deed unknowingly, and so does not sin.

And in þis caas and first membre of þis distinccioun it is 25 [not]² to be seid þat ignoraunce wiþout kunnyng is cause of þis deede. fforwhi þe bifore had kunnyng of þis ignoraunce to come is a former cause of þis deede, bi as mych as what is cause of a cause is cause of pilk causis effect. And þerfore it ouȝte be seid in þis caas þat þis doer doop þis deede wityngli, 30 for bi kunnyng and witing in þe antecedent and in þe former cause of þis deede. Or ellis as for þe ije membre of þis present distinccioun, it is so þat þe doer of þe seid deede was not cause in þe maner now seid of þe seid deede. And þanne in þis caas and membre it ouȝte be seid þat þis 35 man synnep not in doying þe seid deede, neiþir pilk deede is to him viciose or synne, for he doop it not with kunnyng þat he doop þe deede and þat þe deede is viciose. And so, sone,

¹ See Notes. ² not is omitted in MS., but is necessary to the sense.

a man doop neuer eny viciose deede vicioseli, þat is to seie, beyng to him vice and synne, but if kunnyng *and* wityng be cause of þe same deede, and þerfore he wityngli and kunnyngli in it silf or in þe cause of it doop þilk deede, þouȝ in
5 many caacis sum ignoraunce rennyng *with* þe same kunnyng be also cause of þe same viciose deede, but þanne þilk ignoraunce was ouercomeable and avoidable bi þe same doer. And whanne it is so þat þe ignoraunce which is cause of a deede was not ouercomeable and avoidable of þe doer, certis,
10 þilk ignoraunce is not to þe doer wijtable. and þerfore if þilk ignoraunce be al hool directyue cause of þe deede þus, þat no such seid kunnyng be cause of þe same deede, þilk deede is not viciose to þe doer. And þis mych seid and tauȝt is y-nouȝ forto schewe þat ech viciose deede vicioseli
15 doon is doon bi a kunnyng as cause þerof, and so is doon wityngli auentis þe deede in it silf or in his antecedentis, in þe maner bifore spokun, þouȝ ignoraunce be þerwiþ in sum caas cause of þe same viciose doying. for aftir þis what is declarid bifore in þe bigynnyng of þe xxje chapitre, and þis
20 what is here seid in þis present answer, y vndirstonde my first rehercid conclusioun.

fferþirmore, whanne it is seid of þe philesofir þat ech yuel doer is ignoraunt, If þis be vndirstonde of ignoraunce þat þe deede is in doying, or þat þe deede is vice and synne, þe
25 proposicioun of þe philesofir were vntrew. but in a certeyn maner of vndirstondyng þilk proposicioun may be trewe,
71^a which is þis: As is in þe more parti, | and as it were welnyȝ in alle caacis of viciose deedis doying, Ech viciose doer of a viciose deede lackiþ at þe leest sum kunnyng of
30 sum circumstaunce ¹ litil or mych about þe þing of the deede, or about þe deede, of which ignoraunce þe contrari kunnyng schulde helpe þe doer forto þe esilier forbere þe doying of þe seid deede, and which ignoraunce for þat he is had moueþ þe more þe doer into þe doying of þe deede, and bi lijk skile or
35 into forberying of a deede. And so for þe more parti ech viciose doer knowiþ not so mych about þe deede as to his profit were þat he knewe, þouȝ he knowe ful wel þat þe deede which he is in doying be viciose and not to be doon

A deed done through avoidable ignorance is sin.

A deed done through unavoidable ignorance is not sin.

Aristotle is wrong if he means that ignorance is the cause of sin. He is right if he means that in most cases of sin there is ignorance of some circumstance, the knowledge of which would probably prevent the sin.

¹ See Notes.

And pis is y-nouȝ forto saue þe worschip of þe philesosfir in his seid wordis, Namelich for pat he was not bettir þan a secher aftir kunnyng forto fynde out treupis to him silf and to opire men, as summe opire men aftir him laboriden in þe same wise, and profiteden into þis purpos as mych as he 5 profitede, and summe opire men mych more þan he profitede.

Can ignorance of any circumstances of a sin excuse the sin?

ffadir, siþen ȝe han tauȝte þat ignoraunce, errour and vnkunnyng excusip a doer of a deede and also a forberer of a deede, y aske if ech ignoraunce or errour of what euer circumstaunce or þing longyng to þe principal deede schal 10 excuse him which hap þilk ignoraunce or errour?

Only ignorance that the deed itself is sin, or that a principal circumstance of it is sin.

Sone, y seie nay. but pis is to be take for trewe: þat such bifore spokun errour or ignoraunce of þe principal deede in it silf, or of eny substancial circumstaunce or þing to him perteynyng, excusip; but such seid ignoraunce or errour of 15 opir liȝt and accidental circumstauncis or purtenauncis of which þe fruyt and eend of þe principal deede hangip not, excusip not þe doer or þe forberer. And whepir þe circumstaunce or purtenaunce be substancial or accidental to þe principal deede, doom of resoun or of feip or of positijf 20 lawe hap to iuge, aftir þat þe mater be in lawe of kynde or in lawe of feip or in positijf lawe of man. And for pis what is now seid it is holde and seid þat if y ȝeue my bodi into wedlok to Margret in stide of Kateryn, þe ȝift is of no strengþ; and if y ȝeue my bodi into wedlok to a boond 25 womman in stide of a fre womman, þe ȝift is of no strengþ; But aȝenward, if y ȝeue my bodi into wedlok to margret as fairer þan in deede sche is, or as richer þan in deede sche is, þe ȝift is good y-nouȝ.

Whether a circumstance is principal or accidental must be decided by doom of Reason, of Faith, or of positive law.

How can the old distinction of sins of frailty, sins of ignorance, and sins of malice, or sins against the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, be reconciled with Pecock's assertion that all sins are sins of malice?

ffadir, aȝens youre iȝe bifore rehercid conclusioun y may 30 argue þus: An oold and of greet record a distinccioun is þis: þat summe men synnen bi vnpower, summe men bi ignoraunce, and summe men bi maliuolence, þat is to seie, bi malice. And perfore it is seid þat summe men synnen aȝens | þe 71^b fadir in heuen, summe men aȝens þe sone in heuen, and 3 summe men aȝens þe holi goost. And if pis so famosse distinccioun be trewe, þat in þese pre maners ben synnys and vicis, þe iȝe rehercid conclusioun is not trewe, þat ech vice and synne is doon bi maliuolence or bi malice. ffor

panne ech vice were doon in þe iij^e maner of þe now seid remembrid distinceioun.

ffor answer into þis to be maad, it is to wite þat in þe i^e membre of þis distinceioun rehercid in þis present obieccioun, 5 'bi vnpower', is to be vndirstonde greet freelte or febilnes or difficulte or hardnes forto do a deede, or forto forbere a deede, Neuerpeles not so greet but þat it may of þe doer be wel ouercome, þat it lette him not fro doyng a deede which were of him to be doon, or fro forbering a deede 10 which was of him to be forborn; fforwhi ellis þilk difficulte schulde excuse him þat þilk deede were not to him synne. Also 'by ignoraunce' or 'vnkunnyng', spokun in þe i^e membre of þe same distinceioun, is to be vndirstonde ignoraunce in þe doer such as þe doer myzte ouercome and 15 leie aside,¹ if he þerto 3aue sufficient diligence; fforwhi ellis þilk ignoraunce schulde excuse and make þat þilk deede were not to þe doer vice and synne. so þat he which synnep in þe i^e membre of þis distinceioun synnep bi greet difficulte ouercomeable of þe doer, and he þat synnep in þe i^e membre 20 of þis distinceioun synnep bi greet ignoraunce neuerpeles ouercomeable of þe doer, And þefore euer eipir of hem synnep wityngli and wilyngli. And for as mych as euer eipir of hem synnep wilyngli, þefore euer eipir of hem synnep bi yuel wil, bi malyuolence and bi malice, þou3 with þilk malice 25 greet freelte, þat is to seie, greet difficulte or hardnes ouercomeable, or greet ignoraunce ouercomeable, be cause of þe deede rennyngli with þe wityng and with þe wilyng.

But he þat synnep in þe iij^e membre of þis same distinceioun synnep so bi wilyng þat þerto is not ioynyd 30 such seid greet difficulte neipir such seid greet ignoraunce. And þefore þe syn doon in þe iij^e maner is grettir synne and hardir to be vtirli and fulli for3ouun þan if it were doon in þe i^e or in þe iij^e maner.

fferpirmore, þou3 power be not propre to þe fadir in 35 heuen, but it is lijk comoun to him and to the sone and to þe holi goost, and þou3 kunnyng and wisdom be not propre to þe sone, and þat for as mych as þe oon and þe same ful kunnyng and wisdom is in alle þre persoones and lijk comoun to hem alle þre, And þou3 goodnes and loue or welwilyng be

Sins of frailty and sins of ignorance, in that the frailty or ignorance is able to be overcome, are sins of malice.

Though all three kinds of sin are virtually sins of malice, for the third kind there is less excuse, and therefore forgiveness is less easily obtained.

The reason why sins of frailty are sins against the Father, sins of ignorance sins against the Son, and sins of malice sins against the Holy Ghost.

¹ MS. *a side*.

not propre to þe holi goost more þan to þe fadir or þe sone, but | þat oon and þe same goodnes, loue and welwillyng is ⁷²^a euenli in alle þre persooones; ȝit power is approprid to þe fadir, and wisdom is approprid to þe sone, and goodnes or beneuolence is approprid to þe holi goost, for summe goode 5 causis, as þouȝ þese þre perfeccions weren propre seuerali to þese þre persooones, not wiþstonding þat þo perfeccions ben not so propre to hem. And for þis now seid appropriacioun of þe seid þre perfeccions—myȝt, wisdom, and loue or beneuolence—it is seid þat þo men whiche trespassen bi ¹⁰ cause of greet difficulte ouercomeable, trespassen aȝens þe fadir in heuen; and þei whiche trespassen bi cause of greet vnkunnyng ouercomeable, trespassen aȝens þe sone; And þei þat trespassen bi fre willyng, stondyng wiþout þerto ioyned now seid greet difficulte or hardnes or now seid greet ¹⁵ ignoraunce, trespassen aȝens þe holi goost; not wiþstondyng þat in trouþ of þe ping eche of þese trespassers trespassen euen lijk into eche of þe þre persooones, þat is to seie, lijk mych into þe fadir as into the sone and into þe holi goost.

As there is least excuse for the sins of the third kind, so forgiveness for them is hardest to obtain.

To say there is no forgiveness for sins of the third kind, is merely hyperbole.

But ouer þis, for as mych as þe trespass of hem whiche ²⁰ trespassen in þe iije now spokun membre is mych grettir þan þe trespass of eny of þe opire tweyne, alle opire circumstauncis beyng lijk, and þerfore þe hardir it is to haue þerof forȝeuenes, it is seid þat who trespassiþ aȝens þe holi goost, þat is to seie, in þe iije membre of þis last spokun ²⁵ distinccioun, schal not haue forȝeuenes in þis world neipir in þe world to come; forto vndirstonde is speche vndir a figure which is clepid 'yperbole', þat is to seie, hardir it schal be forto gete forȝeuenes of pilk synne þan of opire seid maners of synnes. Suche figurative spechis ben in ³⁰ opire placis of scripture, whanne it is seid þat it is impossible a riche man forto entre into þe kyngdom of heuen, þat is to seie, it is hard a riche man forto entre into þe kyngdom of heuen; ¹ and ad hebreos, vj^o chapitre, toward þe bigynnyng, ² is a lijk speche of him which hap oonys falle into synne, ³⁵ aftir he hap be baptizid and hap be ful turnyd into god from his oold viciouse lijf. Also in þe oold testament ³ it is seid þat certeyn men weren so sure schuters þat þei wolden not

¹ Cf. Matt. xix. 23.

² vv. 4-6.

³ Judges, xx. 16.

faile in her schot forto smyte an heer, and forto cleue it into
two parties. bi which speche was no more meenyd þan þis:
þat þei were mych surer schuters þan opire schuters weren.
And in lijk maner may conuenientli vnder lijk figure be
5 vnderstonde þis speche, þat synne doon into þe holi goost,
þat is to seie, in þe iij^e membre of þe last seid distinceioun,
72^b schal | neuer be forȝoue, þat is to seie, hardir schal be forto
haue forȝeuenesse þerof þan if it were doon in þe i^e or iij^e
membre of þe same distinceioun.

10 þus mych, sone, is y-nouȝ as for here into answeris of þine
obiecciouns aȝens þe ij conclusions sett forþ toward þe bigyn-
nyng of þe [xxij^e] chapitre,¹ and of þe newe rehercid here
bifore in þis present xxv^e chapitre.²

ffadir, whepir bi lijk skile if a man take a gouernaunce in
15 haunt bi which he schal aftirward do habituali or virtuali,
þat is to seie, strengþli, a good deede, whanne he not þenkip
vpon þilk good deede, neipir wote for þe while whepir he
þilk deede doop, or no, and þerfore doop it ignorauntli, þouȝ
not for and bi ignoraunce as cause of þe doying, schal þilk
20 deede be vertuoseli doon of þilk man, and is it to be seid þat
he doop it wityngli and willyngli for þat he was wityng and
willyng vpon þe antecedent of þis deede, which antecedent or
precedent þis man knewe and consideride þat it wole lede
him into þis deede whanne he schulde not vpon þis deede
25 þenke?

ȝis, sone, al þis is trewe for lijk skile, And also for ellis
god were redier forto punysche þan to rewarde, which stondip
not with his greet loue and goodnes, beyng gretter þan loue
and goodnes in eny creature. And also þerbi it is holde for
30 trewe, as it is trewe, þat a man which woneþ him forto
preise and preie god bi psalmes and ympnys spokun bi his
mouþ, preisip and preieþ vertuoseli whanne his mynde is
rauysshid away aȝens his wil, and he for þe while wote not
þat he eny word of preisying and preier seieþ.

The above
should be suffi-
cient answer to
objections
against the two
conclusions con-
cerning deeds
done in ignor-
ance or under
constraint.

A good deed,
done at the time
unwittingly, is a
virtue, if the
doer at some
time has acted
wittingly so as
to bring him
into this good
deed. Thus it
is a virtue to
praise and pray
to God, even
though at a
certain moment
it be done
mechanically.

¹ MS. *xxij^e*; but the reference is to the
conclusions drawn as to the sinfulness of
deeds done in ignorance or under constraint.

See chap. xxii, pp. 121 ff.

² p. 155.

xxvje chapitre.

Deeds of the
Will are all re-
ducible to will-
ing and nilling.

[F]Adir, in many placis bifore in þis present first parti, namelich in þe ix^e chapitre, 3e haue assignyd and namyd to oure wil dyuerse inward deedis, and þat vndir þese namys, 'willyng' and 'nyllyng,' 'chesyng,' 'refusyng', and also 5 'comaundyng' to alle op^{ir}e sensual and placeli movyng powers of þe soul; And also in þe same ix^e chapitre to þe lou3er sensual appetit which is clepid þe 'lou3er wil' or þe sensual wil,' 3e han assignyd like sensual willyngis and nyllyngis and also comaundyngis to alle bodili membris 10 and her sensual powers and to power of bodili mouyng, þat þei wirche or reste from wirchyng; but wheþir so many dyuerse inward kyndis of deedis ben in þe wil, how many namys of hem ben now rehercid, or ellis þat oon and þe same deede is namyd twies or þries vndir summe of the seid 15 names, y wote not, fadir, redili vnto tyme 3e han to me seid þervpon 3oure feelyng.

Sone, y kanne not wite as now þat þer ben eny mo inward actyue or wirchyng deedis of þe wil | þan þese two, willyng 73^a and nilling; and þerfore chesyng is a willyng, and refusyng 20 is a nyllyng, comaundyng to do is a willyng, comaundyng to not do or to ceese is a nyllyng þat þe werk or þe movyng be. And þe cause whi y holde þis wey is þis: þe greet multitude of powers in kynde is neuer to be putt where alle þe werkis assignable to þe more multitude may be seen to be fulfillid 25 of a lasse multitude; fforwhi nature and kynde hatip al superfluyte aboue suffiience in þe oon side and al lack fro suffiience in þe op^{ir}e side. But so it is þat þe effect of choice is seen to be fulfillid bi willyng, and þe effect of refusyng is seen to be fulfillid parfijtli bi nyllyng; and þe effect of 30 comaundyng is seen to be fulfillid bi parfit willyng, and þe effect of rest makyng or of cesyng fro werk is seen to be fulfillid bi parfit nyllyng; fforwhi as soon as a man parfitli willip þat his hond be mouyd to þe heed or to þe moup, anoon wipout more þe movyng vertu of þe bodi obeieþ and moueþ 35 pidir þe hond, And as soon as þe wil parfitli willip þe hond to ceese fro movyng, anoon wipout more þe movyng vertu of þe bodi obeieþ and bigynneþ to sette þe hoond into rest.

Wherfore it semep waast forto putte and assigne eny mo
inward actyueli wirchyng deedis in þe wil þan wyllyng and
nyllyng. Also into þe same purpos þus: how mych euer a
man comaunde bi his wil þat þe foot go and þat þe hond be
5 movid, so þat ech sensual appetit reste fro al causyng into
þilke same movyngis, neuerneipir of þese movyngis schulen
be do but if *perwith* þe same man in þe same while wille þe
membris to be so mouyd, as *experience* schewith. And if
þe man wille parfijtli þe membris to be so movid, þei anoon
10 forþ *with* ben so movid. Wherfore semep þat but if we
schulden folewe and holde to be what we knowen not to be,
and also what nedip not to be holde to be, we schulde not
holde eny such deede of comaundyng in þe wil opir þan is þe
wyllyng or þe nyllyng of þe wil.

15 And ferþirmore, if it be alleggid here þat þe hoond and þe
foot and þe tung and opire membris ben oft mouyd whanne
neipir þe wil neipir þe louzer sensual appetit bisettip eny
deede of wyllyng or nyllyng vpon þilk movyng to be doon, as
experience wel schewip; certis, þis alleggeaunce is not more
20 aʒens þe wey which y haue here now holde, þan it is aʒens þe
wey which wolde putte a comaundyng deede in þe wil and a
comaundyng deede in þe sensual appetit biside þe deedis of will-
73^b yng and of nyllyng and of appetityng, as it is openy-nouʒ. þer-
fore euereipir of þese two weies haþ forto answere to þis allegge-
25 aunce, and þat in þis maner: þilk movyng of which it is spokun
in þe now maad alleggeaunce is causid of a disposicioun or of an
habit, causid in þe membir or in his motyve power bi occasioun
of wyllyngis or nyllyngis or of comaundyngis in þe wil or in
þe sensual appetit whiche wenten bifore þe gendryng of þilk
30 disposicioun or habit. and so þis seid movyng is causid
mediatli and afer ¹ of wyllyng or nyllyng or of appetityng or of
comaundyng, and þat wheþir þilk moving be doon in wakyng
or in sleep. Also it is to be knowe for trouþ þat in sleep þe
inward sensitive wittis *with* her appetitis mowe wake into
35 her werkis lijk wel as out of sleep. Neuerpeles, if to eny
man it schal seme forto holde opir wise, þat is to seie, þat þe
deede bi which þe wil comaundip to eny of þe opire powers is
opir þan þe deede of wyllyng bi which þe wil willip þilk power

Mechanical
deeds of move-
ment, &c., per-
formed when the
Will and the
sensual appe-
tites seem in
abeyance, are
finally caused by
willing or
nilling.

¹ MS. *a fer*.

to wirche, it schal not displese me, for to neuer neipir parti
y se eny mych and excellent suerte, and whepir þe oon wey
or þe opir be holde, y se no greet fors.

Does service to
God consist only
of morally vir-
tuous deeds?

ffadir, of what 3e seiden afore in þe xve, xvje and xviije
chapitris semep to folewe þat oonli moral vertuose deedis ben 5
seruicis to god. Certis, fadir, herof folewith þat al þe seruice
of god is moral vertuose deede, and þat no deede is seruice to
god saue moral vertuose deede. ffadir, it myzte seme 3is.
fforwhi deedis of knowyngal vertues ben seruicis to god, and
ben suche for whom þe hauer and þe doer of hem schal be 10
rewardid of god,¹ whepir not, fadir, if a man studie and
lerne dyuynyte and lawe and natural filosofie and phisik
for a good entent, as for plesaunce to god and for eese of his
euen cristen and for his owen goostli good, is not þis leernyng
and kunnyng a seruice to god? and, in lijk maner, if a man 15
lerne and studie about a craft to be kunnen for a 'good
entent, is not þilk deede of kunnyng a seruice to god and
rewardable of god? and 3it þei ben not deedis of moral
vertues, as it myzte seme, fforwhi þei ben deedis of knowyngal
vertues, as of science and of craft. 20

Pecock did not
mean that God's
service con-
sisted only of
moral virtuous
deeds.

Sone, how euer it hap happid me or schal happe me forto
slide in my wordis, as ful hard it is eny man to kepe him
perfro, y helde not 3itt in my meenyng and entent þat oonli
moral vertuose deedis ben seruicis to god, neipir þat al þe
seruice of god is moral vertuose deede; for y haue holde 25
þe contrari, þat an habit or disposicioun with a moral deede
goyng aftir him is moral seruice to god, and þis habit
or | disposicioun with þe seid deede is not a deede, as is open 74^a.
y-nou3. Also y haue tau3te bifore þat it is not al oon to seie
'a moral vertu' and 'a moral vertuose deede,' and þat not ech 30
moral vertu is a moral vertuose deede. and ferpirmore y
haue tau3te þat moral vertuose deedis ben not moral vertues
but in a large maner of spekyng, pou3 þei mowe be seid wel
moral vertuose deedis for þat þei so ny3 ben to moral vertues
perteynyng. But y holde wel and knowleche þat no deede is 35
þe seruice of god saue moral vertuose deede aloon, and perfore
no deede is to be rewardid saue moral vertuose deede aloon,
and no deede is to be punyschid saue moral viciose deede aloone.

Habits and dis-
positions, with
their deeds
following, may
be service to
God.

But no deed is
service to God
save a moral
virtuous deed.

But the term
'moral virtuous

but pou muste vndirstonde þat of moral vertuose deedis

¹ Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

summe ben wipinforþ in þe wil, as willyngis and nyllyngis, chesyngis and refusyngis, and comaundyngis to ech opir power dyuerse fro þe wil; and summe ben wipout þe wil, comaundid bi þe wil aftir þe doom of prudence or of feip to
 5 be doon, as ben deedis of etyng, drynkyng, spekyng, goyng, and soforþ of opire; whiche deedis, while þei ben comaundid of þe wil to be doon accordauntli to þe doom of resoun and for god, þei ben in þat moral vertuose deedis. And siþen þe wil may comaunde to resoun þat he laboure in sciencis, in
 10 craftis and in prudencis, for as mych as doom is had bifore in prudence or in feip þat it is so to studie for goddis lawe; and þe wil may comaunde to þe movyng powers þat þei laboure answeyngli to þe kunnyngis of craftis and of prudencis for god, and for þat prudence so demep þat þei so
 15 laboure; þerfore bi lijk skile it folewith þat inward deedis of willyng and bisines in þe wil forto fynde, gete and haue þe sciencis and craftis ben moral vertuose deedis propirli and formali. And ouer þis it myzte be seid þat materiali þe deedis and qualitees whiche ben sciencis and craftis, þat is to
 20 seie, knowyngis in hem, whanne þey fallen vndir maundement of þe wil, for cause now seid and in maner now seid, þei ben seruyce of god and moral vertuose deedis, not wipstondyng vndir an opir reward and vndir an opir biholding or in an opir caas þei ben not moral vertuose deedis, for þat þat in
 25 pilk reward or caas þei ben not comaundid of þe wil to be doon aftir prudence for god, but þei ben chosen and comaundid to be doon for lust and plesaunce of þe science or of þe craft in it silf, or for worldli lucre or worldli worschip oonli. In lijk maner þe deede of preisyng and þe deede of preiying
 74^b and þe deede of worschipyng, þouȝ as in hem silf þei | ben not moral vertuose deedis no more þan sciencis or craftis ben, but þei ben deedis of þe vndirstonding and resoun, and so ben vertuose intellectual deedis; ȝit as þei ben commaundid of þe wil willyng and biddyng aftir doom of resoun þat þei
 35 be founde, gete and had, þei ben materiali moral vertuose deedis, and ben so materiali in þe first poynt of þe first table. And þus is answer maad to þyn argument.

ffadir,¹ wheþir not knowyngal vertues ben suche dis-

¹ Some such verb as 'y wole aske' to be understood.

deed' includes inward deeds of the Will, such as willing, nilling, &c., and outward deeds of the Will, such as eating, drinking, &c., so long as they are done for the glory of God.

And deeds of the kunnyngal (knowyngal) virtues, in so far as they are done for the glory of God, are moral virtuous deeds.

Are the kunnyngal (knowyngal) virtues

dispositions and habits produced in the Reason by means of considerations and deeds of knowing going before them?

Do the *kunnyngal* (*knowyngal*) virtues, if they are dispositions and habits, produce considerations and deeds similar to those engendering them?

This is true of the *kunnyngal* (*knowyngal*) virtues. And also of the sensitive wits and of moving power.

The books of Pecoock where teaching on the special moral virtues may be found.

Will not some argue that it is unnecessary for Christians to consider Prudence, since they hold that Faith alone is sufficient?

posicions and habitis causid *and* gendrid in þe resoun or in þe vndirstondyng bi occasioun of consideracions and deedis of knowyng goyng bifore hem, as it is seid bifore þat moral vertues ben disposicions and habitis gendrid in þe wil bi occasioun of willyngis and nyllyngis in þe wil *and* of opire 5 deedis comaundid bi þe wil goyng bifore þe gendryng of þo disposicions and habitis? And if it be so, þanne whepir not suche knowyngal vertues, beyng disposicions and habitis, inclynen þe vndirstondyng into consideracions and deedis of knowyng lijk to þe deedis of knowyng goyng bifore þe 10 generacioun of þo disposicions and habitis, in lijk maner as it is seid of moral disposicions and habitis in þe wil?

3is, sone, euen so lijk it is in hoþe now seid parties bi þee rehercid, and not oonli so in resoun and in wil; but it is in lijk wise trewe þat ech sensitijf witt and ech placeli movyng 15 power in man and in beest may be customyd, disposid and habituad in maner sumwhat lijk to þe customyng and habituacioun of þe resoun *and* of þe wil. And as for pis place no more at pis tyme of moral vertues as in her generalte.

fforto knowe moral vertues in her specialte, go þou into 20 þe first part of 'þe donet' and fro þens into þe ije part of 'þe donet', and fro þens next into 'þe prouoker', and from þens into 'þe book of sentence', and fro þens into þe iije, iiije *and* v^e treticis of þe first parti of 'cristen religioun', and fro þens into þe vije tretice of þe ije parti of þe same 25 book of 'cristen religioun', and fro þens into þe opire bookis into whom þese bookis remytten and senden.

ffadir, parauenture summe sengil dyuynys, suche as mych attenden into summys and sermons and bookis of pulpit ware, wolen trowe þat þe doctrine which 3e han tauzte here 30 so largeli of prudence in þe resoun and of moral vertues gendrid bi it into wil, longip to philesofris whiche ben not cristen men, and han not wherbi to gouerne hem in her moral conuersacioun saue her doom of resoun, and so of her moral filosofie wherynne þei fynden | to be þe seid prudence and 75^a þe seid moral vertu comyng forþ bi þe ledyng of prudence; But to vs cristen lyuers longip oonli to considere what oure feip wole, and into what moral vertues pilk feip ledip vs, and forto considere eny ferpir is not oure parti.

Sone, if eny such haue be or now is, as y may wel trowe
 pat haue be and now is, y wolde he amendid his conceit and
 his opynyoun bi what y schal for him now reherce. I wolde
 pat he biþenke him how seynt poul techiþ, ad *Romanos*,
 5 [xij^e] *chapitre*,¹ pat cristen mennys obsequie or seruice to god
 schulde be resonable. Certis, þis obsequie or seruice to god
 muste be deedis of the fre wil. And þanne y argue þus:
 If þese musten be resonable, as seynt poul seiþ, þat is to seie,
 lad forþ bi reulyng of doom in resoun, þei musten be lad
 10 forþ and maad bi prudence. and if eny oon such deede of
 þe fre wil, so lad forþ bi prudence in þe resoun, be obsequie
 and seruice to god, bi lijk skile ech opir such deede is
 obsequie and seruice to god.

Faith alone is
 not sufficient to
 the Christian.
 St. Paul teaches
 that Prudence
 is necessary.

Also y wolde he bipouzte him what crist bede to hise
 15 apostlis, [Matt. x^e] *chapitre*,² seiying þus: 'Be 3e prudent as
 addris and symple as colueris', and þat to whom euer is
 comaundid forto haue prudence, is comaundid forto haue
 þo vertues in þe wil into whiche prudence serueþ. And
 þanne he schal se þat to cristen men longiþ þe doctrine
 20 which y haue maad here vpon prudence and vpon moral
 vertues gendrid bi prudence; 3he, þanne he schal se þat þe
 more parti of goddis lawe and seruice is moral filosofie.

So also does
 Christ.

Also y wolde he bipouzte him whos lawe is lawe of kynde,
 forto speke of such lawe of kynde as y trete in 'þe iust appris-
 25 yng of holi scripture', in þe i^e parti; And þat he bipouzte him
 whepir pilk lawe ouzte be kept and performyd, or no. And
 þanne he schulde fynde wel þat it is þe lawe of god, which is
 auctor of kynde, and þat it is þe wil of god þat pilk lawe
 be kept as for his lawe. and sipeþ pilk lawe is not kepeable
 30 saue of resonable creaturis, and pilk lawe is not ellis þan
 moral vertu lad forþ and maad bi prudence, he muste con-
 clude þat my present doctrine vpon prudence and moral
 vertues is doctrine of lawe of god longyng to cristen men.

The law of
 Nature, i. e. the
 law of God, is
 based upon
 Prudence.

Also y wolde he bipouzte him how þat god made not in
 35 veyn and into ydilnes mannys resoun and wil, bi which man
 is forto lyue in opir wise þan beestis, 3he, and aboue beestis.
 and þanne he schulde se þat þe wil and þe purpos of god

God requires
 man to use to
 the full his
 powers of
 Reason and Free
 Will, and these
 are not all

¹ Space left in MS. for reference, which is to *Romans*, xii. 1.

² Space left in MS. for reference, which is to *Matt.* x. 16.

necessitated by
Faith.

was þat al þe werk and exercise of mannys wil lad forþ bi poyntyng to him maad | of resoun, schulde be doon into him ^{75b} and into his seruice. And siþen ful mych þing is so to be doon in mannys wil bi poyntyng þerto maad in resoun, which is opir þan what feip poyntip and assignep to be do in þe 5 wil, he schulde soon se þat mych moral seruice is to be doon to god of his cristen peple which is not seruice poyntid bi feip. And so þis present doctrine, fallyng vpon prudence and vpon his moral vertues, is longyng to cristen men.

Since God bids Christians live according to Prudence, will not men say that Faith bids men live according to Prudence?

And that therefore our consent to the truths of Prudence is Faith?

If they say God or Faith bids men live according to Prudence, they must acknowledge that Prudence is essential.

To conclude that our consent to the truths of Prudence is Faith, is absurd.

For Faith is belief in a fact which cannot be proved by our Wits or by Reason, and which therefore depends upon revelation.

It is difficult to say if a truth which can be learned by Reason, but which yet is revealed, is learned by Faith, or no.

ffadir, happili þe seid clerkis wolen fele and seie, for as ¹⁰ mych as god biddip to cristen men forto attende into prudence and into moral vertues lad in bi prudence, þat þerfore feip biddip cristen men forto attende into prudence and into þo moral vertues. And paraenture þei wolen þanne conclude and seie ferþir as þerof folewyng, þat þe consent or assent ¹⁵ which we maken and ȝeuen to treupis of prudence, is feip.

Sone, in þe first of pese ij seiyngis þei knowlechen wel what y purpose here, þat þis present doctrine rennyng vpon prudence and his moral vertues longip mych to cristen lyuers. But if þerof þei wolen conclude þat þerfore it is ²⁰ feip hem forto consente wherto prudence hem mouep, þei maken þerin a bad arguiment and folewyng. fforwhi if god bidde vs attende and consente to what oure outward wittis schewen to vs, as þat þe crowe is black and þat þe swan is white, and þanne þerfore feip were to vs forto consente ²⁵ herto þat þe crowe is blak and þat þe swan is white, þe skile of folewyng were not worþ; and no more is þe ije now spokun folewyng, if þei it make. ȝhe, witti doctouris techen \ þat noon article of feip kanne be lernyd of vs bi strengþ of oure natural resoun oonli, wipout reueling or tellyng or ³⁰ affermyng maad bi god of þe same article to be trewe. And if eny article of oure feip myzte be so of vs knowen, anoon he were þanne noon article of oure feip. But ferþir and biȝonde, þis myzte be brouzt into questioun: if eny treup which we kunnenn sufficientli bi doom of oure resoun wipout ³⁵ assercioun of þe same maad þerto bi god, and aftirward god afferme þe same to be trewe, wheþir þerfore þerof is feip bi cause of goddis reuelacioun comyng vpon it, aftir þat it was

sufficientli bifore knowen in doom of resoun wipout such godli reuelacioun. Certis, þe decidyng of þis questioun is mete for hiȝe and goode clerkis, and þerfore þe decisoun and determynacioun herof is in 'þe book of feip' in latyn.

5

xxvij^e chapitre.

[T]herfore,¹ o my sone, forto gadere togider mych þing bifore largeli sett, y seie þus: If it be askid of þee what
76^a is þe moral goodnes of oure mo[r]al vertuose deede, and fro
whens or fro what þingis oure moral vertuose deede drawip
10 to him and takip to him his moral goodnes, Answer þou
þus and seie þat oure ech deede which is morali good hap
in him two goodnessis. oon goodnes he hap which is his
natural goodnes, and þis natural goodnes folewith his beyng
in kynd or nature. And þerfore what euer þingis causen his
15 beyng, þo þingis causen his seid natural goodnes; and in
what maner þei causen his beyng, in þe same maner þei
causen his seid natural goodnes; and so of þo þingis whiche
causen him into his beyng he drawith and takip his natural
goodnes. of which natural goodnes it is writun, *genesis*,
20 i^e chapitre,² þus: 'God sise all þingis whiche he made, and
þei weren ful goode.' An opir goodnes oure deede hap in
him which is his moral goodnes; and þis goodnes oure deede
to him takip and drawip of his mater or obiet into which
or vpon which he passip, or about which he is don, and of
25 his bifore spokun circumstauncis, whilis him to haue pilk
mater or obiet and þo circumstauncis resoun in his avised
doom allowip, and þe wil for þe seid doom freli him chesip.
and so his seid mater or obiet and his seid circumstauncis
and þe avised doom of resoun and þe fre choice of þe wil
30 togidere ben causis of his moral goodnes, and of hem as of
his causis he drawip his moral goodnes. Moral goodnes in
it silf is not ellis þan a corespondence or accord bitwix þe
deede with his mater or obiet and his circumstauncis on
þe oon side, and þe doom of resoun with fre choice þerof in þe
35 opir side; or ellis pilk moral goodnes is an answeyng of þe
deede with his obiet and his circumstauncis to þe doom of

Every deed which is morally good has two kinds of goodness:

(1) A natural goodness dependent on its nature.

(2) A moral goodness dependent on its object, its circumstances, and its being done according to the doom of Reason and Free Will.

¹ Minuscule *h* in MS.

² v. 31.

Examples of
natural and
moral good-
nesses of a moral
virtuous deed.

resoun *and* fre choice of þe wil, which is, as it were, al oon and þe same.

Ensampl herof is þis: If y chese to ete fleisch attretli whilis y am hungri in þe sunday at mydday, aftir matyns and masse herd or seid, and in myn owen house at þe mete 5 table, and for þis eend þat þerbi y kepe my bodili help and strengþ into goddis seruice, þe beyng of þis deede is causid of my teep and of my iowis gryndyng þe fleisch, and of my movyng power which reulip þe iowes and þe teep forto so tere and grynde þe fleisch as of his makyng causis, and is 10 causid of þe fleisch grounden and toren as of his material cause, about which or vpon which þe deede of etyng passip and is doon. and þerfore of þe same teep and iowis and movyng power *and* fleisch togidere and in þe same maner, his natural goodnes | is causid and maad. which natural 76^b goodnes of myn eetyng now seid is no bettir þan if y wolde ete chaff or erþe or dritt openli in mennys sizt in þe market place for wantownnesse, or for þat men schulde þeron wondre; and is no bettir þan were myn eetyng bi which y wolde ete wipout refreyng fleisch ouer gredili azens hungir in fulnes 20 in friday, eerli afore masse or afore al preier seid or herd, at þe dungehep or at þe bordel hous, and for plesaunce to wantown felawship; And is no bettir þan if y wolde ete fleisch on sunday wipout hungir and *without* nede and wipout dew place *and* dew tyme, but not in such place and 25 tyme in which resoun f[or]bedip¹ to take mete; for in her kyndis *and* natures as good were þese þre last now seid etyngis as þe first bifore seid etyng. But certis, my first seid etyng, so wirching or goyng vpon fleisch as vpon his obiect and with þe bifore rehercid circumstauncis, hap an 30 answeyng or accordaunce bitwixe him as hauyng þe seid obiect and bisett with þe seid circumstauncis in þe oon side, and þe doom of resoun with þe fre choice of wil in þe opir side; and such accordaunce is not bitwix eny of þe þre opire seid etyngis doon vpon þe seid obiectis with her circum- 35 stauncis in þe oon side, and þe doom of resoun and fre choice in þe opir side. and þerfore þe first seid etyng hap in hym moral goodnes, and noon of þe opire seid etyngis hap in him

¹ MS. *febedip*.

moral goodnes. but þe i^e etyng hauyng his seid obiect and circumstauncis is aȝens þe doom of resoun, bi cause he haþ boþe his obiect and his circumstauncis which doom of resoun wole not to be had at þilk deede, and þerfore he is in wors
 5 maner morali yuel þan eny of þe last [iij].¹ þe iij^e seid etyng, þouȝ he haue such an obiect which resons doom allowiþ him to haue, ȝit bi cause he haþ circumstauncis aȝens þe doom of resoun, þat is to seie, which resoun demep to be not had of him, þerfore he is morali yuel, þouȝ not in so yuel maner
 10 as is þe ij^e etyng morali yuel,² but in a lasse maner morali yuel. And þe iiij^e etyng, þouȝ he haue an obiect which resoun allowiþ, and þouȝ he haue not eny circumstaunce which resoun werneþ to be had, ȝit bi cause he haþ not alle þo circumstauncis whiche resoun demep and iugiþ to be of him
 15 had, þerfore ȝit he is morali yuel, but leest yuel of alle þese iij now rehercid yuel soortis.

and so boþe bi reul and bi ensaumplyng now bifore sett, it is open þat a deede is not morali good but if he haue such an obiect as resoun allowiþ to be accordyng to þilk deede,
 77^a and but | if he haue alle þe circumstauncis whiche resoun demep owe to be had of þilk deede, and but if he lacke alle þe circumstauncis which resoun demep and iugiþ him owe to lacke, and but if he be chosen freli of þe wil for þe seid doom of resoun. And þerfore folewith aȝenward þat if a deede
 25 lacke þe obiect which resoun deemep him owe to not lacke, or a deede haue an obiect which resoun demep him owe not haue; or if he haue eny oon circumstaunce which resoun demep him owe to not haue, or if he lacke eny oon circumstaunce which resoun demep him owe to not lacke; or if he
 30 be not freli chosen of þe wil in accordaunce to doom in resoun of prudence or of feiþ, he is morali yuel, and not morali good. And bi þe reul and ensaumplis now bifore sett of þe iiij etyngis may be knowen of ech opir of oure deedis if and whanne he is morali good or morali yuel.

35 And so þe obiect of a deede is so nyȝ and so essenciali perteynyng to þe deede þat if þe obiect be chaungid and doon away,³ þe deede is doon away; and þerfore þe obiect of

A moral virtuous deed has the right object and all the right circumstances, and none but the right circumstances, and is done according to the doom of Reason and Free Will.

A morally vicious deed is one which lacks the right object or has the wrong object; which lacks a right circumstance or has a wrong circumstance; or which is not chosen by Free Will according to the doom of Reason.

The object of a deed is not a circumstance.

¹ MS. *þe last iiij*, but *only four* manners of eating are discussed.

² After *yuel*, l. 10, mark of omission in text; but . . . *yuel*, ll. 10-11, from the foot of page.

³ MS. *a wey*.

a deede causip þe beyng of þe deede and þe natural goodnes and also þe moral goodnes of þe same deede, and þe object is not a circumstance of þe deede.

It is the same thing to say that the moral goodness of a deed is the accordance between the deed and the doom of Reason, and to say that it is the accordance between the deed and the Will and Reason of God.

And ȝit not wipstondyng þis is trewe what is bifore seid, þat moral goodnes of oure deede is an answeyng or 5 accordaunce bitwix oure deede and þe doom of resoun, ȝit it so seid excludip not þis, þat also moral goodnes of oure deede is an answeyng or accordaunce of oure deede to þe wil and resoun of god. fforwhi we owen take and trowe þis, þat what euer and how euer oure resoun demep to be doon or to 10 be vndoon, goddis resoun demep þe same þing, and in þe same maner, to be doon or to be vndoon, and his wil wole þe same þing and in þe same maner to be doon or to be vndoon, saue if *and* whanne it is sureli reuelid to vs from god þat his resoun and wil ben into opire þingis or 15 maners sett þan oure resoun is sett. And if *and* whanne it is so bi sure reuelacioun knowen and so bi feip knowun, and ȝit *perwith* in oure resoun, for þat feip is not but in oure resoun, we ouȝte turne oure resoun to bileue to goddis resoun so to vs reuelid, and we ouȝte þanne to deeme in oure 20 resoun bi feip it to be trew and good, and to be doon or vndoon what we knowen his resoun deme to be trew and to be good, and to be doon or vndoon. And so euermore it is trewe þat noon of oure deedis is morali good, saue whanne and for þat he accordip to þe doom of oure resoun, and is 25 þanne *and* þerbi freli chosen of þe wil. | Neuerþeles in al þis 77^b processe and in alle opire processis to þis processe lijk, whanne euer y speke of resoun y speke of him as he is in his kyndeli state, not hurtid or vndisposid azens his nature, in which mannys resoun ouȝte to be, if alle vnkyndeli in- 30 disposicions and vnkyndeli lettis be away.¹

Nothing is evil, naturally or morally, except a deed of Free Will done against the doom of Reason, and wrongly circumstanced.

Also, sone, forto go ferþir with þee in þe mater bigunne, þou schalt vndirstonde þat no þing, deede or opir, is yuel verili, propirli and absolutli, *and* þat neipir so yuel naturali neipir so yuel morali, except deede inwarde or outward of 35 fre wil doon azens þe avisose doom of riȝt resoun, for sum such is yuel morali. but alle opire þingis ben goode or naturali or morali, and oonli þe deede of þe wil is so yuel morali. And ȝit noon such seid deede is so yuel morali in

¹ MS. *a wey.*

his owen nature and beyng, but he is so yuel morali in þe biholding togidere¹ of him and of his mater and of his circumstauncis, as is here bfore tauzt sufficientli. ffor what euer eny deede þou canst assigne of þe wil wipinforþ or
 5 withoutforþ to be yuel morali, if he were made in þe same kynde and nature wipout þo circumstauncis vnder whiche he is now yuel, and with opire assignable circumstauncis, as it is in þe power of god forto so make him, he schulde be not yuel morali, þouȝ þilk deede were þis bi which a man willip god
 10 to not be, or god to lacke sum of his goodnes, or to haue sum þing not accordyng to him.

þerfore, sone, take þou not þi mark forto knowe a good moral deede bi þis, þat he fallip and is doon vpon a mater good to þe doer or to þe receyuer of þilk mater; fforwhi if
 15 soon man sle an opir innocent and giltles man, þis deede of sleying passip vpon a good mater or þing, for vpon an ynnocent or giltles man, and ȝit þis deede is not morali good; And whanne a man drynkip wijn ouer mych, þis deede is doon vpon a mater beyng good, which is wijn, and ȝit þe drynkyng
 20 þerof is not morali good; And whanne a man gaderip venym forto hide it þat it be not eten, or forto kepe it into poysonyng of rattis, þis deede of gaderyng passip vpon a þing which, as to þi markyng, wolde parauenture seme yuel, which is venym, and ȝit þe deede of gaderyng doon vpon it is morali good.
 25 but take þou þi sufficient mark þus: what euer deede inward or outward of þe wil be assignyd, vpon what euer mater or obiect he passe and be wrouȝt, and þat wheþir in comoun speche it be callid 'good þing' or 'yuel þing,' If þilk deede so and in eche of circumstauncis requyrid bi avisose doom of
 30 resoun to be about þe same deede, accorde with þe seid doom
 78^a of resoun, þanne þilk | deede of þe wil is morali good; and if he not so accorde, he is not morali good; and if he contrarioseli discorde, he is morali yuel. and forȝete þou not þis markyng.

35 fferþirmore, o my sone, þouȝ þer be a natural absolute goodnes in which alle þingis, wheþir þei ben deedis or opire þingis not deedis, ben goode, and to which goodnes is noon contrari yuelnes or baddenenes in which eny þing, deede, or opir is yuel or bad; and þouȝ also þer be a moral goodnes in

The goodness or evil of a deed does not depend upon its matter.

But upon whether its circumstances are, or are not, according to the doom of Reason.

The various kinds of natural and moral virtue and vice: (1) Absolute natural goodness, to which there is no contrary

¹ MS. to gidere.

absolute natural evil.

(2) *Absolute moral goodness of the deeds of the Will, the contrary of which is absolute moral evil.*

(3) *Respective natural goodness, the contrary of which is respective natural evil.*

Examples of respective natural goodness and evil.

Things of respective natural goodness are divided into :

(a) 'Good delectable' or 'good profitable delectable.'

(b) 'Good profitable.'

which ben oonli deedis of þe wil, and whiche ben þerfore morali goode, and to which goodnes is a contrari yuelnes, badnes, or malice, in which also ben summe opire deedis of þe wil, and whiche ben þerfore morali yuel ; 3it biside þese boþe goodnesis whiche ben absolutli and vtirli goodnesis, 5 þe oon natural and þe opir moral, þer is a natural goodnes respectyueli beyng a goodnes, þat is to seie, biholdyngli into sum opir þing, as for þat it is accordyng and conuenient to þe opir þing, and þerfore and þerin it is good naturali to þe same opir þing. And to þis goodnes is had contrari a 10 natural badnes, beyng badnes oonli respectiueli, þat is to seie, in a biholdyng to an opir þing, as for it is discordyng or inconuenient or hurtyng sum opir þing, and þerfore and þerin it is yuel naturali to þe same opir þing. Ensaumple herof is þis : ffor þat wijn cherip and comfortip mannys kynd, 15 in þat, as þat, and so it is good to man kynd naturali ; and for þat venym discherip and hurtip mannys kynd, in þat and so it is naturali yuel to mannys kynd ; But neiþir þis goodnes is vtirli and absolutli natural goodnes, neiþir þis badnes or yuelnes is vtirli and absolutli badnes or yuelnes ; 20 fforwhi þanne fier were vtirli and absolutli natural yuel, and watir were vtirli and absolutli natural yuel, siþen fier hurtip and distroiep watir, and watir hurtip and distroiep fier ; And an almond were vtirli and absolutli togidere natural good and natural yuel, siþen as þe almond coumfortip and cherip 25 man, it is poysoun to a fox, as it is writun ; and fier were togidere natural good and natural yuel, siþen he helpip many þingis and distroiep many opire þingis. But þat oon and þe same þing be respectiueli and biholdyngli natural good and natural yuel togidere, þat is to seie, natural good to þis þing 30 and natural yuel to an opir þing, is noon inconuenient, ffor it is trew of þingis so many þat þei mowe not be numbrid.

Of which respectyue or biholdyng goodis summe ben delectable, as ben delectacions in hem silf, and þingis hauyng in hem power forto cause and make delectacioun ; and þese 35 ben callid vndir oon name 'good delectable.' Al þe 78^b remanent of þese respectyue goodis, and whiche ben not delectable, ben gaderid togidere vndir þis name 'good profitable,' for to make a callyng different fro þe next membre

bifore spokun, which is 'good delectable,' and þat for lak of names in habundaunce, Not wipstondyng þat þis name 'good profitable' may accordyngli y-nouȝ comprehende þe hope membris, for 'delectable good' is 'ful profitable good' to
 5 oure kynd and mych comfortyng oure kynd.

The term 'good profitable', really covers both.

And so, sone, þou maist gadere togidere here of my wordis þis distinceioun of goodnes and of good: þat *per* is a natural goodnes in which al þing is good, and to it noon contrari yuelnes or contrari yuel is. and *per* is a moral goodnes in
 10 which is oonli sum deede of þe wil; and to þis goodnes is contrari a malice or yuelnes in which also is sum deede of þe wil; and þis goodnes is honeste, in which is good honest, and þe contrari yuelnes is vnhoneste or dishoneste, in which is yuel vn honest or dishonest. And *per* is þe iij^e maner of
 15 goodnes which is respectyue natural goodnes, þat is to seie, a respectyue natural¹ accordaunce or conuenience¹ to sum þing. And of þis goodnes ben two membris, of whiche þe oon is 'good profitable delectable', and þe opir is 'good profitable', þouȝ it be not delectable; and in þe contraries of
 20 þese two membris ben 'yuel vndelectable' and 'yuel vnprofitable'. Also eche of alle þese natural goodnessis is causid and maad of þe þing which makip and causip þe þing in which þilk goodnes is, so þat wherof a þing is causid and is dependent of þe same causer, þe goodnes of þe same þing
 25 is causid and is dependent.

Another name for absolute moral goodness is 'Honesty'.

Another name for absolute moral evil is 'Dishonesty'.

The contraries of things 'good delectable' and 'good profitable' are things 'evil undelectable' and 'evil unprofitable'.

An opir distinceioun of goodnes and of good þou maist gadere, o my sone, out of my wordis bifore rennyng, þat *per* is oon goodnes which is fynal principal and eend to opire goodnessis, and þis is þe honeste here bifore spoke, which is moral
 30 goodnes; and *per* is meenal goodnes into þis now seid fynal goodnes, þat is to seie, a goodnes beyng meene ledyng into þe seid moral and honest goodnes. And þis meenal goodnes comprehendip þe bifore seid absolut natural goodnes, and þe opir bifore seid respectyue or biholdyng goodnes hauyng his
 35 ij membris, þat is to seie, delectable goodnes and profitable goodnes; þouȝ also oon moral vertu is meene into an opir moral vertu, but not into þe hool general kynde of alle moral

Goodness or virtue may be also divided into:

(1) *Eendal* virtue, i. e. Honesty or absolute moral goodness.

(2) *Meenal* virtue, i. e. absolute natural goodness and respective natural goodness, which last includes

(a) delectable virtue,

(b) profitable virtue.

¹ *natural . . . conuenience* is written in a lighter ink and somewhat smaller and closer than ordinarily.

vertues; for panne oon moral vertu were meene into him silf, and were bifore him silf and *after* him silf, which is not to be grauntid.

The various kinds of virtue are nowhere so clearly taught as here.

pese distinccions, o my sone, take þou to þee, and make þe myri *with* hem, and þanke god for þyn | so list and esi 79^a comyng into *hem* and into þe leernyng of knowyngal vertues and of moral vertues in her ground and fundament, such as is here bifore in þis book so soon and so redili *and* promptli ȝouun to þee. And marke wel herafter how fer þou myȝtist haue radde and in how many ȝeeris, eer þow schuldist haue 10 founde document forto lede þee cleerli and feelyngli and comprehensiveli into hem; and take þou witnes of many oolde laborers in filosofie *and* dyuynyte, whiche neuer ȝit bifore þis writyng so cleerli and feelyngli *and* comprehensiveli wanne into hem. Al þis y seie, sone, not for avauntyng of 15 me, lord god, þou knowist, but for good cause and hooli, stondyng *with* meeknes *and* charite, and stretchyng into þe more worschip and seruice to god, which cause is priuey bitwix me *and* god, and as I hope, allowid of god, undir perel of my soul, and ellis y schulde be ouer ferd and schamyd forto 20 þus to þee seie or write.

Pecock is encouraged to pay no heed to his detractors.

ffadir, y þanke ȝow for bope ȝowre preciose techyng *and* for ȝowre holsom counselyng, and y hope forto conforme me perto. And aȝens þis, þat in þe oon side ȝe ben movid forto 25 telle out and forto warne men of þe richessis of god, þat þei þe bettir take hede perto and þe more sette þerbi, and in þe opir side ȝe dreden lest ȝowre entent schal not be so of alle heerers and reders takun and acceptid, y wolde ȝe were remembrid into ȝoure confortyng vpon what catoun seide in sentence þus: '*Cum recte viuas, ne cures verba malorum*'.¹ 30 I wote wel, fadir, þat now late in londoun a book of ȝowre writyng which þe kunnyngist and wijsist clerkis in ynglond maken ful mych of and preisen it mych, and in which þei fynden noon yuel, was scornyd and reprouyd of mercers

The wisest clerks acknowledge the worth of Pecock's books. It is only the unlearned who scorn them.

¹ *Catonis Disticha*, III. 2 (ed. Baehrens, *Poetæ Latini Minores*, Vol. III. p. 227). In the MS. of the *Folewer* the distich is written out again in the margin in a later hand—part of 'cures' being cut off by

cropping of margin. Further marginal notes in this hand occur, but are of no importance, and are henceforward passed over in this edition.

seruauntis, whanne þe book came into her handis and was
of hem rad. But what þerfore, schulde 3e haue left vnwrite
pilk book, if 3e hadde bifore knowe suche vnpristis detraccion ?
goddis forbode ! Wherfore neiþir 3e schule forbere to write
5 suche wordis whiche ye han now write to me, and opire lijk,
where and whanne 3e schulen bi good causis be movid hem to
write, pou3 þei schulen not of alle herers and reders be
acceptid or alowid. What eny notable good werk or word
euer 3it lackid his enemy, his hyndrer, his letter or his
10 detracter ? Noon or fewe !

Also, as holi writt seiþ : ‘To clene men alle þingis ben
clene, but to hem whiche ben vnclene, þo þingis ben as
vnclene, pou3 in hem silf and to clene men þei ben clene’.¹
And þerfore suche men more schewen whiche þei ben in hem
15 silf, þat is to seiþ, yuel disposid, þan þei hurten 3ow. ‘In
70^b 3owre pacience | 3e schule awelde 3oure soul’,² as þe gospel
seiþ ; and ‘god knowiþ þe wey of riȝtful men, þe wey forsoþe
of synners schal spille and come to nouȝt’.³ Also þe phile-
safir seiþ : ‘No þing which is violent, þat is to seiþ, out of
20 riȝt ordre and riȝt ioynt, schal dure for euer, but al such þing
takiþ an eend.’ And redili, siþen eueri diffamose, maliciose,
synful clateryng is such a violent or viciose þing out of dew
cours and out of riȝt, it schal haue his eend, and schal lacke his
worschip, but it schal not lacke his punyschyng, for noon
25 yuel gouernaunce schal be left vnpunyschid, and noon good
gouernaunce schal lacke his good reward.

In pese þingis to be remembrid be 3e, fadir, comfortid, and
in many opire whiche 3e kunnen bettir brynge to 3oure
mynde þan y kanne, as þis : ‘Ibant apostoli gaudentes a
30 conspectu concilii, quoniam digni habiti sunt pro nomine
iesu contumeliam pati’.⁴ And rekene 3owre aduersaries to
be as of þe nombre of hem of whiche, in lijk caas as 3e ben inne,
spake crist, seiying þus : ‘Odio habuerunt me gratis’.⁵ And
þenke 3e ferþir þat þis was neuer writun wipout ground of
35 treup forto move it to be of 3ow and of ech persoon seid, which
suffriþ persecucioun of tungis : ‘Dominus mihi adiutor est ;

The scorners
merely show up
their own evil-
mindedness and
ignorance, and
shall receive
their due
punishment.

It is an honour
to be persecuted
for the glory of
God.

¹ Titus, i. 15.

² Luke, xxi. 19.

³ Psalms, i. 6.

⁴ Acts, v. 41.

⁵ John, xv. 25.

no[n]¹ timebo quid faciat mihi homo'.² And perfore god wole be 3owre helper. penke 3e also pat it muste needis be trewe what is includid in pese wordis of crist: 'Beati eritis cum vos oderint homines, et exprobrauerint et eiecerint nomen vestrum tamquam malum coram hominibus gaudete et 5 exultate, ecce enim merces vestra multa est in celo.'³

Truth will be at last victorious.

And so, fadir, if it be wel considerid, pei doon to 3ow mych good, and pei doon to hem silf mych yuel and tresouren to hem silf mych punyschyng, bisidis pis, pat pei letten pe seruice of god and mych ping longyng into wyrryng of 10 soulis, forto come forþ pe sloulier and pe latter into her greet syn anentis god. But 3it redili, fadir, what euer treup 3e holden and haue publischid azens her welwillyng and azens her plesaunce wole haue pe maistrie, if pe sentence of holi writt be trew pat at last treup schal haue pe maistrie and 15 pe victorie, and panne pe enemyes of pe treup schulen haue pe vilonye.⁴ Abide 3e herbi manli and strongli and vnbow-abili, and lete wickid wordis renne into pe harm of her spekers, with pis, pat leefir schulde be to 3ow pat pei kept hem out of syn, Namelich siben perbi 3e faren not pe wors 20 in 3oure bodi, in 3oure dissh, neipir in 3oure purs. And þou3 3e schulden suffre bodili disese and losse of riches for pe same treupis meynテナunce, 3it perseuere 3e euer | stabili til 80⁴ god sende bi processe of tyme sum remedie, as y wote wel he wole bi his owen testimonye.

Pecock has never been afraid to publish the truth.

Sone, forsope, fro pis purpos y neuer bowid 3it in wil neipir in word, and with goddis grace neipir y schal in tyme comyng.

In what does the absolute natural goodness of a deed consist?

ffadir, y bipenke me wel how in pis present chapitre 3e han seide pat in oure deedis ben natural goodnessis and also 30 moral goodnessis, and also 3e haue sufficientli declarid of whom pe natural goodnessis ben causid, and of whom pe moral goodnessis ben causid. Also what is a moral goodnes in eny of oure deedis is at ful reul and at ful ensaumplis schewid. Neuerpeles, what a ping is pe natural absolut and 35 vttir goodnes of oure deede is not 3it of 3ow seid. perfore, fadir, seie 3e and teche 3e what a ping in a deede is his natural absolut goodnes, and panne me penkip pat 3owre

¹ MS. not.

² Hebrews, xiii. 6.

³ Luke, vi. 22-23.

⁴ Cf. Proverbs, xii. 19.

doctrine of þe mater in þis present chapitre tretid is sprad þe more in toward þe fulnes which is to him accordyng.

Sone, þou meenyst ful soop þat what is þe natural goodnes of eny deede wolde be tauzt and knowen, and þerfore into þe
5 knowyng of him y procede þus: In euery creature, for þat and in þat þat he is *and* hap a beyng, is a power to move oure vndirstondyng forto deme and iuge þat he is, *and* deme and iuge him in sum habitude toward sum opir þing affirmativeli or negatijfli; As in a stoon is a power to move oure
10 resoun to iuge and deme þat þilk stoon is, *and* þat þilk stoon is causid of god, and þat þilk stoon is not a tre; and þerfore þilk power so groundid kyndeli in þilk stoon, is þe natural or kyndeli trouþ of þe stoon; and in lijk maner in ech opir creature is a lijk natural or kyndeli trouþ. fferþirmore, sone,
15 in ech creature is naturali a power bi which he may move oure wil into plesaunce or willyng þat he be in kynd, and þat he be in sum habitude toward sum opir þing affirmativeli or negatijfli, and in ech creature þis power is his natural goodnes; As in a stoon is power to move oure wil into
20 plesaunce þat þe stoon be, or þat he be causid of god effectiveli or makyngli, and þat he be causid of his parties materiali, and þat he be not a stok or an hors; and þerfore þis power in þe stoon is his natural or kyndeli goodnes; and in lijk maner in ech opir creature is a lijk natural or kyndeli
25 goodnes. wheþir ech power now seid to be in a þing or a beyng be fulli þe same þing or beyng, or be sumwhat dyuerse from it, schal be tretid in 'þe book of sentence'. fferþirmore, sone, in ech creature is such a lackyng of multitude þat he is not many creaturis, and in him is such a departyng bitwixe
30 him and opire þingis þat he is noon | of þo opire þingis; and þis seid lackyng of multitude in him silf, with þis seid departyng or dyuersite fro opire þingis, is in ech creature his oonnesse or his vnyte, as oon sutil doctoure¹ holdip. And þus, sone, y feele of þese iij natural or kyndeli condicions or
35 disposicions comoun to alle creaturis, þat is to seie, treup, goodnes *and* vnyte. In an opir maner y schal trete of þese iij, þat is to seie, of natural trouþ, of natural goodnes, and of natural oonnes, in 'þe book of sentence'. If eny man kan

The absolute natural goodness of a thing consists of:
(a) its Truth,

(b) its Goodness,

(c) its Unity.

¹ See Notes.

seie opir wise and bettir of hem þan y seie here, and þan y schal seie þere in latyn, y vouche saaf þat he so seie and teche, for y schal be redi of him þe bettir wey to learne.

To recapitulate : the moral goodness of a deed is its accordance in all respects to the doom of Reason and Free Will.

And 3itt eftsoon forto sette nerer togidere at oonys what is now bifore in þis present *chapitre* principali entendid þoru3 5 lengir declaracioun, y seie þus : Moral goodnes of a dede is not ellis þan þe hauyng togidere of alle þe accordauncis whiche ouzte be bi doom of resoun bitwix þe deede, þe obiect of þe deede, ech requyrid circumstaunce of þe deede, þe choice of þe wil to þe doom of resoun ; so þat if eny of þese accordauncis 10 be away, þe deede is not morali good, but oft is seen þat he is þerbi morali yuel. and so azenward moral yuelnesse of a deede is not ellis þan þe lack in þe deede of eny oon accordaunce which is requyrid to be had into moral goodnes of þe deede ; or if in þe deede eny contrari discordaunce be 15 had azens sum accordaunce requirid to be had into making of moral goodnesse.

The moral evil of a deed is its lack of some accordance, or its discordance, to the doom of Reason and Free Will.

Here eendip þe first parti of þis present book clepid 'þe folewer to þe donet'. And now next folewip þe secund parti.

[ij^e parti]

first chapitre.

[F]Adir, not withstanding þat þoure doctrine of 'þe donet' in assignyng iiij tablis of goddis lawe,¹ and in assignyng xxxj poyntis to make þo iiij tablis, is ful trewe, preciose and profitable, 3it, for as mych as men seien þat a tre wel waggid with puffis of wyndis schal take þerbi þe stiffer stondyng, þerfore þat þe same doctrine cacche þe fastir root and þe stiffer foundement, y schal wagge it with puffis of a fewe argumentis in þis present ij^e parti of þis book, of whiche argumentis þis schal be þe first.

TWENTY-THREE
ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE
CLASSIFICATION
OF VIRTUES IN
THE FOUR
TABLES :—

In þe ij^e chapitre bifore of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', 3e haue putte iiij tablis to be alle þe tablis of goddis moral lawe. A3ens þis 3oure puttyng y may argue þus: Bi how good skile 3e putten iiij tablis of goddis lawe, bi so good skile 3e ou3ten putte v tablis of goddis lawe; fforwhi 3e putten iij tablis of goddis lawe to be of deedis whiche ben vertues for hem silf, | bi cause þer ben iij maners of þingis, as ben god, vs silf and oure nei3boris, to whiche iij maner þingis we wirchen immediatli oure moral gouernauncis, so þat we comprehende and conteyne vndir þis name 'nei3boris' alle resonable creaturis, boþe aungels and men, able to be sauid, wheþir þei schulen be sauid or not sauýd. but so it is þat to mo of opire maner þingis we wirchen immediatli oure moral gouernauncis þan to þese iij now seid; fforwhi we immediatli wirchen morali to beestis, as to oxen, horsis and assis, in fedyng hem whenne þei ben hungri, as we immediatli wirchen morali to men whanne we feden hem in her hungir.

The son argues :—
1. There should be a fifth Table, containing our eendal virtues towards beasts.

þe ij^e argument is þis: we wirchen summe of oure moral goode gouernauncis to feendis immediatli, in comaundyng hem fle fro vs, and in arguyng a3ens hem whanne þei tempten vs, and in azenstandyng hem whanne þei tisen vs, ri3t euen as we wirchen immediatli moral vertu to yuel men, whanne we

The son argues :—
2. There should be a sixth Table, containing our eendal virtues towards devils, for they cannot be termed our neighbours.

¹ See Notes to 2/12, and *Donet*, Pt. I, chaps. iv–ix.

comaunden hem go away from vs, and whanne we arguen and pleden *and* stryuen azens her suggestions, and whanne we dissenten to hem as to maliciose creaturis. and pese feendis ben not oure neizboris, for pei ben not able to be sauýd. Wherefore it semeþ þat for suche moral good deedis whiche 5 ben now rehercid in þis present argument, it bihoueþ to putte mo tablis of deedis beyng for hem silf moral vertues, and so of goddis moral lawe, þan þe seid and tauzt of 30w vertues in iiij tablis; and so schulen of alle moral vertues be vj tablis.

The son argues:—
3. To live leern-
yngli is a kun-
nyngal (know-
yngal) virtue, not
a moral virtue.

þe iij^e argument is þis: 3e han tauzte in þe iij^e chapitre of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þat forto lyue leernyngli is a poynt of goddis moral lawe. Azens þis y may argue þus: No deede or poynt is a deede or poynt of goddis moral lawe saue which is a moral vertu or a moral vertuose deede; but so it 15 is þat forto lyue leernyngli is no moral vertu neipir moral vertuose deede; fforwhi to lyue leernyngli is not ellis þan leernyng or kunnyng or remembryng, and eche of pese is a knowyngal vertu or a knowyngal vertuose deede, as is open bifore bi þe x^e chapitre of þe i^e parti of þis present book; 20 and knowyngal vertu and moral vertu ben dyuerse, as is open pere in þe same i^e parti, þe x^e chapitre. Wherefore pilk poynt which 3e han assignyd to be þe i^e poynt of þe i^e table of goddis moral lawe, is not eny poynt of goddis moral lawe. Confirmacioun to þis argument may be þis: ech poynt or 25 vertu of goddis moral lawe is a moral vertu or a moral vertuose deede; but so it is þat to lyue leernyngli is not a moral vertu | neipir a moral vertuose deede, no more þan 81^b leernyng is a moral vertu or a moral vertuose deede, bi cause þat leernyng is a kunnyngal vertu or a kunnyngal 30 vertuose deede, and forto lyue leernyngli and forto learne is al oon; wherefore folewith þat to lyue leernyngli is not a poynt of goddis moral lawe.

The son argues:—
4. We live
leernyngly,
preisyngly,
preisyngly,
worschipingly
and sacrament-
ingly to our
neighbour and
ourselves im-
mediately, but

þe iiij^e argument is þis: ech moral vertu with which we wirchen immediatli to vs silf is in þe iij^e table, and ech moral 35 vertu with which we wirchen immediatli to oure neizbor is a vertu of þe iiij^e table, as is meeuyd openli y-nou3 bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þe iij^e chapitre, and also in þe iij^e treti of þe i^e parti of 'cristen religioun'. but so it is þat

with oure sum leernyng and remembryng we wirchen immediatli to vs silf, and with oure sum opir leernyng and remembryng we wirchen immediatli to oure neiȝbor, ȝhe, and with sum of oure preisyng and worschipyng we preisen
 5 and worschipen and wirchen immediatli to vs silf, and with sum of oure preisyng and worschipping we preisen and worschipen and wirchen immediatli to oure neiȝboris. Also with sum of oure preiyng we preien and wirchen immediatli to oure neiȝboris; And with oure sacramentis mynstryng we
 10 wirchen immediatli to vs silf, ȝbe, and immediatli to oure neiȝboris. Wherefore alle ȝese now rehercid vertues owen to be putt in ȝe iij^e and in ȝe iiij^e tablis in maner as it is now arguyd, and noon of hem owip to be sett in ȝe i^e table neipir in ȝe ije, bi cause with noon of hem we wirchen or suffren
 15 and ben movid into god immediatli and at ȝe next, pouȝ with eche of hem we wirchen or ben movid to wirche for god eendli and fynali.

ȝe v^e argument is ȝis: In ȝe iij^e chapitre bifore of ȝe i^e parti of 'ȝe donet', ȝe haue assignyd leernyngful lyuyng
 20 vpon ȝe vij ȝere rehercid maters¹ to be a poynt propirli and seuerali perteynyng to ȝe i^e table. Azens ȝis ȝowre assignyng y may argue ȝus: leernyng and remembryng of ȝese ȝingis whiche ben mannys natural wrecchidnessis, and whiche ben his wickidnessis azens vertues of ȝe ije table and azens
 25 vertues of ȝe iij^e and iiij^e tablis, and leernyng of remedies azens hem boȝe, ben so propirli and seuerali perteynyng to ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis, how propirli and seuerali vertues of ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis perteynen to ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis; fforwhi bi ȝe seid leernyngful lyuyng vpon ȝe seid v^e,
 30 vje and vije maters, we atteynen to god, to vs silf and to oure neiȝboris as nyȝ and as immediatli as we don bi opire vertues sett in ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis. Wherefore as vertues of ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis ben not wipinne ȝe i^e
 82^a table, so leernyng, knowyng | and remembryng of ȝe seid
 35 v^e, vje and vije maters ben not within ȝe i^e table. and bi ȝe same skile knowyng of ȝe iiij^e mater, which is ȝe lawe of god, as ferforȝ as it is longyng to ȝe ije, iij^e and iiij^e tablis, is not wipinne ȝe i^e table. and so not al ȝe leernyng,

to God only finally. Therefore these virtues ought to be placed in the Third and Fourth Tables, not in the First or Second.

The son argues:—
 5. To live leernynghly of all the SEVEN MATTERS¹ should not be restricted to the First Table. To live leernynghly of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Matters should belong also to the Second, Third, and Fourth Tables.

¹ See Notes to 2/20, and *Donet*, p. 27.

knowyng and remembryng of alle þe seid vij maters longen to be in þe i^e poynt of þe i^e table, þouȝ ȝe haue herof bifore tauȝt þe contrari.

The son argues:—

6. To live leernynghly of the SEVEN MATTERS¹ (i. e. the First Point of the First Table) is not sufficient for a Christian. The dignity of a man and his neighbour must be also learit.

þe vj^e argument is þis: ȝe han tauȝte bifore in þe iij^e chapitre of þe i^e parti in 'þe donet' pat þe leernyng with 5 remembring vpon þere rehercið vij kyndis of maters¹ is sufficient leernyng and remembryng of alle maters to be leernyd and remembrid of a cristen man to be a cristen seruer to god. Aȝens þis, fadir, y may argue þus: It is necessari to ech cristen man, if he schal be an hooli lyuer, 10 forto leerne and remembre what he him silf is in dignyte and worþines of soul, and what his neiȝbor is in dignyte and worþinesse of soul. but þis leernyng with remembryng is not wipinne þe leernyng and remembryng of þe bifore spokun vij kyndis of maters; fforwhi among þo vij kyndis is 15 noon leernyng numbrid perteynyng to þe dignyte of man, but perteynyng to þe vndignyte of man oonli, as in þe v^e, vj^e and vij^e maters. Wherefore it semep þat þe nombre of pilke vij kyndis of maters is not sufficient for þe al necessari leernyng and remembryng which owip to be had of alle hooli 20 cristen lyuers. And so folewyngli heerof and heerbi it semyp þat in þe i^e poynt of þe i^e table is not ȝouun sufficient leernyng for alle maters and alle vertues of þe iij^e table and of þe iiij^e table; for þere in þe first poynt of þe i^e table is not ȝouun sufficient leernyng what a man in him silf is, and 25 what his neiȝbor in him silf is for her dignytees. and ȝit herof, o fadir, ȝe han tauȝte þe contrari in þe iij^e chapitre of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet'.

The son argues:—

7. To live goostly to oneself (i. e. the First Point of the Third Table) includes also to live fleischely, worldly, clerly and honestly to oneself (i. e. the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Points of the Third Table).

þe vij^e argument is þis: þe i^e poynt of þe iij^e table, which ȝe clepe 'goostli loue to a man him silf', conteynep wipinne 30 him þe ij^e, iij^e, iiij^e and v^e poyntis of þe same table, whiche ȝe clepen 'fleischlihode', 'worldlihode', 'clennes' and 'honeste'; fforwhi loue of frendschip of a man to him silf, as it is þe i^e poynt of þe iij^e table, is not ellis þan his willyng pat he him silf haue his alle maner goodis, fleischli, worldli, 35 graciose and gloriose, in mesure, maner, eend and opire circumstauncis whiche resoun assignyp and alowip; and fleischlihode, as it is þe ij^e poynt of þe iij^e table, is not

¹ See Notes to 2/20, and *Donet*, p. 27.

ellis þan a willyng and an haung of þo fleischli goodis to a man him silf, in mesure and maner and eend which resoun
 82^b assignyþ; And also worldlihode, which is þe iij^e | poynt of þe iij^e table, is not ellis þan a willyng and þerbi a takyng or
 5 haung of worldli goodis to a man him silf, in mesure, maner and eend and opire circumstauncis accordyng to þe doom of resoun. Wherefore þese worldlihode and fleischlihode, 3he, and bi lijk skile clenness and honeste, ben loues of a man to him silf immediatli; and so þe i^e poynt of þe iij^e table
 10 ouzte not make nombre with þe i^e or þe iij^e, iiij^e or v^e poynt of þe same table.

þe viij^e argument is þis: þe i^e poynt of þe iiij^e table, which 3e clepen 'loue of a man to his neiȝboris', conteynep
 withinne him þe iij^e parti of þe iij^e poynt in þe same iiij^e
 15 table, which iij^e poynt is clepid 'riȝtwisnesse'; fforwhi loue of a man to his neiȝbor is not ellis þan a willyng þat his neiȝbor haue his alle maner goodis, fleischli, worldli and opire, and þe seid riȝtwisnesse is not ellis þan a willyng of a man þat his neiȝbor haue his owen goodis, and þerbi an
 20 executyng þat his neiȝbor haue his owen goodis. Wherefore þe i^e poynt of þe iiij^e table ouzte not make nombre with þe iij^e parti of þe iij^e poynt in þe same iiij^e table; and 3it, fadir, 3e nombre hem as dyuerse. In lijk maner it myȝte be arguyd þat þe viij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table ouzte not make
 25 nombre with þe i^e poynt of þe same iiij^e table; Wherefore it myȝte seme ȝoure doctrine þerinne to faile.

þe ix^e argument is þis: 3e han tauȝte, fadir, bifore in þe iij^e chapitre of þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þat bi ech vertu of þe iiij^e table a man wirchip immediatli or at þe next to his
 30 neiȝbor. ffadir, it semyþ nay. fforwhi, if y helpe vp my neiȝboris horse out of þe myre, whanne my neiȝbor is absent, and he him silf may not do it for þe while, þis deede is a vertu of þe iiij^e table, for it is in þe poynt of largenesse;¹ and 3it þis deede is not a doying or a wirchyng to myn
 35 neiȝbor immediatli or at þe next, for it is a doying to his horse immediatli or at þe next, and alle men witen þat his horse is not him silf. Wherefore folewith þat not ech deede

The son argues:—
 8. To live goostly to one's neighbour (i. e. the First Point of the Fourth Table) includes also living riȝtwisly to one's neighbour (i. e. the third part of the Third Point of the Fourth Table).

The son argues:—
 9. To live largely to one's neighbour (i. e. the Eighth Point of the Fourth Table) is not necessarily a virtue done immediately to one's neighbour.

¹ See Notes.

of þe iiije table is a doying to a mannys neizbor immediatli or at þe next.

The son argues:—
10. The Second, Third and Fourth Tables are defective, in that they do not include the moral virtues of nilling evil to God, to ourselves and to our neighbour.

þe x^e argument is þis: it is not oonli a moral vertuose deede forto wilne þat god haue his alle maner goodis, but also forto wilne þat god haue not þe yuelis contrari to þo 5 goodis, or forto wilne þat god lacke þo yuelis contrari to þo goodis, and also forto nylle god haue þo yuelis contrari to his goodis. And ech of þese iij deedis ouzte be putt as for a poynt of þe ije table, as wel as þe first of þese iij | deedis 83^a ouzte be putt for a poynt of þe ije table; and 3it, fadir, as 10 3e witen wel, 3e assignen oonli þe i^e of þese iij deedis to be a poynt of þe ije table; for of þe ije and of þe iiije now rehercid deedis 3e maken no mensioun, where bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' 3e discryuen þe poyntis of þe ije table. Wherefore it myzte seme þat 3e vnsufficientli assignen and nombren þe 15 poyntis of þe ije table. Bi lijk skile it myzte be arguyd þat þe iiije and iiije tablis ben defectyue for þis, þat in hem ben not sette nyllyngis wiþ whiche a man ouzte nylle yuel to him silf and nylle yuel to his neizboris.

ije chapitre.

20

The son argues:—
11. Ghostly alms (a part of the Eighth Point of the Fourth Table) is included under Ghostly Love (the First Point of the Fourth Table).

[T]he¹ xj^e argument is þis: oon parti of þe viije poynt in þe iiije table, which parti is clepid 'goostli almes', is not ellis þan goostli loue of a man to his neizbor, fforwhi it is not ellis þan a willyng of a man þat his neizbor haue his goostli good; and no ping ellis is þe i^e poynt of þe iiije table 25 þan such a goostli loue of a man to his neizbor, fforwhi it is not ellis þan a willyng þat his neizbor haue his goostli good. Wherefore it semeþ folewe þat þe i^e poynt in þe iiije table and þe oon parti of þe viije poynt, which parti is goostli almes, ben al oon. And if þis be trewe, þanne folewith þat 30 forto sette þe i^e poynt of þe iiije table in nombre with alle þe hool opire poyntis of þe iiije table is in veyn; ffor þanne þe same oon poynt schulde be rekenyd and nombrid and tauzt twies, þat is to seie, oonys at þe first poynt of þe iiije table, and eft soon in þe viije poynt of þe same iiije table. 35

The son argues:—
12. A special Point in the

þe xije argument is þis: to ech kynde of moral vertues beyng mych aⁿd notabli dyuerse from opire moral vertues

¹ Minuscule *h* in MS.

ouȝte be putt sum special poynt among moral vertues in þe iiij tablis; but so it is þat oop and vow ben moral vertues, and ben notabli dyuerse from opire moral vertues, and ȝit ȝe maken not for eche of hem a special poynt wiþinne þe iiij tablis, ȝhe, and for neuer neipir of hem ȝe maken a special poynt. Wherefore it semyþ þat ȝoure tablis ben þerinne defauti.

Four Tables should be made of oaths and vows as moral virtues.

þe xii^e argument is þis: discrecioun is a moral vertu, and ȝit to it ȝe assignen no special poynt in þe iiij tablis, neipir ȝe techen in which poynt oonli he is to be placid with opire moral vertues. Wherefore it myȝte seme þat also þerinne ȝowre tablis ben defauti.

The son argues:—
13. Discretion is a moral virtue, and yet it has no place in the Four Tables.

þe xiii^e argument is þis: It is tauȝt bi ȝow in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þat vertues of þe first table ben meenal vertues and ben of dyuerse spicis or kyndis. Aȝens þis may be arguyd þus: Alle vertues whiche seruen | to oon and þe same effect or eend to be principali brouȝt forþ bi hem, ben of oon spice and of oon kynde; but so it is þat oon and þe same principle effect is brouȝt forþ and maad bi ech vertu of þe i^e table, which effect is loue to god, and þat whepir it be loue which is þe first poynt of þe ij^e table, or loue to god comprehending generali many mo poyntis of þe i^e table. Wherefore y conclude þat alle vertues of þe i^e table ben of oon spice and of oon kynde or nature in moral vertuosenesse.

The son argues:—
14. The meenal virtues of the First Table are said to be of different kinds. Yet they have one and the same effect, and should therefore be of one kind.

þe xiv^e argument is þis: It is tauȝt bi ȝow in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þat ech vertu of þe i^e table is a vertu wrouȝt into god immediatli. Aȝens þis y may argue þus: No vertu which is immediatli into an opir vertu is to god immediatli; but so it is þat ech vertu of þe i^e table is a menal vertu, and ech meenal vertu is into an eendal vertu immediatli. Wherefore y conclude þus: þat no vertu of þe i^e table is into god immediatli.

The son argues:—
15. The meenal virtues of the First Table, in that they are wrought unto eendal virtues immediately, cannot be wrought unto God immediately.

þe xv^e argument is þis: Penaunce, which is remedie doying away¹ dedli syn, is a moral vertu; fforwhi it is a deede of þe wil according to þe doom of resoun, and ech such deede is a moral vertu, as ȝe han tauȝt in þe i^e parti of þis present book, þe [xxj]² chapitre. And ȝit þe seid penaunce is not assignyd

The son argues:—
16. Repentance is a moral virtue, and yet is not included in the Four Tables.

¹ MS. a wey.

² Space left in MS. for reference. See also Pt. I, Chaps. xv. and xvi.

of þe iiij^e table is a doying to a mannys neizbor immediatli or at þe next.

The son argues:—
10. The Second, Third and Fourth Tables are defective, in that they do not include the moral virtues of nilling evil to God, to ourselves and to our neighbour.

þe x^e argument is þis: it is not oonli a moral vertuose deede forto wilne þat god haue his alle maner goodis, but also forto wilne þat god haue not þe yuelis contrari to þo 5 goodis, or forto wilne þat god lacke þo yuelis contrari to þo goodis, and also forto nylle god haue þo yuelis contrari to his goodis. And ech of pese iij deedis ouzte be putt as for a poynt of þe i^e table, as wel as þe first of pese iij | deedis 83³ ouzte be putt for a poynt of þe i^e table; and 3it, fadir, as 10 3e witen wel, 3e assignen oonli þe i^e of pese iij deedis to be a poynt of þe i^e table; for of þe i^e and of þe ii^e now rehercid deedis 3e maken no mensiouun, where bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' 3e discryuen þe poyntis of þe i^e table. Wherefore it myzte seme þat 3e vnsufficientli assignen and nombren þe 15 poyntis of þe i^e table. Bi lijk skile it myzte be arguyd þat þe ii^e and iiij^e tablis ben defectyue for þis, þat in hem ben not sette nylyngis wiþ whiche a man ouzte nylle yuel to him self and nylle yuel to his neizboris.

ij^e chapitre.

20

The son argues:—
11. Ghostly alms (a part of the Eighth Point of the Fourth Table) is included under Ghostly Love (the First Point of the Fourth Table).

[T]he¹ xj^e argument is þis: oon parti of þe viij^e poynt in þe iiij^e table, which parti is clepid 'goostli almes', is not ellis þan goostli loue of a man to his neizbor, fforwhi it is not ellis þan a willyng of a man þat his neizbor haue his goostli good; and no þing ellis is þe i^e poynt of þe iiij^e table 25 þan such a goostli loue of a man to his neizbor, fforwhi it is not ellis þan a willyng þat his neizbor haue his goostli good. Wherefore it semet folewe þat þe i^e poynt in þe iiij^e table and þe oon parti of þe viij^e poynt, which parti is goostli almes, ben al oon. And if þis be trewe, þanne folewith þat 30 forto sette þe i^e poynt of þe iiij^e table in nombre with alle þe hool op^{re} poyntis of þe iiij^e table is in veyn; ffor þanne þe same oon poynt schulde be rekenyd and nombrid and tauzt twies, þat is to seie, oonys at þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table, and eft soon in þe viij^e poynt of þe same iiij^e table. 35

The son argues:—
12. A special Point in the

þe xij^e argument is þis: to ech kynde of moral vertues beyng mych and notabli dyuerse from op^{re} moral vertues

¹ Minuscule *h* in MS.

ouȝte be putt sum special poynt among moral vertues in þe iiij tablis; but so it is þat oop and vow ben moral vertues, and ben notabli dyuerse from opire moral vertues, and ȝit ȝe maken not for eche of hem a special poynt wiþinne þe iiij tablis, ȝhe, and for neuer neipir of hem ȝe maken a special poynt. Wherefore it semyþ þat ȝoure tablis ben þerinne defauti.

Four Tables should be made of oaths and vows as moral virtues.

þe xiiij^e argument is þis: discrecioun is a moral vertu, and ȝit to it ȝe assignen no special poynt in þe iiij tablis, neipir
 10 ȝe techen in which poynt oonli he is to be placid with opire moral vertues. Wherefore it myȝte seme þat also þerinne ȝowre tablis ben defauti.

The son argues:—
 13. Discretion is a moral virtue, and yet it has no place in the Four Tables.

þe xiiij^e argument is þis: It is tauȝt bi ȝow in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þat vertues of þe first table ben meenal vertues
 15 and ben of dyuerse spicis or kyndis. Aȝens þis may be arguyd þus: Alle vertues whiche seruen | to oon and þe same effect or eend to be principali brouȝt forþ bi hem, ben of oon spice and of oon kynde; but so it is þat oon and þe same
 20 principal effect is brouȝt forþ and maad bi ech vertu of þe i^e table, which effect is loue to god, and þat whepir it be loue which is þe first poynt of þe ij^e table, or loue to god comprehendyng generali many mo poyntis of þe i^e table. Wherefore y conclude þat alle vertues of þe i^e table ben of oon spice and
 of oon kynde or nature in moral vertuosenesse.

The son argues:—
 14. The meenal virtues of the First Table are said to be of different kinds. Yet they have one and the same effect, and should therefore be of one kind.

þe xv^e argument is þis: It is tauȝt bi ȝow in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' þat ech vertu of þe i^e table is a vertu wrouȝt
 into god immediatli. Aȝens þis y may argue þus: No vertu which is immediatli into an opir vertu is to god immediatli; but so it is þat ech vertu of þe i^e table is a menal vertu, and
 25 ech meenal vertu is into an eendal vertu immediatli. Wherefore y conclude þus: þat no vertu of þe i^e table is into god immediatli.

The son argues:—
 15. The meenal virtues of the First Table, in that they are wrought unto eendal virtues immediately, cannot be wrought unto God immediately.

þe xvj^e argument is þis: Penaunce, which is remedie doying away¹ dedli syn, is a moral vertu; fforwhi it is a deede of þe
 35 wil according to þe doom of resoun, and ech such deede is a moral vertu, as ȝe han tauȝt in þe i^e parti of þis present book, þe [xxj]² chapitre. And ȝit þe seid penaunce is not assignyd

The son argues:—
 16. Repentance is a moral virtue, and yet is not included in the Four Tables.

¹ MS. a way.

² Space left in MS. for reference. See also Pt. I, Chaps. xv. and xvi.

The son argues:—
17. The moral
virtue of Kind-
ness should be
included in the
Four Tables.

to be in eny of þe iiij tablis. Wherefore þe xxx^je pointis of þe iiij tablis ben not alle moral vertues of goddis lawe.

þe xvi^je argument is þis: kyndenesse, which in latyn is clepid 'gratitudo', is a moral vertu; fforwhi it is a deede of þe wil doable accordyngli to þe doom of resoun, and ech such is a moral vertu bi þowre doctrine in þe i^e parti of þis present book; and such kyndenesse a man may wirche immediatli to god, and also such kyndenesse a man may wirche immediatli to his neiȝbor; and ȝit for þis kyndenesse is no place ordeynyd bi þow in eny of þe iiij tablis. Wherefore it wolde seme þat þowre iiij tablis ben not large y-nouȝ forto comprehende alle moral vertues.

The son argues:—
18. Meekness,
Truth and
Benignity do
not rightly
belong to the
Second Table,
because they are
not inward
deeds of willing
good to God.
Meekness, Ac-
cordingness,
Truth and
Benignity do
not rightly be-
long to the
Fourth Table,
because they are
not inward
deeds of our
neighbour.

þe xviii^e argument is þis: Bi ech moral vertu of þe i^je table beyng an ynward deede of þe wil, a man willip good to god, and bi ech moral vertu of þe iii^je table beyng an inward deede of þe wil, a man willip good to his neiȝbor, as ȝe haue tauȝt in þe i^je parti of 'þe donet', þe [xiiij]¹ chapitre, and is also tauȝt in þe book clepid 'þe prouoker'. but so it is pat bi noon of þese þre poyntis of þe i^je table, whiche ben meeknesse, trouȝ and benygnyte, as þei ben inward deedis of þe wil, a man willip eny good to god; And also bi noon of þe iiij poyntis of þe iii^je table, whiche ben meeknesse, accordyngnesse, treuȝ and benygnyte, as þei ben inward deedis in þe wil, a man willip eny good to his neiȝbor. Wherefore folewith þat noon of þe þre now first rehercid poyntis ben in þe i^je table, and noon of þe iiij after rehercid poyntis ben² in þe iii^je table.

The son argues:—
19. Since one
and the same
virtue is put in
different Tables,
the Four Tables
are not essential-
ly divided.

þe xix^e argument is þis: If oon and þe same vertu or poynt which is in þe i^e table be also in þe ii^je and in þe iii^je table, as ȝe graunten bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet' in dyuerse chapitris, folewith þat þese iiij tablis ben not disseuerid oon from þe opir essenciali.

The son argues:—
20. The Fourth
Table does not
comprise all the
virtues we
should practise
towards our
neighbour. For
it does not com-
prise living
towards our
neighbour

þe xx^e argument is þis: þe iii^je table is not sufficientli diuisid in his poyntis forto reule vs anentis oure neiȝboris, but if bi pilk iii^je table alle goodis be willid of vs to oure neiȝboris; but so it is pat not alle goodis ben willid of vs to oure neiȝboris bi þe iii^je table. Wherefore þe iii^je table is insufficient. þe i^je premys may be prouyd þus: we ouȝten

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

² MS. be ben.

wille to oure neiȝboris fleischli goodis, and we ouȝten wille to oure neiȝboris riȝt vsis of her fleischli goodis; and neiȝer of þese ij goodis ben willid of vs bi eny poynt or poyntis of þe iiij^e table. Also þus: we ouȝten wille to oure neiȝbor riȝt vsis of yuel pingis bi his pacience and bi his douȝtinesse. And þis is not willid of vs bi eny poynt or poyntis of þe iiij^e table. Wherefore þe iiij^e table is vnsufficient forto conteyne alle moral vertues of oure moral gouernaunce anentis oure neiȝboris.

*fleischli,
patiently
and douȝtily.*

þe xxj^e argument is þis: ffadir, ȝe haue tauȝt bifore in þe i^e parti of 'þe donet', þe viij^e chapitre, þat þe vertu of douȝtinesse is a poynt of þe iij^e table, bi which a man is vertuose anentis him silf immediatli, and willip to him silf good immediatli. ffadir, þis semyþ to be vntrew; fforwhi a knyȝt entriþ place and company of strong fiȝt and perel of soor betyng and woundyng, and fiȝtip aȝens his neiȝboris vertuoseli, if resoun deme it to be doon. And þis vertu is vertu of douȝtinesse, and ȝit þerin he wirchip vertuoseli into his neiȝboris immediatli aȝens whiche he fiȝtip immediatli, and he þerin not wirchip into him silf immediatli. Wherefore it myȝte seme þat þis vertu of douȝtinesse is in þe iiij^e table and not in þe iij^e table.

*The son argues:—
21. The virtue of
Doughtiness, in
that it is done
towards our
neighbour im-
mediately,
should be placed
in the Fourth
Table.*

þe xxi^e principal argument is þis: Bifore in þe ij^e parti of 'þe donet', in þe xij^e chapitre, it is tauȝt þat þe outward deedis comaundid bi þe habit beyng charite into his execucioun, and also þe outward deedis beyng meenys into þe inward habit beyng loue or charite, ben not charite propirli to speke; wheraȝens y may argue þus: Suche outward deedis ben to be seid 'moral vertues' in speche propir; wherefore bi liȝk skile þei ben to be seid propirli 'loue' or 'charite', or 'loues' and 'charitees', as þe habit is to be seid propirli 'habitual loue' or 'charite'.

*The son argues:—
22. The out-
ward deeds com-
manded by the
habit or moral
virtue of
Charity, and the
outward deeds
being means to
this habit or
moral virtue of
Charity, should
be termed
'Charity' or
'Charities'.*

Also in þe same | mater þus: Ech inward deede in þe wil goyng into þe gendring of habitual loue and charite is propirli callid 'loue' and 'charite actual', and ech inward deede in þe wil into which þe same inward habitual loue and charite enclynep, is propirli callid 'actual loue' and 'charite', as þe said habit is 'habitual loue' and 'charite'; for so to ech leernyd man it is open. Wherefore folewith bi liȝk skile þat

*Inward deeds
engendering
Charity and
following Chari-
ty are termed
'Charity'.
Therefore these
deeds should be
termed 'actual
moral virtues'.*

And inward
deeds begetting
and following
Temperance,
Confinence, &c.,
should also be
termed 'actual
moral virtues'.

eche of þe same seid deedis is to be seid propirli 'actual moral vertu', as þe seid habit is to be seid propirli 'habitual moral vertu'. Also in þe same mater þus: Not oonli an inward habit in þe wil is to be seid propirli 'habitual temperaunce' or 'contynence' or 'liberalte' or 'largite' or 'rytwnes'; but also ech of þe inward deedis goyng into his gendryng, and ech inward deede into whom þilk habit inclynep, is to be seid propirli 'actual temperaunce' or 'contynence' or 'liberalte' or 'largite' or 'rytwnes'. Wherefore folewith as bi lijk skile þat, as þilk inward habit is to be seid propirli 'habitual moral temperaunce' or 'contynence', *et cetera*, so ech of þe seid deedis is to be seid propirli 'actual moral temperaunce' or 'contynence', *et cetera*. And if þis consequent concludid be trewe, as needis muste be trewe, þanne semeþ folewe þat eche of þilke deedis is 'actuali moral vertu' in speche propir, as þe habit of hem is 'moral vertu' in speche propir.

Outward deeds
commanded by a
moral virtne, or
begetting a
moral virtue,
should be termed
'moral virtues'.

Also in þe same mater þus: Eche of þe seid outward deedis is to be seid 'moral good' in speche propir y-nouz, fforwhi moral goodnes of a deede is an accordaunce and a correspondencie bitwixe þe deede and doom of resoun or of feip; and euery deede which is morali good is to be seid propirli a 'moral vertu'; wherfore eche of þe seid deedis is a moral vertu propirli.

The son argues:—
23. Heaviness
and lightness
cannot be ex-
amples of quali-
ties unrecogniz-
able by the
outward Wits,
for they are
recognized by
Touch.

þe xxii^e principal argument is þis: Bifore in þe first parti of 'þe donet', in þe first chapitre,¹ ben ensaumplid for qualitees insensible to þe outward wittis heft and liztnes; wherazens may be brouzt þis: þat heft and liztnes, as it wolde seme, ben knowen bi þe touch, ffor as mych as if an heuy birþen be leid on a man or on a beest, he schal soone knowe bi þe dowun pressyng þerof þat it is heuy, and bi þe drawyng vpward þat it is lizt. And þis knowyng is not had but bi touch, which is an outward sensitif witt. Wherefore þe seid ensaumplyng of heft and liztnes as for þingis insensible to alle þe outward sensible wittis is not trewe.

¹ p. 12, l. 12.

iij^e chapitre.

[S]One, y kunne þee þank for þi scharp arguynge. Neuerþeles, ȝeue so good diligence to vndirstonde what y
 85^a schal seie | for answers to þine argumentis, how good
 5 diligence þou ȝauyst to fynde and make þi seid argumentis,
 and þanne we schulen at þe last accorde in oure conceitis.
 take hede, þerfore, for first y schal sette forþ into me semyng
 treupis, and bi hem and from hem y schal descende into þe
 answers assoilyng þine argumentis.

10 þe i^e treup is þat neede is *per* noon forto soorte þe bifore
 expressid xxxj poyntis of goddis lawe into eny tablis or into
 eny porcions or parties of hem. Neuerþeles an eese, a profit
 and avail to lerners and remembrers and kepers of hem
 comeþ, if þei be so soortid and departid into nombres þat
 15 þerbi þei mowe be ouerbiholden and ouer runne in þe sizt
 of resoun þe liztlier, and be reportid þe eselier, and þe
 dyuersitees and differencis had bitwixe hem mowe be seen
 þe opener, and whiche of hem more accorden togidere *and*
 whiche lasse accorden togidere. And þerfore þilk soortyng
 20 of þo seid xxxj poyntis or moral vertues, whiche best and
 . fullest bryngiþ forþ þe now seid effectis of avail and profit to
 þe leerners, remembers and wirchers of hem, is best of alle
opire soortyngis makable vpon hem. And for as mych as
 into þe seid effectis and availis y kanne not fynde a bettir
 25 soortyng of hem þan is þe soortyng afore maad of hem into
 iij bifore maad tablis, and tauzt in þe iij^e chapitre of þe i^e
 parti of 'þe donet', þerfore y am about him to strengþe and
 fortifie, namelich siþen y wote wel þat he is sufficient y-nouȝ
 þat neede is not to seche *astir* eny *opir* soortyng of þe same
 30 vertues; not wiþstondyng y myȝte haue soortid þo xxxj
 poyntis into iij tablis, dressyng vs immediatli to god, to vs
 silf and to oure neiȝboris, and loggyng þe meenal vertues in
 þe same iij tablis in whiche ben her eendal vertues; but
 þanne *oupir* *per* muste be iij repetingis of alle meenal vertues,
 35 þat is to seie, in ech table onys, or ellis, if þe first table
 schulde haue alle þe meenal vertues, þanne þe first
 table schulde haue mo and *opire* moral vertues þan whiche
 dressen vs immediatli morali to god, and so he schulde

Three truths on
 which answers
 to these twenty-
 three arguments
 are based.

1. THE FIRST
 TRUTH. The
 classification of
 the Four Tables
 is merely for
 convenience. It
 seems to Pecoock
 the best and
 easiest method
 of remembering
 and understand-
 ing the thirty-
 one Points of
 God's Law.

It is better than
 making three
 Tables only—
 our duty
 towards God,
 towards our-
 selves, and
 towards our
 neighbour—for
 this confuses the
menal and
eendal virtues.

receyue and haue into him þe contrari of it wherbi he is now assignyd to be dyuerse from opire tablis. Also þilk disposicioun schulde sumwhat derke and schadewe þe knowyng of þe difference bitwixe meenal vertues and eendal vertues, and þerfore it plesip to me bettir forto make iiij tablis of þe 5 seid xxxj poyntis þan forto make of hem oonli iij tablis.

2. THE SECOND TRUTH. There are three considerations concerning a moral virtuous deed :

(1) The matter or object upon which the deed is done.

(2) The person to whom, or the thing to which, the deed is done.

(3) The person or thing for whose sake the deed is done.

þe ije trouþ is þis. | In and about a moral vertuose deede 85^b we mowe haue iij consideracions : oon is vpon what mater or obiect þe deede passip and wirchip ; þe ije consideracioun is to what persoon or to what þing þe same deede is wrouzt and 10 doon ; þe iije consideracioun is for whom, þat is to seie, for what persoon or for what opir þing, þe same deede is wrouzt and doon. Ensamþle herof is þis : If y zeue a peny to a poor man in almes, þe mater of þis deede whervpon þis deede passip or wirchip, which mater is clepid þe ' next obiect ' of þe deede, 15 is þe peny ; þe persoon or þing to which þe same deede is doon, which persoon is þe romber obiect of þe same deede, as in wey of procedyng, is þe poor man ; And þe persoon or þing for whom or for whos sake eendli þe deede is doon, is god, for ellis þe deede were not a moral vertu, as is schewid 20 in þe iije treti of þe first parti of ' cristen religioun ', þe first and þe ije chapitris. In lijk maner, if y repe a poor manyns feeld and bynde his corn, þe corn is þe mater vpon which þe repyng is þe deede or þe doying, but þe poor man is þe þing to which þe deede is a doying.¹ In lijk maner, if y obeie to 25 goddis bidding in receyuyng of his sacrament, þe mater of þis obeiyng is þe sacrament ; þe persoon to whom it is doon y am my silf, or an opir to whom y mynystre it ; and þe eend for which þe same deede of obeiyng is doon is also god. so þat in and about a moral deede þe þre seid consideracions 30 mowe be had : þat is to seie, whervpon, to whom, and for whom or for whos sake ; pouz it be so þat in summe kyndis of deedis, as ben þo whiche ben doon to god, þe persoon to whom þei ben doon and þe persoon for whom or for whos sake þei ben doon, is al oon ; but zit neuerpelattir þe ije and 35 þe iije consideracions schulen in þilk deede be dyuers, pouz þei be about þe same persoon, which is god. In lijk maner we mowe haue iij consideracions about loues whiche we beren

Sometimes the person to whom the deed is done and the person for whose sake it is done are one and the same.

¹ After *doying*, MS. has *In lijk maner*, crossed through in red.

toward vs silf or toward eny opir persoon or eny opir þing ;
fforwhi yf y loue my neiȝbor bi loue of frendschip, þe good
and profite which y wille to him in þilk loue is þe mater of þis
loue, and he is þe persoon to whom þis deede is a doying, and
5 god is he for whom it is doon ; and so þe iij consideracions
or habitudis ben. And in lijk maner þre consideracions ben
to be had about and in þe loue with which we louen god,
þouȝ þerin þe þingis of þe ije and of þe last consideracions
fallen þere togidere into oon þing. And in lijk maner þre
86^a consideracions ben about and in þe loue | with which we
louen vs silf.

þe iije trouþ is þis : þe iije seid consideracioun may not be
a ground þat vpon it be sett *and* multiplied at best tablis of
goddis moral lawe conuenyentli and profitabli, fforwhi þanne
15 schulde not be but oon table of goddis moral lawe, for as
mych as ech vertu of goddis moral lawe is doon for god eendli
or fynali ; neiȝer þe first consideracioun may be ground forto
bi it multiplie þe tablis of goddis moral lawe, fforwhi þanne
þer schulde be ouer many, for þer schulde be so many tablis
20 of goddis moral lawe, how many ben kyndis of poyntis or of
vertues in goddis moral lawe, siþen ech of þe poyntis bifore
assignyd in þe ie parti of ' þe donet ' to be in goddis moral
lawe haþ a dyuerse mater or obiet in kynde fro þe mater and
obiet of ech opir poynt in goddis moral lawe ; and þerfore
25 leueþ þe ije seid consideracioun to be þe ground wherbi þe
tablis t goddis lawe owen to be sette and to be multiplied
conuenyentli into þe effectis and availis seid bifore in þe first
trouþ. Neuerþelattir, ȝit if þe ije seid consideracioun of to
wirchyng in his largest spredyng, wiþout restreyne and
30 narowyng, schulde be such ground, certis, þanne bi þe
multiþlyng of it we schulde haue mo tablis þan were accord-
yng to be of goddis lawis into þe seid effectis in þe first trouþ ;
fforwhi we mowe wirche and strecche oure moral deedis
immediatli to many kyndis of goyng and crepyng beestis
35 vpon þe erþe, and to many kyndis of swymmyng fischis, to
many kyndis of fleyng briddis, and to ful many kyndis of
herbis and treis and spicis, flouris *and* fruytis, and many
kyndis of opire worldli goodis hauyng no lijf. þerfore it
behoueþ forto considere to how many kyndis or maners

3. THE THIRD
TRUTH. The
third and first
considerations
are no ground
for classifying
God's laws
under Tables.

The second
consideration is
the ground for
classifying the
eendal virtues of
God's law under
three Tables,
since pure
friendly love
may be to God,
to ourselves, or
to our neigh-
bour, and to
these three only.

of þingis we mowe wirche vertuoseli bi þe movyng of pure freendful loue berable anentis þe same þingis, and vpon þis consideracioun make a ground to multiplie þe tablis of goddis moral lawe. and for as mych as a man may not haue pure freendful loue saue to his god, to him silf and to opire 5 creaturis vsyng resoun, as it is schewid in þe ije^e parti of 'cristen religioun', þe []¹ treti, þe []¹ chapitre, þerfore þe vertues of goddis lawe whiche ben vertues for hem silf mowe accordyngli and profitabli as into þe seid effectis be soortid into þre tablis, þat is to seie, into þilk nombre of 10 hem bi which we wirchen immediatli to god as louyd for þanne of vs with pure loue of frendship, and into þe nombre of hem bi which we wirchen immediatli to vs silf as louyd | for þanne of vs with pure loue of frendship, and into þe 86^b nombre of hem bi which we wirchen immediatli to opire 15 creaturis of resonable kynde as louyd for þanne of vs in pure loue of frendship.

As it is more convenient to treat the *meenal* virtues separately, they are given a separate Table.

And ferþirmore, siþen þe meenal moral vertues whiche ben not fulli moral vertues for hem silf, mowe be þe bettir knowen and þe esilier ouerrunne in þe siȝt of resoun, and þe bettir 20 falle vndir consideracioun of difference bitwixe hem and her eendal vertues, if þo meenal vertues be soortid bi hem silf, and also in schortir and more compendiose maner þei mowe be sufficientli tauȝt and tretid bi puttyng and namyng of eche of hem oonys in oon table bi hem silf, þan if þei be mengid 25 with eche of þe þre now seid tablis of eendal vertues bi þis puttyng, nombryng and namyng², eche of þe seid meenal poyntis, þerfore of many of hem y make þe iiije table bi hem silf departid fro her eendal vertues of þe opire þre tablis. And þanne ferþir, for as mych as meenys to eny eendis goen 30 bifore in wey of gendryng and wirchyng þo same eendis, þerfore y sette þe table of meenal moral vertues to be þe first table, and þe table of moral eendal vertues strecchyng in þe seid maner to god immediatli to be þe ije table, and þe table of moral eendal vertues strecchyng to in þe seid maner to vs 35 silf immediatli to be þe iij^e table.

The *meenal* virtues are placed in the First Table because means always precede ends.

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

² After *namyng*, MS. has *of*, crossed through in red.

iii^e chapitre.

[A]nd¹ so herbi it may be eesili answerid to pi first argument, o my sone, bi cause here is *zouun* whi pat of oure moral deedis doon to eny creature not resonyng ouzte not be maad
5 eny table bi hem silf; ffor po creaturis ben goodis of man, as ben his gowyns or his housis, and also pei ben not loueable with loue of frendschip oonli.

In an opir maner it may be answerid to pe same first argument pat, for as mych as pe to wirchyng, takun in his
10 largest generalte spokun bifore in pe iij^e troupe, is ouer large forto bi it multiplie pe tablis of goddis lawe, as it is pere schewid, perfore pat pilk to wirchyng may be a ground forto bi it conuientli multiplie pe tablis of goddis lawe, it may be streynynd, narowid, modified and specified þus: þou schalt
15 vndirstonde pat not ech to wirchyng sufficeþ to founde and multiplie eny table of goddis moral lawe into pe seid effectis in pe first troupe, but moral to wirchyng aloon þerto sufficij. ffor a moral table, as for his poyntis or spicis, ouzte be maad
20 bi moral poyntis oonli, and ellis a deede as it is not | moral in eny wise, were a deede and a spice of a moral table and of a moral lawe; and also alle pe moral poyntis and deedis of goddis moral lawe muste needis be first and bifore in her moral goodnesse, eer þan pei be soortid to make of hem eny tablis of goddis moral lawe. and, sipen it is so pat pi first
25 maad argument makij mensioun of a to wirchyng, as it is oonli natural or craftial to wirchyng, and not as it is moral to wirchyng, and pat for cause seid in pe iij^e troupe and in pe next answer bifore goyng, perfore pe seid argument prouep not eny mo moral tablis to be þan pe seid iij. and so is
30 answer maad to pi first argument.

Neuerþeles, for more cleryng of þis answer þou schalt vndirstonde pat we mowe wirche immediatli to oxen and horsis bi natural immediacioun, so pat pei ben pe next to whom we dresen oure deedis as in natural dressyng and
35 in natural nextnesse or immediacioun, and þerbi po deedis mowe be goode in natural goodnesse; but as þou hast

ANSWERS BASED ON THE THREE TRUTHS:

1. (a) No Table of moral law should be made for our duty towards creatures without Reason, for these cannot be objects of pure friendly love.

(b) Again, these creatures without Reason are the objects only of a natural working, not of a moral working. So no moral Table can be made for them.

(c) Though creatures without Reason may be our immediate objects naturally, they cannot be our immediate objects morally. God, ourselves, or our neighbour

¹ Minuscule *n* in manuscript.

must be our
immediate
object morally.

arguyd in þi first argument, 3it we mowe not wirche immediatli to hem bi moral immediacioun so þat þei be þe nexte to whom we dresen oure deedis as in moral dressyng and in moral nextnesse or immediacioun. fforwhi þou3 þou zeue mete and drynk to an oxe or to an horse, and þou3 þou sle and murpere an oxe or an horse, herynne þou doist neipir moral good neipir moral yuel, neipir þou doist eny deede of goddis moral lawe neipir eny vice contrari to a deede of his moral lawe, vnto tyme þou dresse and wirche þis same deede to god, to þi silf, or to þi neizbor; to god as þat þou trete þerinne resonabili or vuresonabli his creature; to þi silf or to þi neizbor, as þat þou þerinne poorist þi silf or þi neizbor in sleying þi catel or his catel, or such opir. and þerfore þe þing to which þou next and immediatli wirchist morali þis seid fedying is god, þi silf, or þi neizbor. and þerbi anon þilk wirchyng is in þe ije table or iije or iiije, aftir þat þou takist þat creature to be goddis owen good, þi good, or þi neizboris good; and in lijk maner it is trewe in ech deede which we mowe do to eny creature not resonyng. and þerfore, siben noon opir þing saue god, we silf and opir resonyng creature, may be it to whom we mowe wirche eny moral deede morali, þat is to seie, eny deede bi which we ben to be seid wel manerid or yuel manerid, rewardable or punyschable, comendable or blamable, and þerfore oonli to þe þre seid maners of þingis, god, vs silf and oure neizbor, we mowe | morali wirche as next or immediatli; it folewith þat bi þe bifore seid consideracioun of to wirchyng morali mowe not be multiplied at lest into þe seid effectis eny mo tablis of goddis moral lawe ouer þe iiij bifore sett tablis. and folewith pleyntli þat þyn assignyd to wirchyng in þyn argument, for as mych as it is not a moral to wirchyng, is not sufficient to founde eny tablis of goddis moral lawe into þe seid effectis, fforwhi no þing foundiþ in multipliying so tablis of goddis moral lawe, saue it which is moral.

2. (α) We ought to love the devil with love of pure friendship and consider him our neighbour. Therefore our duty towards the devil is

To þi ije argument y schal purpose forþ þre answeris, into þis entent þat if þou like not þe on, þou may take þe opir. þe first of þese answeris is þis: þat we mowe and owe to loue þe feend with loue of frendship, fforwhi we owen wilne to him his beyng for euer and his riche natural goodis whiche

he hap, and whiche god wilnep him to haue, *and* alle maner
 if and as resoun or feip alowip or assignep him to haue:
 and perfore it muste needis be grauntid pat we ouzte loue
 him bi loue of frendschip, and so oure to wirchyngis toward
 5 him schulen be in þe iiij^e table; for we ouzte bere vs and
 wirche toward him immediatli in sum maner as we ouzte
 bere vs and wirche toward froward obstinate men beyng oure
 deedli enemyes, and we ouzte entirmete and companye with
 him whanne and how resoun or feip iugip it to be doon, as
 10 it is whanne we muste needis entirmcte with him in fiztyng
 azens him whanne he vs temptip. Neuerpeles, whepir pilk
 freendful loue is to be clepid 'charite' or no, a man may
 chese, for names of þingis ben at wil of hem. but, certis, y
 kanne se no lett in resoun but pat it may be clepid 'charite',
 15 as wel as denyed to be charite; and pat god hap charite
 anentis him, in pat pat god hap loue of frendschip to him, will-
 yng good to þe feend for god him silf; and pat we han
 charite anentis him in lijk maner, pouz he hap not charite
 anentis god or vs, for he willip not good to god or to vs for
 20 god; pouz trouþ be pat god hap not charite anentis him
 which is clepid a 'grace', acceptyng þe feend and his werk
 into a blisful perpetual reward in heuen, of which charite it
 ouzte be vndirstonde pat oonli charite is it which departip
 bitwix sones of perdicoun and sones of saluacioun. And
 25 ferþirmore, as it may seme, no lett in resoun is fyndable for
 which he may not be clepid 'oure neizbor' wel y-nouþ, as
 wel as it may be denyed; fforwhi many men now lyuyng
with vs in her obstinacie schulen not be sauýd, and 3it þei
ben oure neizboris, and if þou seie þo men mowe be seid oure
 38^a neizboris for þei mowe be sauýd | if þei wolen, so y may seie
pat þe feend is oure neizbor for pat god may saue him if
he wole. fforwhi god forto so do includip no repugnaunce
 or contradiccoun, and alle deedis not includyng repugnaunce
 or contradiccoun god may do if he wole, as wel lernyd men
 35 in dyuynyte knowen; and þe signyficacioun or þe bitokenyng
 of þis name 'neizbor' is mych at vsage and also at mennys
 wil. and þis is oon answer to þi ije argument.

þe ije answer is þis: If it ouzte not be seid pat feendis
 ben oure neizboris, *and* pat god and we han loue of frendschip

included in the
Fourth Table.

This pure
friendly love to
the devil may be
termed 'Charity'
of a certain kind.

And the devil
may be termed
'our neighbour'
in that he may
be saved, if he
will.

Soteriology
includes possibility
of the devil's
salvation

(b) If devils be
not our neigh-
bours whom we

ought to love
with pure
friendly love,
then they rank
with beasts, &c.,
and cannot have
a special Table of
moral law as-
signed to them.

(c) If devils are
to be considered
as ministers of
God, then God is
the object of any
virtuous deed
we may do to
devils. So our
moral deeds
towards devils
are included in
the Second
Table.

3. (a) When to
live *leernyngly*
means the busi-
ness of the Will
to will, choose
and command
that the other
powers attend to
learning and
remembering, it
is a *meenal* moral
virtue, and is

to hem, or þat god or we han charite to hem, and þat for
þei neipir schulen neipir mowe, as bi þe ordinat lawe of god,
make with vs a blisful togidere perpetual comunyng and
dwelling, þanne feendis mowe be take to be goddis goodis
and oure goodis into oure profitable vse and excercise, in 5
maner lijk as beestis and briddis and fischis and wormys and
opire noiying pingis ben goddis goodis and also oure goodis.
And þanne with þis presupposid, þe answer which is bifore
maad to þe first argument is for þe remanent of þe ije answer
to þi ije argument.

10

þe ije answer may be þis: If þe kyng sende to me
a messenger or a mynystre of his, þis man may be considerid
and takun of me in two maners: oon as he is mynystre of
þe kyng, an opir as he is my neizbor in mankynde toward
saluacioun. þerfore, if y schulde trete þis man or do eny 15
deede to him vertuoseli as mynystir of þe kyng, y schulde
make þe kyng to be þe mater of pilk deede in þe ije maner
bifore spokun in þe ije chapitre,¹ þe ije trouþ, euen as if y
zaue a ping to þe kyng. And if y schulde vertuoseli trete
and do eny deede to him as my neizbor, þanne y muste make 20
him and not þe kyng to be þe obiect or þe mater of þis deede
in þe ije maner spokun bifore in þe ije chapitre, þe ije trouþ.
And þanne, for as mych as feendis ouzten not be considerid
and take of vs in þe ije maner as oure neizboris, but in þe
first maner as mynystris of god, þerfore we muste make not 25
hem but god to be þe obiect or þe mater of ech deede which
we ouzten resonabli and þerfore vertuoseli and alowabli do
to feendis or about feendis, so þat god be þe obiect or mater
in þe ije maner bifore spokun, in þe ije chapitre,¹ þe ije trouþ.
which ije trouþ, if it be wel vndirstonde and brouzt to mynde, 30
clerip mych þe ije and þe iij^e now maad answeris.

ffor an answer to þi iij^e argument, þou schalte vndirstonde
þat where euer in my writyngis y clepe þe first poynt of þe
first table bi þis name 'leernyng with remembring', or 'for-
to lyue leernyngli and þ remembryngli', þere y may meene 88^b
bi pilk name 'leernyng' or 'leernyngful lyuyng' þe bisnesse
of þe wil which a man hap to leerne and remembre, and þat
whepir pilk bisnesse be þe wilnyng or þe chesyng forto leerne

¹ Of Pt. II.

and remembre, or þe comaundyng of þe wil to þe vndirstond-
yng *and* to opire powers forto attende into leernyng and
remembryng; and þis bisnesse is a moral deede or a moral
vertu, and not a knowyngal deede. and þus ceesip þi iij^e
5 maad argument fro þe entent into which pou him madist.

And ferþir, þou þi bi þis name 'leernyng' or 'remembryng',
or bi þis name 'lyue leernyngli' or 'remembryngli', it like
me to vndirstonde deedis of þe resoun and not þe now seid
wilnyng or chesyng or comaundyng, 3it to þi iij^e argument it
10 may be wist how þer to it is to be answerid bi it what is
bifore tauzt in þe ij^e parti of 'þe donet',¹ where it is seid þat
whanne euer a wilnyng or a nyllyng in þe wil is a moral
vertu, þanne ech deede þerbi comaundid to be, and which ellis
for þe while schulde not be, and þat wheþir þilk deede be of
15 þe resoun or of þe wil or of eny sensuall inward or outward
witt or appetit or of eny movyng power, is a moral vertuose
deede, and in þe same or lijk kynde of moralte or of moral
goodnesse and in þe same table, in which moral goodnesse
and table þe seid inward willing or nyllyng is. and so, þou
20 leernyng and remembryng, as þei ben in hem silf, namlich
not comaundid to be bi such seid willyng or nyllyng, ben
knowyngal vertuose deedis oonli; 3it if and whanne and in
þat þat þei ben comaundid to be bi a willing or nyllyng
accordauntli to þe doom of resoun þervpon bifore maad, þei
25 ben moral vertuose deedis in þe same or lijk moral kynde of
goodnesse in which þe seid comaundyng, willyng, or nyllyng
is; and 3it þilk same leernyng *and* remembryng mowe be
take and sett in a table dyuerse from þe tablis in whiche ben
þo same seid willyngis and nyllyngis, and in a poynt to þe
30 same leernyng and remembryng beyng propre, *and* dyuerse
fro þe poynt in which þe seid willyng and nyllyng ben, and
þat for causis bifore spokun in þe [ij^e]² chapitre of þis ij^e present
parti, in þe first troupe. and þus may sufficient answer be
maad to þi iij^e argument.

35 ffor answer to þi iiij^e *and* v^e argumentis it is to be seid þat
þou takist oon ground for þine seid bope argumentis, which
ground is not trewe, and þerfore þine argumentis prouen not
þine entent. þe seid ground is þis: þat ech moral vertu bi

rightly placed in
the First Table.

(b) When to live
leernynghy
means the deed
of the Reason
willed or nilled
by the Will,
then this deed is
also a *moral*
virtuous deed;
although learn-
ing in itself,
when not
commanded by
the Will, is a
knowyngal
(*knowyngal*)
virtuous deed
only.

To live *leernynghy*
is placed with
the other *meenal*
virtues for the
sake of
convenience.

4, 5. The *meenal*
moral virtues
are placed
together in the
First Table
merely for con-
venience. They

¹ Chap. ii, pp. 110-113.

² MS. *ij^e*.

are not excluded from the other Tables, but belong also to the same Tables as their corresponding eendal virtues.

which we wirchen immediatli morali to god is in pe ije table oonli | and in noon opir table; and ech moral vertu bi which ^{89^a} we wirchen immediatli morali to vs silf is in pe iije table oonli, and in noon opir table; and in lijk maner pat ech moral vertu bi which we wirchen immediatli morali to oure 5 neizbor is in pe iiije table oonli. but y denye pis ground, for, pouz it be so trew of ech eendal moral vertu beyng a moral vertu for him silf, it is not trewe of po menal moral vertues to sum of whom y haue maad pe first table. and perfore y denye pe seid ground whervpon pi iiije and ve argumentis ¹⁰ ben bildid and takun her strengp. If eny man aske whi y wole not admytte and receyue pat alle menal moral vertues bi whiche we wirchen immediatli morali to oure neizbor be in pe iiije table oonli, as wel as y admytte and receyue eendal moral vertues bi whiche we wirchen immediatli morali to ¹⁵ oure neizbor to be in pe iiije table oonli, Certis, cause is noon nycete or oonli willnesse wipout skile; but for pat a certeyn nombryng and soortyng of pe moral lawis of god into pe bi-fore seid profitis and availis may bettir be maad with pis, pat a certeyn nombre of meenal moral vertues be putt bi ²⁰ hem silf in a table propre to hem silf, pan schulde be maad if po same meenal vertues were suffrid to be in pe tablis of her eendal vertues oonli; and zit herbi pat of po certeyn meenal vertues is maad pe first table is not maad eny excludyng of pe same meenal vertues fro pe ije, iije and iiije tablis ²⁵ in whiche her eendal vertues ben; and ellis y wolde receyue hem al redi into pe ije, iije and iiije seid tablis oonli, out of whiche y hem not exclude vtirli. and pis is y-nou3 for answer to pi iiije and ve argumentis.

6. The dignity of man and his neighbour is included in the SECOND MATTER, the Benefits of God, and is covered by the First Point of the First Table.

To pi vje argument y answepe pat sufficient knowyng of ³⁰ oure owen dignyte and of oure neizboris dignyte, zhe, and of pe feendis dignyte, into pis eend pat moral vertues of pe iije and iiije table ben at ful gendrid and had, hap conuenient place y-nou3 in pe ije ¹ of pe vij principal maters, pat is to seie, in pe benefetis of god tauzt in pe first poynt of pe first ³⁵ table; fforwhi pat god zeuep to me my soul is to me a benefet, and pat he zeuep to me my bodi, such as my bodi is, is to me a benefet, rzt as it is a benefet to me pe beyng in which

¹ See Notes to 2/20, and *Donet*, pp. 86-92.

wise god ȝeueþ it to me and puttþ me þerinne. and þat he
ȝeueþ to me my neiȝboris, beyng summe eesi to me and
summe vexyng to me, and þat he ȝeueþ feendis to assaie and
tempte me, and þat he ȝeueþ wormes to bite me, is of goddis
5 beneficence; and alle þese ben his benefetis to me. and þat
89^b he ȝeueþ to me goode aungels | to be my frendis is a benefet.
And þis is y-nouȝ for answer to þi vj^e argument. Neuerþeles,
forto reduce þe knowyng of oure dygnyte into sum place of
þe iiij tablis, it is open y-nouȝ þat of þese benefetis to trete
10 is accordyng place in þe first poynt of þe first table.

v^e chapitre.

[T]O þi vj^e argument forto answer, y schal seie þus: If
þe first poynt of þe iij^e table were generali al freendful loue
which we haue vertuoseli to vs silf, þi vj^e argument hadde
15 greet strengþ. but for as mych as þe first poynt of þe iij^e
table is not but oon spice of þe hool general loue which a man
ouȝte haue to him silf, for þilk first poynt is not but loue
with which a man willþ to him goostli goodis which it is
not in his owen power forto ȝeue to him, as ben stiryng
20 gravis and acceptyng gravis, and suche opire as it is open bi
what y haue tauȝt in þe first parti of 'þe donet', þe vj^e
chapitre, þerfore þyn argument hap no strengþ. þe assumpt
or premysse with which þou bigynnest þyn vj^e argument is
to be denyed, and it which þou next þerto takist forþ forto
25 verifie þilk assumpt or premysse is also to be denyed as for
his first parti, wheryn he spekip of þe first point of þe iij^e
table, as is open bi þe first parti of 'þe donet', þe vj^e
chapitre, where it is tretid what is þe i^e poynt of þe iij^e table.
and þus is þi vj^e argument assoilid.

30 And in lijk maner may þyn viij^e argument be assoilid, as
now soon aftir þis schal be schewid. And herwith al, sone,
lerne þou þat a mannys soul may conuenyentli be clepid his
'bodili good' and his 'fleischli good', for as mych as his soul
is neuer with him but whanne þe soul ȝeueþ to him bodili
35 and fleischli lijf, and a mannys bodili and fleischli lijf
hangþ vpon þe hauyng of þe soul; And ȝit a mannys
kunnyngis, þat is to seie, his intellectual or kunnyngal vertues,

7. To live *goostly* to oneself is only one kind of friendly love to oneself, namely the willing to oneself of spiritual goods which one cannot give to oneself. Hence it does not include living *fleischely*, worldly, clerly and honestly.

8. To live *goostly* to one's neighbour is only one kind of friendly love to one's neighbour, namely the willing to him of spiritual goods which one cannot give to him. Hence it does not include *riȝtwisnesse*,

which is the
willing to one's
neighbour of
fleshy and
worldly goods.

mowe be clepid his 'worldli goodis'. To þyn viij^e argu-
ment y graunte wel pat riȝtwisnesse doon bi vs to oure
neizboris is a spice of oure loue to oure neizboris, but ȝit þis
spice conteyneþ not saue oure vertuouse fleischli loue and oure
vertuose worldli loue toward oure neizboris vnder oon general
name of 'riȝtwisnesse' to hem boþe togidere. and þe first
poynt of þe iiij^e table namyd in þis maner 'oure loue to oure
neizbor' is to be take, forto conteyne oonli opire spicis of oure
loue dew to oure neizbor; whiche opire spicis ben oure will-
yngis þat he haue his stiryng gracis and his blisful glories, 10
þat is to seie, suche goodis as we mowe not ȝeue to him. And
þerfore þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table vnder þilk name 'loue
to oure neizbor', þus vnderstonden and taken | for defaute of 90^a
more propre þerto name had redi, may make nombre with þe
ij^e parti of þe ij^e poynt in þe same iiij^e table wel y-nouȝ; 15
fforwhi þe i^e poynt of þe iiij^e table is not to be vnderstonde
þat he conteyneþ and is al þe freendli willyng and louyng
which a man ouȝte haue anentis his neizbor, for þanne þe ij^e
and iiij^e poyntis of þe same iiij^e table were sette forþ and
nombrid in veyn; but þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table is of 20
þilk general loue a maner spice with which he willip to his
neizboris oonli þo kyndis of goodis whiche he may not ȝeue to
his neizboris, neipir he hap natural power forto ȝeue, as ben
gracis and glories; and þe opire spicis of loue, whiche spicis
a man ouȝte haue anentis his neizboris, ben conteynynd in þe 25
ij^e, iiij^e and iiij^e poyntis of þe iiij^e table. and in lijk maner
þe first poynt of þe ij^e table is not to be vnderstonde þat he
conteyneþ and is al þe welwillyng with which a man wole
eny good of god to him silf, for þanne þe ij^e poynt of þe same ij^e
table were sett forþ in veyn; but þe first poynt of þe ij^e table 30
is oon spice of þe now seid al hool welwillyng and louyng to
god, for he is þerof þilk spice with which a man willip to
god þilke goodis whiche forto ȝeue to god or contynue in god
is not in eny mannys power, as ben goddis myȝt, goddis
wijsdom, his euerlastyngnesse and suche opire.

Similarly, to live
ghostly to God is
only one kind of
friendly love
towards God,
namely the
willing to Him
of spiritual
goods which it
is not in our
power to give
Him.

9. The answer
to the ninth
argument is
covered by the
answer to the
first argument.

To þi ix^e argument it nedip not sette here eny answer, for as
mych as bi þe answer to þe first argument þe answer to þis
ix^e argument may cleerli at þe ful be knowen, if þerwith þe
iij trouþis of þe ij^e chapitre be wel weied.

To þi x^e argument, o my sone, y answerē þus : y graunte wel, sone, þat of þe iij deedis bi þee rehercid in þe x^e argument y make expresse mentioun oonli of þe i^e in þe first parti of ‘ þe donet ’, þe iiij^e chapitre. but, sone, y may not assigne
 5 expresseli or openli þe first of þo iij deedis to be a vertu of þe ij^e table, but þat þerinne and þerwith y assigne inpresseli or priueli, 3he, and as it were in sufficient¹ expressioun, þe opire two deedis to be vertues of þe same table. fforwhi [þo]² deedis ben of such kynde þat þei ben as it were vn-
 10 departable, namlich so þat if þe first deede be, þe ij^e and þe iiij^e needis muste be; and with þis þei ben so nyȝ togidere þat þei semen to þe peplis conceit as it were al oon; and þerfore it is no nede forto expresse eche of hem alle þre, but it is y-nouȝ forto expresse þe principalist of alle þe þre, and
 15 in þilk expressioun to meene and vndirstonde þe opir tweyne
 90^b to be includid and as it | were sufficientli y-nouȝ to ech witt expressid, namlich whanne ouer greet lengþ is dred to be in þe bisnesse of expressioun, as it is now in my purpos of nombryng þe poyntis of goddis lawe.

20 Ensampl herof may be þis: If eny man entendip or purposip and laborip forto make a þing to be hoot, he and ech opir man may liztli, 3he, and muste needis, graunte þat he þerinne and þerbi sufficientli entendip, purposip and laborip to make þe same þing to be not colde; so þat, if it be
 25 expressid bi me þat þis man laborip to make þe seid þing hoot, it were not but veyn and waast, or it were wiþout eny nede, forto expresse þat he laborip to make þe same þing be not coold, bi cause it is open y-nouȝ þat heet and coold ben contraries, and mowe not be togidere³ in oon and þe same
 30 þing. and in lijk maner in þis þat he wilneþ þe same þing to be hoot, it is open y-nouȝ þat he muste needis anoon, or soon vpon, wilne þe same þing to be not coold, and also nylle þe same þing to be coold; so þat it were waast and veyn, or at þe leest needles, to more expresse þerwith þat he
 35 wilneþ þe þing be not coold, or nylleþ þe same þing to be coold. Wherefore bi lijk skile in oure present purpos it is þus: þat if eny man wilneþ god to haue eny of his goodis, he þerinne and þerbi anoon or soon wilneþ god to not haue

10. The moral virtues of nilling evil to God, to ourselves and to our neighbour, are included in the moral virtues of willing good to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbour. Therefore the nillings need not be expressly set out in the Four Tables.

An example of a deed of willing which necessarily includes a deed of nilling.

To express the nillings in the Four Tables would be to add six unnecessary

¹ MS. *insufficient*, conjunctively.

² MS. *pouȝ*.

³ MS. *to gidere*.

Points to the
thirty-one
necessary.

þe contrari yuel, and nyllip god to haue þe contrari yuel; and þe first of þese iij deedis may not be had wipout þe opire tweyne anoon or soon vpon liztli þerbi to be had. and þerfore it is y-nouȝ þat y expresse þe first of þese iij deedis to be a vertu of goddis lawe, and þerinne meene and vndir-
stonde þe tweyne opire to be also deedis of goddis lawe, as
it were oon and þe same with þe first; namlich for if y
schulde expresse in openest speche þe now two opire seid
deedis to be vertues of goddis lawe in þe ije table, þanne bi
lijk skile y schulde in þe iije table sette lijk two deedis of
a man toward him, and y schulde in þe iiije table sette opire
two lijk deedis of a man toward his neizbor, as it is arguyd
in þe x^e argument; and so y schulde large wipout eny neede
þe openest expressioun of goddis lawis into þe nombre of
seuen and þritti poyntis, and so bi sixe mo þan y haue take
vpon me forto in openest maner expresse. Certis, if þe first
of þo þre deedis myȝte be had wipout þe ije and þe iije
coursli and with long contynuaunce aftir þe wonyd disposi-
cioun of men, and wipout so greet redinesse into þe ije and
iije aftir þe first had, or if þe ije and þe iiije myȝte be knownen,
and so, as is now seid, | had wipout þe first, and if þei
semeden not as it were al oon, y wolde graunte þat sum need
or sum cause were forto make mensioun of eche of hem bi
him silf, and ellis y wolde graunte þat y vnsufficietli
nombrid þe poyntis of goddis lawe in þe ije, iije and iiije
tablis. but siben herof þe contrari is, and myn entent and
purpos is to not multiplie nombre expressistli, wipout need
or sum profit þerbi comyng, it is open y-nouȝ þat it lieþ to
myn entent, as it were in need, þat y leue þe ije and þe iije
vnrehercid and vnnombrid seuerali and bi name. And so
not oonli for þe seid stillyng of hem y am excusable, but y
am into þilk stillyng bi need accordyng to my purpos con-
streynable. and þis is y-nouȝ, my sone, for answer to þi x^e
argument. And herbi it is open whi y am stille of nyllingis
vnrehercid in þe iije table and in þe iiije table, wipout eny
vnsufficiency of þo tablis.

11. To love one's
neighbour *goost-*
ly is to will to
him spiritual

ffor answer to þyn x^e argument, þou schalt vndirstonde
þat, þouȝ y may do goostli almes to my neizbor bi ȝeuyng to
him my techyngis, counselyngis, exhortacions, correpciouns and

corrections, 3it y may not 3eue to him eny inward stiring
 grace, neipir y may 3eue to him his blisse, pou3 y may wilne
 to him pese now rehercid goostli goodis. Wherefore forto
 wilne to my neizbor his graciose goodis and his blisful goodis,
 5 beyng out of my power to 3eue hem to him, which wilnyng is
 pe first poynt of pe iiij^e table, is not oon and pe same with
 pis, me forto wilne and 3eue to my neizbor my techyng and
 myn exhortyng, myn vndirnymyng and my correccioun, beyng
 in my power forto 3eue hem to him, which wilnyng is a parti
 10 of pe viij^e poynt in pe iiij^e table. and perfore it is
 not trewe what pou takist in þyn argument to be trewe,
 þat pe first poynt of pe iiij^e table and goostli almes ben
 al oon.

ffor answer to þi xij^e argument, y seie þat neipir oop neipir
 15 vow, takun propirli and verili, is a moral vertuose deede, but
 euer eipir of hem may be a circumstaunce sett to a moral
 vertuose deede of affermyng or denyng or bihetyng to god
 or to a mannys neizbor. Also boþe oop and vow mowe be
 circumstauncis sett to a moral viciose deede of affermyng or
 20 denyng or bihetyng to god or to a mannys neizbor. And,
 sipen no poynt of goddis tablis or of goddis lawe ou3te be
 maad of a circumstaunce oonli, which is not a vertuose deede,
 perfore, sone, y ou3te to not make eny place or poynt of pe
 tablis propreable and seueral to an oop or to a vow. þat an
 25 oop in him silf is not a moral vertuose deede, lo, if y seie þus :
 ‘bi god’, ‘bi marie’, ‘bi seynt Jame’, and seie no more
 30 þan so, y neipir seie good neipir yuel ; but if y seie þus : ‘bi
 god, y am fastyng’, ‘bi marie, y herde masse to day’, ‘bi seynt
 Jame, y schal paie to pee xx^{ti} pound’, sopeli pese deedis of
 35 affermyng and bihetyng, so circumstancionatid þat to hem
 oopis ben sett, ben good or badde morali. and of hem,
 whanne þei ben morali vertuose, ben poyntis in goddis tablis,
 as pe v^e poynt in pe iij^e table, whanne oure affermyng or deny-
 yng, so circumstancionatid with oop or vow, we maken to god ;
 40 and pe iij^e poynt in pe iij^e table, whanne oure bihetyng, so
 circumstancionatid with oop or vow, we maken to god ; and
 pe vj^e poynt in pe iiij^e table, whanne oure affermyng or denyng
 or bihetyng, so circumstancionatid with oop or vow, we make
 to oure neizbor ; and pe iij^e poynt in pe iiij^e table, whanne

goods which it
 is not in our
 power to give
 him. This is
 not the same as
 to will to him
 spiritual alms,
 such as teaching,
 exhorting, &c.,
 which it is in our
 power to give
 him.

12. Oaths and
 vows are not in
 themselves
 moral virtues or
 moral vices, but
 only circum-
 stances of moral
 virtues or moral
 vices. Circum-
 stances are not
 included in the
 Four Tables.

The deeds of
 affirming or
 denying or pro-
 mising, to which
 an oath is set,
 are good or bad
 morally. These
 deeds are dealt
 with in the
 Third and Fifth
 Points of the
 Second Table,
 and the Third
 and Sixth Points
 of the Fourth
 Table.

oure bihetyng, so circumstancionatid *with* oop or vow, we maken to oure neizbor.

The promises to which a vow is set are good or bad morally. These promises are dealt with in the Third Point of the Second Table and the Third Point of the Fourth Table.

And *in* lijk maner it is to be seid of a vow pat he in him silf is no moral vertuose deede neipir viciouse deede; fforwhi yf y make a sensible signe, which is wonyd to be maad 5 whanne promyssis ben maad to god or to man, and *perwith* y make no promys, pilk signe is neipir morali good neipir morali yuel; but pe promys to which pe signe is sett is morali good or yuel. And if it be morali good *and* maad to god, it is in pe iije poynt of pe ije table; and if it be morali good and 10 maad to man, it is *in* pe iije poynt of pe iije table. and herbi answer is maad to pi xije argument.

vje chapitre.

13. Discretion is the same as Prudence.

(1) Discretion may be a *kunnynge* (*knowynge*) virtue required as a circumstance to every moral virtue. Circumstances are not dealt with separately in the Tables, but belong to the virtues to which they are the means.

(2) Discretion may be the matter of the moral virtue of willing to learn such Discretion. In that case it is included materially in the First Point of the First Table with that willing.

[F]Or answer to pi xiiije argument, y seie pat discrecioun is al oon *with* prudence, which is an intellectual or knowal 15 vertu requyrid to renne *with* ech moral vertu poru3 out alle pe iij tablis of goddis lawe; and *perfore* of him, as it is such a cause or a circumstance of ech moral vertu, and is not in him silf a moral vertu, ou3te not be putt eny poynt among moral vertues, pou3 oure wilnyng and chesyng and laboryng 20 to haue prudence be a moral vertu and a spice conteynynd in pe ie poynt of pe ie table. Neuerpeles, discrecioun or prudence, in such maner *and* caase takun as he is chosen or comaundid to be leernyd, and pat bi choice and wilnyng or comaundyng of pe fre wil bi doom of an opir discrecioun or prudence bfore 25 goyng to him, is materiali a moral vertu, pat is to seie, is a deede which is pe mater of a moral vertu, and vpon which rennep a moral vertu here now bfore spokun, which is pe seid willyng; and *in* pis wise pilk prudence or discrecioun takun is materiali and bi reduccioun in pe first table, and in 30 pe same first poynt in which is pe seid willyng to haue pilk prudence. as yf y be in purpos to reule me vertuoseli anentis god | or my silf or my neizbor, and y heere and knowe pat 92a perto certeyn discrecioun is necessari, and *perfore* y wole haue and leerne pilk discrecioun, pat aftirward *with* him y wirche 35 pe moral vertuose deede; certis, pis discrecioun in pat pat it

is so lernyd is in þe first table, and in þe same poynt in which is þe willyng or þe chesying þerof, þouȝ oonli material; but aftir as he is takun to be a cause or a circumstance to opire moral vertues, he is in no table seuerali, but he is in ech table
5 into which and into whos poynt he is take as meene.

To þi xiiij^e argument answer is forto denye þe i^e premysse of þe argument, which premysse is þis: 'alle vertues whiche seruen into oon and þe same', *et cetera*. And so ceesiþ þe strengþ of þe xiiij^e argument.

10 To þe xv^e argument answer is also forto denye þe first premysse of þe argument, which premysse is þis: 'no vertu which is immediatli into an opir vertu', *et cetera*. fforwhi so it is þat oon and þe same vertu, which immediatli strecchip him silf and lediþ vs into an opir vertu as into an eend,
15 strecchip him silf immediatli vpon an opir þing, which is a certeyn mater or a certeyn persoon vpon which or to which þilk vertu wirchiþ or moviþ vs to wirche. And þus a vertu is opirwise immediatli anentis an opir vertu þan he is immediatli anentis an obiect or a mater vpon which þe same
20 vertu gooþ. And þerfore, þouȝ a vertu be immediatli strecching into a þing as into an eend which is an opir vertu, þis lettip not þe same vertu forto strecche him immediatli vpon an opir þing as for his mater vpon which schal be his wirchyng, or vpon an opir þing as for þe persoon to whom schal be his
25 wirchyng. and so oon and þe same vertu may be immediat in þe first maner to an opir moral vertu, and may be þerwith immediat to a persoon, as is god or man, and haue so togidere¹ tweyne immediacions of dyuerse natures; as ensample may be putt: If y make and ȝeue a preisyng of god to god,
30 and if y ȝeue a peny into releuyng of a poor man. And þerfore þe first premysse of þis xv^e argument is vntrewe, and so ceeciþ þe strengþ of þe argument.

To þe xvj^e argument for answer, þe first premysse is to be denyed, which is þis: 'penaunce is a moral vertu'. And
35 whanne into proof þerof it is seid þus, 'Penaunce is a deede of þe wil,' *et cetera*, þis is to be denyed. fforwhi penaunce of whiche we speken of here includiþ in him silf þre þingis: oon is a passioun of sorow, which is no deede of þe wil; An opir is a willyng þat þe persoun hadde not do þe syn; þe iij^e is a

14. It is not true to assert that all virtues which serve to the same end are one and the same virtue. Therefore this argument fails.

15. It is not true to assert that no virtue can be wrought immediately into another virtue, and also immediately to God. Both kinds of immediate working are possible at one and the same time.

16. Repentance is not a moral virtue, but consists of a Passion and two deeds of the Will.

¹ MS. to gidere.

These two deeds of the Will are included in the Third Point of the Second Table.

Passions are not dealt with separately in the Tables.

17. (1) Kindness, taken as a virtue of counsel, is a sort of *Largeness*, and so is included in the Seventh Point of the Second Table and the Eighth Point of the Fourth Table.

(2) Kindness is taken by some as a virtue of precept, and is then included in the Third Point of the Second Table, and the Third Point of the Fourth Table.

willyng or a ful purposyng forto neuer do pilk syn or eny opir. Wherefore, siben penaunce is maad of pese pre, penaunce is not a deede of þe wil, but an aggregat | of a passioun and 92^b of twey deedis of þe wil. If a man wole aske in which table ben þo two deedis of þe wil, answer may be þat þei ben in þe 5 ii^e poynt of þe i^e table, which is iustnes to god. And if it plesse to eny man forto seie and holde þat complet penaunce stondip in þo twey deedis of þe wil, certis, þanne he may seie answeyngli þat penaunce is a spice of þe ii^e poynt of þe i^e table, which poynt is riȝtwisnesse to god, and þerfore 10 penaunce is þere in his general kynde. And þat passions ben not in eny table but bi reduccioun and secundarili, for þei ben not deedis of goddis seruice and lawe, but þei ben maters vpon whiche vertues of goddis lawe rennen and wirchen, it is tauȝt bifore in 'þe donet'¹ and in þis present 15 book, þe first parti,² and schal be tauȝt in 'þe book of cristen religioun'. And þis is y-nouȝ for answer to þe xv^je argument.

To þe xv^je argument answer may be maad liȝtli, þat oure kyndenes to god is a spice of largenesse, which is þe vi^e 20 poynt of þe i^e table; and oure kyndenesse to oure neiȝboris is a spice of largenesse, which is þe vii^e poynt of þe ii^e table; and so euer eipir of pese twey kyndenesis is in his general wipinne þe iiij tablis. And siben myn entent is not forto explie þe poyntis in her specialte, but in a competent 25 specialte bitwix ouer greet nombre and ouer litil nombre, þerfore, þouȝ y include þe two now seid kyndenesis in her two now seid generalis, for þat y wolde not haue grettir nombre of poyntis expressid in þe iiij tablis þan xxxj, whiche y holde to be a competent and mesurable nombre, þerfore 30 þis present xv^je argument prouyþ not insuffiçience of my devise.

fforsoþe, if kyndenes were a vertu of precept in lawe of kynde, as y weene þat it is not, but y trowe þat it is a vertu of counseil in þe lawe of kynde and of god, fforwhi ellis y 35 muste trowe þat many mo men ben dampnable þan y hope ben, and also þat many men were dampnable mych more þan þei weene, and mych oftir þan þei weenen, y wole seie þat

¹ Pt. II, chap. ii, p. 114.

² Chap. xviii, pp. 95-6.

oure kyndenesse to god is in þe iij^e poynt of þe ij^e table, which poynt is oure iustnes to god; and oure kyndenesse to oure neiȝboris is in þe ij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table, which poynt is oure riȝtwisnesse to oure neiȝboris.

5 To þe xvij^e argument answer may be þis: þat as if a man comyng into a company of persons sittynge in dyuerse degrees, wole sette him in such place as is accordyng to his merit and his state, wirchliþ þerinne a good to þe company, and forberip to do eny vneese and yuel to þe same company, so a meek
10 man dooþ in his meek beryng wipinforþ bigynnyngli *and*
93^a without | forþ executyueli anentis hise neiȝboris. And pouȝ herwipal it be trewe þat a meek man bi his meeknes dooþ good to him silf, it is not aȝens þe entent for which y, haue deuysid þese iiij tablis. heerbi may be seen wel y-nouȝ þat
15 a man bi myldenes and bi treuþ and bi accordyngnes willip wipinforþ good to him to whom he is mylde or trewe or accordyng, siþen who euer willip to an opir persoon what is conuenyent to him, willip to him his good, and who euer willip to an opir persoon his good, in þat loueþ him; and so
20 eche of þe seid inward vertues, of which spekip þe xvij^e argument, in þe wil is loue. þis mych to a good witt which kanne go ferþir is y-nouȝ for answer to þe xvij^e argument, as semeþ to me here and now.

To þe xix^e argument y answeere, grauntyng what is con-
25 cludid bi it, þat þe iiij tablis ben not vttrli *and* seuerali essenciali departid *and* distinctid, for þe i^e table is not so distinctid and departid fro þe ij^e, iij^e, and þe iiij^e, how euer it be herof þat þe iij last tablis ben essenciali disseuerid, distinctid and departid a twyn, which at þis tyme and for
30 my principal purpose nedip not forto be here determyned or tauȝt.

To þe xx^e argument it is to be seid þat þe ij^e premysse is vntrewe. And to it which is arguyd for proof of pilk ij^e premysse, it is to be seid þat oure willyng of fleischli
35 necessari goodis to oure neiȝbor, and oure willyng of necessari riȝt vsis of þo goodis in oure neiȝboris, and oure willyng of necessari riȝt vsis of yuelis bi her pacience and bi her douȝtinesse in oure neiȝboris, ȝhe, and oure willyngis þat oure neiȝboris haue alle maners of necessari moral *and* of

18. Meekness, Accordyness, Truth and Benignity right-ly belong to the Fourth Table, because they may be inward deeds of good willing or love towards our neighbour. Similarly Meekness, Truth and Benignity rightly belong also to the Second Table, because they may be inward deeds of good willing or love towards God.

19. It is true that the Four Tables are not essentially divided. They are drawn up for the sake of convenience.

20. The Fourth Table comprises living towards our neighbour *fleischely, paciently and douȝtily* under the Third Point, i.e. living towards him *riȝt-wisly*; and comprises willings of other goods not therein

included,
under the
Eighth Point,
i. e. living
towards him
largely.

Righteousness,
Fleshlihood,
Worldlihood,
Cleanness and
Honesty are put
out in full in the
Third Table, and
reduced under
the general
heading
'Righteousness'
in the Fourth
Table, merely
for the sake of
convenience.

intellectual vertues to be gete bi natural power, ben spicis of þe iij^e poynt in þe iiij^e table, which poynt is riȝtfulnes to oure neiȝbor. And alle oure opire willyngis of lijk goodis to oure neiȝboris, beyng not necessari to hem forto kepe hem fro deedli syn, ben in þe viij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table as spicis in 5 her general, which viij^e poynt is clepid 'largenesse'. And þefore þese willyngis now here spokun ben þere in þe iiij^e table in þe poyntis of riȝ[t]wisnes¹ and of largenes as in her generalis. and so ceeciþ þe strengþ of þis xx^e argument.

If eny man þanne wole conclude and reduce þat þilk oon 10 poynt of þe iiij^e table, which is riȝtwisnes to oure neiȝbor, includiþ in him as many spicis of oure vertues to oure neiȝboris, how many ben þe ij^e, iij^e, iiij^e and v^e vertues or poyntis in þe iij^e table to vs silfward, whiche ben iiij clepid þus, 'fleischlihod', 'worldlihod', 'cleennesse' and 'honeste', 15 y wole wel graunte þat it is so. þanne if þilk man wole aske whi y explie not and putte not forþ in pleyn þe specialis of riȝtwisnes in þe iiij^e table into iiij suche spicis 93þ like to þe opire now seid spicis in þe iij^e table, I answere and seie þat cause is for y wolde not þat þe iij^e table schulde 20 haue ouer fewe spicis explied, neiþir þat þe iiij^e table schulde haue ouer many spicis explied, so þat þe hool nombre of poyntis explied in þe iiij tablis schulden not be fewer þan xxx, neiþir schulden be mo þan xxxj, which nombre y holde to be in a good meene bitwix extremytes ȝeuyng damage to 25 oure scole and to þe report of goddis moral lawis. And þis is y-nouȝ here for answer to þe xx^e argument.

If eny man schal kunne answere bettir to þese argumentis, 1 or to eny opire maad, or whiche schal be maad, aȝens my doctrine, y wole preie him forto so helpe myn entent. And 30 if eny man schal kunne correcte and amende or fille my doctrine, y schal preye him of þilk help, and þanke him for it.

If it be askid wheþir þe willyng in which a man williþ to his neiȝbor kunnyngal vertues and moral vertues be in þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table, which poynt is goostlihod or 35 goostli loue of a man to his neiȝbor, or in þe iij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table, which is riȝtfulnes of a man to his neiȝbor, in whos oon spiȝe a man williþ and dooþ worldli goodis to his

¹ MS. riȝtwisnes.

The willing to
one's neighbour
of kunnyngal
(knowyngal)
and moral
vertues is
included under
Righteousness,
the Third Point
of the Fourth
Table.

once again -
open up to correction
discrepancy

neizbor, it is to be answerid þat it is in þe seid iij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table. fforwhi if þe willyng in which a man willip kunnyngal vertu and moral vertu to him silf be not in þe first poynt of þe iij^e table, but be in þe iij^e poynt of þe iij^e table, and þat bi cause þat a man is a causer and a maker of kunnyngal vertu and of moral vertu into him silf, þouȝ he be not al þe causer and maker þerof into him silf, and so moral vertu is a worldli good and not so a goostli good, as ben þe goodis whervpon rennen þe first poynt of þe iij^e table and þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table; certis, bi lik skile, siþen he is in lik maner a causer and maker in parti of kunnyngal vertu and of moral vertu in his neizbor, þouȝ not so mych a causer as into him silf, þe willyng answeyng þerto is to be sett in þe poynt of riȝtwisnes in þe iiij^e table, and not in þe first poynt of þe iiij^e table.

And al þis is trewe what is seid, þat a mannys willyng and getyng of moral vertues to him silf is in þe iij^e poynt of þe iij^e table, but if þei be excellent hard to be getun and had, for þanne þe willyng and getyng of hem to a man him silf is in þe viij^e poynt of þe iij^e table, which poynt is douȝtines.

The willing of moral virtues to oneself is included under Worldlihood, the Third Point of the Third Table, or under Doughtiness, the Seventh Point of the Third Table.

vij^e chapitre.

[T]O þin xxj^e argument answer may be þis: þat þe moral vertu of fiȝtyng which þilk knyȝt of whom spekip þe caas of þyn argument wirchip, may be considerid in ij maners; in oon maner as a deede | which aftir doom of resoun þe knyȝt wirchip anentis hise neizboris immediatli, and so þilk deede, wheþir he be circumstancionatid with excellent difficulte or with mych lasse difficulte, is in þe iiij^e table and in þe iij^e poynt of þe iiij^e table, bi as mych as he in þilk vertu is about¹ forto do to hem and brynge into hem what is her good. In an oþir maner þilk fiȝtyng may be considerid as he hap þilk notable circumstaunce which is an excellent hardnes and difficulte, ȝhe, paraventure, which hap in him perel of deep, and as in þilk skile and consideracioun for as mych as þilk difficulte or þilk drede of so greet peyn or of deep is in þe

21. (a) Doughtiness, in so far as it is done with difficulty towards our neighbour immediately for his good, is included under Righteousness, the Third Point of the Fourth Table.

(b) Doughtiness, in so far as it is done with difficulty, under peril of pain or death, for the good of the doer, and does not affect his neighbour, is

¹ MS. *a bout*.

rightly included
in the Third
Table, a special
Point being
given to it for
the sake of
convenience.

doer, and is not wipout him in þe neiȝboris, and also for as mych as þe doer willip and bryngip forþ þilk circumstaunce into him silf, and not into his neiȝboris, and so in þat he willip and doip to him silf a notable good, þanne with þilk circumstaunce in þese consideracions, þis fiztyng biholdip so 5 notabli þe doer him silf and not his neiȝboris. And þerfore, in þilk consideracioun and skile, to þis same fiztyng may be ordeynynd and sett a place accordyng wel to þe ii^e table; Namlich forto fulfille þe entent for which y deuysid such a departyng of þo tablis, and made such a nombryng of her 10 poyntis, which entent was þis: þat bi so mych moral vertues of goddis lawe and of lawe of kynde schulde be þe clerer seen and knowen, and þe esilier remembrid and reportid, þat þei were in so many poyntis nombrid, and þat alle þo vertues which hadde excellent hardnes myȝten þe oftir falle into 15 mynde in general or special, bi how mych þei were gadrid togidere into oon place or poynt, or þat oon place or poynt were namyd and assignyd to receyue hem, þouȝ þo same vertues weren in opire poyntis bi and aftir opire skilis neuer þe lattir. If a man aske ferþir whi y wolde assigne such a 20 special poynt for hard moral vertues, and wherþir nede droue me þerto or volunte, y auswere þat no need which y sawe made me forto so dispose þilk vi^e poynt fro opire poyntis. Neuerþeles it plesip not me so to do wipout a congruence movyng me þerto, which is þe clerer explyyng and þe opener 25 declaryng of moral vertues, and þe liztlier conceyuyng and þe esier reportyng in mynde of hem whiche schulen leerne moral vertues. And so herbi a man may take þat paraenture þe poyntis of þe ii^e table ben not distinctid and seuerali departid ech from ech opir essenciali, but sum ben atwix 30 departid paraenture accidental.

Doughtiness is
only another
name for
Strength.

If eny opir philosophir name douȝtinesse or 'strengþ' or sum opir moral vertu which y not so name, it byndip not me, whilis my namyng or name ȝeuyng is not agens resoun: neiþir is cause | of greet harm. And ferþirmore, how euer 94^b it be þat y discorde in namyng from opire notable treters of þe moral vertu of strengþ, y discorde not in þe resoun and in þe filosofie and in þe þing which þei holden, and þat is y-nouȝ to me.

Also þis is to be take for trewe: þat in many caacis
 vertues excellentli hard fallen vndir precept of god and of
 resoun, as fallen vertues not excellentli hard; 3he, and in
 many caacis vertues so hard þat her werkis leden not onli
 5 into perel of deep, but certeynli *and* sureli into deep, fallen
 vndir precept and comaundement of god and of feiþ, as list
 is to ech witti man to se bi what crist seiþ, [Matt. xvj]¹
 ‘what chaunge schal a man 3eue for his soul?’ A mannys
 natural lijf is not so mych worþ as his graciose *and* gloriose
 10 lijf, and perfore þe losse of graciose and of gloriose lijf is
 worse and more to be avoidid þan losse of his natural lijf.
 Wherefore, if caace falle and suche circumstauncis come þat
 a man muste lese his natural lijf, or ellis synne bi forsakyng
 god or bi doyng aȝens þe precept of god or of resoun, and
 15 þerbi leese his graciose and gloriose lijf, he owiþ bi precept
 and comaundement forto do wherbi he schal die and lese his
 bodili natural lijf. And perfore it is not to be felid þat al
 douȝtines, or þat al excellentli hard moral vertu, falliþ oonli
 vndir counseil.

20 ffor clerer vndirstondyng of what is seid here, þis distinc-
 cioun wolde be considerid, þat þer ben iiij dyuerse willyngis
 morali vertuoseli good.

oon is bi which y wille a passioun, as loue or drede or
 angir or sorow *and* suche opire, to be had into a good purpos
 25 þe bettir to be doon, *and* þis willyng falliþ vpon þe passioun
 as vpon his mater, which is a worldli good. And perfore, yf
 y wille þis passioun to my silf, þilk willyng is in þe iije table,
 and in his iije poynt if þilk willyng be so circumstancionatid
 þat it be a precept; and ellis he is in þe last poynt of þe
 30 same iije table. *and* if y wille þilk passioun to be in my
 neizbor, þilk willyng is in þe iiije table, and in þerof þe iije
 point if þilk willyng be so circumstancionatid þat he be a
 precept; and ellis he is in þe last poynt of þe iiije table.
 And þe seid passioun vpon which rennep þe seid willyng as
 35 vpon his mater is perfore materiali in þe same poynt in
 which is þe willyng formali and propirli.

An opir vertuose willyng is forto wille an intellectual or
 a knowyngal vertu to be had of me or of my neizbor. And

Doughtiness
 may be a precept
 or command-
 ment of God, as
 well as a counsel.

There are four
 different kinds
 of moral virtu-
 ous Willing:

(1) Of a Passion,
 either to oneself
 or to one's
 neighbour.

Which Willing
 is arranged
 under the Four
 Tables according
 as it is, or is not,
 a precept.

(2) Of a *kun-
 nyngal* (*know-
 yngal*) virtue

¹ v. 26. Space left in MS. for reference.

either to oneself or to one's neighbour, which Willing is similarly arranged under the Four Tables.

(3) Of a moral virtue either to oneself or to one's neighbour, which Willing is similarly arranged under the Four Tables.

(4) Of goods other than Passions, *knowyngal* (knowyngal) virtues, or moral virtues. This Willing is arranged under the Four Tables according as the goods are ghostly, fleshly, or worldly, and according as they are willed to God, to oneself, or to one's neighbour.

The deeds executing a willing and the deeds being means into a willing are in the same Point of the same Table as the willing.

even in lijk maner as it is now bifore seid of þe willyng and of þe willid passioun, so it is here to be seid of þis willing and of þe willid intellectual vertu.

þe iije vertuose willing is forto wille eny moral vertu to be had, and þanne pilk moral vertu, in what euer table he | be, ⁹⁵ and which euer he be, is þe mater vpon which goiþ and falliþ þis same now seid willyng. And, siþen ech moral vertu is a worldli good in reward of grace and of glorie, if y wille pilk moral vertu to my silf, pilk willyng is in þe iije table, in þe iije poynt, so þat pilk willyng be so circumstancionatid ¹⁰ þat it be a precept; and ellis he is in þe last poynt of þe iije table. And azenward, if y wille pilk moral vertu to my neiþbor, pilk willyng is in þe iiije table, and in þerof þe iije poynt, so þat pilk willyng be so circumstancionatid þat it be a precept; and ellis he is in þe last poynt of þe same iiije ¹⁵ table.

þe iiije vertuose willyng is forto wille a good not beyng passioun or intellectual vertu or eny moral vertu in it silf, but opir good or goodis goostli, fleischli, worldli, or her vse, for þat resoun seiþ or iugiþ it to be doon, and vndir þe ²⁰ circumstauncis vndir whiche resoun demep it to be doon. þe mater of þis willyng is þe good whervpon rennyþ pilk willyng; And þerfore, aftir þat pilk willyng is to god or to a man him silf or to his neiþbor, and aftir þat pilk good is goostli good or fleischli good or worldli good or vse of such ²⁵ good, so is pilk willyng in þe ije, iije, or iiije table, and in þis poynt or pilk poynt, as is esi to be seen of him which is leernyd in 'þe donet' and in þis present book and in 'þe prouoker'.

Also in what table and in what poynt of þe table þis ³⁰ willyng is, in þe same table and in þe same poynt is or ben þe deede or deedis executyng þis willyng, and with whiche deedis of execucioun þis willyng or wilyngis rennen bi and bi ioyntli; þforwhi so mych lijk moral goodnes is bitwixe þe moralte of þe seid willyng and þe moralte of þe deede ³⁵ comaundid bi þe same willyng to be and executyng þe same willyng, þat it is wonyd be seid oon and þe same moralte or moral goodnes to be of hem. and þerfore resoun wole þat in þis and for þis þat þei ben morali goode and

moral vertues, þei be in oon and þe same table, *and* in oon
 and þe same poynt of þe table. And ferpirmore, not oonli
 þis willyng and þe deede comaundid forto execute it ben in
 oon and in þe same poynt of moralte, but also þe willyngis
 5 and þe deedis executyng hem whiche ben meenys into þe
 opir now next bifore seid willyng and his deedis, ben also in
 þe same table and in þe same poynt in which is þe opir seid
 willyng into whiche þese ben take as meenys, namlich in
 þat and for þat þat þei ben so and suche meenys. And
 10 cause þat it be so is for þe willyngis and opire deedis takun
 as meenys into þe opir seid principal willyng and his deedis,
 in þat and for þat þat þei ben suche meenes, han her moral |
 95^b vertuose goodnes of pilk principal willyng and his deedis,
 and hap al lijk mych, or parti lijk mych, as hap þe seid
 15 principal willyng. and þerfore þese þre, þat is to seie, þe
 principal willyng of which spekiþ þe iiij^e membre of þis
 present distinceioun, and þe deede executyng pilk willyng,
 and þe deede beyng meene and ledyng into þe willyng or
 into þe executyng or into þe boþe, ben as in þat in oon and
 20 þe same table, and in oon and þe same poynt of þe same
 table. þat al it be trew what is seid in þis present distinc-
 cioun and in his iiij membris, may esili be seen of ech man
 wel lernyd in þe first *and* ije parties of 'þe donet', and in þe
 first and ije parties of þis present book.

25 ferpirmore, it is not to be forȝete þat in þis distinceioun,
 and also sumwhere ellis, bi þis name 'willyng' y vndirstonde
 sum tyme þe inward deede of þe wil, and sum tyme þerbi y
 vndirstonde þe disposicioun or habit gendrid in þe wil bi
 occasioun of suche deedis of willyngis oft hauntid bifore in
 30 þe wil. and þis y do for defaute of habundaunce of propr
 names to þingis, and for þat writers in latyn sumtyme in lijk
 maner doon. Also it is not to be forȝete þat oft tymes in
 'þe donet' and in many opire placis, y name and calle þe
 habit 'þe vertu', and ful many sipis þe deede of pilk habit
 35 and lijk deede goyng bifore pilk habit y calle 'a moral
 vertu', and so ben wonyd opire clerkis to calle lijk. Also it
 is not to be forȝete þat bi þis name 'poynt' y vndirstonde
 sum tyme þe place ymaginyd wheryn is ymagynyd a moral
 vertu to be, and sumtyme þerbi y vndirstonde al þe vertuose

The term 'will-
 ing' signifies
 sometimes the
 inward deed of
 the Will, some-
 times the habit
 engendered in
 the Will by such
 an inward deed.

The term 'moral
 virtue' signifies
 sometimes this
 habit of the
 Will, sometimes
 the deed
 engendering
 this habit, some-
 times the deed
 engendered by
 this habit.
 The term
 'Point' signifies
 sometimes the
 place of a virtue

in the Four Tables, sometimes the whole virtue in this place, sometimes one kind of the virtue, sometimes the manner of the virtue.

The willing to have the willing to reap our neighbour's corn is the third kind of willing, because it is the willing to have a moral virtue. The willing to reap our neighbour's corn is the fourth kind of willing, because the reaping is neither a Passion, nor a *kun-nyngal* (knownynghal) virtue, nor a moral virtue.

ping which ocupiep pilk place, and sum tyme perbi y vndirstonde a spice of þe vertu stondyng in pilk place, and sumtyme perbi y vndirstonde þe maner or þe meene of þe moral vertu stondyng in þe seid place; for eche of þese may be callid in oon maner or opir maner 'moral vertu', and þerfore eche of þese may be callid in oon maner or opir a 'poynt' of a moral table.

Ensampl for þe more cleeryng of þe iije and iiije membris in þis present distinecioun may be þis: If y haue leernyd þat þe habit or disposicioun in þe wil forto wille repe my poor neizboris corn is a moral vertu of almes, and þerfore if y wille to my silf forto haue pilk vertu, þis willyng is in þe iije membir of þis present distinecioun, and þat wher þis willyng be an habit or a deede in þe wil. but þe opir now seid habit or willyng so willid to be had, is þe willyng spokun in þe iiije membir of þis present distinecioun, so þat þe former of þese ij willingis is willing to haue þe ije willing, þat is to seie, is a willing to haue a willing to repe, and þe ije willing | is þe willing to repe. and þanne þis willyng to repe and þe outward repyng which is execucioun of þis willyng, and þe meenes þerto, as ben þe whettyng of þe hook or makyng or borowyng of þe hook, 3he, and etyng and drynkyng as helping into þe repyng, ben al togidere as in þat and for þat in oon and þe same table, and in oon and þe same poynt of þe table.

25

viiije chapitre.

Correspondences and differences between the Second, Third and Fourth Tables.

(1) The difference between Obedience, the Second Point of the Second Table, and Attendance, the Second Point of the Fourth Table.

[H]Ere it is worpi to be take heed þat þe poyntis of þe ije table reulyng vs anentis god immediatli, and þe poyntis of þe iiije table reulyng vs anentis oure neizboris immediatli, answeren and accorden togidere in mych lijknes; not wijp- stondyng þat þe ije poynt in þe ije table, which is obedience to god, is somewhat vnlijk to þe ije poynt in þe iiije table, which is attendaunce togidere bitwix ouerers and neperers; and þat for as mych, þou3 we ben bounde forto attende to god, he is not bounde forto attende to vs, as among men þe ouerers ben bounde forto attende to þe neperers, and þe

30

35

neperers ben bounde forto attende to þe ouerers; not wip-
 stondyng also þat to þe [v^e]¹ poynt in þe iiij^e table, which is
 accordaunce, is noon poynt answeyng in þe ij^e table, and
 þat for as mych as men ben not bounde bi lawis maad among
 5 hem and of men but if þo men whiche schulde be bounde bi
 þo lawis wille and consente into þe makyng of þo lawis, and
 þat immediatli and expresseli, or into þe sufficient antecedent
 perto, and þat bi hem silf or bi her sufficient procutoures or
 attorneyes; but bitwix vs and god it is so þat oure wil and
 10 consent is not requirid forto renne with goddis wil and con-
 sent þat god make a lawe to bynde vs, and ech of his profit
 and fulwelpesyng willyng of eny deede bi vs to be doon is a
 lawe to vs byndyng vs. And þerfore þe ij^e poynt of þe ij^e
 table, which is obedience, fu[ll]² in þilk table þe stide in
 15 which þe [v^e]¹ poynt stondip in þe iiij^e table, which [v^e]¹
 poynt is accordaunce.

(2) Obedience,
 the Second
 Point of the
 Second Table,
 takes the place
 of Accordance,
 the Fifth¹ Point
 of the Fourth
 Table.

þerþirmore, it is worpi to be take hede þat neipir to þo
 poyntis in þe ij^e table and in þe iiij^e table whiche beren in
 hem ouerte and neþerte, as þe ij^e poynt in þe ij^e table, which
 20 is obedience, and þe ij^e poynt in þe iiij^e table, which is
 attendaunce, neipir to þo poyntis in þe ij^e table and in þe
 iiij^e table whiche beren in hem compeynabilte, as ben
 meeknes, treup, accordaunce and benygnyte, answeren noo
 poyntis in þe iiij^e table bi lijknes; and þat for as mych as
 25 man hap not ouerte neipir neþirte anentis him silf, neipir
 a man hap companye with him silf, for þanne a man were
 dyuers fro him silf, and oon man were two men, siben ouerte
 is not but bitwix tweyne at fewist, and company is not but
 bitwix tweyne at fewist.

(3) There are no
 Points in the
 Third Table
 corresponding
 to Obedience,
 the Second
 Point of the
 Second Table,
 to Attendance,
 the Second
 Point of the
 Fourth Table, or
 to Meekness,
 Truth, Accord-
 ance and
 Benignity.

96^b Neuerþeles | to þe first poynt of þe ij^e table and to þe first
 poynt of þe iiij^e table, whiche ben goostli loues, answerip in
 good liknes þe first poynt in þe iiij^e table, which also is
 goostli loue, as it is open y-nou3 to se þat þei so answeren
 wel togidere.

(4) Ghostly Love
 corresponds in
 the Second,
 Third and
 Fourth Tables.

35 But ferþir it is to be wel notid and markid þat to þe iiij^e
 poynt in þe ij^e table, which is iustnes, and to þe iiij^e poynt
 in þe iiij^e table, which also is iustnes or ri3tfulnes, pese v
 poyntis in þe iiij^e table, whiche ben fleischlihode, worldlihod,

(5) There is no
 Point in the
 Third Table
 corresponding
 to Righteous-
 ness or Justice,
 the Third Point

¹ MS. v^e. ² MS. fu^{ll}illip.

of the Second
and Fourth
Tables.

clennes, honeste and pacience, answeren not. for pese v ben not spicis of iustnes or of riȝtwisnes of a man anentis him silf immediatli, and perfore noon of pilke v poyntis is a iustnes and a riȝtwisnes of a man to him silf immediatli, as may be seen ful wel where pilke v poyntis ben descryuyd 5 and tauȝt, what eche of hem is in him silf, and which is his werk. fforwhi if ouerte or neperete or compenyng were of a man anentis him silf, he were panne two men, which may not be; euen so, if riȝt or iustnes were of a man into him silf or anentis him silf, folewith pat pilk man schulde be 10 perfore two men, for as mych as iustnes askip nedis to be bitwix oon persoon and him which is dyuerse and opir pan he is, and so be ouerer or neperer or euen felaw, riȝt as attendaunce and obedience asken to be bitwix oon persoon and an opir, as beyng ouerer or neperer oonli; pouȝ þis not 15 folewith if loue or charite be of a man to him or anentis him silf, pat perfore pilk man is two men. And pat of a man to him silf immediatli is loue and charite, is open bi what crist seiȝ, pat we schulden loue oure neiȝboris as we louen oure silf.¹ perfore þo poyntis whiche beren in hem silf loue and 20 charite mowe be in þe iij^e table, but þo poyntis whiche beren in hem² ouerte and neperete or compenyng mowe not be in þe iij^e table.

For a man can
have Love or
Charity towards
himself.

But a man
cannot be just or
unjust to him-
self.

There can be no
wrong done
unless the
sufferer dissents
from the doer,
and as a man
cannot be at once
sufferor and
doer, he cannot
be unjust to
himself.

Also into þis purpos þus: If eny moral vertu bi which a man doip good to him silf immediatli bi riȝtwisnes into 25 him silf, þe contrari vice bi which a man doip yuel to him silf immediatli is wrong and vniustnes to him silf, and þerin a man is wrongful and vniust to him silf; but so it is þat a man may not be wrongful and vniust to him silf; wherfore a man may not be iust to him silf. þe ij^e premysse of þis 30 argument, which is þat a man may not be iniust and wrongful to him silf, may be prouyd þus: Wrong and vniustnes is neuer doon but whanne þe sufferer dissentip to þe doer; and whanne euer þe sufferer consentip to þe doers deede, þe doer wrongip not þe sufferer. but so it is þat anentis a deede 35 which a man doop to him silf | willyngli, he dissentip not 97^a aȝens him silf and aȝens þe willyng of him silf, but he at ful consentip, for panne pilk oon man were two men, of whiche

¹ Matt. xix. 19; xxii. 39.

² After *hem*, MS. has *silf*, crossed through in red.

two men þe oon is contrari to þe opir of hem, which may not be. Also it is a reul in moral filosofie þat to a consenter and a willer is no wrong doon, as in þat to which he consentip. Wherefore folewith needis þat no man wrongip to
 5 him silf, or may wronge and do uniustli or vnriȝtfulli to him silf. And so, if þis be trewe, folewith þat no man may do riȝtfulli or iustli to him silf.

Likewise he cannot be just to himself.

Also þus: forto do wrong wityngli and willyngli is alwey greet syn and vice. forto suffre wrong wityngli and willyngli
 10 is not alwey syn, but it is neuer so greet syn as is þe doying of pilk wrong. Wherefore folewith, if a man wityngli and willyngli doip wrong to him silf, pilk deede is syn and is no syn, or at þe leest pilk deede is more syn and lasse syn, and so he is more þan him silf, of whiche boþe euereipir is
 15 inconuenient. Wherefore vntrew is it out of which eny of þese two inconuenientis folewith.

Also to do wrong is a greater sin than to suffer wrong; so if the doer and the sufferer are one and the same, this would necessitate a contradiction.

ffor cleer vnderstanding to be had vpon þis reul in moral filosofie, þat to a willer and consenter is no wrong doon, þou schalt take hede to what y schal now seie. It is to be
 20 considerid whepir þe willer and consenter willip and consentip bi his ful fredom, not dym[ynu]sshid¹ or lassid, bi þis, þat he chesip þe lasse yuel forto scape þe grettir yuel þretenyd, or chesip þe lasse good þat he not lese þo boþe goodis þretenyd ellis to be lost, or þat he chesip þis ping bi
 25 ignoraunce, which he wolde not wille and chese if ne were þe same ignoraunce; Or ellis he willip and consentip not bi ful fredom, but bi fredom dymynusshid or lassid in eny of þese now seid caacis. If þe willer and consenter stonde in þe first membir of þis now maad distinceioun or particioun,
 30 noon wrong or vniustnes is doon to him as for him silf in deede doon to him into which he so consenterip; þouȝ, certis, wrong and vnriȝt may be doon to an opir persoun to whom he is seruauant. And aȝenward, If þe willer and consenter stonde in þe iȝe membir or parti of þe now maad distinceioun
 35 or particioun, wrong and vnriȝt may be doon to him in a deede, þouȝ he in pilk iȝe maner perto consente; for his consent is not parfijt and ful fre, but lassid and dymynusshid bi ignoraunce, or bi þe opir now seid caas and circumstance bi which it may be seid in sum maner of speche þat he is

If a man wills and consents to suffer a lesser evil to escape a greater, &c., when his freedom is not diminished, no wrong is done to him, though a wrong may be done to his master. If his freedom is diminished, a wrong is done to himself.

¹ MS. dymunysshid.

constreynyd, as is bifore seid in þe i^e parti of þis present book, in þe [xxij^e]¹ chapitre, and in opire chapitris pere folewyng.

It does not matter if some hold that a man can do justly to himself, and that therefore the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Points of the Third Table are Points of Righteousness. For the Points are still the same and their work is still the same, whichever way they are named.

Pecock's naming seems to him the best.

Though sometimes he speaks according to one idea of Righteousness or Justice, sometimes

If it schal plese to men forto seie and holde | opir wise of 97^b
 ríztwísnés and of vnríztwísnés þan y haue now seid, and þat 5
 a man may do iustli or iniustli anentis him silf, and þerfore
 þat þe i^e, ii^e, iii^e and v^e poyntis of þe ii^e table ben poyntis
 of ríztwísnés; and also wole accordyngli perto seie and holde
 þat no man may do wrong to him silf, but what euer eny man
 doop to him silf he doip ríztfulli, as in þat þat he so doip 10
 as to him silf, not biholdyng into þis þat he is seruau^t of an
 opir persoon, þat is to seie, of an opir man or of god; And
 þat þis is not trew, ech ríztwísnés may haue an vnríztwísnés
 contrari to him, ffor þilk proposicioun or reul takip instaunce
 and excepcioun whanne oon and þe same is þe wil of þe doer 15
 and of þe receyuer; And þat for lijk skile, þe fadir in
 godhed doip rízt to þe sone and to þe holi goost, and to þis
 ríztwísnés may noon vnrízt be doon contrari—it schal not
 mych displese me; namlich for it schal not lette but þat in
 ech table suche and so many poyntis be as y haue hem sett, 20
 and þat þe werkis seid to be her werkis ben her werkis, how
 euer þei ou^{er}ten be namyd, and wheþir euer y name hem in
 best maner, or no. ffor, soþeli, y may requyre ech reder þat
 he fauore me anentis þe namyng of þo poyntis, siþen to many
 of hem y kanne not fynde redi bifore had propir names to 25
 hem. and þerfore, in such caas as opire clerkis doon, in
 lijk caas y muste needis or feyne and make newe namys (and
 þanne wolden men wondre) or y muste take þe propir name
 of sum opir þing mych lijk to þe þing which in my tretim^g
 lackip propir name, and sette þilk name to þis þing, and 30
 fauore þe callyng of þis þing bi þilk name, and þat for nede.
 And if eny man wole take his ground to argue azens my
 doctryne bi occasioun of such a namyng, as y may trowe
 þat summe wolen, it may be seid þat þei ful ruydli,
 vncurteisli and chorleli beren hem in so inpugnyng. And 35
 also, if in sum place among myne so many writyngis, y
 entende speke aftir oon of þese ij rehercid opynyons, and in
 an opir place aftir þe opir of þese ij opynyons, y wolde not

¹ MS. xxje.

pat y were holde perfore and as perin to be contrari to my silf. Seynt thomas of aquyn, þe greet doctour, if þis schulde be seid contrariete, were contrari to him silf in mo placis þan a doseyn among hise writyngis, as y haue þo placis redili

5 reportid and putt into writyng.

ffor þe bettir knowyng of þe answer to be maad in special vpon þe iij parties of þe xxij^e principal hool argument, it is to be vnderstonde þat þouȝ oonli an habit in þe wil or disposicioun in þe wil toward þe habit be a 'moral vertu',

98^a as apperip wel bi Aris|totil in hise 'etikis',¹ and bi þe diffinicioun of 'vertu' general to 'moral vertu' and to 'natural vertu' ȝoun bi þe philesafir and bi grete clerkis, and bi what is sumwhat schynyng in þe book callid 'þe donet' into þis present book, so þat neipir þe inward neipir

15 þe outward deedis goyng bifore þe gendryng of þe seid habit or disposicioun as gendreris or occasioners of hem, neipir þe inward or outward deedis folewyng hem into whom þei enclynen, ben to be seid propirli 'moral vertues' or ellis 'vertues' generali, ȝit þei mowe propirli y-nouȝ be callid

20 'deedis of moral vertu'; bi cause in þe oon maner or opir now seid þei longen and perteynen to moral vertues, siþen þe genetijf case may be in ful many dyuerse maners gouernyd of þe nominatijf case, among whiche maners oon is ex vi cuiusdam pertinencie. And perfore þe same deedis mowe

25 propirli y-nouȝ be callid 'moral vertuose deedis', þouȝ þei mowe not be callid propirli 'moral vertues'; and þat for þe cause now bifore seid, þat neipir þe diffinicioun of 'moral vertu' neipir þe diffinicioun of 'general vertu' is verified of hem and in hem.

30 Also, siþen moral goodnes is an accordaunce to þe riȝt doom of resoun or of feip, þilke deedis mowe in ful propir maner be callid 'moral good', and perfore 'moral goode deedis', for þat þei han þe now seid accordaunce. but, certis, þei mow not be propirli callid 'moral vertues' neipir 'moral

35 vertues', for þat þei ben not habitis in þe wil or disposicions in þe wil growyng to be suche habitis, to whom accordip þe diffinicioun or þe discryuyng of 'moral vertu' or of 'vertu' general, in which is includid þat vertu is a þing vttrist.

according to the other.

22. *First Truth.* The term 'moral virtue' is restricted to a habit or disposition of the Will, and cannot be applied to inward or outward deeds of the Will engendering or following this habit. But the term 'moral virtuous deed' applies to such inward and outward deeds engendering this habit and following this habit.

Second Truth. These deeds may also be termed 'morally good deeds', but not 'moral virtues'.

¹ II. vi. See Notes.

Deductions from these Truths:—

(1) Outward deeds engendering Charity and following Charity may be termed 'charitative deeds', but not 'Charity'.

(2) Inward deeds engendering Charity and following Charity may be termed 'Charity' or 'actual Charity'.

Also inward deeds engendering Righteousness and following Righteousness may be termed 'Righteousness' or 'actual Righteousness'. But these inward deeds may not be termed 'virtues' or 'actual virtues'.

And in lijk maner, þouȝ outward deedis goyng bifore loue or charite in þe wil, as in wey of gendryng or occasionyng or helpyng into þe seid loue or charite in þe wil, and þouȝ þe outward deedis folewyng þe same loue or charite, as in wey of executyng pilk same loue or charite, mowe propirli y-nouȝ 5 be callid 'charitative deedis' for þat þei ben deedis of charite, þat is to seie, longyng and perteynyng to charite in oon of þe ij now seid maners, ȝit þo same outward deedis ouȝten not be callid propirli 'charite' or 'charitees', and þat for as mych as þei ben not propirli loue, beyng an inward deed 10 subiectid or restyng in þe wil, but þe[i]¹ ben outward deedis subiectid or restyng in þe outward membris, as y declare opener in þe ij^e parti of 'þe donet', þe xiiij^e chapitre.

Neuerþeles, þe inward deedis goyng in toward þe gendryng of habitual loue or charite in þe wil, and þe inward deedis 15 into which þe seid habitual loue or charite enclyneþ, ben propirli 'actual loues' and 'charitees', and þerfore ben propirli 'loues' | and 'charitees'. Also, þouȝ þe inward deedis goyng 98^b bifore þe habit of riȝtwisnes and þe inward deedis folewyng þe same habit, ben callid propirli 'riȝtwisnessis', þat is to 20 seie, 'actual riȝtwisnessis', euen as þe habit of hem is callid propirli 'riȝtwisnes', þat is to seie, 'habitual riȝtwisnes', þerof folewith not þat þe seid deedis goyng bifore or goyng aftr ouȝten be callid propir 'vertues', þat is to seie, 'actual 25 vertues', euen as þe habit of hem ouȝte be callid propirli 'vertu', þat is to seie, 'habitual vertu'. And þe cause of dyuersite, and whi it so not folewith, is þis: þat þouȝ a þing be in a gendre or a kynde with an opir þing, ȝit þerof folewith not þat it is þerfore þe hiȝest and vttrist in pilk gendre or kynde for þat þe opir þing is hiȝest and vttrist in 30 pilk gendre or kynde. And þerfore, siþen what is vertu in eny gendre or kynde is strengist, hiȝest, and vttrist in pilk gendre and kynde, herof folewith not þat what euer opir þing is in þe same gendre or kynde is vertu in þe same gendre or kynde, euen as folewith not þerof þat what euer 35 opir þing is in þe same gendre or kynde is hiȝest and strengist and vttrist in þe same gendre or kynde. And so

¹ MS. þe.

bi pis declaracioun is open þat neipir þe i^e neipir þe iij^e
neipir þe iiij^e argument maad in þe [xxij^e]¹ principal
argument concludiþ and proviþ his consequent. and cause
whi noon of hem concludiþ and cause of dyuersite ben open
5 bi þe declaracioun maad here now bifore rennyng.

As to þe ij^e argument conteynynd wipin þe [xxij^e]¹
principal argument, þe ij^e premysse is to be denyed, which
is þis: 'Euery deede which is morali good is to be seid
propirli a "moral vertu".' and bi þilk denyng þe same ij^e
10 argument is lettid fro his provyng and concludyng. And whi
þilk ij^e premysse is to be denyed, is open bi þe declaracioun
now and here bifore rennyng.

(3) It is not true
that every deed
which is morally
good is to be
termed a 'moral
virtue'.

Answer to þe xxij^e bifore goyng principal argument is
forto denye þat heft and liztnes ben knowen and perceuyd
15 of þe outward sensitive touch; fforwhi panne if a man wolde
sette his fyngir to a greet stoon liggyng, he schulde fele and
knowe it perbi to be heuy and heuyer þan an opir stoon or
stok, which is not trewe. And þefore it is to be seid þat
heft is knowen bi discurse in resoun, for as mych as it is
20 knowen bi resoun or bi outward sensitive witt þat it mouep
and presseþ downward. And liztnes is knowen bi doom and
discurse in resoun, for as mych as it is knowen bi resoun or
bi outward sensitive witt þat it is movyng and drawyng
vpward. Wherefore þe seid xxij^e principal argument hap
99^a not his | entent.

23. Heaviness
and lightness
cannot be recog-
nized by the
Touch.

ix^e chapitre.

[N]Ow toward þe eend of þis present book, it is not to be
forȝete þat, þouȝ y haue disposid þe iiij tablis þat þei haue
wipin hem xxxj poyntis, y myȝte haue disposid hem forto
30 haue had xxvij oonli, and ȝit in þo xxvij poyntis or placis
schulden haue stonde alle þe same moral vertues whiche now
ben assignyd to stonde in þese xxxj placis or poyntis; fforwhi
y myȝte haue smyte away² þe last poynt of þe ij^e table and
þe last poynt of þe iiij^e table and þe last poynt of þe iiij^e table,
35 whiche ben poyntis of largessis, siþen þe vertues of þo iiij laste

The thirty-one
Points of the
Four Tables may
be reduced to
twenty-seven or
twenty-six.

(1) *Largenes*, the
last Point of the
Second, Third,
and Fourth
Tables, might
be cut out, since
the virtue of

¹ Space left in MS. for reference.

² MS. *a wey*.

Largenes is included under other Points. Special Points were made of *Largenes* because it is a virtue of counsel, while the others are virtues of precept.

(2) Doughtiness, the Seventh Point of the Third Table, might be cut out. It was included for the sake of special remembrance of the virtue of excellent hardness belonging to certain other virtues.

Doughtiness was placed in the Third Table because its principal circumstance, excellent hardness, is to the doer himself.

(3) Promises made to God or to our neighbour might be included under Righteousness, the Third Point of the Second and Fourth Table, instead of under Truth, the Fifth Point of the Second and Fourth Tables.

poyntis rennen vpon lijk maters to þe maters vpon whiche rennen þe vertues of opire poyntis in þe same ije, iije, and iiije tablis, and ben in þo same opire poyntis with opire spicis of þe ful vertues of þo poyntis, þouȝ þese ben of counseil, and þe opire be of precept. for cause was noon opir þat y gadrid out of þe opire poyntis þilke iij last poyntis, þei beyng not þe emptier, saue þat y wolde for more pleynnes, and for þe sooner to remembre and reporte þe counseilis of god and of resoun, þat þo iij placis schulden be vndirstonde for placis of counseilis. Also y myȝte haue smyte away¹ 10 þe vije poynt of þe iije table, wheryn stondip douȝtinesse, and þat for as mych as alle þe vertues þere assignyd to stonde ben stondyng wel y-nouȝ vndir opir skile and considera- cioun in opire poyntis of þe same iije table. And ȝit motyue was to me forto gadre out from þe opire poyntis of þe iije¹⁵ table, ȝhe, and fro þe poyntis of ech opir table, þei stondyng not þe emptier, for þat y wolde þe liztlier and þe ofter falle into remembrance and into report þat of vertues longyng to þe iije table summe ben excellentli hard in reward of opire beyng in þe same iije table, and in lijk maner of vertues in þe²⁰ opire tablis. fterþermore þanne, whi y wolde place þis hool douȝtines in þe iije table rapir þan in þe ije or iiije table, motyue was to me for þe principal circumstance of douȝtines, which is excellent hardnes, for which þis douȝtines is markid and callid 'douȝtines', is in þe doer, and not wipout þe doer²⁵ in þe neizboris, and is a good which he willip and doop immediatli to him silf, þouȝ he wirche into an opir persoon immediatli; and also herwith þe iije table is in þe myddil bitwix þe ije table and þe iiije table. And þouȝ þis motyue, maad of þese ij consideraciouns, be not necessari cause forto³⁰ so place, ȝit it is sufficient to move me into myn oft seid here entent.

Also y myȝte haue disposid and assignyd þe v^e poynt | of 99^b þe ije table and þe v^e poynt of þe iiije table, whiche conteynen moral vertues of treup to god and to oure neizboris, 35 þat in þo poyntis schulde not haue stonde promyssis maad to god and promyssis maad to oure neizboris, but þat in þo poyntis schulden haue stonde affermyngis and denyngis to god and to oure neizbor, whepir oop hadde be sett to, or no ;

¹ MS. *a wey*.

and þat alle promyssis, wheþir oop or vow were to hem sett, schulden haue be, as þei ben al redi, vndir opir skile and consideracioun in þe ii^e poynt of þe i^e table, and in þe ii^e poynt of þe iii^e table, whiche ben clepid 'iustnessis' or 5 'riȝtwisnessis' to god and to oure neiȝbor, þouȝ for more redi fallyng into remembraunce of reders y haue sett alle promyssis to god or to oure neiȝbor to be also vndir opir skile and consideracioun in þe v^e poynt of þe i^e table and in þe v^e poynt of þe iii^e table.

10 Also y myȝte haue smyte away¹ þe vii^e poynt of þe first table, and haue sett al sacramentyng ordeynyd bi crist in þe newe testament forto haue stonde in þe vi^e poynt of þe same first table with opir sacramentyng and signyfyng maad bi man. And ȝit me þouȝte good forto ordeyne a place bi him 15 silf to conteyne more expresseli þe sacramentyng ordeynyd bi crist, þat þerbi þe sooner, þe oftir, and þe pleyner remembraunce myȝte be had vpon cristis sacramentyng; not withstondyng þat þerwith þe vi^e place or poynt of þe first table may be vndirstonde forto receyue into him alle 20 sacramentyngis ordeynyd bi crist or bi man, or ellis þat þe vi^e place be vndirstonde to conteyne pilk parti of sacramentyng which is maad bi man, and þe vii^e poynt conteyne pilk opir parti of sacramentyng which is maad bi crist, litil fors is it wheþir it be þus or þus felid.

25 Sopeli, þouȝ þis disposicioun of xxxj poyntis be þe more pleyne and eesi, and þerfore þe more fruteful into remembraunce and report, ȝit þe opir disposicioun of xxvij poyntis oonli, or of xxvj poyntis, is paraenture more clerkli and curiose. And how þe long diuisions maad in 'þe prouoker' forto lede 30 into þe xxxj poyntis may be schortid forto serue into þe ledyng of þe xxvij poyntis oonli or of xxvj poyntis, it is eesi to se, what euer kunnyng man rede in þo diuisions; fforwhi opir labour is þer not but forto smyte away¹ þe membris of þo diuisions, whiche membris leden into þe poyntis now rehercid 35 to be smyte away, and lete alle þe opire membris of þo same diuisions stonde stil.

(4) *Sacramenting* ordained by Christ, the Eighth Point of the First Table, might be cut out, and the virtue included under *Dis-worschipping*, the Seventh Point of the First Table.

The division into thirty-one Points is easier; the division into twenty-seven or twenty-six more scholarly.

A man may choose which-ever method of division he pleases. Peacock

Now, siben it is so þat in my writyngis of 'þe donet' and 100 of þis present book and of 'þe prouoker' and of þe ii^e treȝtice in þe first parti of 'cristen religioun', y haue maad my

¹ MS. *a wey*.

uses sometimes
one, and some-
times the other,
and is not to be
blamed for so
doing.

doctrine forto serue to þe boþe weies or for boþe disposicions
of þe poyntis in þe iiij tablis, so þat to which euer of hem
a man wole take him, he schal fynde þe doctrine þerof
answeryng þerto in þe now rehercid writyngis, y wole þat
men chese whiche of þese disposicions schulen to hem plese; 5
for litil fors it is, as anentis þe mater and þe trouþ of
vertuose lyuyng, wheþir þe oon or þe opir be holde, þouȝ as
into more fruteful remembryng and reportyng þe disposicioun
of xxxj poyntis wole serue bettir þan þe disposicioun of xxvij
or of xxvj wole serue, as it semeþ to me. y wole þerfore lete 10
men chese and take þese boþe weies, as forȝeuen to hem of
me, vnder choice. but þanne noon clerk, good or symple,
replie aȝens me þat y am þerin contrari to my silf, as late in
lijk caas greet stroutyng and noysyng in replicacioun hap be
maad aȝens me in opir mater, and þat mych vnclerkli. And 15
þouȝ y speke in sumwher aftir þe oon wey or opynyoun, and
sumwher ellis aftir þe opir wey or opynyoun, lete not me
þerfore be blamyd, for so han do many clerkis bifore me, as y
kanne wel allegge. Also, if y be not alwey and euerywhere
so war and so attendaunt to my wordis þat no colour of 20
inpugnacioun may be maad aȝens þo wordis, as neuer ȝit
clerk, oold or newe, was so war, and also it were not
expedient þat he schulde so mych laboure for wardyng of
his maner of speche, and þerbi þe lasse attendaunce haue to
þe mater which he tretip, lete no man þerof wijte me, neiþir 25
eny man be about so to snacche at me; namlich whilis what
euer þo my wordis ben, what was my meenyng may be
knowe bi circumstauncis of þe processis þere or sumwhere
ellis and opire markis, at ech good clerk indifferent and wel
avisid; but if it schulde þerof falle þat þe writyngis of 30
Ambros, Jerom, Austyn and Gregori, and of also newer
doctouris, whiche ouȝten rapir be susteynyd þan distroied,
schulden for her wordis, so in þilk maner chalengeable, be
dampnyd. And ȝit how my wordis han be þus chalengid,
whanne ech witti, welwilli man to trouþ myȝte knowe þat 35
y opir wise meenyd, writyngis in þe repliers side and
writyngis aȝen in my side, beren-witnes.

Pecock is forced
to defend
himself so fre-

No man wijte me, þouȝ y speke and write so oft for my
defensis. þe malice of summe clerkis (as y heere seie, and

sumwhat haue felid) is so greet azens me þat þis and mych
more is lital y-nouȝ forto azenstonde it, and forto assaie to make
hem leue and ceese from it.¹ I wolde þei took vpon hem forto
fynde and trace out a quarter of so hard a purpos as y do
100^b in myn englich | and in myn latyn writyngis; and þanne it
schulde ful soon be seen þat þei schulde haue need into
supportyng and fauoryng, not oonli anentis her wordis and
maner of spekyng, but also anentis þe sentence which þei
myȝten not denye to be of hem entendid *and* meenyd.

quently because
of the malice of
his enemies.

irrationality
over emotional
reacting

¹ See Notes.

NOTES

1/2. The title 'Donet' is from *donatus* = 'grammar', so called because of the famous Latin grammar of Ælius Donatus, the fourth-century grammarian—*Ars grammatica* or *De octo partibus orationis*, the handbook of every scholar of the Middle Ages.

2/12. Pecoock's Four Tables are discussed at length in the *Donet*, Pt. 1 chaps. iv–ix, pp. 27–67. They are arranged as follows:—

FIRST TABLE: the eight *meenal* moral virtues.

'viij poyntis of meenal vertu: forto gouerne vs leernynghly, preisyngly, dispreisingly, preiyngly, bankingly, worschipingly, disworschipingly and sacramentingly.'

SECOND TABLE: the seven *eendal* moral virtues towards God.

'vij poyntis [of eendal vertu]: forto lyue and gouerne vs anentis god at the next, goostly, obediently, rihtwisly, mekely, treuly, benyngneli and largeli.'

THIRD TABLE: the eight *eendal* moral virtues towards oneself.

'viij poyntis [of eendal vertu]: forto lyue and gouerne vs silf anentis vs silf at the next, goostly, fleischely, worldly, clenly, honestly, paciently, dougtili and largeli.'

FOURTH TABLE: the eight *eendal* moral virtues towards our neighbour.

'viij poyntis [of eendal vertu]: forto lyue and gouerne us anentis oure neiȝboris at the next, goostly, attendauntly, rihtfully, mekely, accordingly, treuly, benyngnely and largeli.' (Donet, p. 24.)

2/20. See *Donet*, Pt. I, chaps. iii–xviii.

The Seven Matters are:—

1. What God is in Himself.
 2. His benefits.
 3. His punishments.
 4. His laws.
 5. Our natural wretchednesses.
 6. Our natural wickednesses.
 7. Remedies against our natural wretchednesses and wickednesses.
- (Donet, p. 27.)

5/36. On mediaeval 'publication' see 'Publication before Printing', by R. K. Root, *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assoc. Amer.*, xxviii, 15 (1913).

8/24. See above, note to 2/20.

11/8. Cf. Pecoock's denial of the infallibility of Aristotle and the doctors, pp. 65–6, 151–2. He appreciates their work, but opposes superstitious veneration of their doctrines.

14/39. Note syntax—the main noun following the noun in the genitive dependent upon it: *for of alle newe bigynners þe feble capacite*. Cf. the similar construction of 15/25–6: *þouȝ it be to of þe former treupis lernyng vnpertynent*. Cf. also the position of the adjectival phrase in 15/5: *eny hard to hem mater*. Such constructions are common in Pecoock.

15/33. Note omission of the pronoun subject: *if to sum persoon . . . schal be ouer hard*.

18/34. In the Notes below, I give some points of likeness between Aristotle and Pecock. These are not intended to be exhaustive, or to imply Pecock's *direct* borrowing, though Pecock was probably acquainted with Latin versions of the works of 'the Philosopher'. Miss Jessie Flemming in her Arnold Prize Essay for 1922, *Reginald Pecock: his place in the history of English Thought* (unpublished), has indicated the closer relationship of Pecock to Thomas Aquinas, to whom Pecock refers in the *Folewer*. (See General Index.) But it is thought that the comparisons with Aristotle as *final* authority may be interesting to those unable to pursue the subject in detail.

With the discussion here of the origin of the soul, cf. Aquinas's view in *Summa Theologica*, Pt. I, Q. xc, Article 4. For Aristotle's doctrine on the soul, cf. *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics . . . a translation from Zeller's 'Philosophy of the Greeks'*, by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead, vol. ii, pp. 4-10, 129-35.¹

21/1-2. Aristotle is commonly called 'the Philosopher' by the schoolmen.

21/27-8. *þat hem silf . . . moven*. A good and rhythmic example of the verb placed last in a subordinate clause.

22/2. Aristotle holds that Touch and Taste are necessary to all animals. 'Taste he considers as a species of Touch, the only difference being that the tongue is its sole conductor.' See *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, vol. ii, pp. 64-7.

23/8. Aristotle holds that only Touch and Taste are indispensable, the lowest animals therefore possessing these alone. See *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, vol. ii, p. 64.

23/12. 'inward *sensitiȝf* wittis.' These are the 'inward *bodili* wittis' of the *Donet*. I have kept the terminology of the *Donet* for the sake of consistency, but Pecock's change of expression is noteworthy.

24/10-11. *god and kynde . . . failiþ*. Here we may have either a rare -i plural, or two closely allied subjects considered as forming a singular, and so taking a verb in the singular.

24/15-16. *it is ful accordyng, necessari and profitable þat . . . knowe*. Contrast this subjunctive after the impersonal construction with the infinitives of 25/20-2—*for to holde and kepe*.

25/3. Aristotle's 'Common Sensibles' are Time (omitted by Pecock), Motion, Rest, Size, Unity or Multiplicity (Pecock's Number) and Form. They are not the objects of the special senses, but perceived by the distinct faculty of Common Wit or Common Sense. Cf. *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, vol. ii, p. 68.

26/5. Cf. *Donet*, 10/16-20. Imagination in Pecock seems identical with Memory, the scribe or recorder. Aristotle likewise connects 'Common Wit' and Imagination, 'Common Wit' being the source of Imagination and Memory, and Memory being the name given to that kind of Imagination 'which relates to earlier perceptions and presents a copy of them'. See *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, vol. ii, pp. 70, 73.

See also the article on 'Imaginatif in *Piers Plowman*', by H. S. V. Jones, in the *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, vol. xiii (1914), pp. 583-8.

¹ In the following Notes, this translation of Zeller's '*Philosophy of the Greeks*' will be referred to briefly as *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*.

'This imagination, to be traced to the Aristotelian *φαντασία*, played a prominent rôle in scholastic psychology from the time of Augustine. Its function was that of recording the images of the phenomenal world, not simply of noting but of retaining the multiple messages that come through the channels of the several senses to the unifying *sensus communis*. The *cella fantastica* was the repository of its records, as the *cella rationalis* was the abode of the higher faculty. From all this it is clear that imagination was often equivalent to memory. But the point to be noted here is that in mediaeval psychology imagination was not only a faculty of lower grade than reason, but that in man's mental processes and the growth of his mind it mediated between the world of senses and the intellectual world' (pp. 586-7).

Mr Jones notes that it is 'Imagination who took the dreamer of *Piers Plowman* in charge after the confession of the Deadly Sins and after he had impatiently sought to know by reason alone' (p. 586); that '*Imaginatif* is not only the spokesman of Reason but is gifted with a vision of joy and sorrow to come, and is entitled to speak of the relation of Kind Wit and Clergy, and the uses to which in our spiritual education we should put the images, the phenomena of the physical world' (p. 584); and that 'throughout we find the Imagination . . . mediating as the character in *Piers Plowman* between the senses and the reason' (p. 588).

26/20. Fantasy is much the same in Aristotle, being the power of re-producing images, and often exposed to illusion. See *Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics*, vol. ii, pp. 72-3. Cf. *Donet*, 10/22-9.

30/35-31/1. *Sipen þe same mater . . . ben*. Note wrong concord, the verb being attracted into the plural by the intervening plural *þingis*.

35/2. 'Movyng power' in Pecock is not the wide philosophic Motion, but simply Locomotion, the opposite to which is Rest. See above, p. 25.

35/28. Cf. 69/1, 80/13, 124/5, 164/11, 165/38, and footnotes.


41/34. See above, note to 35/2.

42/13. With Pecock's account of the part played by Reason and Free Will in controlling the sensual appetites of man, cf. *Aristotle and the early Peripatetics*, vol. ii, pp. 108-116.

48/25. Cf. *Repressor*, p. 133.

49/9. In the following table 'þe seid v knowal [*kunnyngal* or intellectual] virtues' are printed in capitals. It is to be noted that Opinion may be subdivided in the same way as Science. (See 49/28-50/7.)

THE FIVE KUNNYNGAL VIRTUES



52/22. For the various kinds of Prudence, see pp. 49, 53.

54/31. Cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. VI, chap. vii.

62/13. Cf. *Repressor*, p. 131. Science and Opinion deal with truths capable of being proved by Reason from other self-evident truths. The self-evident truths in the case of Faith are the impossibility or improbability of falsehood in the affirmer.

67/4. See *Liber de diversis quæstionibus octoginta tribus*, LII; vol. iv, p. 391, of the Bâle edition; or Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, tom. 40, p. 34. Cf. also *Repressor*, p. 178, and *Donet*, p. 4.

70/16-17. The *Book of Feith* seems therefore to have not yet been published, and hence the *Folewer* was written before 1456. Cf. *Introd.* to *Folewer*, Section I, B. and note to 108/23.

75/22. With the teaching of this chapter, cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bks. II and III.

77/4. *stondip* is probably singular, agreeing with the first of the following subjects—a not uncommon construction.

77/8. Cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. I, chap. i.

82/5. For the distinction between vices strictly contrary to virtues and vices opposed privatively to virtues, see *Donet*, pp. 181-3.

83/10. See preceding note.

84/15-36. Cf. 85/27-31. The three kinds of Ignorance may be roughly described as follows:—

(1) *Ignorancia facti*, ignorance of the performance or non-performance of the actual deed itself.

(2) *Ignorancia negacionis* or *Ignorancia negatiua iuris*, ignorance of facts which should be known about the deed, and therefore inability to argue rightly about the deed.

(3) *Ignorancia dispositionis* or *Ignorancia erronea iuris*, ignorance consisting in wrong ideas about the deed, and hence leading to a wrong judgement.

85/27-31. See preceding note.

85/32. Aristotle distinguishes between *non-voluntary* and *involuntary*: 'Every act done in ignorance is, as such, *non-voluntary*, but is strictly *involuntary* only when it is followed by pain and involves regret.' See *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 52, R. Williams's translation.

85/33. Aristotle distinguishes between *in* ignorance and *through* or *from* ignorance. See *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 52, R. Williams's translation. A man who is drunk does not act *from* ignorance, but from being drunk. But he acts *in* ignorance, because he does not know what he is doing.

90/9. With the teaching of this chapter, cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. II, chaps. vi. to end.

93/28. With this chapter on the Passions, cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. II, chap. v.

99/16. Cf. Aristotle's observations on Shame, *Ethics*, Bk. IV, chap. ix.

100/10. Cf. *Donet*, p. 107, ll. 17-20, where reference is made to 'a greet famose scole doctoure', who, 'in a ful famose and moche apprisid book, þoruþoute an hool article, bi disputing of manye questiouns', differs from Pecoek's views on Sloth. This doctor is Thomas Aquinas and the book the *Summa Theologica*. (Cf. Pt. II (2nd Part) Q. xxxv.) In the *Folewer*, 100/35-7, exact references to the *Summa* are given.

For Pecock's debt to Aquinas, see above, note to 18/34.

100/33. The *De civitate dei*, IX, 4, deals with the opinions of the Stoics and Peripatetics about the Passions. Cf. *Fowler*, Pt. I, chap. xx, and note to 113/25.

104/6, 108/16. The reference is obviously to Pecock himself and his famous sermon at Paul's Cross, 1447, the Seven Conclusions of which were privately circulated. See *Introd. to Rep.*, pp. xv-xvii, and *Abbreviatio Reginaldi Pecok* (being a vindication of his sermon at Paul's Cross) *Rep.*, pp. 615-19.

108/23. i.e. more than six years after the sermon of 1447. Hence the *Fowler* cannot be earlier than 1453-4. Cf. *Introd. to Fowler*, Section I, B, and note to 70/16-17.

109/37. A reference to the famous *Liber diætarum* of Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, who lived from the middle of the ninth to the middle of the tenth century (?845-940, according to Guttman; ?854-954, according to Fried). An account of his life and work has been given by Dr. Salomon Fried (Leipzig, 1884) as an introduction to an (apparently never issued) edition and translation of the *Book on the Elements*. For an account of his philosophy, see *Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli*, von Jacob Guttman, Münster, 1911 (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bd. x, Heft 4).

In the British Museum are manuscript copies of the *Liber Diætarum* of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

111/11. Cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. II, chap. v.

113/25. Cf. Dod's translation of the *De civitate dei*, vol. i, pp. 355-8 :—

'Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call *πάθη*, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions.

Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians, for Aristotle was Plato's disciple and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book *De Finibus*, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and the Peripatetics rather in words than in reality. . . . The Stoics maintain [Epictetus: *Diog. Laert.* ii. 71] that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call *phantasiai*, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man,

though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. . . . The mind . . . suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul.'

121/36. Cf. *Fowler*, p. 85, and Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i.

122/30. Cf. *Fowler*, pp. 84-5, and Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i.

123/21-4. The first manner of constraint is later shown (125/3-21) to be impossible, since no creature or thing may work *actively* (cf. 125/5) and *principally* (cf. 125/37) contrary to its nature. This first manner of constraint must be carefully distinguished from the fourth, where the creature or thing is made to act contrary to its nature, as *the instrument* of the constrainer.

125/15. These are stock examples. Cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. II, chap. i, p. 29, R. Williams's translation. See above, note to 123/21-4.

135/37. *caste* [*t*]vs. I am indebted to Professor Chambers for this emendation, which seems to me the correct one, although confusion of pronouns is possible. *Thus* = 'frankincense' (Lat. *tūs*) is employed by Trevisa in his translation (finished 1398) of Bartholomew de Glanville's *De Proprietatibus Rerum*. See N: E. D.

146/21. With the matter of this chapter, cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i.

148/23. *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 49, R. Williams's translation.

148/32. It should be noted that Aristotle does not state (as Pecock asserts, p. 151, ll. 11-12) that the deed is more involuntary than voluntary. On the contrary, he says: 'Such actions then are of a mixed nature. But they would seem upon the whole *rather to resemble voluntary acts than involuntary*. For, at the exact moment at which they are done, such acts are choiceworthy. . . . All cases such as these are, then, voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such action for its own sake, and independently of its results.'

See *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, pp. 49-50, R. Williams's translation. See also below, note to 151/24, 28.

It is interesting to compare Thomas Aquinas's remarks on this subject, *Summa Theol.*, Pt. II (First Part), Q. vi, Articles 6 and 8.

149/17. Aristotle comes to the same opinion. See note above.

149/24. Aristotle certainly speaks of deeds which are 'in the abstract involuntary, but upon a certain given occasion, and in lieu of such or such an alternative, choiceworthy'; but he insists several times that such acts are *rather voluntary than involuntary*. See above, note to 148/32, and *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 51, R. Williams's translation.

151/6, 14. See above, notes to 148/32, 149/24, and below, note to 151/24, 28.

151/24, 28. What Aristotle says is that 'every act done in ignorance is, as such, *non-voluntary* [i. e. not-willed] but is strictly *involuntary* [i. e. done unwillingly] only when it is followed by pain and involves regret'. Pecock seems to lose sight of this distinction. Aristotle, according to his definition, rightly calls the casting of the merchandise into the sea 'in the abstract perhaps *involuntary*' rather than *non-voluntary*, since the act

causes pain and involves regret. And anyhow Aristotle does not make the distinction between *involuntary* and *non-voluntary* in the case of deeds done under constraint. See *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 52, R. Williams's translation.

152/13. Cf. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Bk. I, chap. vi, p. 7, R. Williams's translation, where Aristotle criticizes the Platonic theory that the Chief Good is the abstract 'Idea' of Good:—

'And next we had best, perhaps, consider what is the exact meaning to be attached to the conception of the one absolute good; although such a discussion is not without its difficulties, seeing that the doctrine of transcendental ideas was introduced by those whom we hold dear. And yet, where the interests of truth are at actual stake, it would seem as if it were, perhaps, better for us, and indeed incumbent upon us, to sacrifice even that which is our own—if, at least, we are to lay any claim to a philosophic spirit. *Both are dear to us alike, but truth must be religiously preferred.*'

Hence the famous saying 'Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas'.

152/19. With the denial of the infallibility of the doctors, compare Pecock's acknowledgement that doctors' 'wrytyngis ben ful profitable . . . if they be take into vse bi a good discrecioun', p. 11, ll. 7-8.

156/3. Pecock seems to be referring here to the following assertion of Aristotle: 'Every wicked man is in ignorance as to what he ought to do, and from what to abstain, and it is because of error such as this, that men become unjust and, in a word, wicked.' See *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i, p. 52, R. Williams's translation. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, Pt. II, (First Part) Q. lxxvi, Article 1.

157/30. So Aristotle asserts that it is ignorance of particular details or circumstances that may excuse sin, *Ethics*, Bk. III, chap. i. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, Pt. II, (First Part) Q. vii, Article 2.

179/33. 'Oon sutil doctoure': i.e. Duns Scotus.

185/33. *Largenesse*, the Eighth Point of the Fourth Table, is also dealt with in the eleventh argument, p. 186.

221/10. 'Moral virtue, then, is a certain formed state, or habit of purpose', &c. See *Ethics*, II, vi, pp. 39-49, R. Williams's translation.

227/3. Probably a reference to the heated controversy between Pecock and his opponents as to the exact length one might go in defence of certain abuses prevalent in the Church at that time, and particularly to Pecock's justification of these in his Sermon at Paul's Cross, 1447.

APPENDIX

LIST OF REFERENCES¹ TO THE BIBLE IN THE 'FOLEWER'

	PAGE		PAGE
Genesis i. 27	20	St. Matthew xix. 19; xxii. 39	218
„ i. 31	169	<i>St. Matthew xix. 23</i>	160
„ ii. 7	20	„ xxv. 14-30	3
<i>Judges xx. 16</i>	160	St. Luke iii. 7	106
<i>2 Kings v.</i>	139	„ vi. 22-23	178
<i>2 Kings v. 19</i>	139	„ xiii. 32	106
Psalms i. 6	177	„ xvi. 8	54
„ cxxxix. 22	106	„ xxi. 19	177
<i>Proverbs xii. 19</i>	178	St. John xv. 25	177
Ecclesiastes i. 8	5	Acts v. 41	177
Ezekiel xviii. 25	134	Romans xii. 1	167
„ xxxiii. 17, 20	134	<i>1 Corinthians xiii.</i>	71, 72
„ xxxvi. 8	81	<i>2 Timothy iv. 2</i>	104
St. Matthew iii. 7	106	Titus i. 15	177
„ x. 16	167	<i>Hebrews vi. 4-6</i>	160
„ x. 28	19	<i>Hebrews xiii. 6</i>	178
<i>St. Matthew xii. 36</i>	118		
St. Matthew xvi. 23	106		
„ xvi. 26	213		

¹ Italics denote reference only; roman print, quotations.

GLOSSARY.

NOTE.

All words are glossed under forms which actually occur in the text. It has been thought useless to note *all* the occurrences of simple, well known words, one reference and ' &c. ' being usually considered sufficient. In the case of orthographical variations, instances are usually given, and, where difficulty might arise, cross-references.

The Glossary is not a complete concordance, but aims at incorporating *all* words which differ materially in spelling, or even slightly in meaning, from present-day forms and uses. Certain differences of spelling are, however, too commonly understood to make it necessary to include them—such as *lengþe*, *hungir*, *mater*, *religioun*, *substaunce*.

Infinitives which do not occur in the text, if used as headwords, are placed within square brackets.

The following abbreviations are used :

1, first person.	OE., Old English.
2, second person.	orig., originally.
3, third person.	p., participle.
acc., accusative.	p p., past participle.
adj., adjective.	pers., person, personal.
adv., adverb.	pl., plural.
anom., anomalous.	poss., possessive.
aux., auxiliary.	pr., present (indicative).
comp., comparative degree.	pr. p., present participle.
conj., conjunction.	prep., preposition.
dat., dative.	pret., preterite (indicative).
demons., demonstrative.	pron., pronoun.
f., feminine.	s., strong.
gen., genitive.	sb., substantive.
imper., imperative.	sg., singular.
impers., impersonal.	subj., subjunctive.
interj., interjection.	sup., superlative degree.
intr., intransitive.	tr., transitive.
m., masculine.	v., verb.
n., neuter.	vbl., verbal.
nom., nominative.	w., weak.
num., numeral.	

A.

- A**, *prep.* on, at, 86/30, &c. **A bak**, behind, 106/22. **A place**. See **Place**. **A twix**, a twyn, into two, 212/30; 209/29, &c.
- A, An**, *article*, a(n), one, 1/3, &c.; 2/5, &c.
- Abide**, *s.v.* 29/10, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* abiden, 29/13, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* abide, 138/4; 2 *pl. imper.* abide, 178/17; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* abide, 34/7; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* abide, 22/15; 3 *pl. pret.* aboden, 29/10; *pr. p.* abidyng, 52/25 (as *adj.*).
- Abie**, *w.v.* pay the penalty (for an offence), 109/16.
- Able**, *w.v.* enable, 79/19; *p.p.* ablid, 79/21.
- Adauntynge**, *vbl. sb.* refuting, putting down, 60/9.
- Afer**, *adv.* remotely, afar, 22/9, &c.
- After**, **Aftir** (1) *adv.* after, 44/29, &c. (2) *prep.* after, in accordance with, 12/32, &c.; 40/10, &c. **Aftir pat**, *conj.* according as, 42/24, &c.
- Aggrege**, *w.v.* exaggerate, aggravate, make heavy, 144/37.
- Ajensholdyng**, *vbl. sb.* defence, 102/25.
- Ajenvnstondabilnes**, *sb.* unchangeableness, 44/18.
- Ajenward**, *adv.* on the other hand, 9/38, &c.
- Algate**, **Algatis**, *adv.* altogether, 151/33; 17/18, &c.
- Alizten**, 111/23, 3 *pl. pr.* of **Alizte**, *w.v.* enlighten, kindle intellectually.
- Ambassiatouris**, *sb. pl.* ambassadors, 107/28.
- Anentis**, *prep.* as regards, in respect of, in sight of, towards, 10/13, &c.
- Anothomy**, *sb.* anatomy, 35/9.
- Araie**, *w.v.* arrange in position, set in readiness, 68/3, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* araien, 46/29, &c.; *p.p.* araiad, 76/2, &c.
- Araiynge**, *vbl. sb. pl.* of above, 75/25, &c.
- Arere**, 60/21, 3 *sg. pr. subj.* of **Arere**, *w.v.* draw back.
- Arsmetrie**, *sb.* arithmetic, 49/26.
- (**A**)scape, *w.v.* escape, 112/2; 3 *pl. pr.* scapen, 137/31; *p.p.* (a)scapid, 85/11; 85/10.
- Aspie**, *sb.* discovery, 54/24.
- Aspie**, *w.v.* espy, ascertain, discover, observe, 17/19, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* aspiep, 44/29; 1 *pl. pr.* aspien, 17/21, &c.; *p.p.* aspied, 75/13, &c. [**As(s)oil**, *w.v.*] refute; *pr. p.* assoil- yng, 191/9; *p.p.* as(s)oiled, 19/6; 71/36.
- Assoil yng**, *vbl. sb.* of above, 10/16, &c.
- Assumpt**, *sb.* assumption, 201/25.
- Attendaunce**, *sb.* ministration, service, 216/33, &c.
- Attretli**, *adv.* straight off, continuously, 170/3.
- Auctor**, *sb.* author, 18/31, &c.
- Autorite**, *sb.* 9/37, &c.
- Avise**, *sb.* consideration, reflection, advice, 90/27, &c.
- Aviseful**, *adj.* attentive, considerate, adviceful, 119/21.
- Avisement**, *sb.* consideration, 84/17, &c.
- Avisid**, 86/10, &c., *p.p.* of **Avise**, *w.v.* consider, reflect.
- Avisidli**, *adv.* attentively, advisedly, 88/21, &c.
- Avising**, *vbl. sb.* counselling, consideration, 116/9.
- Avisose**, *adj.* considered, 84/16, &c.
- Avisoseli**, *adv.* with due consideration, 117/24, &c.
- Awaite**, *w.v.* observe, attend to, watch for, 12/8, &c.
- Awelde**, *w.v.* control, subdue, 177/16.

B.

- Baiard**, **Bayard**, *sb.* bay horse, 33/37; 34/1.
- Baptym**, *sb.* 62/16.
- Be**, *anom. v.* 4/3, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* am, 100/18, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* art, 71/11, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* is, 1/1, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* ben, 6/27, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* be, 32/3, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* be, 113/19, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* bi, 218/25; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* be, 6/22, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* was, 20/14, &c.; 3 *sg. pret. subj.* were, 8/21, &c.; 3 *pl. pret. subj.* weren, 7/10, &c.; were, 7/12, &c.; *pr. p.* beyng, 3/6, &c.; *p.p.* be, 5/37, &c.
- Bere**, *s.v.* 13/15, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* bere, 125/32; 3 *sg. pr.* berip, 105/17; 3 *pl. pr.* beren, 82/3, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* bere, 76/14, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* bere, 129/9, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* bare, 106/16; 3 *pl. pret.* beere, 104/38, &c.; *pr. p.* beryng, 104/7; *p.p.* born, 62/15, &c.

- Bere on hond, accuse, charge, ascribe an argument to a person; *pr. p.* beryng on hond, 77/33; *p. p.* born on hond, 111/3, 26, 114/9.
- Besauntis, *sb. pl.* gold coins issued at Constantinople (Byzantium) during the Middle Ages, and circulated throughout Europe, 3/4.
- Best. See under Good.
- Bete, *s. v.* 125/30; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* bete, 148/27; *p. p.* bete, 37/3, &c.; beete, 37/6, &c.; beten, 36/33.
- Bettir. See under Good and Wel.
- Bi and bi, (1) *prep. phrase*, through in order, 9/22. (2) *adv. phrase*, one after another, in due course, 214/33.
- [Bidde, *s. v.*]; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* biddip, 79/12, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* bidde, 168/23; 3 *sg. pret.* bede, 167/14; *pr. p.* biddyng; 165/34.
- Bifalle, *s. v.* 44/11, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* bifalle, 37/11, &c.; *pr. p.* bifallyng, 18/10, &c.; *p. p.* bifalle, 99/20.
- Bigynne, *s. v.* 5/12, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. bigynnest*, 201/23; 3 *sg. pr. bigynnep*, 81/7, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. bigynnen*, 13/12, &c.; *bigynnyn*, 13/13; 2 *sg. pr. subj. bigynne*, 138/19; 3 *sg. pr. subj. bigynne*, 12/19, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj. bigynne*, 138/18; 3 *sg. pret. biganne*, 20/8; 3 *pl. pret. biganne*, 68/9; *p. p. bigunne*, 4/25, &c.
- Bihete, *w. v.* promise, 138/9.
- Bihetyng, *vbl. sb. of above*, 137/29, &c.
- [Biholdre, *s. v.*]; 3 *sg. pr. biholdip*, 29/2, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. biholdre*, 78/20; *pr. p. biholdyng*, 66/27, &c.; *p. p. (ouer) biholden*, 191/15.
- Birpen, *sb.* burden, 2/27, &c.
- Bisi, *adj.* busy, diligent, 151/35.
- Bisnesse, Bisynesse, *sb.* diligence, 94/37, &c.; 53/27, &c.; *pl. bisnessis*, 104/30.
- [Bitake, *s. v.*] hand over, commit, entrust, grant; 3 *sg. pret. bitoke*, 3/3; *p. p. bitakun*, 3/6.
- Bitaking, *vbl. sb. of above*, 3/5, &c.
- Bite, *s. v.* 201/4.
- Bitoke. See under Bitake.
- Bitwix(e), *prep.* between, 3/37, &c.; 4/35, &c.
- Bipenke, *w. v.* bethink oneself of a thing, 19/37; 1 *sg. pr. bipenke*, 178/29; 3 *sg. pr. subj. bipenke*, 167/4; 3 *sg. pret. subj. bipouzte*, 167/14, &c.; *pr. p. bipenkyng*, 102/19.
- Biwrie, *w. v.* betray, 138/10.
- Byng, *vbl. sb.* buying, 49/19.
- Blewe, 20/5, 3 *sg. pret. of Blowe, s. v.*
- Bluysch, *sb.* glance, glimpse, 39/12.
- Boistose, *adj.* rough, discourteous, 106/35.
- Boond, *sb.* bond, obligation, 108/15.
- Bordel, *sb.* as *adj.* brothel, 170/22.
- Bowe, *w. v. (orig. s.)* 76/38, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. bowe*, 43/21; 1 *sg. pret. bowid*, 178/26.
- Brède, *sb.* breadth, 90/15, &c.
- [Bréke, *s. v.*]; 1 *sg. pr. bréke*, 125/32; *p. p. brokun*, 106/18.
- Brennyng, *vbl. sb.* burning, 108/5.
- Briddis, *sb. pl.* birds, 193/36, &c.
- Brymli, *adv.* fiercely, violently, 108/1.
- Brymme, *adj.* strong, fierce, 99/6, 113/10.
- Brynge, *w. v.* 16/19, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. bryngip*, 45/22, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj. brynge*, 33/34, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. brynge*, 68/23; *p. p. brouzt*, 16/15, &c.
- Bynde, *s. v.* 142/39, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. byndip*, 212/33; 1 *sg. pr. subj. bynde*, 142/19, &c.; *pr. p. byndyng*, 217/13; *p. p. bound*, 1/4, &c.; *bounde*, 130/25, &c.; *bounden*, 73/30, &c.

C.

- Caace, Caas(e), *sb.* 91/10; 69/5, &c.; 59/26, &c.
- Bi caas, *adv.* perhaps, perchance, 59/26.
- Putte caas, propound an hypothesis, 59/15, &c.
- Can(ne). See under Kunne.
- Catel, *sb.* property, 54/8.
- Caste, *v. (w. & s.)* 7/21; 3 *sg. pr. castip*, 86/20; 2 *sg. imper. caste*, 113/7; *p. p. casten, (strong)* 126/1.
- Charge, *sb.* duty, undertaking, responsibility, 2/27.
- Chargid, 38/10, *p. p. of Charge, w. v.* consider, take as a charge.
- Chese, *s. v.* choose, 47/14, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. chese*, 141/1; 2 *sg. pr. chesist*, 138/23; 3 *pl. pr. chesen*, 146/25; 2 *sg. imper. chese*, 113/14; 1 *sg. pr. subj. chese*, 170/3; 3 *sg. pr. subj. chese*, 64/28, &c.;

- 3 *pl. pr. subj.* chese, 226/5; *p.p.* chosen, 54/21, &c.
- Chesyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 102/10, &c.; *pl. chesyngis*, 82/16, &c.
- Childide**, 74/15, 3 *sg. pret.* of Childe, *w.v.* bring forth, bear (children).
- Childli**, *adj.* childish, 115/24.
- Chirch**, *sb.* 143/11, &c.
- Chorleli**, *adv.* churlishly, rudely, 220/35.
- Circumstancionatid**, 205/38, &c., *p.p.* of *Circumstaunce*, *w.v.* support with circumstances.
- Clepe**, *w.v.* call, name, 101/3; 1 *sg. pr. clepe*, 198/33, &c.; 1 *pl. pr. clepen*, 69/22, &c.; *p.p. clepid*, 3/11, &c.
- Clergi**, *sb.* scholarship, 58/34.
- Clubbisshenes**, *sb.* roughness, rudeness, 108/37.
- Colueris**, *sb. pl.* doves, 167/16.
- Come**, *s.v.* 10/34, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. comyp*, 33/1; *comep*, 84/8; 3 *pl. pr. comen*, 181/29, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. come*, 12/20, &c.; 1 *pl. pr. subj. come*, 52/19, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj. come*, 213/12; 3 *pl. pret. camen*, 30/1; *pr. p. comyng*, 80/9, &c.; *p.p. come*, 159/8; *comen*, 79/28.
- Comoun**, *Comune*, *adj.* 25/24, &c.; 25/23, &c.
- Comounnalte**, *Comunalte*, *sb.* commonwealth, 143/12; 53/23, &c.
- Companye**, *w.v.* 197/8.
- Compendi**, *sb.* compendium, abridged version, 1/3.
- Compeynabilite**, *sb.* companionability, 217/22.
- Complexioun**, *sb.* temperament, 111/34, &c.; *pl. complexions*, 50/36. The 'four complexions', choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine and melancholic (hot, cold, moist, and dry) were the different temperaments of man, depending on the proportion in the body of the 'four humours' or fluids, choler, phlegm, blood, and melancholy.
- Conceit**, *sb.* conception, idea, 203/12; *pl. conceitis*, 191/6.
- Conscienceli**, *adv.* conscientiously, 146/1.
- Correpcions**, *sb. pl.* rebukes, 204/39.
- Coursli**, *adv.* in due course, 204/18.
- Coupen**. See under *Kunne*.
- Crafti(al)**, *adj.* belonging to craft or trade, 50/1, &c.; 37/26, &c.
- Craftili**, *adv.* in the manner of craft or trade, 38/8.
- Curiose**, *adj.* perversely minute in inquiry, 107/27, &c.
- Curiosite**, *sb.* perversely minute inquiry, 101/24, &c.
- Curraunt**, *adj.* flowing, ready, 55/39, &c.
- Cyuylite**, *sb.* civil organization, 53/24.

D.

- Dampnyd**, 99/13, *p.p.* of *Dampne*, *w.v.* condemn, damn.
- [**Dare**, *pret. pr. v.*]; 1 *sg. pres. durste*, 107/37; 3 *sg. pret. durste*, 108/23.
- Deed**, *adj.* dead, 19/26; *pl. deede*, 35/11.
- Deel**, *sb.* portion, bit, 32/3.
- Default**, *sb.* fault, 61/9, &c.; *pl. defaultis*, 94/2, &c.
- Defauti**, *adj.* faulty, 187/12, &c.
- Defie**, *w.v.* divide, 41/18.
- Deie**, *w.v.* die, 16/10, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. deiep*, 18/9, &c.
- Dele**, *w.v.* divide, 147/20.
- Demeene**, *w.v.* manage, deal with, employ, 3/6; *pr. p. demeenyng*, 123/31.
- Demenyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 104/13.
- Denomyned**, 57/20, *p.p.* of *Denomyne*, *w.v.* name.
- Departe**, *w.v.* divide, 41/18; 3 *sg. pr. departip*, 63/28; *p.p. departid*, 48/36, &c.
- Departyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 179/32, &c.
- Depper**, *adv. comp.* more deeply, 142/6.
- Derke**, *w.v.* darken, 192/3; 3 *sg. pr. derkip*, 109/24; *p.p. derkid*, 95/13.
- Deynte**, *sb.* fondness, honour, esteem, 104/27, 108/34.
- [**Diffame**, *w.v.*] report evilly; 3 *pl. pret. diffameden*, 106/9.
- Diffamose**, *adj.* of evil report, 61/1.
- Diffamyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 105/19.
- Digne**, *adj.* worthy, 55/12; *comp. digner*, 56/39.
- Discherid**, 13/30, *p.p.* of *Dischere*, *w.v.* distress, dishearten.
- Discouere**, *w.v.* disclose, 61/37.
- Discryuyd**, 41/3, &c., *p.p.* of *Discryue*, *w.v.* describe.
- Discryuyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 69/25, &c.

- Dispose, *w.v.* place apart, separate, 212/23.
- Distinctid, 209/29, &c., *p.p.* of Distinote, make distinct.
- Disturbid, 32/3, *p.p.* of Disturble, *w.v.* trouble, disturb.
- Diuisid, 188/34, *p.p.* of Diuise, arrange, design.
- Do, *v.* 2/1, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* do, 8/36, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* doist, 196/6, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* doop, 46/14, &c.; doip, 212/4, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* doon, 119/24, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* doon, 36/1, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* do, 130/7; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* do, 105/15, &c.; doo, 115/36; 1 *sg. pret.* dide, 4/36, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* dide(n), 105/18; 105/20; *pr. p.* doying, 88/31, &c.; *p.p.* doon, 2/19, &c.; do, 50/5, &c.; don, 119/8, &c.
- Donet, *sb.* grammar, 1/2, &c.
- Doom, *sb.* judgement, 9/16, &c.; *pl.* domes, 66/5, &c.; doomes, 88/8, &c.
- Dout, *sb.* doubt, 35/28, &c.
- Do(w)un, *adv.* down, 190/31; 12/20, &c.
- Drad. See under Drede.
- Drawe, *s.v.* 41/17; 3 *sg. pr.* drawip, 169/9, &c.; *pr. p.* drawyng, 223/23; *p.p.* drawe, 20/35.
- Drede, *w.v.* (*orig. s.*) 19/20, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* drede, 19/21; *p.p.* drad, 149/31; dred, 43/33, &c.
- Drenche, *w.v.* drown, 129/6.
- Drenchyng, *vbl. sb.* of above, 129/7, &c.
- [Dresse, *w.v.*] direct, arrange; 3 *pl. pr.* dressen, 191/38, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* dresse, 196/9; *pr. p.* dressyng, 53/13, &c.
- Dressyng, *vbl. sb.* of above, 195/34, &c.
- Dritt, *sb.* dirt, 87/21, &c.
- Drynke, *s.v.* 87/15; 3 *sg. pr.* drynk-
ip, 173/18; *p.p.* drunkid (*weak*;
as *adj.*), 156/10.
- [Dryue, *s.v.*]; 2 *sg. pr.* dryuest, 70/5;
3 *sg. pr.* dryuyp, 9/21; 3 *sg. pres.*
droue, 142/7, &c.; *p.p.* dryuen,
50/19, &c.
- Dukis, *sb. pl.* leaders, 66/38.
- Dure, *w.v.* endure, last, 16/14, &c.;
3 *sg. pr.* durep, 16/14, &c.; 3 *sg.*
pret. durid, 108/11.
- Dymynusshid, 219/27, 219/37,
p.p. of Dymynusshe, *w.v.* di-
minish.
- Dymyssid, 139/31, *p.p.* of Dymysse,
w.v. dismiss.
- Dyuersip, 72/3, 3 *sg. pr.* of Dyuerse,
w.v. separate.

E.

- Eend, *sb.* 4/7, &c.
- Eendal, *adj.* final, ultimate, 187/30,
&c.
- Eende, *w.v.* 18/17, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.*
eendip, 18/12, &c.
- Eendli (1) *adj.* final, 78/19. (2) *adv.*
finally, 192/19.
- Eendyngli, *adv.* finally, 4/6, &c.
- Eer, (1) *prep.* before, 7/6, &c. (2)
conj. before, 18/33, &c. (3) *adv.*
before, sooner; *sup.* eerst, 56/12,
&c.
- Eere, *sb.* 3/28, &c.
- Eesili, *adv.* 19/6, &c.; *comp.* eesilier,
15/13, &c.
- E(e)te, *s.v.* 36/37, &c.; 21/38, &c.;
3 *sg. pret.* eete, 36/34, &c.; *p.p.*
eete, 87/24; eten, 173/21.
- Eftsoone, *adv.* again, soon after, 20/
3, &c.
- Eire, Eyre, *sb.* air, 20/15, &c.; 50/
34, &c.
- Enquere, *w.v.* inquire, 101/22, &c.
- Enquerri, Enquerry, *sb.* inquiry,
116/14, 116/17.
- Ensampl, *sb.* example, 50/32, &c.
- Enserch(e), *sb.* search, examination,
116/15; 116/17.
- Entirmete, *w.v.* come into contact
with, intermingle, 197/8, &c.; 3 *sg.*
pret. entirmetid, 156/22; *pr. p.*
entirmeting, 92/22.
- Ete. See E(e)te.
- Etik, *adj.* pertaining to ethics, 49/13,
&c.
- Etikis, *sb. pl.* 61/11, &c.
- Euen, *adj.* equal, even, 218/13, &c.
- Euer eipir, *pron.* both, 5/30, &c.
- Eukarising, *vbl. sb.* receiving the
Eucharist, 83/22.
- Explic, Explie, *w.v.* explain, 5/25;
208/25; 1 *sg. pr.* explie, 210/
17; *p.p.* explied, 47/38, &c.
- Expressistli, *adv.* on purpose, 204/
27.

F.

- Fadir, *sb.* 11/15, &c.
- Fail, *sb.* failure, 11/3.
- Falle, *s.v.* 36/35, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* fallip,
48/37, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* fallen, 26/22,

- &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* falle, 84/22, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* falle, 105/10, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* fille, 142/6; 3 *sg. pret.* felle, 71/25; *pr. p.* fallyng, 37/11 (as *adj.*), 48/38, &c.; *p.p.* falle, 84/28, &c.
- Falshed, *sb.* falsehood, 75/12, &c.
- Fantastik, *adj.* pertaining to Fantasy, 26/18, &c.
- [Fare, *w.v.* (*orig. s.*)] get on, fare; 3 *sg. pr.* it farip, 122/25; 2 *pl. pr.* faren, 178/20.
- Fecchen, 10/9, 3 *pl. pr.* of Fecche, *w.v.*
- Felawlik, *adj.* pertaining to fellowship, 8/19.
- Felawschip, Feleschip, *sb.* company, comradeship, 88/3, &c.; 5/32.
- Felers, *sb. pl.* feelers, perceivers, 10/32.
- Feleschip. See Felawschip.
- Femawle, *sb.* female, 20/3, &c.
- Fer, *adv.* far, 3/12, &c.; *comp.* ferpir, 17/36, &c.; *sup.* ferpist, 32/10, &c.
- Ferid, Ferd, 100/25, 176/20, *p.p.* of Fere, *w.v.* frighten.
- Fier, Fire, *sb.* 20/14, &c.; 51/28.
- Fierid, *p.p.* as *adj.* on fire, 21/22 (twice).
- Fizte, *s.v.* 134/28, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* fiztip, 189/16, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* fizte, 134/26.
- Fille. See under Falle.
- Fle, *w.v.* (*orig. s.*) flee, 43/37, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* fleep, 92/24; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* fle, 21/16; *p.p.* fled, 50/20, &c.
- Fleisch, *sb.* flesh, 36/34, &c.
- Flewmatik, *adj.* phlegmatic, 109/27. See under Complexioun.
- Flewme, *sb.* phlegm, 111/33, 113/3. See under Complexioun.
- Fleyng, 193/36, *pr. p.* of Fle(e), *s.v.* fly.
- Folewer, *sb.* sequel, 3/11, &c.
- Foonde. See under Fynde.
- Foorm, *sb.* form, 12/4, &c.
- For, *conj.* because, 104/10, &c.
- [Forbede, *s.v.*] forbid; 3 *sg. pr.* f[or]bedip, 170/26; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* forbede, 7/22, &c.; *p.p.* forbode, 131/13, &c.
- Forbere, *s.v.* 36/38, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* forbereren, 110/12; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* forbere, 36/38, &c.; *p.p.* forbore, 37/5, &c.; forborn, 159/10.
- Forbode, *sb.* forbidding, 7/17, &c. See also under [Forbede].
- [Forzete, *s.v.*] forget; 2 *sg. imper.* forzete, 173/33; *p.p.* forzete, 215/25, &c.
- Forzeuen, Forzoue, Forzoun, 226/11, 161/7, 159/32, *p.p.* of Forzeue, *s.v.* forgive.
- Former, *adj.* first, 131/15, &c.
- Fors, *sb.* matter, 64/35, &c.
- Forsake, *s.v.* 44/12, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* forsake, 139/8; 1 *sg. pr.* forsake, 139/8; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* forsake, 142/22; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* forsake, 130/17, &c.; *p.p.* forsakun, 65/38; forsaken, 44/31, &c.
- Forswere, *s.v.* 137/10.
- Forwhi, *conj.* because, 3/8, &c.
- F(o)undement, *sb.* foundation, 46/1 &c.; 46/5, &c.
- Freendfull, *adj.* friendly, loving, 201/13, &c.
- Frenesse, *sb.* generosity, 1/10.
- Frike, *adj.* eager, 5/11.
- Fro(m), *prep.* 17/12; 8/8, &c., 18/32, &c.
- Fro(m)ward, *prep.* away from, 94/24; 92/24.
- Fume, *sb.* vapour or exhalation of the body, 41/28.
- Fynde, *s.v.* 18/35, &c.; 2 *pl. pr.* fynde, 19/9; 3 *pl. pr.* fynden, 43/14, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* foonde, 67/1 (twice); *p.p.* founde, 6/8, &c.; founden, 114/3.

G.

- Gastid, 13/29, *p.p.* of Gaste, *w.v.* terrify.
- Gendre, *sb.* kind, class, 'genus' in the logical sense, as opposed to 'species', 222/30, &c.; *pl.* gendris, kinds, 5/11.
- Gendre, *w.v.* beget, 20/26, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* gendrip, 69/34, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* gendren, 81/13, &c.; *p.p.* gendrid, 16/15, &c.
- General, *sb.* 'genus' in the logical sense, as opposed to 'species', 208/24, &c.; *pl.* generalis, 208/28.
- Gete, *s.v.* get, beget, 36/15, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* getip, 76/11; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* gete, 7/27, &c.; *p.p.* goten, 44/32; geten, 11/26, &c.; gete, 47/22, &c.; getun, 62/6, &c.
- Gladid, 100/25, *p.p.* of Glade, *w.v.* make glad.
- Go, *anom. v.* 9/22, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* go, 129/12; 3 *sg. pr.* goip, 33/37, &c.;

goop, 34/1, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* goen, 35/12, 194/30; goon, 57/6, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* go, 166/20, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* go, 76/29, &c.; 2 *pl. pr. subj.* go, 131/32, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* go, 183/15, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* wente, 61/15, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* wenten, 10/31, &c.; *pr. p.* goyng, 1/2, &c.

God, *sb.* 1/10, &c.; *gen.* goddis, 1/3, &c.

Good, *adj.* 32/21, &c.; *comp.* bettir, 57/19, &c.; *sup.* best, 10/13, &c.

Goost, *sb.* spirit, 158/36, &c.

Goostli, *adj.* spiritual, 97/27, &c.

Gootis, 26/11, *gen. sg.* of Goot, *sb.* goat.

Gowne, *sb.* 52/33; *pl.* gowyns, 195/6.

Greet, *adj.* 10/38, &c.; *pl.* grete, 7/20, &c.; *comp.* grettir, 2/31, &c.; gretter, 7/26, &c.; *sup.* grettist, 8/22, &c.; greetist, 59/36.

Groce, *adj.* gross, 113/4.

Groundli, *adv.* thoroughly, profoundly, 105/7.

Growe, *s.v.* 79/24; 3 *sg. pr.* growip, 35/16; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* growe, 10/34; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* growe, 13/10, &c.; *pr. p.* growyng, 142/38, &c.; *p.p.* grownen, 13/23, &c.

Grucche, *w.v.* murmur, 155/6; *pr. p.* (as *adj.*) grucchyng, 155/7.

Grynde, *s.v.* 170/10; *p.p.* grounden, 170/11.

3.

3e, *pers. pron.* 2 *pl. nom.* you, 11/36, &c.

3e(ə)lde, *s.v.* yield, 118/36, &c.; 121/6; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* 3elde, 12/22.

3eue, *s.v.* give, 15/1, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* 3euep, 1/10, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* 3euen, 69/19; 2 *sg. imper.* 3eue, 191/3; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* 3eue, 142/21, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* 3eue, 196/4; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* 3eue, 12/22; 2 *pl. pr. subj.* 3eue, 17/1, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* 3afe, 69/17; 3aue, 143/5, &c.; 2 *sg. pret.* 3aunst, 191/5; *pr. p.* 3euyng, 141/6, &c.; *p.p.* 3ouen, 2/8, &c.; 3ounn, 4/38, &c.

3(h)e, *adv.* yea, 7/22, &c.; 41/4.

3ift, *sb.* gift, 46/30, &c.; *pl.* 3iftis, 2/13, &c.

3onge, *adj.* *pl.* young, 13/34, &c.

3ouen, 3ounn. See under 3eue.

3oure, 3owre, *pers. pron.* 2 *pl. gen.* your, 12/4, &c.; 136/30, &c.

3ouris, *pers. pron.* 2 *pl. gen.* (non-attributive) yours, 133/27, &c.

3ow, *pers. pron.* 2 *pl. acc. and dat.* you, 18/27, &c.; 132/3, &c.

H.

Haare, *sb.* hare, 36/2, &c.

Habundaunce, *sb.* 175/2.

Habundaunt, *adj.* 59/17, &c.; *sup.* habundauntist, 59/21, &c.

Handis. See under Hond.

[Hang, *s.v.*]; 3 *sg. pr.* hangip, 18/4, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* hangen, 97/15, &c.; *pr. p.* hangyng, 17/25, &c.

Happ, *sb.* chance, 137/35.

Happe, *w.v.* befall, happen, 164/21; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* happe, 110/16; *p.p.* happid, 164/21.

Happili, *adv.* perchance, 168/10, &c.

Haue, *aux.* and *princ. v.* 6/14, &c.;

1 *sg. pr.* haue, 6/6, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.*

hast, 12/18, &c.; haste, 93/15,

108/13; 3 *sg. pr.* hap, 9/2, &c.; 2

pl. pr. haue, 20/35, &c.; han, 93/

30, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* haue, 36/

36, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* haue, 21/

37, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* hadden, 10/11,

&c.; 1 *sg. pret. subj.* hadde, 9/37,

&c.; 3 *sg. pret. subj.* hadde, 80/21,

&c.; *pr. p.* hauyng, 110/5, &c.;

p.p. had, 4/9, &c.

Haunt, *sb.* custom, practice, 14/28,

&c.

Haunte, *w.v.* accustom, be accustomed

to, 89/18; *p.p.* hauntid, 79/16, &c.

He, *pers. pron. m.* 3 *sg. nom.* 2/5,

&c.; referring to object without life,

6/5, &c.

Heelden. See under Holde.

Heer, *sb.* hair, 161/1.

He(e)re, *w.v.* 123/12, &c.; 50/10,

&c.; 3 *sg. pr.* heerip, 75/15, &c.;

3 *pl. pr.* heeren, 71/9; 1 *sg. pr. subj.*

heere, 68/33, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.*

heere, 70/17; 1 *sg. pret.* herde,

205/28; 3 *pl. pret.* herden, 71/3;

p.p. herde, 8/28, &c.; heerd, 99/

2; herd, 114/30, &c.

Heft, *sb.* weight, 190/27, &c.; *pl.*

heftis, 15/15.

Helde, *w.v.* shed out, pour out, 39/

20; 3 *sg. pr.* heldip, 39/19; 3 *pl.*

pr. helden, 39/24; 2 *pl. imper.*

helde, 20/36. See also under

Holde.

Helpe, *s.v.* 142/11, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* helpe, 139/38; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* helpe, 185/30.

Hem, *pers. pron.* 3 *pl. acc.* and *dat.* (*all genders*) them, 2/2, &c.; 133/32, &c.

Her(e), *pers. pron.* 3 *pl. gen.* (*all genders*), their, 30/25; 3/33, &c.
See also **Hir**, **Her(e)**.

Heris, *pers. pron.* 3 *pl. gen.* (*all genders*; *non-attributive*) theirs, 133/7, &c.

Heuyed, 100/25, *p.p.* of **Heuye**, *w.v.* make heavy, sad.

Hide, *w.v.* 133/6, &c.; 2 *pl. pr. subj.* hide, 135/17; *p.p.* hid, 131/36, &c.

Hiz, *adj.* high, 10/15, &c.; *hiȝe*, 11/28, &c.; *comp.* *hiȝer*, 2/31, &c.; *sup.* *hiȝest*, 1/10, &c.; *hiȝist*, 60/36, &c.

Hized, 102/11, *p.p.* of **Hize**, *w.v.* exalt.

Him, *pers. pron.* (1) *m.* 3 *sg. acc.* and *dat.* 1/11, &c.; 2/5, &c.; (2) *n.* 3 *sg. acc.* and *dat.* 169/18, &c.; 1/9, &c.; (3) *m.* 3 *pl. acc.* (= *hem*, in quotation from Wycliffite Bible), 19/20.

Hir, **Her(e)**, *pers. pron.* *f.* 3 *sg. acc. gen.* and *dat.* her, 65/11, &c.; 65/22; 65/11, &c.; 66/4, &c.

His, *pers. pron.* *m.* and *n.* 3 *sg. gen.* his, its, 1/11, &c.; 6/34, &c.; *pl.* hise, 62/21, &c.

Holde, *s. v.* 6/3, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* holde, 18/11, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* holdip, 145/6, &c.; 1, 2, 3 *pl. pr.* holden, 23/20, 178/13, 8/11, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* holde, 113/14; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* holde, 36/24, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* holde, 6/13; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* holde, 129/9; 1 *sg. pret.* helde, 164/23; 3 *sg. pret.* helde, 113/28; 3 *pl. pret.* helden, 111/10, &c.; heelden, 111/16, &c.; *pr. p.* holdyng, 60/9; *p.p.* holde, 6/3, &c.; holden, 6/9, &c.

Hond, **Hoond**, *sb.* hand, 135/31, &c.; 163/15; *pl.* handis, 131/38, &c.; hondis, 129/9, &c.

Bere on hond. See under **Bere**.

Honest, *adj.* creditable, befitting, 3/35, &c.

Honeste, *sb.* reputation, credit, 4/29, &c.

Hool, *adj.* whole, 5/9, &c.

Ho(o)li, *adj.* holy, 8/31, &c.; 67/21, &c.

Hoond. See **Hond**.

Hoselyng, *vbl. sb.* receiving the Eucharist, 83/22.

Humoures, *sb. pl.* 111/32. See under **Complexioun**.

I, J.

I. See **Y**.

Jepardi, *sb.* 22/5.

Iȝe, **Yȝe**, *sb.* eye, 3/28, &c.; 21/5, &c.; *pl.* *yȝen*, 28/35.

Inconuenyentis, *sb. pl.* inconveniences, 140/18.

In lasse pan, *conj.* unless, 79/25, &c.

Inparfütli, *adv.* imperfectly, 150/25, &c.

Inparfitnes, *sb.* imperfection, 152/7, &c.

Impite, *sb.* cruelty, 146/5.

Impressli, *adv.* in indirect terms, not expressly, 203/6.

Inprouyd, 85/23, *p.p.* of **Inproue**, *w.v.* prove to be wrong, disprove.

Impugnacioun, *sb.* contradiction, 226/21.

Impugnyng, *vbl. sb.* refuting, contradicting, 220/35.

Inquerry, *sb.* inquiry, 54/24.

Insensible, *adj.* not to be perceived by the senses, 190/34.

Instiwes, *sb. pl.* institutes, i.e. elements of instruction, elementary treatises, 13/17.

Interesse, *sb.* interest, 74/28.

Joied, 100/24, *p.p.* of **Joie**, *w.v.* make joyful.

Jorneiyng, *vbl. sb.* 149/27.

Journeie, **Journeye**, *w.v.* 96/30; 97/24.

Journeier, *sb.* 5/22.

Jowes, **Jowis**, *sb. pl.* jaws, 170/9; 170/13, &c.

It, *pers. pron.* *n.* 3 *sg. nom.* and *acc.*, 1/1, &c.; 9/19, &c.

Justificable, *adj.* 107/34.

K.

Kan(ne). See under **Kunne**.

Kelip, 141/13, 3 *sg. pr.* of **Kele**, *w.v.* cool.

Kepe, *w.v.* keep, heed, desire, care for, 4/13; 3 *pl. pr.* *kepen*, 127/34.

Knowal, *adj.* pertaining to knowledge, 54/30, &c.

Knowe, *s.v.* 3/12, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* knowist, 176/16; 3 *sg. pr.* knowip,

- 9/32, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* knowen, 50/29, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* knowe(n), 24/22, &c., 24/16, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* knowe, 134/37, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* knowe, 3/12, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* knewe, 39/36, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* knewe, 40/5; 1 *sg. pret. subj.* knewe, 134/30; *pr. p.* knowyng, 47/10, &c.; *p. p.* knowen, 2/17, &c.; knowe, 2/21, &c.
- Knowleche**, *w. v.* acknowledge, 118/20, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* knowleche, 73/34; 3 *pl. pr.* knowlechen, 38/20, &c.
- Knowlechyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 34/36, &c.; *pl.* knowlechyngis, 119/11, &c.
- Knowyngal**, *adj.* pertaining to knowledge, 3/19, &c.
- [Knytte, w. v.]**; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* knytte, 5/19; *p. p.* knytt, 2/16, &c.
- Koupe(n)**. See under Kunne.
- Kunne**, *pret. pres. v.* know, get to know, be able, 60/7, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* kanne, 60/3, &c.; canne, 107/6, &c.; kunne (in the phrase 'y kunne pee pank') 191/2; 3 *sg. pr.* kanne, 66/12, &c.; kan, 52/20, &c.; canne, 107/8; 1 *pl. pr.* kunne, 17/18, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* kunnen, 58/5, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* coupen, 10/23, &c.; koupe(n), 7/11, &c.; 2 *sg. pret. subj.* koupist, 146/8; 3 *sg. pret. subj.* koupe, 143/10; *p. p.* kunnen, 48/21, &c.; kunnyd, 48/22, &c.
- Kunnyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, learning, 48/15, &c.; *pl.* kunnyngis, 201/37, &c.
- Kunnyng**, *adj.* learned, 7/20, &c.; *sup.* kunnyngist, 57/32, &c.
- Kunnyngal**, *adj.* pertaining to knowledge, 5/2, &c.
- Kynd(e)**, *sb.* (1) nature, 89/8, &c.; 169/14. (2) kind, species, 114/18, &c.; 114/20, &c.
- Kynd(e)ful**, *adj.* natural, 125/11; 125/11, &c.
- Kyndeli**, (1) *adj.* natural, 95/32, &c. (2) *adv.* naturally, 51/27, &c.
- L**.
- Lad, Ladde**. See under Lede.
- Large**, *adj.* big, liberal, generous, 1/10, &c.; *comp.* larger, 13/11, &c.; *sup.* largest, 193/29, &c.
- Large**, *w. v.* enlarge, 204/13; *p. p.* largid, 56/30, &c.
- Largeli**, *adv.* widely, 20/19, &c.; *comp.* largelier, 1/5.
- Large(ne)sse**, *sb.* generosity, 185/33, &c.; 80/9, &c.; *pl.* largessis, 223/35.
- Largite**, *sb.* generosity, 190/9, &c.
- Lasse**, *w. v.* lessen, 112/37, &c.; *p. p.* lassid, 99/20.
- Lasse**, (1) *adj. comp.* See under Litol. (2) *adv. comp.* less, 17/29, &c.
- Late**, *adv.* not long since, recently, 51/39, &c.
- Lateral**, *adj.* arising as a side-issue, 139/10.
- Laterali**, *adv.* as a side-issue, 138/38.
- Lauze**, *w. v.* (*orig. s.*) laugh, 120/21, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* lauze, 120/20, &c.
- Lauzyng**, *vbl. sb. of above*, 120/36, &c.; *pl.* lauzyngis, 119/2.
- Lede**, *w. v.* 83/26, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* ledip, 83/24, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* leden, 77/26, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* ladde, 104/25; *pr. p.* ledyng, 78/26, &c.; *p. p.* lad, 12/12, &c.
- Leefir**, *adv.* rather, preferably, 30/5.
- Le(e)ful**, *adj.* lawful, 135/17, &c.; 135/14, &c.
- Leene**, *w. v.* lend, 145/18; *pr. p.* leenyng, 145/17.
- Leener**, *sb.* lender, 145/17, &c.; *pl.* leeners, 146/15.
- Leerid**, *adj.* learned, 75/18.
- Le(e)rne**, *w. v.* 5/11, &c.; 13/12, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* lerneþ, 15/22, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* leernen, 13/23, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* lerne, 201/32, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* leerne, 19/8, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* lernede, 65/28; leernyd, 9/3, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* leernyden, 10/23, &c.; *p. p.* le(e)rnyd, 4/32, &c.; 11/17, &c.
- Le(e)se**, *w. v.* (*orig. s.*) lose, 132/33, &c.; 60/23, &c.; *p. p.* lost, 219/24.
- Leest**, *adj. sup.* See under Litol.
- Le(e)syng**, *vbl. sb.* lying, telling of untruths, 11/2, &c.; 135/22, &c.
- Leie**, *w. v. tr.* lay, 97/14, &c.
- Leiser**, *sb.* 12/26, &c.; *pl.* leisers, 14/32.
- Lengir**, *adv. comp.* more at length, 1/8, &c. See also under Long, *adj.*
- Lepre**, *sb.* leprosy, 139/19.
- Lete**, *s. v.* let, allow, esteem, think, 225/35; 3 *pl. pr.* leten, 10/36;

- 2 *sg. imper.* lete, 5/12, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* lete, 178/18.
- Lett**, *sb.* hindrance, 80/29, &c.; *pl.* lettis, 172/31.
- Lette**, *w.v.* hinder, 36/13, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* lettip, 96/24, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* letten, 96/31, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* lette, 159/8; *pr. p.* lettyng, 97/38; *p.p.* lettid, 15/39, &c.
- Letter**, *sb.* hinderer, 177/9.
- Lettyng**, *vbl. sb.* hindering, 115/13.
- Leue**, *w.v.* leave, 10/33, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* leue, 133/8, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* lefte, 65/29, &c.; *p.p.* left, 65/16, &c.
- Lewde**, *adj.* ignorant, foolish, 58/37, &c.
- Lie**, **Lye**, *w.v. (orig. s.)* tell untruths, 62/20, &c.; 69/3; 3 *sg. pret.* lyed, 62/13; **Liede**, 68/37, &c.
- Liep**. See under **Ligge**.
- Ligge**, *s.v. intr.* lie, 124/20; 3 *sg. pr.* liep, 97/13, &c.; **lijp**, 97/13; *pr. p.* liggyng, 125/23, &c.
- Liggyn**, *vbl. sb.* of above, 145/12.
- Lizte**, *w.v.* enlighten, kindle intellectually, 79/19; *p.p.* liztid, 79/21.
- Liztlier**, *comp. adv.* more clearly, 191/16.
- Lijfi**, *adj.* living, vital, 41/7, &c.
- Lijp**. See under **Ligge**.
- Like**, *w.v.* (still usually *impersonal*), please, 5/7; 3 *sg. pr.* pis likip me, 50/9, &c.; it likip to me, 152/9, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* (personal use) if pou like, 196/36.
- Litil**, (1) *adj.* 9/19, &c.; *comp.* lasse, 130/20, &c.; *sup.* leest, 171/15, &c. (2) *sb.* 11/6, &c.
- Long**, *adj.* 13/16, &c.; *comp.* lengir, 180/6, &c.; **lenger**, 13/9, &c.
- [**Long**, *w.v.*] belong; 3 *sg. pr.* longip, 2/22, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* longen, 41/32, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* longide, 122/15; *pr. p.* longyng, 10/13, &c.; **longing**, 92/18, &c.
- Lost**. See under **Le(e)se**.
- Lou3**, **Lowe**, **Low3**, *adj.* low, 64/8, &c.; 90/35, &c.; 91/26, &c.; *comp.* louzer, 50/18, &c.; **lower**, 91/11; **lowzer**, 76/32; *sup.* louzist, 51/27, &c.; **lowist**, 91/9, &c.
- Lowable**, *adj.* permissible, commendable, 12/33.
- Low3li**, *adv.* 138/10.
- Lust**, *sb.* pleasure, desire, 7/26, &c.
- Lusti**, *adj.* eager, 5/10, &c.
- M.**
- Mai**, **Maist**. See under **Mowe**.
- Maistrie**, **Maystrie**, *sb.* victory, mastery, 178/14, &c.; 66/13.
- Make**, *w.v.* 6/32, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* make, 13/32, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* makist, 143/39; 3 *sg. pr.* makip, 2/4, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* maken, 27/13, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* make, 176/4; 1 *pl. pr. subj.* make, 74/38, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* make, 168/28, &c.; 2 *sg. pret.* madist, 199/5; 3 *sg. pret.* made, 20/2, &c.; 2 *pl. pret.* made, 89/1; *pr. p.* makyng, 87/9, &c.; *p.p.* maad, 5/4, &c.; **made**, 37/25, &c.
- Male**, *sb.* bag, wallet, 113/36.
- Malencolie**, *sb.* 113/1, &c.
- Malencolik**, *adj.* 113/5, &c.
- Manli**, *adv.* as a man, 178/17.
- Marchaundisyng**, *vbl. sb.* 57/1, &c.; *pl.* marchaundisyngis, 82/19, &c.
- Marchaunt**, *sb.* merchant, 56/37; *pl.* marchauntis, 57/39, &c.; **marchaundis**, 58/18, &c.
- Mawle**, *sb.* male, 20/3.
- May**, **Mayst**. See under **Mowe**.
- Maystrie**. See **Maistrie**.
- Me**, *pers. pron.* 1 *sg. acc. and dat.* 18/27, &c.; 8/12, &c.
- Mediatli**, *adv.* by means, 163/31.
- Medlid**, 147/37, &c., *p.p.* of **Medle**, *w.v.* mingle.
- Medlyng**, *vbl. sb.* of above, 146/28, &c.
- Me(e)de**, *sb.* reward, 3/9, &c.; 80/13.
- Meenal**, *adj.* instrumental, as a means to, 187/30, &c.
- Meeuyd**, 182/37, *p.p.* of **Meeue**, *w.v.* move.
- Meir**, **Meyre**, *sb.* mayor, 105/32, &c.; 54/22, &c.
- Membracioun**, *sb.* disposition of members, 16/22.
- Mengid**, 194/25, *p.p.* of **Menge**, *w.v.* mingle.
- Meri**, **Myri**, *adj.* 99/2, &c.; 176/5; *comp.* merier, 120/23, &c.
- Methafisical**, *adj.* 50/2.
- Methafiscien**, *sb.* 57/3.
- Methafisik**, *sb.* 55/13, &c.
- Meyne**, *sb.* company, 23/5, 105/37.
- Mich**. See **Mych**.
- Mo**, *pron. and adj.* more in number, 36/19, &c.; 41/1, &c.
- Modir**, *sb.* mother, 52/35, &c.
- Moost(e)**, *sup.* of **Mych**, *q.v.*
- More**, *comp.* of **Mych**, *q.v.*
- Morownyng**, *sb.* morning, 54/20.

Mowe, May, *pret. pres. v.* be able, may, 56/5, &c.; 138/36, 139/14; 2 *sg. pr. maist*, 57/27, &c.; *maiste*, 112/34, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. may*, 2/17, &c.; 1 *pl. pr. mowe*, 17/24, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. mowe*, 2/21, &c.; *mow*, 5/27, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj. may*, 129/11, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. may*, 130/20, &c.; 1 *sg. pret. myzte*, 134/32, &c.; 2 *sg. pret. myztist*, 60/13, &c.; 3 *pl. pret. myzte*, 17/29, &c.; *myzten*, 22/20, &c.; 3 *sg. pret. subj. myzte*, 14/9, &c.; 3 *pl. pret. subj. myzten*, 105/39; *p.p. mowe*, 15/16.

Murpere, *w.v. murder*, 196/6.

[**Muste**, *pret. pr. v.*]; 2 *sg. pr. muste*, 62/4, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. muste*, 4/15, &c.; 1 *pl. pr. muste*, 51/11, &c.; 2 *pl. pr. muste*, 131/26, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. muste(n)*, 30/15, &c.; 24/5, &c.

My(n), Mi, *pers. pron. 1 sg. gen.* 7/29, &c.; 27/26, &c.; 27/33, &c.; *pl. myn(e)*, 36/28, &c.; 132/38.

Mych, Mich, (1) *adj. great*, 31/3, &c.; 99/35; *comp. more*, 130/19, &c. (2) *adv. much*, 23/1, &c.; *comp. more*, 15/23, &c.; *sup. moost(e)*, 51/18; 3/22, &c.

Myddis, *sb. midst*, 51/31.

Mydreef, *sb. diaphragm*, 41/10.

Myzte(n). See under **Mowe**.

Myri. See **Meri**.

Mysberyng, *pr.p. (as adj.) and vbl. sb. misbehaving*, 104/7, 106/14.

N.

Namelich, Namely, *adv. especially*, at any rate, 61/8, &c.; 4/1, &c.

Ne, *conj. nor*, 29/32, &c.

Needis cost, *adv. phrase, necessarily*, 43/13.

Needis(li), *adv. necessarily*, 20/8, &c.; 9/38, &c.

Neer, *adv. comp. nearer*, 40/16.

Neize, *w.v. draw near*, 21/16; 3 *sg. pr. neizep*, 121/1; *pr.p. neizyng*, 22/13, &c.

Neisch, *adj. soft*, 25/29.

Neischli, *adv. softly, mildly*, 61/6.

Neipir . . . *neipir, correl. conjs. neither . . . nor*, 95/20, &c.

Neperer, (1) *sb. inferior*, 218/13, &c.; *pl. neperers*, 216/33, &c. (2) *adj. inferior, lower*, 111/37, &c.

Neperte, *sb. inferiority*, 218/7, &c.

Neuerpalattir, *conj. nevertheless*, 192/35, &c.

New(e): of *pæ new(e)*, *adv. phrase*, anew, over again, 24/21, &c.; 38/1, &c.

Next: at the next, *adv. phrase*, in the next place, directly, 32/37, &c.

Nile. See under **Nylle**.

Noisid, 114/29, *p.p. of Noise*, *w.v. report*, spread rumour.

Noiyng, *adj. harmful, vexatious*, 198/7.

Nolle, *sb. nape of the neck, back of the head*, 35/4, &c.

Noon, *Noun, Nooun, adj. and pron.* no, none, no one, non-, 16/12, &c.; 18/4, &c.; 63/19; 27/19, &c.

Nopir, *conj. nor*, 66/29.

Nou3nesse, *sb. sufficiency*, 2/36.

Noysyng, *vbl. sb. report, outcry*, 226/14.

Nycete, *sb. fastidiousness*, 200/17.

Nylle (= OE. *nyllan* = *ne + willan*), *v. not-will, be unwilling*, 101/14, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. nylle*, 129/10, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. nyllip*, 146/32, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. nyllen*, 146/25, &c.; 2 *pl. imper. nile*, 19/20; 1 *sg. pr. subj. nylle*, 129/18; 3 *sg. pr. subj. nylle*, 77/1; 1 *pl. pr. subj. nyllen*, 95/2, &c.; *pr.p. nylling*, 145/3.

Nylling, *vbl. sb. of above*, 46/4, &c.; *pl. nyllingis*, 17/24, &c.

O.

Occasionarili, *adv. occasionally*, 137/39.

Of, *adv. off*, 15/19, &c.

Oft(e), *adv. often*, 34/10, &c.; 32/32, &c.; *comp. oftir*, 32/24, &c.; *sup. oftist*, 33/1, &c.

Ofte, *adj. pl. many*, 37/19.

Oftir, *comp. adj. more frequent*, 225/16.

See also under **Oft(e)**, *adv.*

Oones, **Oonys**, *adv. once*, 19/38; 20/24, &c.

Opener, *adv. comp. more openly*, 191/18, &c.

Opyny(on)al, *adj. pertaining to Opinion*, 64/25, &c.; 70/14, &c.

Or . . . *or, correl. conjs. either . . . or*, 48/12, 15, &c.

Ordinat, *adj. appointed, ordained*, 198/2.

Ortodox, *adj.* 69/23.

Ouerer, (1) *sb.* superior, 218/13, &c.; *pl.* ouerers, 216/33, &c. (2) *adj.* upper, 112/20.
Ouerte, *sb.* superiority, 10/38, &c.
Ouzte(n). See under **Owe**.
Ouzwhere, *adv.* anywhere, 23/19, &c.
Oure, *pers. pron.* 1 *pl. gen.* our, 51/11, &c.; *ouris* (*non-attributive*), ours, 133/29, &c.
Out of, *adv. phrase*, outside of, apart from, beyond, 53/14, &c.
Outdraugt, *sb.* extract, 118/33.
Oupir . . . or, *correl. conj.* either . . . or, 191/34, 35.
Owe, *pret. pr. v.* owe, ought, 171/21, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* (strictly *pret.*) ouzte, 129/6, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* (strictly *pret.*) ouztist, 91/10, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* owip, 32/37, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* (strictly *pret.*) ouzte, 2/10, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* owen, 13/35, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* (strictly *pret.*) ouzten, 222/24, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* (strictly *pret.*) ouzte, 91/29, &c.; 1 *pl. pr. subj.* owen, 69/13.

P.

Pament, *sb.* paved flooring, pavement, floor, 91/13.
Parauentur(e), *adv.* perhaps, 7/1, &c.; 5/16.
Parfjtli, *adv.* perfectly, 17/15, &c.
Parfite, **Parfijt**, *adj.* perfect, 20/29, &c.; 55/39, &c.; *comp.* parfiter, 23/2, &c.; *sup.* parfistist, 13/5, &c.
Parfite, *w. v.* perfect, 76/39; 3 *pl. pr.* parfiten, 46/29, &c.; *pr. p.* parfityng, 75/25.
Parte, **Parti**, *sb.* part, 1/9, &c.; 1/8, &c.; *pl.* parties, 1/1, &c.
Passional, *adj.* pertaining to the Passions, 99/29, &c.
Pees, *sb.* peace, 110/35.
Peese, *sb.* a pea, 115/13.
Pesable, *adj.* peaceable, 53/23, &c.
Pesabili, *adv.* peaceably, 52/15.
Peyren, 97/1, 3 *pl. pr.* of **Peyre**, *w. v.* injure.
Philosofir, **Philosofre**, *pe*, i. e. **Aristotle**, 21/2, 22/30, 55/27, 56/4, 13, 15, 65/3, 67/26, 67/31, 155/36, 157/22, 25, 158/1, 177/18, 221/12.
Place: come a place, appear, come into notice, 61/23.
Placeli, *adv.* locally, 162/6, 166/15.
Plese, *w. v.* (*pers.* and *impers.*) 52/36,

&c.; 3 *sg. pr. (impers.)* it plesip, 112/23, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj. (impers.)* if it plesie, 50/10, &c.; 3 *sg. pret. (impers.)* it plesid, 101/22; *p. p.* plesid, 52/35, &c.
Potel, *sb.* as *adj.* pottle (= two quarts, or half a gallon), 2/35.
Prece, *sb.* press, 29/36.
Preier, *sb.* prayer, 7/37, &c.
Prentying, *vbl. sb.* printing, 25/30, &c.
Propreable, *adj.* restricted, peculiar to, 205/24.
Publischyng, *vbl. sb.* issuing copies of a book to the public, 5/36.
Purueie, *w. v.* provide, 68/5; 3 *sg. pr.* purueiep, 21/11; *p. p.* purueied, 26/27.

Q.

Quyck, *adj.* alive, lively, 99/6, &c.
Quykene, *w. v.* make alive, 16/30, &c.; *p. p.* quykenyd, 20/16.
Quykliet, *comp. adv.* more quickly, 113/17.

R.

Rad(de). See under **Re(e)de**.
Rapir, *adv. comp.* sooner, 16/24, &c.; *sup.* rapist, soonest, 32/11, &c.
Rawli, *adv.* imperfectly, unsatisfactorily, 56/3.
Re(e)de, *w. v.* (*orig. s.*) read, 5/16, &c.; 12/31, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* redist, 33/34; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* re(e)de, 5/18; 5/9, &c.; *pr. p.* redyng, 100/1, &c.; *p. p.* radde, 27/14, &c.; rad, 177/2, &c.; redde, 7/8; red, 15/15.
Reio(i)oe, *w. v.* enjoy by possessing, 43/34; 79/3.
Remanent, *sb.* 198/9.
[Remembre, *w. v.* usually *reflexive*] remember, remind oneself, 199/1, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* remembrip him, 145/22; *p. p.* remembrid, 134/34, &c.; 184/8.
Renne, *s. v.* run, 44/8, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* rennep, 206/28, &c.; rennypp, 214/22; 3 *pl. pr.* rennen, 208/14, &c.; *pr. p.* rennyng, 35/7, &c.; *p. p.* runne, 191/15, &c.
Rennyngli with, *prep. phrase*, concurrently with, 159/27.
Replicacioun, *sb.* answer, rejoinder, 226/14.

Repugnep, 25/36, 3 *sg. pr.* of Repugne, *w.v. impers.* be contrary to.
 Rethoricions, *sb. pl.* 105/22.
 Rethorik, *sb.* 103/23.
 Reup, Roup, *sb.* pity, 152/8; 108/36.
 Reward; in reward of (to), *prep.* phrase, in comparison with, 9/20, &c.; 56/2.
 Rewe, *sb.* row, order, 23/34, &c.
 Rewm, *sb.* realm, 53/35, &c.
 Reynes, *sb. pl.* kidneys, 41/11.
 Rigge, *adj.* and *sb.* back, 35/13; 48/4, &c.
 Rigt, *adj.* straight, 40/7.
 [Rise, *s.v.*], 3 *sg. pr.* risip, 154/28, &c.; *pr. p.* risyng, 54/16, &c.
 Romber, *adj. comp.* more distant, remoter, 192/17.
 Roup. See Reup.
 Runne. See under Renne.

S.

Sad, *adj.* (1) dark, 39/25; (2) sober, grave, 34/22, &c.
 [Sauere, *w.v.*] give forth a savour or scent, show traces of, have the characteristics of; 2 *sg. pr.* sauerist, 106/22; 3 *sg. pr.* (it) sauerip, 56/21, 101/23.
 Sauerer, *sb.* one who recognizes a savour or scent, perceiver, 56/21.
 Sau(i)e, *w.v.* save, 115/37; 135/27, &c.; *p.p.* savid, 181/23, &c.
 Sawter, *sb.* psalter, 133/38.
 Scape. See (A)scape.
 Schal, *aux. v.* denoting future tense, obligation, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* schal, 6/6, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* schalt, 33/25, &c.; schalte, 198/32; 3 *sg. pr.* schal, 2/8, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* schule, 18/36, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* schulen, 2/5, &c.; 2 *sg. pret.* schuldist, 109/16, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* schulde, 4/15, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* schulde(n), 8/23, &c.; 8/25, &c.
 Schapen, 12/27, Schapid, 52/33 (twice—weak), *p.p.* of Schape, *s.v.*
 Schappe, *sb.* shape, 12/4.
 Sche, *pers. pron.* 3 *sg. f. nom.* 158/28, &c.; referring to object without life, 132/18, 20.
 Scheete, 126/2, 1 *sg. pr. subj.* of Scheete, *s.v.* shoot.
 S(c)hewe, *w.v.* 17/13, &c.; 6/25; 1 *sg. pr.* schewe, 6/24, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* schewip, 22/31, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* schewen, 25/8, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.*

schewide, 69/20, &c.; *p.p.* schewid, 6/25, &c.
 Schulde(n), Schuldist, Schulen. See under Schal.
 Schyne, *s.v.* 33/20; *pr. p.* schynyng, 221/13.
 Science, *sb.* knowledge, 37/21, &c.
 Sciencial, *adj.* pertaining to knowledge, 55/31, &c.
 Scole, *sb.* school, schooling, teaching, 10/13, &c.
 Se, *s.v.* 7/35, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* se, 17/1, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* seep, 39/30, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* seen, 16/20, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* se, 75/21; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* se, 129/5, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* se, 34/7; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* se, 44/5, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* sawe, 212/22, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* sawe, 29/21; size, 169/20; 3 *pl. pret.* sizē, 71/2; *pr. p.* seyng, 40/8, &c.; *p.p.* seen, 6/33, &c.
 Seche, *w.v.* seek, search, examine, 191/29; 21/7, &c.
 See, *sb.* sea, 66/11.
 Seie, *w.v.* say, 6/26, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* seie, 6/23, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* seiēst, 60/11, &c.; seiēst, 70/4, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* seiēp, 156/2, &c.; seiēp, 3/7, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* seien, 63/3, &c.; 2 *pl. pr.* seien, 27/18, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* seien, 57/36, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* seiē, 106/24, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* seiē, 178/37; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* seiē, 149/33, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* seiē, 54/17, &c.; 2 *pl. pr. subj.* seiē, 135/16, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* seide, 73/34, &c.; 2 *pl. pret.* seide(n), 20/28, &c.; 16/9, &c.; *pr. p.* seiēng, 34/5, &c.; *p.p.* seid(e), 23/10, &c.; 7/15, &c.
 Sende, *w.v.* 41/29; 3 *sg. pr.* sendip, 48/3, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* sende, 178/24, &c.; *p.p.* sent, 2/7, &c.; send, 104/31.
 Sengle, Sengil, *adj.* single, individual (as opposed to larger numbers of persons and things), 145/12, &c.; 166/28.
 Sensible, *adj.* able to be perceived by the senses, 127/5, &c.
 Sensibli, *adv.* in a manner able to be perceived by the senses, 127/3, &c.
 Sentence, *sb.* opinion, 85/23, &c.
 Sette, *w.v.* 5/29, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* settip, 9/19, &c.; 2 *pl. pr.* setten, 54/32, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* sette, 3/20, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* sette, 194/32, &c.; *pr. p.* setting, 102/9; *p.p.* sett, 1/5, &c.; *pl.* sett(e), 193/26; 196/29.

- Seuerall**, *adj.* separate, 205/24.
Seuerali, *adv.* separately, 207/4, &c.
Sewe, *w.v.* follow, sue, 26/14; 141/34.
Sewte, *sb.* suit, 138/11.
Sidehalf, *adj.* aside, of secondary importance, 108/26.
Size(n). See under **Se**.
Sikir, *adj.* certain, 54/15, &c.
Sikirnesse, *sb.* certainty, 5/32.
Silf, *reflex. pron.* (uninflected), self, selves; **my silf**, 221/2, &c. (*dat.*); **pi silf**, 196/15, &c. (*nom.*); 113/19, &c. (*acc.*); 196/11, &c. (*dat.*); **him silf**, 184/11, &c. (*nom.*); 184/25, &c. (*acc.*); **her silf**, **hir silf**, 65/11, 65/32, &c. (*acc.*); **it silf**, 61/26 (*acc.*); **we silf**, 196/20 (*nom.*); **vs silf**, 181/19 (*nom.*); 69/28, &c. (*acc.*); 183/2, &c. (*dat.*); **hem silf**, 61/37 (*nom.*); 5/29 (*acc.*); 5/28 (*dat.*).
Sillyng, *vbl. sb.* selling, 49/19.
Sitte, *s.v.* 21/23, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* sittip, 29/8, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* sitten, 30/31; *pr. p.* sittyng, 30/30, &c.
Sittyng, *pr. p.* as *adj.* beseeeming, fitting, 3/11.
Sipen, *conj.* since, 1/1, &c.
Sipis, *sb. pl.* times, 215/34, &c.
Skile, *sb.* reason, 25/18, &c.; *pl.* skiles, 22/35, &c.
Slake, *w.v.* assuage, abate, 113/10.
Sle, *s.v.* slay, 19/21, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* sleen, 19/20; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* sle, 196/5; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* sle, 178/15; *pr. p.* sleying, 156/10; *p.p.* slayn, 19/26; sleyn, 137/30.
Slide, *s.v.* 164/22; *p.p.* sliden, 16/28, &c.
Sliz, *adj.* sly, 36/19.
Smyte, *s.v.* 128/31, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* smyte, 125/32; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* smyte, 128/32; *p.p.* smyte(n), 68/6; 225/10, &c.
Smype, *sb.* craft of a smith, 46/9.
Solempne, *adj.* famous, 108/7, &c.
Sone, *sb.* son, 20/7, &c.; *pl.* sones, 54/9, &c.
Sonne, *sb.* sun, 91/15.
Sophim, *sb.* sophism, 109/1, &c.
Sore, *adv.* sorely, 2/9, &c.
Soried, 100/25, *p.p.* of **Sorie**, *w.v.* grieve, cause to grieve.
Sotil. See **Sutil**.
Sown, *sb.* sound, 39/37, &c.; *pl.* sownys, 134/3.
[Sowne, w.v.] sound, tend to, be consonant with; 3 *pl. pr.* sownen, 140/23, &c.; *pr. p.* sownyng, 107/11.
Specialte, *sb.* state or quality of being a 'special', in the logical sense, 5/20, &c.; *pl.* specialtees, 11/27, &c.
Spedi, *adj.* profitable, advantageous, 61/39.
Spedili, *adv.* effectually, 103/29.
Speedful, *adj.* efficacious, 105/28.
Speke, *s.v.* 8/25, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* speke, 8/34, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* spekip, 60/6, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* speken, 207/37; **spekun**, 62/6; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* speke, 60/27, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* speke, 107/9; 3 *sg. pret.* spake, 105/5, &c.; 2 *pl. pret.* spake, 73/15; 3 *pl. pret.* spake, 60/39, &c.; *p.p.* spokun, 6/31, &c.; **spoke**, 12/18, &c.
Spice, *sb.* kind, species, 53/24, &c.; *pl.* spicis, 3/24, &c.
Spille, *w.v.* perish, 177/18.
Spiritis, *sb. pl.* fluids or 'pyne bodies' formerly supposed to be present in the blood and chief organs of the body, 29/7, 39/32, &c.
Spo(o)r, *sb.* spur, 105/28; 113/17.
Sprad, 179/1, *p.p.* of **Sprede**, *w.v.* [**Stable, w.v.**] establish; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* stable, 12/20; *p.p.* stablid, 89/17, &c.
Stide, *sb.* place, 135/22, &c.; in stide, instead, 123/38, &c.; stonden into grete stides, are of great service, avail, 59/27.
Stille, *adj.* silent, quiet, 204/34.
Stillyng, *vbl. sb.* silencing, 204/31, &c.
Stonde, *s.v.* stand, 59/6, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* stondip, 77/4, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* stonden, 61/34, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* stonde, 219/28, &c.; *pr. p.* stondyng, 33/17, &c.; *p.p.* stonde, 224/38, &c.
Stondyng, *pr. p.* of above (used in absolute constructions) during, pending, considering that, in view of, &c., 43/19, 103/36, &c.
Straitnes, *sb.* strictness, 146/5.
Stronger, **Strengist**. See under **Strong**.
Strengpe, *w.v.* strengthen, 191/27.
Strengpli, *adv.* strongly, 161/16.
Strong, *adj.* 9/30, &c.; *comp.* strengir, 27/25, &c.; **stronger**, 62/19, &c.; *sup.* strengist, 10/29, &c.

Stronglier, *adv. comp.* more strongly, 89/17.
Stroutyng, *sb.* strife, dispute, 226/14.
Stryuen, 182/2, 1 *pl. pr.* of Stryue, *s.v.*
Su(b)stanciali, *adv.* 19/5, &c.; 138/6.
Sufficientli (1) *adv.* 13/26, &c.; (2) *adj.* 53/5.
Sutil, *Sotil*, *adj.* 51/38, &c.; 41/27.
Swerd, *sb.* sword, 21/24, &c.
Swere, *s.v.* 107/37; 1 *sg. pr.* swere, 135/8; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* swere, 135/6, &c.; *p.p.* sworn, 137/13.
Synew, **Synow**, *sb.* nerve, 28/37, 28/36; *pl.* synewes, 35/6, &c.

T.

Take, *s.v.* 36/37, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* take, 6/15; 2 *sg. pr.* takist, 196/17, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* takip, 9/15, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* taken, 62/17, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* taken, 36/1, &c.; takun, 200/11; 2 *sg. imper.* take, 36/33, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* take, 37/5; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* take, 77/30, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* take, 176/26, &c.; 1 & 3 *sg. pret.* toke, 106/27, &c.; tooke, 24/10, 36/34; took, 9/9, &c.; 2 *sg. pret. subj.* tokist, 153/23; 3 *pl. pret. subj.* took, 227/3; *pr. p.* takyng, 92/14, &c.; *p.p.* take, 2/37, &c.; takun, 2/8, &c.; taken, 54/16, &c.
Teche, *w.v.* 8/10, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* teche, 8/35, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* techip, 8/29, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* techen, 27/22, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* teche, 42/11, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* teche, 9/25, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* tauzte, 62/21; *pr. p.* techyng, 53/13, &c.; *p.p.* tauzt, 2/14, &c.
Telle, *w.v.* 68/34, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* telle, 114/26; 3 *sg. pr.* tellip, 69/30; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* telle, 133/14, &c.; 2 *pl. pr. subj.* telle, 131/31; *pr. p.* tellyng, 66/31; *p.p.* toold, 44/29, &c.; tellid, 83/21.
Tere, *s.v.* 170/10; *pr. p.* teryng, 87/34; *p.p.* toren, 170/11.
Tisen, 181/33, 3 *pl. pr.* of Tise, *w.v.* tease, annoy, irritate.
Title, *sb.* heading of section or subdivision of a book, hence the section

or subdivision itself, 143/17; *pl.* titlis, 143/16.
Togidere, *adv.* together, 25/36, &c.
Twey(ne), **Twyn**, *pron. and num. adj.* two, 217/28, &c.; 25/32, &c.; 208/4, &c.; 209/29, &c.
Twies, *adv.* twice, 162/15, &c.
Tyme: into tyme, *conj.* until, 69/35, &c.
Tyran, *sb.* tyrant, 148/27; *pl.* tyrannys, 137/6.
Tyranrie, **Tiranrie**, *sb.* 137/3; 145/37.

p.

Pank: y kunne pee pank, I give thee thanks, express gratitude, 191/2.
Panke, *w.v.* 210/32; 1 *sg. pr.* panke, 131/25, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* panke, 176/5.
pat (1) *demons. pron.* that, 14/36, &c.; *pl.* (also as *demons. adj.*) po(o), 28/34, &c.; 2/11, &c. (2) *rel. pron.* 9/39. (3) *conj.* that, in order that, 1/1, &c.
pee, *pers. pron.* 2 *sg. acc. and dat.* 19/14, &c.; 19/8, &c.
pei, *pers. pron.* 3 *pl. nom.* (all genders), 8/5, &c.
penke, *w.v.* think, 60/27, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* penkist, 105/8; 3 *sg. pr.* penkip, 15/28, &c.; 2 *pl. imper.* penke, 177/34; *pr. p.* penkyng, 104/7.
pese. See under pis.
pidir, *adv.* thither, 90/32, &c.
pilk, *demons. adj.* 2/1, &c.; *pl.* pilke, 1/12, &c.
pillid, 34/1, *p.p.* of pille, *w.v.* put between the shafts.
pillyngis, *sb. pl.* shafts, 33/37.
Pi(n), **pyn**, *pers. pron.* 2 *sg. gen.* thy, thine, 211/22, &c.; 8/23, &c.; 21/6, &c.; *pl.* pine, 199/36, &c.
[Pinke, impers. v.] seem; 3 *sg. pr.* me pinkip, 38/36, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* me pouzte, 225/14.
pis, *demons. adj. and pron.* 1/2, &c.; 3/16, &c.; *pl.* pese, 10/25, &c.; 3/21, &c.
po(o). See under pat.
pou, *pers. pron.* 2 *sg. nom.* 12/18, &c.
prid(de), *num. adj. & pron.* third, 14/6, &c.; 26/18, &c.; 31/19.

pries, *adv.* thrice, 162/15, &c.
pritti, *num. adj.* thirty, 204/15.
prowe, 126/2, 1 *sg. pr. subj.* of *prowe*, *s.v.*
prowt, *adv.* across, from side to side, 36/1.
py(n). See *pi(n)*.

U, V.

Vauntage, *sb.* advantage, 113/16, &c.
Vilonye, *sb.* reproach, 178/17.
Unaweidoable, *adj.* 79/25.
Unawayfallable, *adj.* 79/25.
Uncurrauntli, *adv.* unreadily, 56/3.
Uncurteisli, *adv.* discourteously, 105/2.
Undeatable, *adj.* indivisible, 203/10.
Undependent, *adj.* independent, 17/8, &c.
Undirname, *Undirnyne*, *s.v.* blame, 103/1, &c.; 102/21, &c.
Undirnymyng, *Undirnymyng*, *vbl.* *sb.* of above, 104/35, &c.; 102/23.
Undirnymers, *sb. pl.* blamers, 105/37.
Undirstonde, *s.v.* 7/5, &c.; 1 *sg. pr.* *vndirstonde*, 215/39, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* *vndirstondist*, 154/16; 3 *pl. pr.* *vndirstonden*, 135/19; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* *vndirstonde*, 5/9, &c.; 3 *pl. pr. subj.* *vndirstonde*, 7/23; 3 *pl. pret.* *vndirstoden*, 60/37, 148/30; *p.p.* *vndirstonde*, 7/35, &c.; *vndirstonden*, 20/19, &c.
Undo(on), 2/19, &c., 79/13, &c.; *p.p.* of *Undo*, *v.*
Undoutabili, *adv.* 70/25, &c.
Undoyng, *vbl. sb.* not doing, 122/4, &c.
Unformali, *adv.* informally, 116/36.
Ungloriying, *vbl. sb.* debasement, 99/29, &c.
Unhonest, *adj.* not honest, 175/14, &c.
[Unknowe, s.v.] not to know, 3 *sg. pr.* *vnknowip*, 122/3, &c.; *p.p.* *vnknowe(n)*, 134/29, &c.; 9/33.
Unknower, *sb.* one not knowing, 122/32.
Unkunnyng, *vbl. sb.* ignorance, 159/12, &c.
Unkunnyngli, *adv.* ignorantly, 10/30.

Unkyndeli, *adj.* unnatural, 172/30, &c.
Unle(e)ful, *adj.* unlawful, 136/38, &c.; 137/3, &c.
Unlettid, *p.p.* as *adj.* unhindered, 98/33.
Unpacience, *sb.* impatience, 118/24.
Unparfite, *adj.* imperfect, 22/38, &c.
Unpower, *sb.* frailty, 158/32, &c.
Unpristis, *sb. pl.* unlearned people, lay people, 177/3.
Unscapable, *adj.* not to be escaped, 95/14.
Unscapabli, *adv.* without possibility of escape, 95/13, &c.
Unstondabilnes, *sb.* want of power to stand, 44/18.
Unto tyme, *conj.* until, 196/9, &c.
Unpank, *sb.* unthankfulness, 108/9.
Unwityng, 133/13, &c. *pr. p.* of *Unwite*, *pret. pr. v.* not to know.
Unwonyd, *p.p.* as *adj.* unaccustomed, 89/7, &c.
Us, *pers. pron.* 1 *pl. acc.* and *dat.* 3/18, &c.; 183/2, &c.
Usure, *sb.* 145/18, &c.
Uttirli, *adv.* 6/18, &c.; *adj.* 122/37.

W.

Waar, *Ware*, *adj.* aware, 100/19; 6/12, &c.
Waite, 123/5, 2 *sg. imper.* of *Waite*, *w.v.* observe, watch.
Waxe, 113/30, 3 *sg. pret.* of *Wexe*, *s.v.* wax, grow.
We, *pers. pron.* 1 *pl. nom.* 1/4, &c.
We(e)ne, *w.v.* think, 67/38; 1 *sg. pr.* *we(e)ne*, 36/24, &c.; 47/39, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* *weenen*, 208/38; 3 *pl. pret.* *weneden*, 10/31; 3 *sg. pret. subj.* *wenede*, 65/38.
Wel, *adv.* 2/21, &c.; *comp.* *bettir*, 226/9, &c.
Weriful, *adj.* weary, 15/9.
Werne, *w.v.* forbid, refuse, warn against, prevent, 16/1; 3 *sg. pr.* *werneþ*, 171/13; 3 *pl. pr.* *wernen*, 146/27.
Wernyng, *vbl. sb.* of above, forbidding, 147/13.
Wey goer, *sb.* wayfarer, 5/22.
What (1) *interrog. pron.* & *adj.* 102/17, &c.; 104/38, &c. (2) *rel. pron.* 103/37, &c.
Wherefore, *conj.* wherefore, therefore, 17/24, &c.

- Whepir**, *pron.* which (of two), 64/29, 131/23.
- Which(e)** (1) *interrog. pron. & adj.* 75/33, &c.; 84/2, &c.; 46/25, &c. (2) *rel. pron.* which, who, 9/9, &c.; 9/22, &c.; *pl.* 7/3, &c.; 7/25, &c.; *gen.* whos, 31/16, &c.; *acc.* and *dat.* whom, 34/21, &c.
- Whidir**, *adv.* whither, 90/30, &c.
- Whistle**: go whistle, a phrase of contempt, consigning the offender to some objectless pursuit, 106/26.
- Wijs, Wise**, *adj.* 20/17, &c.; 54/24, &c.; *sup.* wijsist, 58/3, &c.; *wisist*, 57/37, &c.
- Wijsdom, Wisdom**, *sb.* 54/30, &c.; 55/9, &c.; *pl.* wisdomes, 61/4.
- Wijtable, Witable**, *adj.* worthy of blame, 157/10; 95/34, &c.
- Wijte**, *s.v.* blame, 226/25, &c.
- Wille, Wole** (= OE. *willan*) *v.* 101/13, &c.; 87/4. A. (1) *princ. v. tr.* wish, desire; (2) *princ. v. intr.* be willing. B. *aux. v.* denoting future tense, determination, &c. 1 *sg. pr.* wole, 8/34, &c.; wille, 129/10, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* wolt, 73/14, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* wole, 9/22, &c.; 1 *pl. pr.* willen, 148/1, &c.; 2 *pl. pr.* willen, 131/35; 3 *pl. pr.* wole(n), 5/29, &c.; 105/23; willen, 146/24, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. subj.* wille, 129/18, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* wole, 197/32, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* wolde, 1/12, &c.; 2 *sg. pret.* woldist, 60/13, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* wolde, 6/13, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* wolden, 160/38; 1 *pl. pret. subj.* wolde, 95/3; *pr. p.* willyng, 165/34.
- Note.* Wille, Wole < OE. *willan*, has been contaminated by Wille < OE. *willian*, and the will-forms given under Wille, Wole < OE. *willan*, may often, with equal likelihood, if principal verbs, be assigned to Wille < OE. *willian*.
- [Wille, (= OE. *willian*)] *w.v.* will, desire, long for; 3 *sg. pr.* willip, 146/33, &c.; *p.p.* willid, 188/35, &c.
- Willinesse**, *sb.* willingness, readiness, 200/17.
- Wilne**, *w.v.* wish, desire, 186/5, &c.; 3 *sg. pr.* wilnep, 197/1, &c.; 2 *sg. imper.* wilne, 113/14; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* wilne, 43/23, &c.
- Wilnyng**, *vbl. sb.* of above, desiring, 198/38, &c.
- Wirche**, *w.v.* work, 4/3, &c.; 2 *sg. pr.* wirchist, 196/14; 3 *sg. pr.* wirchip, 17/19, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* wirchen, 42/14, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. subj.* wirche, 196/9; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* wirche, 2/2, &c.; *pr. p.* wirching, 170/29; *p.p.* wrougt, 173/27, &c.
- Wircher**, *sb.* worker, 46/8, &c.; *pl.* wirchers, 4/19.
- Wirchyng**, *vbl. sb.* working, 31/21, &c.; *pl.* wirkyngis, 42/13; wirchyngis, 31/25, &c.
- Witable**. See Wijtable.
- Wite**, *pret. pr. v.* know, 8/36, &c.; 1 *sg. pr. wote*, 27/21, &c.; 2 *sg. pr. wost*, 142/18; 3 *sg. pr. wote*, 15/27, &c.; 3 *pl. pr.* witen, 65/7, &c.; 3 *sg. pr. subj.* wite, 4/14, &c.; 1 *sg. pret.* wiste, 104/6, &c.; 3 *sg. pret.* wiste, 156/18, &c.; 3 *pl. pret.* wisten, 61/37; *pr. p.* wityng, 88/23; *p.p.* wist, 199/10; wiste, 10/25.
- Witti**, *adj.* related to the wits or senses, 41/7, &c.
- Wityngli**, *adv.* knowingly, 119/17, &c.
- Withdrawe**, *s.v.* 145/22.
- Wipout**, *prep.* outside, 120/11, &c.
- Wolde(n), Woldist, Wole(n), Wolt**. See under Wille, Wole.
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- [Wone, *w.v.*] accustom; 3 *sg. pr.* wonep, 161/30; *p.p.* wonyd, 6/1, &c.
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wonyd to be opire writers of her writyngis. } fforwhi y
 proteste first pat in noon of my bookis, englisch or latyn,
 y haue affermyd or holde, or schal afferme or holde, | pere 4^a
 vtirli eny conclusioun, principal or secundari, and pat
 whepir he be sett forþ pere namyd a conclusioun or no, but 5
 pat y haue and schal eche of pilke conclusions sette forþ bi
 wey of profre and of forþ purposyng to be sirt of ech reder
 into þis entent: if þei be founde trewe, pat þei be bi so mych
 þe redier araied and foormyd to be acceptid, holden and
 grauntid of þe reder and of þe heerer for trewe; And, if þei 10
 ben founde vntrewe, pat þe reeder or þe heerer may knowe
 þe bettir of what conclusions he schal be ware, pat he hem
 not holde and graunte, whiche ellis paraurenture he wolde,
 and in deede schulde, in sum tyme haue holde and grauntid.
 Also y proteste pat y take and schal take ech argument or 15
 mocionn maad, or to be maad, bi me in eny of my writyngis,
 englisch or latyn, as for argument or mocionn oonli, and not
 as for a proof vtirli, þouȝ for more cleer foorm and forto þe
 more enclyne men into þe conclusions of þo argumentis, in
 caas pat þo conclusions be founde trewe, and forto make þo 20
 argumentis and þo conclusions þe redier to be take into good
 vse, if þo argumentis be founde to proue, and her conclusions
 be founde trewe, y seie ofte þus, or in eny opir wise lijk:
 'y proue', or 'y schal proue', 'y schewe', or 'y schal'¹
 shewe', 'y haue prouyd', or 'y haue schewid', 'no man 25
 may seie nay'; and so forþ of opire lijk spechis, whiche at
 sum tyme ben wonyd so to be spoke in arguyng bi word and
 bi writyng, whan þe arguer entendip noon opir þan is now
 seid, as may at sum tyme appere bi circumstaunce of his
 processe, or bi sum protestacioun maad bi him; and whiche 30
 also at sum tyme ben wonyd so to be spokun in arguyng bi
 word and bi writyng, whanne þe arguer intendip forto make
 as to his semyng vtirli proof, as may be seen to be so bi
 circumstauncis of his procedyng, or bi sum protestacioun bi
 him maad.

to be read
 individually
 to prove
 the conclusion
 is logically proved
 from the
 premises.

¹ After *schal*, MS. has a second *schal*, crossed through in red.

ije chapitre.

[P]Arauenture summe men wolen seie þat in þis present
book, and in 'þe book of cristen religioun', and in opire
bookis whiche y write for lay men, y write maters passyng
þe capacite and þe power of lay men forto þo maters
5 vndirstonde; wherto y seie þus of certeynte: þat þei passen
not ech lay mannys power which haþ assaied hem eer þis
day to hem leerne and vndirstonde, how euer fewe lay men
haue redde and studied in hem afore þis present day. And
þit y meene not of suche lay men whiche schulden mowe
10 leerne and vndirstonde þo writyngis if þei weren maad in
4^b latyn, but of þo lay men whiche koupe | not studie and
vndirstonde hem if þei were maad in latyn. And þit ferþir
y seie þus: Be it so þat þo writyngis passen ful many lay
mennys power and capacite forto þoruþ ech place of þo
15 writyngis vndirstonde hem, what þerof? Schal it be seid as
folewyng þerof þat no lay men þerfore schulden reede and
lerne in eny opir place of þo writyngis? Goddis forbode
pat it schulde so folewe. fforwhi þe bible in latyn in many
of his parties passip þe capacite and þe power of ful many
20 grete clerkis and of grete and kunnyng doctouris, Schulen þei
þerfore caste aside þe bible, and not rede and studie in eny opir
parti þerof? god forbode þhe. and forto seie ferþir: þouþ þo
grete clerkis in clerist and listist maner vndirstonde not derk
processis of þe bible in latyn, þit þei ben in sum maner sweteli
25 fed and edified bi redyng þerin; and summe whiche han
gretter leiser and lust þerto þan opire han, wrastlen so long
þerwith til þei gete competent vndirstondyng þerof. And in
boþe wisis mowe lay men do in processis whiche ben to hem
hard and derk in my writyngis, summe in oon of þese ij seid
30 maners, and summe in þe opir of þe same ij seid maners, as
þei han þerto grace and deuocioun.

Also if þe book which y haue write in latyn, and which y
calle 'þe book of lay mennys bookis', and þe book which
y write in englisch callid 'þe afore crier', be wel rad and
35 vndirstonde, sipeþ a man schal þere se þat it is ful profitable
and, as it were, neede, þat summe writyngis of doctrine and
summe writyngis of officiyng bi preisyng and bi preier be

Though some of
the matters
treated in the
Folewer and
other books of
Pecock are
beyond the
understanding
of some laymen,
they may be
understood by
others, and all
may derive
benefit from
studying them.

In the same way
clerks derive
benefit from the
Latin Bible,
even though
they may not
understand
some of its
truths.

Theological
books should
not be made too
easy for laymen,
for then they
reverece the
superior learn-
ing of clerks.

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